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## EVALUATION

# Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative Regional Report, South Region

**November 2016**

This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was prepared independently by Keri Culver, Pablo Gutiérrez, Carlos Castañeda, Diana Bernal, Centro Nacional de Consultoría and Management Systems International.

# Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

## REGIONAL REPORT, SOUTH REGION

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# ACRONYMS

ARD	Associates for Rural Development
BACRIM	Criminal bands, Bandas Criminales (in the service of the narcotics trade)
CAR	Regional Autonomous Corporations, Corporaciones Regionales Autónomas
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CELI	Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
CELI Central	CELI program in the Central region
CELI MdM	CELI program in the Montes de María region
CELI Norte/Sur	CELI program in the North and South regions
CERAC	Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos
CNC	National Consulting Center, Centro Nacional de Consultoría
CNC-DoD	Crime and Narcotics Center, U.S. Department of Defense
CSDI	Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DNP	National Planning Department, Departamento Nacional de Planeación
DO	Development objective
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DPS	Department for Social Prosperity, Departamento para la Prosperidad Social
ELN	National Liberation Army, Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EVIDINCE	Research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict ( <a href="http://esoc.princeton.edu">esoc.princeton.edu</a> ), a multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FHH	Female head of household
GLAC	Local savings and loans groups, grupos locales de ahorros y crédito
GOC	Government of Colombia
HH	Household
IAG	Illegal Armed Group
IC	Illicit crops
ICO	Index of Organizational Competencies, Índice de competencias organizacionales
IDI	Integral Performance Index, Índice de desempeño integral
INCODER	Colombian Institute of Rural Development, <a href="http://www.incoder.gov.co">Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural</a>
JAC	Community Action Council, Junta de Acción Comunal
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MADR	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural
MdM	Montes de María
MHH	Male head of household
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc.
PAR	Regional Action Plan, Plan de acción regional
PMP	Performance management plan
PNCRT	National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy, Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial
SENA	National Learning Service, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SGP	General Participation System, Sistema General de Participación
SIJIN	Judicial police, Seccional de Investigación Judicial
SIMCI	Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos
SISBEN	Identification and Classification system for potential social program Beneficiaries, Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de potenciales Beneficiarios para programas sociales
TA	Technical Assistance
UACT	Territorial Consolidation Administrative Unit, Unidad Administrativa para la

UARIV	Consolidación Territorial Victims' Integral Attention and Reparation Unit, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas
UMATA	Municipal Agricultural Extension Units, Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
URT	Land Restitution Unit, Unidad de Restitución de Tierras
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEO	Verification of Organizational Status, Valorización del Estado Organizacional



# ABSTRACT

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

CELI South is responsible for the municipality of Tumaco in the department of Nariño. The midterm evaluation took place in this municipality as well as in the control municipalities of Policarpa (Nariño) and Patía (Cauca).

## **Economic Development**

The economic situation of families in Tumaco is getting worse, with more families living under conditions of extreme poverty. However, beneficiaries in the South region are more likely to perceive their economic situation as good or very good compared to the general population. In addition, the support CELI South provided for productive projects is highly valued by the community. However, restitution of land rights in Tumaco is affected by threats and other security problems.

## **Institutional Development**

The data do not show acts of coercion or vote buying; both phenomena that have been historically linked to the municipality's poorly regarded government institutions. Worryingly, respondents do not believe that ex-combatants should become political figures and stigmatization of former combatants remains high.

Poor accountability of government officials reduces trust in the institutional order. Perceptions of trust declined for all public institutions because of corruption and the lack of infrastructure and transportation improvements. While official data show that public utility coverage is pervasive (with the exception of the sewers and waste disposal), respondents report negative changes in access to quality services.

## **Social Development**

Confidence levels among community members fell, weakening the ability for communities to work together. One of the causes of distrust is the influence of drug trafficking on young people, which has fragmented families and unwoven the social fabric.

CELI succeeded in increasing the participation of families in the Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs), thereby strengthening their capacity for decision-making. However, women have not succeeded in securing leadership positions in spite of their importance within the community.

Tumaqueños consider sports, especially soccer, to be an integral part of their collective identity. The municipality maintains soccer training schools that young people actively participate in, even though resources are scarce. Soccer players serve as role models for young people, as both a source of pride, and an example of achievement.

## **Security**

Tumaco is the municipality with the largest area of coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, and coca farmers are less likely to substitute coca for licit crops than in other regions. Despite these challenges, security improved slightly compared to what was reported at baseline, but is not attributable to CELI interventions. Perceptions of both the quality of state and non-state security services have declined in addition to worsening perceptions of the legitimacy of the formal justice system.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics International, has worked through the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, ARD Tetra Tech, implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (Mdm) project. This volume reports on achievements and impacts to date in CELI Norte/Sur's South region.

## Evaluation purpose

In 2011 USAID/Colombia's evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., designed an impact evaluation of the CSDI interventions. The design included two more measurements: midline and final. EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), carried out the midline. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline design, additional qualitative fieldwork, in-depth interviews with the CELI teams, and program satisfaction questions. Key audiences for the evaluation are the USAID/Colombia Mission Program and Technical Offices, who will use the results to plan follow-on programming.

Three guiding principles were set for uses of the evaluation, as follows:

1. *Measure the change in impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with target populations.*
2. *Inform decision-making processes with timely data, to identify components needing strengthening to achieve program goals.*
3. *Identify best practices and lessons learned to date, to inform future USAID programming.*

## Project background

Based on the GOC's National Consolidation Plan and formalized in the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT in its Spanish acronym), the concept of "consolidation" refers to the expansion in the conflict zones of Colombia of the legitimate presence of the state. The policy, designed for implementation once minimal conditions for public safety were established, would create the necessary institutional mechanisms to provide basic human rights protections to the populations in those zones historically affected by conflict and illicit crops. The PNCRT was oriented to establishing the presence of state institutions capable of efficiently bringing necessary public goods needed for development.

The U.S. Embassy developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and

reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and, at the reduction of illicit crops and the presence of illegal armed groups in the conflict zones. The basic premise of the CELIs, one component of CSDI, is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of the state, and their activities are oriented to bolstering state institutions, generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life.

Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: *Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated*, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation–strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS FOR 2014-2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

Obviously, the CELIs are no substitute for the state. They were called upon to provide support to the PNCRT. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice services in the consolidation zones is a sine qua non condition for enabling the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation.

### Evaluation questions, design, methods and limitations

The midterm evaluation took place in 32 CELI municipalities as well as in 16 municipalities from three regions (Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle and Putumayo) in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities. The midline, structured around the baseline completed by DevTech, examined changes since the baseline was completed across the institutional, social and economic indicators related to the interventions.

**Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions**

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target population in the areas of interventions?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting
3. Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities? <sup>1</sup>	IR 3.2
4. What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)	Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?	IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities?	Cross-cutting

<sup>1</sup> This is answered in Annex 6 of the main report with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
7. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
8. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

EVAL, working with its strategic partner the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), used a mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of the CELI interventions. The design closely followed the baseline, with additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, opinions and experiences of the population. Full design considerations are found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Limitations to the study are various and important to consider fully. There are limitations based on the design, such as the difficult and imperfect process of matching municipalities in a country which has an important history of isolation and variation among regions. The original design has also been deeply affected by the loss of the whole-of-government intervention, in which impact goals and indicators were set at a very high level, but the implementation has been far more limited than promised. Exogenous factors (such as the drop in world oil prices) and variations in implementation also condition the interpretation of the data. Please see the Limitations section of this volume as well as the methodology annex (Annex 3) to the main report for full details.

## Findings and conclusions

### How to read the findings and conclusions


This summary, like the report that follows, shares two key types of data: *trends* and *impacts*. Trends show the change over time in CELI municipalities, while impacts compare the change to control municipalities.

Details of trends and impacts are presented in the report at the *cluster* level: individual municipalities or small groups that are geographically and socioeconomically similar. The details often tell a very different story than at the regional level, so consult those for more local-level information on conditions, what works, and what has not.

The implementer of CELI North/South provided information of its achievements reached through June 30, 2016 compared with the goals established in its Project Management Plan (PMP), which includes such indicators as the number of organizations and governmental offices that have received support from the project, the level of product sales resulting from the project, and funds that have been leveraged. CELI North/South met or exceeded the majority of its indicators across three pillars, as of June 30, 2016: economic, social and institutional. Their compliance was highest among social and economic indicators. The latter are also the most numerous of the indicators for which the CELI was responsible. Additional indicators may be

met before program close. The following figure presents a summary of their indicator achievement (a more complete explanation of how these figures were constructed can be found in Annex 3).

**Figure 1.2. CELI North-South PMP indicator compliance**



### Economic Development

According to the information received, the economic situation of families in the CELI municipalities is getting worse. The perception is that more are living under conditions of extreme poverty while the perception of an increase in profitability in productive activity has declined. A lack of food supplies is also evident, all of which are the basis for the strengthening, development, growth and consolidation of economic activities. However, according to the data, this situation is balanced with a perception of a drop in unemployment, even though work opportunities are scarce and most of the population is dedicated to informal economic activities. It is worth noting that the largest employer in the municipality<sup>2</sup> is the mayor’s office, for which reason an intervention in programs that strengthen the economic activities such as Colombia Responde<sup>3</sup> are highly valued by the population.

It is notable that in comparison with the baseline, direct beneficiaries in the South region are close to 11.5pp more likely to affirm that the economic situation in which they live is good or very good, in comparison with the general population. However, close to 11pp more than those on the baseline of those surveyed say they live in extreme poverty.

This is why the technical support for productive projects in which families look to adopt better labor technology to increase productivity has positive results; among other reasons, because they promote associative movements which are directly linked with the goals set forth both in CELI South as in the PNCRT.

<sup>2</sup> A municipality is a political division that includes both rural areas and towns thus making it very similar to a county in the US.


<sup>3</sup> Colombia Responde is the name given by the Colombian and United States governments as referred to the Consolidation Strategy with USAID support in the field. A person inhabiting a region being benefited from CELI, will recognize it as the Colombia Responde program.

**Support for productive projects.** The CELI is recognized in this study for its ability to provide technical assistance services and to strengthen associations and make them sustainable. Economic rationality is one of the great incentives in the region to promote associative processes, insofar as families would rather associate to improve the marketing of their products and to solve logistic problems, as well as to gain access to training, as may be observed in the following figure. In line with this, they seek financing for their projects and access to credits according to the degree of bank use currently existing. It is worth mentioning the analysis can reveal positive effects when the technical assistance is provided via an intervention that is either multi-offer or integrated, meaning a combination of payment in kind, money, training, assistance, credit. As a result, the support provided by Colombia Responde for productive projects to Community Councils and base organizations is positively valued by the community.

*The productive component has been worked in cacao and coconut projects. Today, it is public knowledge that Tumaco is exporting, and that has been really important. It has been permanently accompanying the community councils and base organizations. [That's why] Tumaco is nowadays reviving its fields, and people are planting in big scales. (Government Secretary, Tumaco, Nariño)*

Given that the development of processes of association is a critical activity for all CELI components, we recommend that cooperation rather than competition be prioritized among grassroots organizations, as well as technical assistance for submitting individual associative projects. The fact is that submitting projects with the sole goal of obtaining resources for the associations has brought with it an uncontrolled creation of organizations which are not always sustainable in time.

**Figure 1.3. Trends in reasons to associate**



**Markets and commerce.** The busiest place for the purchase of inputs for productive projects as well as for the sale of the farmers' crops is the municipal head. Here, farmers sell their products to wholesalers or intermediaries, who have a greater logistical and marketing capacity, yet who pay low prices to the farmers. If one adds to this the high cost for inputs, the quality of the soil, the lack of water and the poor infrastructure (which affects the value added of products and logistics), the farmer earns little. However, the sale of these same products via other distribution channels such as farmers'

*The focal groups reported other problems in marketing due to the competition from foreign products, which arrive processed and at a lesser cost, bringing as a consequence a decrease in competitiveness against local prices. The coconut case is illustrative of this situation.*

markets and in nearby population centers and sales to the general public, achieved an improvement in their performance.

One of the initiatives to enhance producers' income is to generate certified products such as "Green production" and "Environmentally Responsible" and by strengthening the infrastructure via collection centers and community-based transports for the products.

**Land.** Processes for land titling are critical and have an impact on public safety. Particularly when it comes to restitution of land rights in the municipality of Tumaco, and beyond the problematic of individual restitutions, the collective factor and the restitution of small expanses of territory vs the fragmentation of deeds imply serious challenges for the Land Restitution Policy insofar as it is necessary to make the operations models more flexible consistent with the context of each region.

To guarantee the proper use of land, the policy must be consistent with factors inherent in land tenure and take into account the "vocation" of the land, the legalization of land plots, and the allocation of titles and restitution processes, all of which demand a knowledge of the realities of the land owners and holders. A factor that has to be considered is the will to pay taxes, which is challenged by the impossibility to do so given the lack of resources to effectively pay them, not always feasible given the low profitability of their crops.

*The territory is, in a very high degree, Afro community councils or protected indigenous territory with property titles issued by INCODER, and that which is neither Afro community councils nor protected territory, we're in a protected forestry reserve under Law Second. So, in Tumaco, in the peasants' route, we've been unable to advance at all, because an individual claim for a piece of land within a collective territory, the collective or ancestral territory or black's and indigenous people's rights prevail.*

*Anyhow, we wouldn't be able to enter Tumaco due to security reasons, because there is no security nor warranties we will get out... so they wouldn't let us anyhow (Lands Restitution Unit, Pasto, Nariño)*

It is noteworthy that in this region, the implementation of the Policy Restitution is affected by threats and other security problems. This situation has led, in some cases, for opting to lose the land rather than losing their lives because they tried to gain legal title to their property. On the other hand, there are incentives for the settlers wanting to legally appropriate lands, which can lead to conflicts with the communities and with indigenous protected territories.

Finally, given the scarcity of water, there need to be advances in the implementation of drainages and irrigation districts in order to improve soil productivity.

**The evaluation team recommends:** (for full details, please see the report)

**Make simultaneous improvements in production and trade.** Quality, stable production gives better results when directed at adequate markets. This must be one of the most important concerns for post-conflict policies. International cooperation should lead small focused pilots that treat these interconnected structural failings holistically.

**Support an array of markets, actors and efforts.** Support projects in local and regional export markets. Intermediaries fulfill an economic function that would be difficult to replace, but of course cannot be monopsonistic.

**Plan for interim food security.** Provide traditional farm or other activities to combine short- to long-term returns, increase cash flow and ensure project sustainability.



**Articulate with national initiatives** (irrigation districts, drainages, product collection centers, cold chains, financing and banking, technological parks and technological extension, amongst others). Analyze the Policy for the Productive Development project furthered by the DNP.

**Use the community models for improvement of tertiary roads.** Reinforce the successful work done with the JACs to build community based models for the Colombian tertiary roads system, consistent with the international experiences yet taking into account the national context.

**The land restitution processes require a greater effectiveness** to guarantee an informed process with respect to land restitution and legalization. Building new relationships with the entities in charge of these processes at the national level must be a priority, in particular with those who are responsible today for the roles of the now extinct INCODER (Rural Development Agency and National Lands Agency) and with the Lands Restitution Unit.

**Continue the activities to expand financial services.** Revolving funds are useful for supplying credit needs. In line with this, the evaluation recommends its strengthening with clear management, follow up, experiences exchange, and incentives and accountability guidelines.

## **Institutional Development**

**Participation.** The innovative political projects have helped to foster participation and strengthen democracy, which is evident in the increase in the intention to vote and in exercising this right. Citizens express that their reasons to vote are associated with processes of legitimacy, with the promotion of new leaders, young men and women, who really represent the dynamics of their communities and who mobilize innovative proposals. However, there is a high awareness amongst these same citizens of the difficulties that exist when it comes to casting their votes, so that a call to elections authorities needs to be made to ensure that this democratic process is backed with security.

Expressions such as “every vote counts”, or “voting is a responsibility” and the quality of proposals made by candidates are gaining ground and encourage the exercise of democracy. It is notable that the data do not show acts of coercion or vote buying, both phenomena historically linked to the municipality’s institutionality.

It is not well received that an ex-combatant may turn into a potential political figure, which implies the need to define strategies to reduce the stigma associated with combatants, which impact their legitimacy as potential community leaders. In terms of the peace process and a post-conflict environment, it is not clear that the participants in the guerilla have the credibility for their participation in politics within this region.

**Transparency and accountability.** Accountability processes are still not consolidated, which impacts trust in the institutional order. In spite of efforts to implement these practices from years past, and the fact that Colombia Responde has supported them, no positive results have been achieved. It is not possible to state that the community participates actively in, for example, planning processes, which increases the gap in community participation processes in social

control and monitoring, even if there is a perceived improvement in the performance of these [participation] mechanisms.

The low trust in public institutions that is generalized throughout the country is repeated or also apparent in this region. According to the responses from those interviewed, the perception of trust declined for all institutions, some with considerable differences, such as for the JAC and the mayor’s office.

The factors that impact institutionality the most are the lack of offers in areas such as health, education and child care, and the deficiency in the provisioning of public services, which only get worse given the low (if not null) responsiveness of the utilities companies when there are claims brought forth by the community.

*The focal groups identified that the accountability processes by the local or national authorities to the communities is starting to strengthen only up to now. However, the population is ever more aware about the need to follow up on projects and public resources.*

*In a Community Council they tell about all the hardships that the Municipal Development Plan’s implementation has had, the problems with previous consultation to the communities, the difficulty in gaining access to information: “... then you discover it’s a copycat from another municipality and finally the sanction imposed by the Comptroller’s office, which delays all processes”.*

Corruption, the lack of decisive actions in infrastructure and transport and the mistrust felt towards the public institutions all play a key role in this evaluation, and are factors impacting institutionality. The following figure summarizes the perceptions of those enquired about the problems of governance with the municipalities

**Figure 1.4. Perception trends on problems with the governance of the municipality**

CELI		Control
↑	Mistrust towards public entities	↑
→	The municipal administration pays no attention to the community’s requests	↑
↑	The administration does not have the capability to solve the community’s requests	↓
↓	Deficiency in the homes’ utilities	↓
↑	Lack of roads	↓
↑	Corruption	↑
↓	Lack of institutional offerings: hospitals, schools, court houses, gardens	↓
↑	The municipal administration does not report on what it’s doing	↓
↓	The municipal authorities invite the communities to express their opinion on issues of communal interest	↓
↓	The municipal authorities have in mind the citizens’ opinion when making their decisions	→

People still perceive there is a low performance in the mayor’s office, the governor’s office and the National Government’s management. This circumstance has an impact on the leadership processes required for the implementation of interventions by the state and the recovery of territories currently under armed groups. It also has a negative impact on the peace process achievements. The non-compliance of commitments made is still persistent.

The majority of the population in Tumaco is Afro-Colombian. They have 16 community councils and number close to 54,000 inhabitants. Tumaqueños lack the necessary resources and ability to generate development through joint efforts. The institutional reinforcement of these local bodies would make it possible to coordinate with regional and national policies more efficiently and gain access to conditions for development and improvement in their community's quality of life.

*Sustained support for education is fundamental to the productive development of Tumaco. It is a way of generating new employment and income opportunities for the population. Along with the presence of the University of Nariño, the National University and UNAD are also becoming important players that should pursue technical education. Support for higher education is essential to developing productive sectors such as agriculture, fishing or tourism.*

**Provision of services.** Although it is true that the coverage of public utilities reported in the official data is high (with the exception of the sewer system, handling of garbage, and final waste disposal), those surveyed report negative changes in both access to services and the quality provided. Improving the capability of the local institutional structure should continue to be a priority as well as guaranteeing budgetary efficiency and suitable municipal planning.

**Figure 1.5. Trends in access to and the quality of public utilities**

	Access at mid-line	Change in access	Change in quality	Has it improved in the last two years?
Health clinics			2%	No
Children under 5 years of age with access to quality infant care.	49%	4%	3%	Yes
Children between 5-11 years of age with access to quality education.	97%	0%	-16%	No
Young people between 12-18 years of age with quality education.	81%	-5%	-10%	No
Electricity	89%	-2%	-5%	Yes
Propane Gas	72%	7%	-2%	Yes
Water	11%	4%	-3%	Yes
Sewage	4%	3%	-23%	No
Garbage collection	24%	0%	4%	No
Cell phone service	83%	-5%	-11%	No

**The evaluation recommends:** (see report for details)

**Maintain credibility in the processes and mechanisms of political participation and empower the communities and their new leaders.** CELI and other USAID programs should be instruments for applying the norms that guarantee the exercise of political rights. This includes the principle of gender equality with respect to participating in political activities as well as representation in and access to electoral debates to generate and consolidate proposals that can mobilize the electorate behind a consolidation of democracy.

Two tasks must continue to be developed. Continue strengthening political participation through social organizations and consolidation of expertise regarding the channels for political participation and influence on public administration as the observers from the ADAM project have done.

**Link CELI to national-level strategies to improve transparency and the processes for accountability.** Be a promoter of the National Strategy for the Comprehensive Public Anti-Corruption Policy and the right to have access to public information. CELI (or other future USAID programs) requires action that is organized, decisive, sustainable, and coordinated with the government’s inter-institutional activities.

CELI’s challenge is to continue strengthening local governments in order to improve the provision of services by the municipalities and departments. Decentralization is a national imperative, but, on the municipal level, the capability is low and finances are limited. Given that, it becomes necessary to reinforce citizen participation and produce information that is relevant from the point of view of demand and, thus, manage the supply and emphasize pilot projects that significantly involve civil society and, at the same time, support local governments with permanent technical assistance. Tools such as “score charts” and other measures to get citizens to rate the changes in the provision of services are very useful for improving it.

## Social Development

**Social capital: Trust.** According to the data gathered, confidence levels among community members tend to fall, which impairs levels of mutual assistance and the ability to work together. This phenomenon affects the strengthening of associative processes as well as the success of CELI interventions. This is evident, despite the fact that for citizens, solidarity is important between neighbors and relatives. Commitments to help neighbors confront possible difficulties fell from 27% to 18%. Likewise, the tradition of working in groups to complete community projects decreased. The population of Tumaco, however, values their living conditions, compared to what they believe is life in cities.

*The corruption in the municipal government discourages its use and relevance and this makes it more difficult to operate since the budget depends on the municipal government which uses it to garner political support. In other cases, the chairmen of the boards use [the municipality’s] scarce resources for their own benefit.*

One of the causes of distrust in this municipality is the influence of drug trafficking on young people. In many cases the value of easy money prevails, which has fragmented families and unwoven the social fabric.

**Social capital: Participation in associations.** Participation in the JACs drives the association process in the municipality, reinforcing the positive view people have of JAC-led community meetings and the creation of productive associations. CELI has succeeded in increasing the participation of families and strengthening their capacity for decision-making. There is a general tendency to improve decision-making participation among households belonging to associations even when the leaders themselves continue to make discretionary and subjective decisions.

Women have not succeeded in securing leadership positions in spite of their importance within their communities. Although the data show that women are critical and influential stakeholders for resolving conflicts and building peace, their involvement in leadership fell.

Tumaqueños also consider sports (especially soccer) to be an integral part of their collective identity. The municipality does have soccer training schools that the young people actively participate in even though resources are scarce and securing opportunities to pursue a career in the sport is difficult. This is not helped by the absence of prospects which affects the credibility and legitimacy of sports as a tool for overcoming young people's problems. It is fortunate, however, that soccer players serve as role models for young people, as both a source of pride, and an example of achievement.


*Today there is another slave trade, so you understand, what's being done with boys who want to become soccer players, with young people who bet their lives on continuing playing football, but who have only one opportunity. Many of their lives in the big cities... many of their lives are frustrated. When you can create a sports company in Tumaco and dream up cultural companies and sports companies in Tumaco, they allow that potential to be shaped and to be shaped well. The life of a player in Tumaco, even those who reach professionalism does not exceed 10 years... maximum 15 years (Secretary of Planning, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Security.** Tumaco is the municipality with the largest area of coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia. It is also the epicenter of conflict on the country's Pacific coast. The FARC, allied with criminal gangs and Mexican cartels, traffic weapons and supplies on the border with Ecuador and control drug trafficking across the region.

According to the data, the FARC maintain control of communities through violence and intimidation, reducing the ability of existing social structures to denounce the group. Therefore, the legitimacy of the state has been undermined by its limited ability to effectively control territory or impose a monopoly on the use of force.

Despite these circumstances, security improved slightly compared to what was reported at baseline (an increase from 31% to 33%) with a concurrent increase in the number of people who recommend that their relatives return to the *veredas* (going from 63% to 69%). However, based on statistical analysis, this small improvement in security cannot be attributed to CELI interventions

**Figure 1.6. Trends in security perceptions**



Perceptions of both the quality of state security services (police and military forces) and the performance of the non-state security services (private, indigenous forces, etc.) have declined. In

view of this, the households state that individuals and other stakeholders such as the JACs should be responsible for their own security.

As was stated above, Tumaco has the largest tract of land under coca cultivation in the country. In addition, coca farmers are less likely to substitute coca for licit crops than in other regions. Based on the Tumaco case study done by the USAID's EVAL program, "...from an economic point of view, Tumaco is an atypical case in the Colombian context. Unlike what happens in similar areas or in any other part of the country in general, the evidence shows that the greater the violence in Tumaco, the higher the economic growth..." which makes it possible to conclude that black market economies, which generate violence, also drive economic growth. The challenge, if the Peace Treaty with the FARC is approved, is recapturing their strongholds, returning these territories to government control, and implementing a sustainable crop substitution program.

*Regarding the peace process, I tell you there will not be peace in municipalities like Tumaco. It is not that I want to be skeptical, nor do I want the war to go on, but Tumaco should already be implementing programs [and] attacking the problem of violence, but here Tumaco only addresses the symptoms of the problem and not its roots... What mentality are our children growing up with? What do we do? (Women's focus group, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Human rights, justice, and the legitimacy of the state.** According to the data, the efforts to legitimize the presence of the state have not succeeded because of a lack of access to the formal justice system as well as minimal reductions in human rights violations by state authorities. Although the guerrillas are responsible for the majority of human rights violations, many survey respondents are not able to identify the party responsible for the violation, which may imply that respondents fear lodging complaints with state authorities. This is accompanied by a fall in the perceived legitimacy of formal justice. These data indicate that the state has difficulty responding in a timely fashion to reported violations, facilitating access to formal justice and fostering confidence in the justice system.

The peace process is viewed with both hope and apprehension in the region. The people note that peace could bring with it increased recognition of the region's potential, especially for the tourism sector. However, the community believes that state interventions should be more decisive in order to guarantee security. The citizenry have little faith in the outcome of the peace process. Tumaco has received numerous interventions from the government and the international community, but the promised benefits have not yet materialized.

This information is critical in any post-agreement scenario because it would be possible to adapt policies and instruments to reinforce the presence of the state and thus strengthen government legitimacy.

**The evaluation recommends:** (see report for details)

**Adapt programming to build confidence.** Guaranteeing security and promoting better leadership is essential to strengthening the state's relationships with associations and communities.

**Improve the effectiveness of association processes by building confidence between the community and its members.** There are clear benefits to working together in ways that favor dialog, foster improved understanding, and utilize economies of scale, etc. to understand and manage community projects. It is important to coordinate national efforts

to encourage the participation of young people and women even though they have been the main victims of the conflict. Young people are not the future – they are the country's present, and their sense of belonging is essential for the development of their community and the region.

**Increase the work done with households headed by women.** Women heads of household can benefit from cooperation with the state. Helping women may require targeted interventions, such as the provision of childcare or meetings during their free time. Those who already participate could serve as guides for other women in order to encourage their participation.

**Continue to reinforce the JACs.** Create multiple mechanisms for strengthening the role of the JACs: for example, they can serve as conflict resolution agents, manage community radio stations, oversee and follow-up on community processes, etc. The main evaluation report recommends adapting the ICO-VEO competency index instrument for the JACs and making the results public to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of their communities.

**Reinforce cultural initiatives and sports events in order to rebuild social ties and mutual respect.** Align interventions with the Ministry of Culture efforts to improve diversity, information, communication skills, participation, and education. Likewise, coordination with Coldeportes' Program for Peace and Coexistence is recommended.

# INTRODUCTION

## Background

After decades of conflict in rural areas with illegal armed groups (IAGs) and with increasing success in limiting their activities, the Government of Colombia (GOC) launched the National Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT) in 2009 to increase its presence and to reduce inequity in the historically marginalized conflict zones where IAGs and coca production coexist. The concept of “consolidation” refers to the expansion in the conflict zones of Colombia of the legitimate presence of the state. The policy, designed for implementation once minimal conditions for public safety were established, would create the necessary institutional mechanisms to provide basic human rights protections to the populations in those zones historically affected by conflict and illicit crops. The PNCRT was oriented to establishing the presence of state institutions capable of efficiently bringing necessary public goods needed for development.

The policy conceives of social, economic and institutional consolidation and social reconstruction as the result of a process of mobilization and continual strengthening of three pillars: (1) the territorial institutionalization of state institutions focused on guaranteeing security and creating the necessary capacities to institutionally manage the area; (2) the strengthening of citizen participation; and (3) the fostering of regional integration.<sup>4</sup> The interaction of these three pillars on a base of territorial security and combined with coordinated collaboration with state entities would be the path to guarantee the fundamental rights of the citizenry.

The U.S. Embassy, for its part, developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and at the reduction of illicit crops and the presence of illegal armed groups in the conflict zones. It included significant investments in security, antinarcotics, access to justice, and eradication activities:

*USAID is already coordinating closely with other Embassy entities, including the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), the Military Group, and the Department of Justice as well as the Political and Economic sections of the State Department to develop an integrated USG approach for the priority CSDI consolidation zones. Programs will include peace and security, illicit crop eradication, access to justice, justice sector reform and humanitarian and development interventions targeted at a wide range of populations.<sup>5</sup>*

The multi-faceted nature of security and development problems required a coordinated response. The joint CSDI activities were designed to address the multiple challenges remaining across

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<sup>4</sup>[http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/themes/danland/descargas/entidad/planeacion/POLITICA\\_NACIONAL\\_DE\\_CONSOLIDACION\\_Y\\_RECONSTRUCCION\\_TERRITORIAL\\_PNCRT.pdf](http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/themes/danland/descargas/entidad/planeacion/POLITICA_NACIONAL_DE_CONSOLIDACION_Y_RECONSTRUCCION_TERRITORIAL_PNCRT.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> USAID Colombia Solicitud de Aplicaciones Número 514-09-000005, “Montes de María – Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative;” Septiembre 15 de 2009, p. 5.



consolidation zones, including continued presence of armed groups and the illicit narcotics trade, enduring poverty, and the lack of rule of law. Working with the GOC and PNCRT, the goal of uniting USG agencies toward consolidation was:

*To reach a “tipping point” where state presence and positive perception of the government is sufficiently well-established so that communities decide to align with their government rather than illegal armed groups and the coca industry.<sup>6</sup>*

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) as one of the CSDI components and as the backbone of this integrated plan to bolster the PNCRT by supporting efforts to consolidate the state’s institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in the production of illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

The basic premise of the CELIs is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of the state, and their activities are oriented to strengthening state institutions, generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life. The CELIs clearly are no substitute for the state. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice services in the consolidation zones is a *sine qua non* condition for enabling the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation.

The CELIs, or *Colombia Responde* as the projects are known in the implementation zones, supported the GOC through three pillars that are similar (though not identical) to those of the PNCRT:

**Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their CELI peers**

<b>PNCRT pillar</b>	<b>CELI pillar</b>	<b>CELI pillars defined as:</b>
1 Territorial institutionalization	Strengthening institutional development	Improving local government response; formalizing property rights; processing cases of victims’ property rights; implementing a rural development strategy
2 Citizen participation and good government	Strengthening social development	Strengthening civil society organizations (CSOs); promoting alliances between the community and the state
3 Regional integration	Catalyzing economic development	Implementation of rural development programs and improving competitiveness

With this shared mandate and the assumption of the GOC’s leadership role, the CELIs developed strategies for institutional, social and economic development in four of the seven corridors where the policy was implemented: 1) Montes de María, in the departments of Bolívar and Sucre; 2) the Southern Corridor in the municipality of Tumaco in the department of Nariño; 3) the Central Corridor in Meta, southern Tolima, and the Valle del Cauca as far as Buenaventura; and 4) the Northern Corridor in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia and southern Córdoba.

Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics International, has worked through the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, Tetra Tech ARD, implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (MdM) project.

Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: *Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated*, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation–strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS FOR 2014-2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

CELI investments are targeted to Intermediate Results in supporting Development Objective 3, and have much in common with their original results framework in spite of the shift toward economic activities. The current framework, tied to the CELIs’ common Performance Management Plan (PMP) prioritizes the following:

- IR 3.1 More equitable and secure land tenure
  - Sub IR 3.1.1 Land restituted to displaced victims of conflict
  
- IR 3.2 Increased private and public investment in the rural sector
  - Sub IR 3.2.1 Strengthened local governments’ capacity to access and manage public funds for productive infrastructure
  - Sub IR 3.2.2 Increase private sector investment in target rural communities
  
- IR 3.3 More effective producer associations benefitting smallholder farmers
  - Sub IR 3.3.1 Improve institutional capacity to producer associations

In 2011-2012 USAID/Colombia called upon its monitoring and evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., to design an impact evaluation of the set of CSDI interventions and collect the baseline survey data. DevTech worked with Econometria, S.A., to carry out this work.<sup>7</sup> The design included two subsequent measurements: a midterm after two years of program implementation, and a final evaluation following completion of the program.

EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), has been charged with carrying out the midterm measurement, and reporting on CELI impacts to date. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline evaluation design, program satisfaction questions for participants, additional qualitative fieldwork and in-depth interviews with the CELI teams. The evaluation design included the collection of data in seven corridors in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities.

The midline examined changes since baseline across institutional, social and economic indicators and established three guiding principles for their use:

1. *Measure the change in impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with target populations.*

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<sup>7</sup> DevTech Systems, Inc. and Econometría S.A. 2013. “Impact Evaluation Methodology of the USAID Strategy in CSDI Zones - Final Methodology Report.”

2. *Inform decision-making processes with timely data, to identify components needing strengthening to achieve program goals.*
3. *Identify best practices and lessons learned to date, to inform future USAID programming.*

The impact evaluation was originally linked to the full range of interventions within the framework of the CSDI. Unfortunately, funding for the other programming was curtailed, leaving the CELIs alone as only one component of the full strategy. Given this, it should not be expected that an impact evaluation designed for the larger initiative would detect results of aspects of the CSDI strategy that were never carried out.

This volume reports on achievements and impacts to date in CELI Norte/Sur’s northern region. It is also important to mention that the results of this study are also presented at the level of “clusters,” that is, individual municipalities or small groups of municipalities that are geographically adjacent and similar socioeconomically. At times, the results of the analysis at the level of the cluster differs from those at the regional level, and for this reason it is important to examine topics at the cluster level to obtain more focused information. In the case of CELI South, the cluster includes a single municipality, Tumaco. The cluster is shown below with its control municipalities:

**Figure 2.2. Municipalities in the Southern Region**

Cluster	Treated Municipality	Control Municipality
23	Tumaco (Nariño)	Policarpa (Nariño) and Patía (Cauca)

This report includes the achievements and impact to date of the CELI South project, which was carried out in Tumaco and which the GOC is also involved in through the implementation of PNCRT.

## How to read this report

An impact evaluation is a powerful tool but also includes important challenges and differences from other evaluation research.<sup>8</sup> It is important to understand the different types of findings an evaluation like this generates and how they should be interpreted.

**Types of findings.** The report has four types of findings, shown in figures and text in the report.

**Impacts.** These come from the survey and compare treated and control groups on key outcomes of interest. Impact is read as the percentage point (pp) difference between baseline and midline *that is attributable to the intervention*. Data tables show statistical significance with asterisks (\*) and the title of the table starts with the word *Impact*.

**Trends.** These come from the survey and show how *a sample* changes over time. Trends are shown in graphics, not tables, and the figure title always starts with the word *Trends*. In the text the percent sign (%) and absolute values are used.

<sup>8</sup> Please see Design section at the end of the Executive Summary, Limitations there and in the main report, and Annex 3 for details.

**CELI performance data.** These data come from the CELIs and they track CELI performance indicators. The figures with this data begin with the title *CELI performance*.

**Secondary data.** These data come from other sources like government figures and indices, and they help to describe the context in which CELI interventions operate. Tables with these data are entitled *Secondary data*.

**Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report**

Table title:	In the text:	How to read:
<b>Impacts</b>	pp (percentage point)	Relative change over time (compared to control groups) attributable to the intervention
<b>Trends</b>	% (percentage)	Change over time in one sub-sample
<b>Secondary data</b>	Secondary data	Show context to support findings and/or to explain challenges
<b>CELI performance</b>	CELI performance	CELI progress toward performance goals

**Whole sample and four sub-samples.** The whole sample survey is approx. 19,000 households, divided into four sub-samples. These are respondents from: CELI municipalities, their controls, PNCRT municipalities and their controls. Sometimes we refer to the “*full sample*,” when results are similar across all 19,000 households.

**Direct and indirect beneficiaries.** Due to design challenges (see the Limitations section, below), households that were supposed to be direct beneficiaries at baseline did not always receive CELI interventions. As a result, this evaluation report looks at all residents of *veredas* in treated municipalities as indirect beneficiaries. There is one exception, and that is in the economic development chapter, where we have been able to identify a population of direct CELI participants, and track their progress.

## Methodology and design

EVAl, with the support of its strategic partner, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), used a mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization and security as a result of the CELI interventions. The design followed the baseline design from 2012-2013 very closely, with additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, experiences and opinions among treated (CELI and PNCRT) and control groups. Full design considerations can be found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact.

### Evaluation questions

The baseline identified the evaluation questions in 2011, and have been slightly adjusted (per USAID; please see Annex 2 of the main report for the SOW) and are presented below.

**Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions**

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target population in the areas of interventions?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting
3. Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities? <sup>9</sup>	IR 3.2
4. What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)	Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?	IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities?	Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
8. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

These questions serve both impact (1, 4-8) and performance evaluation (2, 3) goals, and the evaluation reflects this blended purpose with a mixed methods design (please see section on Methodology and its detailed annex in the main report for full details.) The interdisciplinary team used data from the quantitative, household survey (in a quasi-experimental pre-post design) and a range of qualitative instruments, secondary data search and multi-faceted analyses to answer these questions in this report. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

### Quantitative methods

The impact evaluation design included a quantitative survey of households in Consolidation municipalities, both with and without CELI interventions, with these data collected between July 20 and November 30, 2015. Control municipalities were selected using an advanced matching protocol, described in detail in the annexes to the original baseline report.<sup>10</sup> The original design included an oversample of 12% for each follow-on survey, to allow for attrition. In the field, the midline evaluation, following a panel design, revisited the same households in order to ensure comparability, and lost approximately 15% of the sample to attrition. Within CELI municipalities, not all *veredas* had CELI interventions, and this was reflected in the sample.

The survey instrument (Annex 8 to the main report) includes modules on demographics, justice and security, licit and illicit economic opportunities and performance, government legitimacy,

<sup>9</sup> This is answered in Annex 6 to the main report with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.


<sup>10</sup> From the baseline report: "The survey interviews occurred in two phases, with the first phase providing interviews for 65 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control households between March 27 and July 5, 2012. The second phase, providing the remaining 35 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control interviews, plus 100 percent of the direct beneficiary interviews, occurred between November 7, 2012, and May 25, 2013, with a break for the Christmas and New Year holidays." *Impact Evaluation of USAID's Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report. Volume 1: Summary of findings.* June 30, 2013.

social capital and participation in grassroots organizations, electoral behavior, social and public services, land rights and ownership, victims’ rights, roads, social programs, and opinions about the future and about peace. Several indices are created from the data, including indices of social capital, government performance, and government accountability. In general, the survey measures perceptions (as in the case of security) which are important, but more sensitive to news and recent events. The survey is less adept at capturing actual experiences, in part because most respondents will not have had direct contact with the changes in institutions or security, for example. In this regard, there is subjectivity in the indicators that were designed at the time of the baseline survey.

The evaluation added several new items for the midline on satisfaction with interventions and a short set on victimization from the LAPOP<sup>11</sup> survey. The survey was administered in person in households, workplaces and, when issues of security prevented deployment to *veredas*, in heads of municipalities.

In the South region, the assessment team completed 2,475 surveys in which 1,058 of the interviewees were men and 1,417 were women. Those surveyed reported a literacy rate of 77% and more than two-thirds (69% or 1,709) self-identified as Afro-Colombian, black, or mulatto as can be seen in Figure 2.5.

**Figure 2.5. Sample by ethnicity (self-identified)**



Approximately 73% of those who were surveyed in the southern region live in scattered rural settlements, 23% in population centers that are not municipality seats, and only 3% in the municipality seat. A small percentage (16%) had heard of Colombia Responde activities in their municipalities.

A slightly higher percentage of men (21%) than of women (13%) had heard of Colombia Responde’s activities. It should also be noted that the people surveyed were very optimistic about the future since a large majority said that they expected conditions to improve. Women were the most optimistic.

<sup>11</sup> The Latin American Public Opinion Survey (<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/>), which has been implemented throughout Latin America by a team at Vanderbilt University for the past three decades.

Other quantitative measures include the analysis of key secondary data sources. These come from governmental sources as well as from the EVIDINCE<sup>12</sup> consortium which gathers municipal-level quarterly data on issues such as the presence of police and judicial personnel, etc.

As part of the official statistics submitted by the government, updated data on major crimes such as homicides, terrorist acts, and massacres were used as well as the Consolidation Index described in the Regional Context chapter below.

## Qualitative methods

Qualitative methods included in-depth interviews with key informants at national, regional and local levels, in CELI and PNCRT sites, as well as control municipalities. The team conducted structured interviews with representatives from municipalities and *personerías*, in 21 sites chosen to capture variations between CELI and PNCRT sites and their control zones. Also interviewed were heads of civil society organizations and producers' associations. Focus groups covered themes parallel to those in the survey and the participants were citizens in CELI and PNCRT zones, some of whom had received or participated in interventions, and others who had not. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Qualitative data were analyzed in Atlas.ti using thematic coding that mirrored the evaluation questions and allowed for emergent codes to cover issues not foreseen in the evaluation design. These codes were correlated to understand coincidence and patterns of importance to the evaluation's response to the research questions.

## Limitations

The evaluation design followed in this study has certain limitations. These are grouped and discussed below, and a more detailed discussion can be found in Annex 3, Methodology.

### Factors related to the evaluation design

1. **The CELIs were to be evaluated as part of a much larger and more comprehensive effort that failed to materialize.** The outcomes of interest are at a high level of generality in the Results Framework of USAID's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), relative to the investment, the interventions, and the duration of implementation to date. The evaluation was created to assess a set of programs, formerly called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), with broader funding and goals than the current set of interventions. CSDI included a whole-of-government approach from both the U.S. and Colombian governments – anti-narcotics, security and justice, regional and local institutions, economic development, regional integration and roads, and civil society interventions, across the same geographic intervention area. The Initiative as a whole dwindled to comprise only the Colombia Enhanced Livelihoods

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<sup>12</sup> EVIDINCE es un esfuerzo de investigación asociado con Estudios Empíricos de Conflicto (<https://esoc.princeton.edu/>), un conjunto multi-institucional de académicos conformado para facilitar los estudios de los conflictos y de insurgencia a nivel sub-nacional.

Initiative, run by USAID, with significant funding but without the wider approach initially envisioned. As a result, the impact evaluation design includes several indicator sets for which few or no targeted interventions were completed. No impacts can be detected for programs that no longer exist.

For CSDI to have produced detectable effects would have been an enormous feat; for the CELIs to do it without the other CSDI interventions, including the interventions promised by the GOC, was far too much to expect. As a result, impacts found by the evaluation as measured by rigorous statistical techniques are few and mostly at the local level with particular direct interventions with producer associations.

- 2. Selecting the panel of respondents at baseline was a challenge, resulting in discrepancies in the list of “direct beneficiaries” at midline.** A further limitation in terms of determining and attributing impact involves the panel design of the baseline, followed closely at midline. Baseline data collection was carried out over 18 months, crossing various growing seasons and the three different starting dates of the CELIs. In order to respond to the baseline team’s request for lists of direct beneficiaries, CELI Central approached local leaders and called for meetings of potential local participants, who signed attendance lists. CELI N/S, which was already in progress, provided lists of those who were participating in their interventions at that time. These lists served as the sampling frames for the treatment sites, but they created a problem: attendees knew they would receive a program, thus violating the basic assumption of an impact evaluation baseline that *the intervention has not yet begun*. Knowing about the future benefit changes the population’s perceptions, perspectives, decisions and expectations. To some extent, the changes begin to appear from the time of the meeting invitation, and such changes can no longer be observed when the baseline information is collected, so we do not know how this knowledge may have changed their responses, but the relevant literature suggests a social desirability bias in which respondents who think they are to receive some benefit will respond more positively, in an attempt to be amenable to researchers – who they may presume to be involved with the intervention. This makes it very difficult to detect small effects on certain variables, since the baseline measurement has already incorporated, or lost, such effects.

The midline evaluation found that some baseline respondents originally identified as direct beneficiaries did not participate (or did not recall or report participating) in CELI interventions. There were significant discrepancies between people who were classified as direct beneficiaries at baseline and the people who eventually participated in CELI programming. The evaluation team therefore recognized three definitions of “direct beneficiaries”: (1) direct beneficiaries per the baseline evaluation design (4,426 households); (2) respondents who answered a survey question about receiving an intervention from *Colombia Responde*, as the program was known in the field (2,198 households); and (3) direct beneficiaries from the baseline who are on the CELIs’ own participant lists (2,015).

Random households in the municipalities were then selected as indirect beneficiaries, to complement the sample and to represent the wide-ranging set of indicators that the CSDI



was to have impacted, such as economic integration through roads and markets, security and justice, and increasing and improving government presence.

None of the three “direct beneficiary” definitions provides a sufficiently reliable gauge of participation and, as a result, for analysis of the more diffusely applied components of CELI activities in governance, infrastructure support and social development, the indirect and direct beneficiaries of the baseline were combined into one group of beneficiaries. However, for certain activities, especially with respect to participation in producers’ associations and other economically focused interventions, analysis was conducted on a separate “direct beneficiaries” subgrouping based on the three definitions just specified. When taken together, with no double counting (that is, counting a household only once, for example, when a participant fulfills more than one of the definitions such as by appearing on the original list and by responding “yes” to the survey question on *Colombia Responde* participation), there are 5,445 unique respondents among the three definitions. The evaluation uses this larger group to examine economic impacts on participants, which represents a more rigorous standard. Where impacts are found on this group, they are generally much more positive than the rest of the citizen population.

The qualitative team’s experience in the field conducting focus groups helps to understand why so few of those identified as direct beneficiaries actually reported being participants. The first and key questions in the focus groups were regarding participation in *Colombia Responde* activities, and few focus group participants said they had participated. The reasons for the problems with the *Colombia Responde* name are not precisely known, but the evaluators speculate that the following could have contributed: i) at GOC request, USAID hid its participation under the *Colombia Responde* name so that the beneficiaries would attribute the effects of the program to the GOC; ii) subcontractors have other names, and beneficiaries may have been confused about the identity of the benefactor in the first instance; iii) the results may suffer from recall bias, since the baseline was established between 2012 and 2013, and certain benefits ended a long time ago; and iv) a combination of these and other factors that are unobservable.

- 3. The category of indirect beneficiaries is imprecise, and capturing impacts at that diffuse level will take more investment and more time.** Several categories of CELI and PNCRT interventions – essential though they may be – are likely to be invisible to average respondents, and do not reach a minimum treatment threshold, for one of two main reasons. First, some public goods affect few residents of a given area, like the strengthening of justice services or work with municipalities or *personerías*, or some social or productive infrastructure projects. Internationally, only an average 6% of a given population ever accesses justice services in their lifetime, and only a fraction of that figure do so in a given year. Detecting perceptions of change among this “fraction of a fraction” is therefore very difficult. Second, as discussed above, the CELI programming had important goals and benchmarks across the pillars of social, economic and institutional development – such that the significant funding is fragmented across geographic sites and pillars. While a member of a treated productive association or civil society group knows well that they have benefited from an intervention, the “indirect”

beneficiary is indeed very distant from the benefits. Their inclusion in the sample dilutes the impacts that can be detected by the evaluation design.

Had the robust set of CSDI and GOC whole-of-government interventions continued as planned, perhaps more impacts in these higher-order indicators would have been detected. As it stands, however, the “dose” of intervention is a fraction of what was planned, in far fewer sectors, and at great distance from the beneficiaries, particularly the indirect beneficiaries.

### **Factors outside the control of the interventions**

4. **Local contexts and the absence of public entities condition the effectiveness of the CELIs.** The intervention municipalities are historically economically isolated, with stagnant local markets, very limited road connectivity, armed illegal group activity, minimal (and sometimes corrupt) government institutions, and deep intergenerational poverty. The households in these zones have limited access to land – in terms of either size or low productivity – and a deficit of human capital (education, health, nutrition, as shown in baseline statistics on education coverage, perceptions of service quality, and food security challenges).<sup>13</sup> The main consequence is low productivity and income from land and work, which are rural families’ two main factors of production. This constrains households in a logic of poverty perpetuation – the trap – in which poverty is reproduced as a consequence of low savings capacity, which prevents changing the initial amounts of capital, land and work. The cycles are reproduced in the short term, limiting the capacity to change the initial situation, and in the long term, limiting changes in the welfare of the next generation: young people cannot find opportunities and are pressured into migrating or joining illegal armed groups. In this context – and others related to unemployment and informality – violence, in its different forms, reinforces poverty traps. The other face of this poverty trap context is communal: the municipalities lack access to roads, political representation and market formation. Weak political representation often dilutes attention by the central or departmental government, such that the investment in roads is insufficient to develop markets in which small farmers can sell their products above production and transportation costs. As such, poverty is not only individual: it is poverty at a municipal level that encompasses the collective. There is an evident absence of public goods that are essential for the development of communities and entire regions. The capacity of rural interventions to generate significant effects on economic and social development is closely linked to land tenancy and property rights. However, the state’s policy has had little success on this front, and the CELIs faced the same – or worse – institutional roadblocks.
5. **Exogenous contextual factors cannot be discounted.** Among exogenous factors,<sup>14</sup> it is important to mention the inflation caused by the global economic slowdown and the

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<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report Volume 1: Summary of Findings – All PNCRT Zones pp 30 and 42-43; Volume 2 p. 47-50 and 69-70; plus the regional baseline reports.

<sup>14</sup> The role of the control municipalities is to ensure that exogenous factors do not bias results. Under perfect conditions, exogenous factors apply to both types of municipalities, so in principle these factors would “cancel out.” However, no quasi-experimental design is ever perfect, and as a result, the evaluation uses control co-variables and clusters in order to minimize possible biases.

sharp drop in oil prices, resulting in recession in economic activities associated with extraction. These effects occurred at the moment that beneficiaries' perceptions of the performance of the CELIs and the PNCRT were sought.

- 6. The CELIs' relationship with the Consolidation Unit was not uniformly strong, based on political and other factors.** The Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial (UACT) was a newly created government body as the CELIs began, which benefited from CELI support for opening regional offices and for staff capacity building. The Unit had the function of coordinating government agencies to deliver the state's programs to the consolidation zones. One of the great difficulties it faced in realizing this task was its lower (or at best equal) status within the government hierarchy with respect to those entities responsible for those state programs, which presented challenges for the CELIs as well. The national level and regional level offices were also not always in synch, according to some stakeholders, and one CELI COR<sup>15</sup> reported better and more collaborative relationships at the regional than at the national level.

The UACT faced great obstacles in successfully carrying out its role in the territories, including limited budgets for meeting needs in a complex geographic area with deep social, economic and institutional challenges. It was in the context of these conflicts and complexities that the CELIs had to coordinate their tasks with the national-level GOC (although, as noted, regional and local contacts were reportedly much more operational). The UACT was finally merged with the Social Prosperity Department (DPS, for its Spanish initials) in December of 2015 as a result of the termination of the National Policy of Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT for its Spanish acronym). Afterwards, the CELIs in essence lost their counterpart at this midpoint in their programming. Nevertheless, the CELIs continue working to articulate their efforts with responsible institutions.

### **Factors related to implementation**

- 7. The selection process for *veredas* in which to work faced challenges that could affect the evaluation results.** The selection of *veredas* is a crucial foundation for implementation and for evaluation. The selection of municipalities and *veredas* in which the work is ultimately performed has substantial effects on the results of the strategy – and, therefore, on the impacts measured. Implementing partners are guided in selection by USAID and GOC preferences, and the baseline team for this quasi-experimental design followed up by employing a municipality matching system. Such systems, while imperfect, allow for the modeling of a robust counterfactual – what would have happened in municipalities that did not receive the interventions.

At least at the outset of the programs, the selection of *veredas* depended on the “stoplight” methodology, which relied on Colombia's military for impartial classification of the danger of each *vereda* where the CELIs might potentially intervene. Stakeholders in USAID and the CELIs eventually sought a way out of this requirement, as they found the system highly politicized and, at times, the stoplight decision unjustified. Over time,

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<sup>15</sup> Contracting Officer Representative.

the CELIs' contracts were amended to allow implementers to amplify their reach to *veredas* in which local dynamics suggested potential positive relations – such as a shared productive project. In this way, the CELIs could serve communities that were divided administratively but shared common agricultural goals and could expand to *veredas* that they themselves had established as safe for project activities.

One hypothesis generated during the evaluation was that the *vereda* selection – guided by the “traffic light”<sup>16</sup> methodology – tended toward the *veredas* closest to the municipal centers, with greater access, more resources, greater associativity, and greater social capital, etc., while the problems of illicit crops and armed groups were extended in more remote and dispersed geographic areas. In general, it can be asserted that the poorer the population, the greater the impacts of an intervention of this type. Thus, focusing on what was easiest operationally may have been counterproductive in terms of impact.

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<sup>16</sup> The stoplight classifies the zones according to their level of safety risk as follows: Green: low risk, yellow: medium risk, orange: high risk, red: critical risk.

# REGIONAL CONTEXT

The goal of consolidation was to establish and strengthen institutions, regional economic integration and social fabric in zones affected by Colombia’s armed conflict, on a basis of security gains made by Colombia’s security forces. As discussed, the CELI interventions were a part, but certainly not all, of that effort. The other elements that were to lead to that goal have been less than expected. Advances in security are important but not absolute; regional economic integration is promising but incomplete; and the presence of the state and good governance are still scarce in some areas, especially in the most rural. The confluence of conditions that nourished armed conflict and illegal groups has improved, but indicators within the regional context still do not present a perfect setting within which the CELI can fulfill its objectives.

## The Consolidation Index

The Consolidation Index is a tool designed to measure and monitor the advances of municipalities in the process of consolidation and shows one considered viewpoint of the progress to date. This index is built from a set of 37 indicators in the three pillars of the national consolidation policy, each of which is in turn made up of a set of components, as shown in Figure 3.1 below.


**Figure 3.1. Consolidation Index pillars and their components**

Pillar	Components
1 Territorial institutionalization	Security, justice, property rights, and human rights
2 Citizen participation and good government	Good government, citizen participation, and social capital
3 Regional integration	Connectivity, social services, and economic growth

Each pillar is composed of a set of indicators that are reliably available, primarily from government sources – line ministries, defense and police bureaus, departments and municipalities. Indicators in the first pillar, for example, include indicators on security challenges and incidence of crimes, in particular conflict-related crimes, and indicators on access to justice mechanisms, human rights indicators, and figures on property rights. Pillar 2 includes data from municipal governments on their provision of spaces for citizen participation, their effective tax collection, their coverage of citizen oversight committees, the status of local civil society and *juntas de acción comunal* (JACs), and the Procuraduría General de la Nación’s Open Government Index. Pillar 3 on regional integration includes indicators on roads, electricity and cellular coverage, access to education and health services, hectares in cultivation and the presence of financial entities.

CELI South includes only one municipality, Tumaco, which covers a large area and is important in terms of Consolidation. It is referred to as the “municipality of Tumaco” in the Index. It is interesting to see that Tumaco’s scores vary widely from pillar to pillar and that changes have also been seen within each pillar since the first measurement in 2011 as seen in Figure 3.2:

**Figure 3.2. Secondary data: Consolidation Index, scoring by pillar**



*Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations*

Pillar 1, Territorial Institutionalization, reveals the municipality's most serious problems, while Pillar 3, Territorial Integration, shows that both the starting point in 2011 and the changes registered over time are very positive and have a steady positive trend. Pillar 2, Good Governance and Citizen Participation, makes it possible to see a net positive change between 2011 and 2014, although there is a peak in 2013.

The Consolidation Index is made up of indicators, each of which has strengths, weaknesses, and particular viewpoints that should be taken into account when making comparisons between the scores and the evaluation data.

First, the indicators contained in the Index correspond, in general, to government perceptions. In many cases, they are reported by government officials at the municipal, departmental, and national levels, and differ from citizen perceptions on similar issues covered in the survey (security, institutional structure, etc.). Neither is more "correct" than the other, nor are they precisely comparable. Results are different depending on the measurement tool used: on the one hand, the Index takes the data gathered in the main population centers as the basis for many of its indicators. In many cases, these data have been reported by government officials and, in other cases, by citizens or entities, such as transportation companies that provide information on road conditions. In contrast, the data from the survey sample includes 73% of the population from dispersed rural areas, 23% from population centers other than the municipality seat, and only 3% from the municipality seat.


Second, the scores of many indicators are weighted in order to be compared to those of municipalities that have similar socioeconomic conditions. As a result, high scores are registered even when the absolute scores are among the worst in the country. For example, the Open Government indicator (data from the Open Government Index issued by the Colombian government) shows that Tumaco's score on the Index for 2014 is 34.9; however, this figure is adjusted to 55.8 due to the effects stemming from the comparison to similar municipalities. This is not a flaw in the Index. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the fact that the scores are modified this way before they are compiled to create the Index.

## **Security**

The southern evaluation sample – disaggregated by risk level and measured with the Ministry's of Defense's "stoplight methodology" – only contains zones with high and critical levels of security risk which, in comparison to the total sample, imply that interventions are more difficult.

Of 128 *veredas* sampled in the southern region, 52 are considered high risk and 76 critical risk. (Figure 3.3)

**Figure 3.3. Levels of security, CELI South *veredas* (left) compared to the country total (right)**




The Consolidation Index’s security component includes indicators such as police operations that do not involve the military, implementation of a public safety plan, terrorist and subversive acts, and the density and changes in the production of coca. Each indicator shows deterioration in Tumaco based on the data from the Index. It is likely that the data from 2015 (when they are finalized and made official) will show both a significant deterioration in said indicators and an increase in coca production (this has already been publicized by various media outlets). According to various sources, the amount of land dedicated to coca cultivation in Colombia has doubled since 2013.<sup>17</sup>

In contrast, according to the results in the survey, the perception in the hamlets and villages in CELI South indicates a slight improvement in security compared to what was reported at baseline (going from 31% to 33%). This increase in security has been greater in the last two years, (going from 30% to 34%, which has caused a higher percentage of the population (69%) to recommend that their relatives return to their *veredas*. However, this is not an effect that can be attributed to CELI interventions. (Figure 3.4)

<sup>17</sup> The Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) of the Central Intelligence Agency produces an annual estimate of the area cultivated with coca for the Andean region. Its latest results were presented to the GOC in March 2016. The main conclusions – national statistics – were disseminated in the media. Coca cultivation in Colombia reached a historic low in 2013 (in both the SIMCI and CNC-DoD measurements). In the two years since, however, the growth has been sustained and drastic. In the last CNC measurement, cultivated hectares doubled, from 80,000 to 159,000, with a proportional increase in the production of cocaine, from 290 to 442 metric tons. The complete report is not accessible to the public. The statistics cited here are found in the articles published in the *El Tiempo* newspaper, *Semana* magazine and *El Espectador* newspaper on March 15, 2016 (<http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/ee-uu-y-canada/ee-uu-advierte-de-aumento-de-cultivos-de-coca-en-colombia/16537123>).

**Figure 3.4. Trends in the perception of security**



Source: Base and Mid-Line Evaluations, CELI; authors' calculations<sup>18</sup>

Specifically, when the problems that affect security in this region are analyzed, the presence of illegal armed groups (IAGs) is identified as both the biggest problem for the security of the territory and the one that has had the best improvement from baseline. The reported presence of IAGs has dropped from 68% at baseline to 35% at mid-line. Public safety also showed a significant positive performance. Of those surveyed, 36% at baseline perceive the area as insecure from the point of view citizen safety, but only 15% see it this way in the mid-line measurement. Cases of sexual violence in Tumaco fell while incidents related to landmines and forced recruitment increased. The trends are shown in the following figure:

**Figure 3.5. Trends in the perception of crimes**

	CELI Baseline	CELI Mid-Line
Homicides	28%	14%
Illegal armed groups	68%	35%
Landmines	6%	8%
Displacement	33%	25%
Kidnapping or forced disappearance	8%	2%
Extortion	14%	6%
Lack of public safety (theft, muggings, etc.)	36%	15%
Forced Recruitment	0.4%	2%
Sexual violence	6%	1%


Upon reviewing the data reported with respect to security services, there is a sharp decrease in citizen perceptions of security by state agencies (police and military forces). Perceptions regarding police protection for citizens is 35% at baseline and declines to 19% at mid-line. The decline is 81% to 51% for military protection. Consolidation Index data on police operations without military support reveal a slight decline in Tumaco, from 16% to 15.8%.

There are no significant differences between what was reported and the perceptions of the quality of service provided by state agencies. The trends are negative or flat in the majority of cases (Figure 3.6). The performance of the non-state security services (private, tribal guard, others) did not improve either.

<sup>18</sup> Unless otherwise noted, the source for all figures in the report is the baseline and midline survey database collected for the impact assessment of CELI interventions.




**Figure 3.6. Trends in the perception of state security**



In addition to the above, households continue to believe to some extent that individuals and social agents themselves, such as JACs, should take responsibility for security even though they recognize that this is the responsibility of the military and the police. (Figure 3.7)

**Figure 3.7. Trends in the preferred providers of security services**



In the qualitative field studies, communities indicate that the problem with security and the armed conflict that Tumaco went through in the last few decades made relations with the military and the police difficult. This is demonstrated in the people's distrust of them.


*For example the police... if I have to file a complaint about something, I don't trust the police ... the National Government is interested in numbers... what someone says: – I file a complaint, I help them capture the guys, but after that, nobody will take responsibility for my life, no one will protect me... So I'm not going to get myself into trouble... The police may be at the mercy of any kind of attack and nobody helps them. (Community Action Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

### Illegal crops and the culture of (il)legality

According to the survey, there have been noticeable changes in the proportion of households who think that there has been an increase in illegal crops (from 16% at baseline to 29% at midline) in contrast to what was reported in the control municipalities where families said that there has been a decrease of 3% compared to the baseline. This shows that CELI has had a negative effect of 16pp. The same behavior has been reported in Tumaco with regards to illegal mining activity although there was a decline of 2% in the control municipalities.


In the view of the households surveyed about illicit crops, there has been a decline of approximately 24% with respect to the idea that coca should not be cultivated. Nevertheless, growing coca as a subsistence crop dropped from 97% to 67%. The significant impact of CELI's work can be seen in these results. (Figure 3.8)

**Figure 3.8. Trends in perceptions of illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree)**



In this region, the intervention has shown that the justifications given for disobeying the law generally increase. The most notable increase is seen in the example set for the community that disobeying regulations does not have negative effects (this went from 3% to 16%). The main justification continues to be that disobedience is required to help the family. This factor rose 6% up to 35% in the cases reported.

**Figure 3.9. Trends in the acceptable justifications for disobeying the law**



One aspect that is of major importance for security is the ownership and use of land. Tumaco has high levels of informality in legalization, which requires reinforcement from the judicial authorities. As was mentioned, this municipality has an ethnic majority of Afro-Colombians and Amerindians and, therefore, the problem of ownership by communities is critical. The armed conflict and vulnerability of these communities has produced forced displacement accompanied by the subsequent plundering and accumulation of land by private parties:

*A large part of that land is held by private parties and you know that there are vested interests. At times the peasants and natives of the municipality get worried about the monopolization of the land, yes... It is extremely important to be able to take on the process of claiming rights for the nation, true... but nonetheless, ...since some pieces of property that are going to be legalized and*

*have property titles also have priority, but there are always problems between private parties and the communities. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

The community has asked the local councils and Amerindian reservations for the restitution of property belonging to individuals and groups. However, the claims of small farmers who have been deprived of their own land conflict with the claims of community owned land, which makes the restitution process very difficult. Furthermore, the process of selecting those cases that should be given priority has not yet started since security conditions make that impossible:

*The territory has a very high percentage or at least a good one of Afro-Colombian or Amerindian reservation community councils certified by INCODER and what is a community council or reservation for us....we are in second law forest reserve areas. So those of us who are peasants in Tumaco haven't been able to move forward on absolutely anything because obviously when an individual requests a piece of land that is within community owned land the collective or ancestral lands of the blacks and Amerindians take precedence. [...]*

*Likewise, we can't go to Tumaco for reasons of safety, because there is no safety... no guarantee for people to return. So they won't let us go back at all. (Land Restitution Unit, Pasto, Nariño)*


The findings and conclusions derived from the analysis of the data are explained in the Lands section under the economic development component.

### **Human rights, justice, and the legitimacy of the state**

The Consolidation Index reports mixed numbers for Tumaco with respect to human rights. The municipality has a Human Rights Committee and its statistics on criminal acts such as massacres, kidnapping for ransom, and politically motivated homicides have dropped to values that are close to zero. Victimization indicators have been improving since 2011. Nevertheless, there are still high numbers of people being displaced with close to 14,500 displaced people and more than 25 landmine accidents in 2014.


With respect to the violations of human rights, the data show a decrease in information about who is committing the violations. At baseline, 46% of those interviewed reported that they knew who the party responsible was. This indicator drops to 37% at mid-line. The guerrilla is still considered mostly responsible for rights violations- that indicator rose 10% compared to what had been reported at baseline. Perceptions of BACRIM and paramilitary groups as those presumed responsible for violations of human rights declined. (Figure 3.10)

**Figure 3.10. Trends in the perceived responsibility for violations of human rights**




Regarding the willingness to report violations, there is a general tendency towards being unwilling to file complaints. At both the baseline and mid-line, the majority of the complaints filed are for cases of theft of harvest or livestock (58% at baseline and 47% in this evaluation). The number two cause for filing a complaint is kidnapping (49% at baseline and 38% in this evaluation). (Figure 3.11)

**Figure 3.11. Trends in the willingness to lodge a complaint**



As can be seen, a complaint to the formal justice system is still the preferred channel for initiating a procedure for restoration of rights or a search for justice in spite of the drastic decrease compared to what was reported at baseline (going from 48% to 13%). In an appeal, the ombudsman or mayor continues to be the institutional authority they resort to for lodging complaints. However, this has declined compared to what was reported at baseline (it went from 16% to 4%). (Figure 3.12)

**Figure 3.12. Trends in mechanisms for reporting a violation of rights**




In addition, the focus groups report that justice is seen as ineffective. Therefore, citizens are afraid to report crimes as was noted in their perceptions of police and military performance:

*The police may be subject to any kind of attack and nobody cares. The other thing is that the national government, justice, for example, you capture them... After three years or after five years, they are free so, they say – why should I risk my life – if the judicial system is... (Laughter) So, this is complicated too, isn't it? (Community Action Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

In view of the above, it is striking that while lodging complaints with a regular court of justice has increased, when asked if the people know about the services that are offered, the perception drops with respect to the baseline and goes from 51% to 9%. The same thing happens when knowledge of alternative justice mechanisms are studied (it drops from 48% to 6%) and about the ombudsman's office as a means of gaining access to justice (this goes from 43% to 4%). Note that while the perception of the performance of the ombudsman's office decreases, that of regular and alternative courts of justice improves. (Figure 3.13)


**Figure 3.13. Trend in the performance of mechanisms of justice**



Finally, with respect to issues related to state legitimacy, the results show relevant declines in the South region. The results related to the low support for the country's political system and the increasingly lower pride in living under this system as well as the reported lack of respect for

political institutions (Figure 3.14). Today, these institutions have less legitimacy than they had at baseline.

**Figure 3.14. Trends in the legitimacy of the state (agree or very strongly agree)**




The justice system figures prominently in the survey as well as in the Consolidation Index, and, in a third data source cited in this study, EVIDINCE’s quarterly municipal data. In the survey, the legal institutions were rated poorly while the respondents trusted other institutions – as can be seen in the above figure where only 7% think that the courts guarantee a fair trial.

The survey measured perceptions of Colombian justice while the Consolidation Index reports on whether or not there is a “judicial apparatus” there: formal, administrative justice and (where applicable) indigenous jurisdiction as a complement to the ombudsman's office and public defender. Tumaco’s score for the existence of these bodies was 87.5 points (out of 100).

The data from EVIDINCE's quarterly panel, which were collected by local people, measure the presence of judges and other officials at their places of work and how well they serve the citizens on a specific day. Figure 3.15 shows the data for all of the CELI municipalities (T1 on the table) and PNCRT (T2) and the controls (C1 and C2 respectively).

**Figure 3.15. Secondary data: EVIDINCE Quarterly Data, assistance from authorities**



Nota: Índice creado sumando las variables de asistencia en el día de la encuesta de fiscal, juez, procurador y notario en el municipio.

Source: Panel quarterly data, EVIDINCE. Authors’ calculations

CELI municipalities show the highest consistent increase, reaching above 2.7 on average (of the four officials whose work was observed). The PNCRT municipalities in the study (where CELI has no interventions) and their controls were the most volatile.

In a peaceful post-conflict scenario, these data are critical since they would mean adapting and improving whatever the Consolidation Policy was and the instruments that reinforce the state's recovery and the region's legitimacy.

# CELI INTERVENTIONS IN THE SOUTH REGION


The CELIs included the following components to reach the results framework objectives, organized in order of greatest investment:

- Support for productive activities focusing on the agricultural value chain (such as technical assistance and training in farming, processing and marketing) and on support for youth entrepreneurial efforts in developing skills in business and commerce;
- Governance support to strengthen local and regional governments through training in planning, budgeting, taxes, royalties, project formulation and management, and accountability;
- Infrastructure support, providing assistance in building social goods (schools, roads, health clinics, improved sanitation and electricity) and productive infrastructure (such as improving processing plants, warehouses, and marketing centers);
- Social capital development and the development of civil society, in terms of providing training and support for JACs, producers' associations, community councils in indigenous and Afro-Colombian areas, and others;
- Assistance in land issues for communities and individuals, including the formalization of land titles, private property rights and restitution claims, the regularization of the status of public lands, and management of special rights reserved for ethnic minorities; and
- Support for the development of credit and financial institutions and programs in target areas.

CELI North/South met the majority of its indicators across three pillars, with data current as of June 30, 2016 for economic, social and institutional indicators. CELI compliance was highest among social and economic indicators. The latter are also the most numerous of the indicators for which CELI was responsible. (Figure 4.1; the calculations for these figures are described in Annex 3)




**Figura 4.1. CELI North South completion of PMP indicators**



CELI Sur's financial commitments, as they appear in the USAID/Colombia MONITOR<sup>19</sup> database, are broken down by the source of funds (image on the left) and by type of intervention (image on the right):

**Figure 4.2. CELI Performance: Commitments (in US millions) by source and activity (approx. \$124.1M)**



Source: MONITOR database, May 1-9, 2016

<sup>19</sup> USAID/ Colombia's system of information-gathering and monitoring.

# ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

*Evaluation question:* To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?

## Findings and conclusions

According to the study that the USAID EVAL program did of Tumaco, the municipality's economic growth over the last 15 years has been sustained and remarkable compared to other municipalities. However, paradoxically and in spite of the fact that Tumaco has undertaken ambitious palm oil, cocoa, coconut, canary-raising, fishing, and crude oil production projects, it remains one of the municipalities with the highest poverty indices in the country. An econometric analysis was done as part of the above-mentioned study, and its results showed a positive correlation between the cultivation of illegal crops and GDP growth, which is atypical when compared to other municipalities involved in consolidation. This is growth that cannot be explained by legal activity concentrated in agriculture, agribusiness, fishing, forestry, and tourism. The evidence suggests that the economy in this region is still permeated with drug trafficking.

In agriculture, the sub-sector that has characterized the region since the sixties is the African palm, complemented by subsistence crops. The economic problems of the region were exacerbated between 200 and 2010 due to the bud rot, which led to the loss of 95% of the land area under cultivation.<sup>20</sup>

In addition, cocoa and coconut are part of the community's ancestral culture.<sup>21</sup> A variety of cocoa is grown in this region that is valued on the international market due to its nutty and woody flavor. In addition, coconut production in this area has the potential to supply the global market. Despite these strengths, productivity is held back by the lack of technology, making it impossible to cope with foreseeable losses from plant diseases. This has brought about the intervention of the Ministry of Agriculture and of the Colombian Corporation for Agricultural Research (Corpoica) who, along with other entities, are leveraging this technical development. Last of all, aquaculture is another productive activity that holds a significant position in Tumaco's economy. The focus groups reported additional economic activities in response to the current situation:

*Bee-keeping started up approximately 15 years ago, in the mid-90s because there was a bonanza in the 80s and 90s, a very strong bonanza, in agriculture, growing palms, fishing...Then came the industrial shrimp farms that hired many people, then during those years there was like a, like a boom, yes, in the 90s, at the end of the 90s, small-scale beekeeping which we participated in appeared... Then the African palm lands were sold, the coconut business is dying, [and] fishing is disappearing because of the spills.*

*The coconut farmers want to regain their land, regain their coconuts, the fishermen, the shrimp farmers ... Coconut trees died, but there are studies that show that coconut trees may be protected so that they never get damaged, the same goes for African palms. (Focus group of beneficiaries, Tumaco, Nariño)*

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<sup>20</sup> USAID Colombia, "Estudio de Caso: Tumaco 2000 - 2015". 1 de Noviembre, 2015, p. 29.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 30.

From the gender perspective, CELI focuses a large part of its effort on supporting companies owned by women where many participants took a leadership role within their communities and in producer associations. In Tumaco, there are shrimp farming projects in particular. CELI supported the alliance between a shrimp processor and a women's association. The shrimp industry has benefited from technological upgrades and new female personnel while the women's association has received shares in the company to create a revolving credit fund for its members.

When all of the regions where CELI N/S has worked are taken as a whole, more than 50% of the beneficiaries supported were women. Of the 45,000 women, 3,000 were the heads of their households.<sup>22</sup>

### **Direct beneficiaries**

Compared to the baseline, the direct beneficiaries of the South region are about 11.5pp more likely than the general population to assert that their economic situation is good or very good. However, approximately 11pp more of those surveyed than those at baseline say that they live in extreme poverty. There are several questions in the survey that have to do with the economic situation and food security and, on average, it does not look like there has been any general change in responses compared to baseline.

The direct beneficiaries of CELI South were more likely than those at baseline (7.5 negative impact) to see unemployment and the lack of opportunities as a serious problem and 9pp more of those interviewed said that illegal activity was the only productive option that was attractive.

With respect to financial topics, beneficiaries saw a 4pp increase in obtaining checking accounts but a 12pp drop in savings accounts. There were no changes in the use of the majority of financial services although those interviewed had close to 20pp less in active savings.

As an atypical case in CELI's four regions, there was a significant change in the pattern of product sales in the South. With a 4pp and 5pp change, the direct beneficiaries were more likely to sell outside of their own municipalities and sell to cooperatives, albeit with a corresponding drop in local sales and to intermediaries at farm entrances. CELI Sur's strategies, which consisted of encouraging alliances in the production of cocoa and other products for sale in distant municipalities, has succeeded in broadening the markets for a growing number of participants. It is also interesting to see that these respondents reported larger purchases outside of the municipality.

At the same time, the direct beneficiaries saw greater problems in production and sales than what was seen at baseline. Close to 10pp more of the direct beneficiaries say that transportation costs are a problem; 9.5pp more said that the quality of the seeds was a problem; 16.5pp more said that interference from armed groups was a problem; and 12.5pp more said that difficulties in getting loans was a problem.

The direct beneficiaries of CELI South universally report positive results with respect to their efforts to work together on productive projects based on a range of questions on the types of benefits they could receive from such alliances. Between 5pp to 12pp more of those interviewed said they had joined in order to get supplies. Almost 13pp more said they had joined to process

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
<sup>22</sup> CELI N/S International Women's Day flyer, undated.

products; and close to 15pp said they had joined in order to sell and transport products as well as receive training, apply for loans, have group representation, and look for financing.

### Global survey: Perceptions of economic conditions

The perceptions of those surveyed in general (both direct and indirect beneficiaries) are less positive. They think that extreme poverty and hunger, which have gone from 34% to 90% and from 18% to 42% respectively, have gotten worse in comparison to the baseline.<sup>23</sup> At baseline, 48% of families said that their economic situation was “good” or “very good,” but only 10% stated that at the mid-line measurement. In contrast, the income received from productive activities improved. At the mid-line, only 10% say that “they provide little money” in comparison with 86% of the households which gave this opinion at baseline. (Figure 5.1)

**Figure 5.1. Trends in the economic situation**



However, the statistical analyses do not show any impact from the intervention to generate economic development that would reduce the poverty families live with. Although there are significant changes between the baseline and the mid-line in some cases, there was no impact because both the magnitude and the direction of the change (positive or negative) is similar in the control municipalities as seen in Figure 5.2.

**Figure 5.2. Impact on the economic situation of households**

Variable	CELI baseline	CELI mid-line	Control baseline	Control mid-line	Impact CELI
The economic situation I am experiencing is good or very good	48%	10%	50%	9%	0.0954
The family is suffering from hunger	18%	42%	11%	33%	0.0538

<sup>23</sup> Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Variable	CELI baseline	CELI mid-line	Control baseline	Control mid-line	Impact CELI
The family is living in extreme poverty	34%	90%	39%	89%	0.0882
Unemployment and a scarcity of opportunities	92%	67%	96%	70%	0.0226
Productive activities earn very little	86%	10%	84%	6%	-0.0471
One of the few attractive, productive options is illegal activities.	11%	2%	17%	1%	0.136
Within the last week I was afraid of running out of food	90%	89%	83%	78%	0.0588
During the last week the family ran out of food due to lack of money	73%	76%	26%	35%	0.00180


The income for those surveyed in the South, measured by their estimated monthly expenditure, rose approximately 20%, from 426,725 COP at baseline to 510,188 COP at mid-line (from \$152 to \$182 USD using an exchange rate of 2,800 COP/\$1). This finding cannot be attributed to the impact of CELI interventions. However, since the control municipalities saw incomes rise at a similar rate, this change is not attributable to CELI. (Figure 5.3)

**Figure 5.3. Trends in income (in Colombian pesos, COP)**

	CELI South			Control		
	Income in the mid-term	Changes from the baseline	% change	Income in the mid-term	Changes from the baseline	% change
Approximate income (monthly estimate of family expenditures)	510,188	83,462	19.6%	373,382	62,939	20.3%

The Consolidation Index measures economic growth using two indicators: the presence of financial services and number of hectares cultivated. The data for the first two years in Tumaco are the same. However, the third year shows a significant increase in the presence of financial entities (2013) and a fall in cultivated hectares. (Figure 5.4)

**Figure 5.4. Secondary data: Consolidation Index, scores, economic growth**



Source: Consolidation Index data, Authors' calculations

The growth of the economic assessment based on these two indicators is not as robust as was expected. The increase in the number of financial institutions in the municipality contrasted with the drop in the number of hectares cultivated indicates that legal economic growth is actually not improving. As was mentioned above, the economy still seems to be permeated with illegal crops. The Index is based on data available from different sources which, in some cases, are not the same as the results of the evaluation, which were based on primary data about citizens' perceptions contained in the findings of the survey.

According to what has been reported by the focus groups on employment, the situation is critical because job opportunities are scarce and the majority of the people are engaged in the informal economy. It is noteworthy that the municipality's top employer is the municipal government. That is why interventions to reinforce economic activities, like in Colombia Responde's case, are welcomed by the community.

*Unemployment is a structural process ... of 100 inhabitants, 25 have some type of work; the rest depend on informal work, so in general, the municipality today is the largest employer. All those agreements and projects that have been signed with international cooperation, as is the case of Colombia Responde, on the issue of being able to rehabilitate the countryside, will become important because planting will start again, people will grow crops again, which will decentralize the people (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

As a means of subsistence, some farmers in the region decided to grow illicit crops:

*Now that there are no coconuts, the fishing is difficult because of the crude oil problem ... which has directly affected ... So now people say - I plant [illegal crops], because I need to buy groceries, I need to ensure food for my children every month. I, what criteria am I going to use to tell them not to plant if I don't have any suggestions to give the family? (Community Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

One economic sector where significant future possibilities can be seen is tourism. Tumaco has places that are of value for their scenery and eco-tourism possibilities and a wide variety of cuisines. However, the security conditions still make development difficult in this sector:

*The advantages of the municipality, because of its location, it is a city with a lot of potential. For example, let's say for business projection and tourism. It is a municipality that has all the transportation routes that you could want, for example, maritime, rivers, overland, aerial, a fair number of roads and, above all, the human talent (Leader of the Community Action Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

*In the Morro [section of beach to the north] and there was a huge number of people ... because there, the military compound controls practically all the beach and all the best land in Tumaco, yes, and this is limiting urban development and the possibilities, yes, of developing tourism, which would absorb an enormous number of those in the workforce that is putting pressure on this problem of insecurity. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

*You know what is going to happen to tourism from Ecuador, with the dollar reaching three thousand pesos, well, tourism will simply move to Tumaco. But, what conditions do you have to offer to tourism, tourism that is not saturated; so we must emphasize this. (Secretary of Economic Development, Tumaco, Nariño)*

When asked, the Tumaqueños responded optimistically to the question about their expectations for their future economic conditions. Today, 86% of the respondents believe that there will be a

better life, which adds to the positive impact of the question related to improvement in legal income (4pp). Likewise, the interviewees in control municipalities expressed even more optimism and, therefore, the results described above are not attributable to CELI. (Figure 5.5)

**Figure 5.5. Impact on expectations for improvement in public utilities in the future**

	Baseline	Mid-line	Impact
Will your living conditions improve in the years ahead?	75%	86%	0.0341
Will the income your household receives from the legal activities you are going to be carrying out improve?	68%	83%	0.0444*
Will the people in your vereda or township see an improvement in their economic situation?	80%	92%	-0.0330*
Will your housing conditions improve?	69%	91%	0.0311
Are you planning to make investments over the next two years that will be essential for the productivity of your household's business?	77%	63%	-0.00296

**Conclusion 1: The economic situation for the average family is getting worse although the effects on CELI's direct participants are positive.** The perception that the condition of extreme poverty has gotten worse has risen and the perception that the economic situation is good or very good has dropped sharply. There is a potential in agriculture, aquaculture, and ecotourism that is positive and legal, but phytosanitary conditions and oil spillage have made success in these sectors difficult. The interventions show no positive effect on economic activity in the region. If this is compared to the above, a very difficult economic future can be predicted with the background data on the weakness of the rule of law. However, a large percentage of those surveyed express hope for a better future.

### Support for productive projects

The priorities established for CELI workers changed from an approach towards strengthening the state's presence to reinforcing agricultural production, rural value chains, and mobilizing public goods. This change in orientation is evident in the relocation of CELI workers from CDCS DO 1 "Civil government presence in the consolidated CSDI areas" to their current location in DO 3 "Conditions for an improved, inclusive rural economic growth." In this regard, the new definition of the CDCS Development Objectives will serve as a guide for the producer associations to help them reach these priority objectives.

As a result, CELI has supported producer associations various ways: technical and training assistance, support for the development of marketing and sales (frequently this also includes training), and assistance in financial services to support production and sales.

One notable example in the Tumaco region was the creation of a consortium for marketing cocoa called "Chocolate Tumaco" with the support of CELI N/S in 2013. Chocolate Tumaco has supported more than 5,300 small producers in the marketing of commodity products. Working

with other organizations supported by CELI N/S in Tumaco and Cordoba, they began to export cocoa to Europe in 2014 and won prizes from a Swiss organization for the quality of the cocoa.<sup>24</sup>

Another good example is the case of a local rice processor who received support from CELI N/S to improve his infrastructure and strengthen his financial and administrative procedures. With these improvements, CELI succeeded in reducing transportation costs for producers and raising their profitability.<sup>25</sup>

CELI gave special attention to organizational formation, development of abilities, and technical assistance for a large variety of crops. The training programs for producer associations addressed various topics which included the improvement of agricultural production, introduction of new crops, the operational and management aspects of their organizations, and training programs for young people to foster the sharing of knowledge and resources with the next generation. The intervention concentrated on giving support to productive activities with an emphasis on reinforcing the value chain through technical assistance, training families in productive processes, and marketing and final sales targeting cultivation and processing cocoa and coconut. CELI works in coordination with the communities' organizational efforts. One interesting example of projects mentioned above is the alliance between a shrimp processor and a women's association. The company has benefited from technological upgrades and the new female personnel while the women's association has received shares in the company to create a revolving credit fund for its members.<sup>26</sup>

According to those surveyed, assistance, training, and in-kind provision as well as support in technical fields are the most frequent types of support that families received (support programs were rated highly, between 88% and 98% at both the baseline and this evaluation. The difference between trainings is minimal.). A decline was seen in the number of households that reported having a business or production unit in comparison to the baseline (from 71% to 41%). No positive impact could be attributed to CELI but the data concludes that there was a 20pp positive impact in the case of technical assistance.

Colombia Responde's support for the community councils and grassroots organizations regarding productive projects is very highly valued by the community. Those who were interviewed reported that the cocoa and coconut crops are very important to the local economy and provide viable economic alternatives for the municipality's rural areas. Secretary of Government for Tumaco explains:

*The production component has been working on cocoa, coconut palm projects that have greatly helped the inhabitants of rural areas. Today it is common knowledge that now Tumaco already exports, and this has been very important. This was a very, very important Colombia Responde program indicator – about when to undertake the whole process of rehabilitation, and it has been, like, the continual support for community councils and grassroots organizations. [That] is why today Tumaco returns again to its countryside areas, to reactivate them so that people today are growing crops on a large scale. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

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<sup>24</sup> CELI N/S Quarterly Report, July-September 2014, p. 15.


<sup>25</sup> CELI N/S Quarterly Report, Q1 FY16 Sept – Dec 2015, p. 25.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 29.



According to the data reported, working together generally increases for productive projects. The incentives for joining associations that reoccur the most are those related to transportation and selling products. The number of families that gave priority to these incentives went from 13% to 25% (transportation) and from 9% to 19% (sales) compared to the baseline. Training remains the most important incentive for joining associations. (Figure 5.6)

**Figure 5.6. Trends in reasons for joining forces**




The results from the focus groups show that different productive projects in the municipality have been successfully supported by funds from international sources, especially projects that were created by small farmer associations. In the case of cocoa, the production has risen significantly and today, this product reaches international markets. As a consequence, the number of cocoa producing associations has risen.

**Conclusion 2: There are positive effects for the direct beneficiaries of CELI**, particularly the technical assistance for productive projects in which families seek to improve technical output in order to receive greater productivity gains (and for which they have indicated they are very grateful). This assistance has generated more associations and searches for funding to finance productive projects. All of this is directly linked to meeting both CELI’s and PNCRT’s objectives. The tendency to join forces became important for dealing with the use of technology for coconut and palm farming and shrimp production. These were devastated in previous periods due to phytosanitary health problems, but the community realizes that they have huge potential. These positive results were not enough to have a major and more general impact on the people interviewed.

### Markets and commerce


According to those interviewed, the marketing channels that are used the most but are not the most preferred are the municipality seat and sales to wholesalers or intermediaries. These opinions are maintained at baseline and in the current evaluation. However, sales to wholesalers have declined as a preference by 28% compared to what was reported at baseline (it went from 61% to 33%). Other channels which saw an improvement in performance were sales in the market square (this went from 11% to 29%) and sales in nearby towns and to the general public which went from 7% to 13% and from 16% to 22% respectively. No impact attributable to CELI can be seen. (Figure 5.7)

**Figure 5.7. Trends in the marketing channels for small-farm products**




When asked about places or channels for purchasing supplies and products, the municipality seat is the place they turn to the most often. The rest of the places that are preferred are outside of the municipality or in *veredas* or nearby towns. (Figure 5.8)

**Figure 5.8. Trends in the marketing channels for small-farm products**



Problems related to producing and marketing are primarily due to the fact that prices for final products are very low, although this perception has declined compared to what was reported at baseline (from 96% to 72%). Other problems are associated with the high cost of transportation and supplies. The abuse from intermediaries is less of a problem, according to interview respondents. It dropped from 65% to 43%, even as it continues to be problematic for commercial relationships. This finding had a positive impact of 11pp that can be attributed to CELI. (Figure 5.9)

**Figure 5.9. Trends in problems related to production and marketing**



The cost of transportation, quality of the soil, and lack of water did not show positive improvements (Figure 5.10). Only the control municipalities underscored the lack of water as a problem that is more serious today than it was at the baseline.

**Figure 5.10. Trends in production and marketing problems**

CELI		Control
↓	Very high costs for supplies	↓
↓	Exploitation by the intermediaries	↓
↓	Very low prices for products	↓
↑	Very high transportation costs	↓
↑	Poor soil quality	↓
↑	Lack of water	↑
↓	Interference from armed groups	↓
↓	Ban on coca	↓
↓	Lack of access to credit	↓

In the focus groups, problems in marketing related to competition with pre-processed, low-cost foreign products was of serious concern. The consequence of this was that the local prices were not competitive. The case of coconuts illustrates this situation:

*They [companies] were buying cheaper coconuts that came from Sri Lanka, came from Vietnam, came from Asian countries, because they entered the country already processed, so we had difficulties with sales and it was a time of good production; local farmers were told no, we could not buy from you, we stopped because they are not accepting them on the domestic market; there were coconuts coming from Venezuela, coconuts coming from Panama, from around the San Blas islands. (Producers Association, Tumaco, Nariño)*

One of the initiatives for improving the producers' incomes is to produce products that are certified as coming from green and environmentally responsible production. This is the case with small-scale fishing among the mangroves in that region:

*As for fishing, it does not improve at all, because we don't yet have something like a Community Council. A purchase, in which we say that we are going to buy everything, in all parts of the territory ...those who make a living by fishing, we are going to buy what they produce and that product, let's say, we also pack it, place a nice design on the package, for example we'll put the green label on it, with the green label getting added value, they pay us more. So that is the idea... generate a better quality of life for our producers, our people, our territories. (Community Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

As was indicated, the difficulties in transportation and associated costs are a bottleneck for merchandising the products since the majority of the profits stay in the hands of the intermediaries. In some cases, the associations have built collection centers and methods of community transportation for products:

*There are many who have their own boat, so they store it there, a post-harvest handling that is not mobile, part of the husks are cut; they store it in a place in the same veredas; they have small warehouses that they have built nearby, there on the river bank or in the house, then they organize what they have produced and bring it down to Tumaco on a boat; sometimes two, three farmers get together in the same boat and bring it as a group. The Cooperative has a collection center, what the Cooperative also does is buy from the farmer and send it to Bogotá. (Association of Cocoa Farmers, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 3:** As a share of the sales, markets in territories that are being consolidated continue to be local and regional. Export markets are still limited. Small producers are affected by the high costs of marketing by which small, mostly undeveloped, and non-specialized markets are characterized. In this case, the transaction costs are very high and the communities remain trapped in a vicious cycle where there is little incentive to increase production and, at the same time, the rise in production generated by external markets runs up against the rigidity of the local market and lack of preparation to export to other regions.

**Conclusion 4:** Technical assistance and support for merchandising help to counteract problems related to the low profitability. Those surveyed and interviewed report that these problems have diminished in their productive projects. The region has a tradition of self-help and creativity while searching for common solutions. Nevertheless, markets with enough supply and demand are needed to allow for products with prices that are above the costs of production and transportation. This also suggests a need for more support from the government in supplying public goods, such as multi-modal methods of transportation, in order to lower transportation costs (a critical factor in the area). The lack of access to broader markets inside and outside of the consolidation areas hinders success for PNCRT and CELI. Likewise, the productive projects counteract incentives to plant illegal crops. However, given the poor markets, pressure from armed groups, environmental crises from oil spills, and the persistent lack of access roads (see the sub-section on road infrastructure further ahead in this chapter), it is difficult for programs and policies to have the desired effects. The fact that these structural problems have been present historically and are ultimately the responsibility of the GOC and a reflection of the state's absence for decades makes it very unlikely that programs like CELI or PNCRT itself will produce sustainable effects.

## Savings, credit, and financial services

Throughout the life of the project, more than 20,000 men and women have mobilized the 16 focus municipalities to participate in the GLACs<sup>27</sup> in an effort to reduce poverty under the auspices of the Bank of Opportunities, a GOC program. As of 2014, CELI N/S started working to establish GLACs in Tumaco.

In 2015, CELI N/S expanded the program to help its members use their savings to generate more income and create small businesses such as micro franchises for small goods.<sup>28</sup> About 71% of those who participate in GLACs are women and a significant part of the intervention is directed towards them. Many women are taking advantage of these plans to improve their situation.<sup>29</sup> The female participants in GLAC who were interviewed for a study ordered by CELI N/S in 2015 reported that as beneficiaries of these groups, they had developed more confidence, had become better able to express themselves, and had been able to set up their own project<sup>30</sup> which improved family integration. Furthermore, the GLACs are the platform for setting up distribution channels for other ventures such as selling gas for kitchens and electronic payment points.<sup>31</sup> The community believes that these are very good alternatives to other types of informal credit such as *gota a gota* or *pagadiario* loans. Due to the scarcity of financing, this type of informal credit has gained ground, in addition to very high resource and security costs for these regions.

The associations, in turn, have created rotating funds through which the participating producers can get loans and which are valuable for the families and production. However, the sustainability of the funds depends on internal supervision and clear rules. Within the groups, confidence is the key element for ensuring that the debt is paid in the midterm. This will give the Funds viability in the long term.

The data from the Consolidation Index show a substantial growth in the number of financial entities in Tumaco. They report seven entities per 10,000 inhabitants in 2014, which is a significant increase over the 0.43 entities per 10,000 inhabitants in 2011. This level of financial entity representation is similar to what the comparison municipalities have.

Nevertheless, survey data show a decline in the perception of using banks for savings accounts compared to what was reported at baseline (from 38% to 25%). At the same time, checking accounts and using banks for paying utilities rose from 1% to 5% and from 17% to 19% respectively. The data show that family indebtedness dropped (from 62% to 49%) as did ongoing loans (from 65% to 59%). The percentage of people with any kind of debt (formal or informal) fell in Tumaco, but less than it did in the control municipalities. (Figure 5.11)

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<sup>27</sup> Local credit and savings groups.


<sup>28</sup> CELI N/S, QR 2 FY 2015, p. 27.

<sup>29</sup> From conversations and email with Deputy Chief of Party of the CELI on the importance of women's involvement in the GLACs.

<sup>30</sup> Ospina, Sofi. (2015). Saving, Adding and Developing: A study of the local credit and savings groups (GLAC), p. 5.

<sup>31</sup> CELI N/S Annual Report, FY 2015, p. 23.

**Figure 5.11. Trends in the use of banks and access to credit**



Based on the results from the focus groups, one of the reasons why people belong to associations is the chance of getting loans and cooperative aid, which is similar to what happens in other regions. This implies that there is an economic rationale for associations:


*There are several factors [that generated associations], but the first factor may be that the Agricultural Bank started granting us association loans under individual responsibility. That forced the farmers to associate to be able to create programs; that's, on one hand, the thing about loans. (Local official from Colombia Responde, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 5:** Based on the results of the survey, the use of banking services and regular credit has fallen in both the region under treatment and the control municipalities. Loans from rotating funds and local savings and loan groups with their significant links to associations and confidence are also interesting as alternatives to informal loans.


### Transportation and infrastructure

Regarding the issue of connectivity, families' perceptions of the state of transportation infrastructure generally decreased. At baseline, 35% of the people said they had roads that connected them to the rest of the municipality. Today only 22% hold this opinion. The same thing has occurred, though to a lesser degree, regarding their connections to other municipalities, dropping from 35% to 30%. (Figure 5.12)

**Figure 5.12. Trends in the perceptions of infrastructure and transportation**




The Consolidation Index includes two indicators on the issue of roads in the connectedness component on the Regional Integration Pillar. These data are shown in Figure 5.13.



The first indicators from the Consolidation Index reported the percentage of the main population centers in the municipality that are connected (by road, river or sea) to the municipality seat throughout the whole year. The index scores with respect to the connection to towns are particularly high (100% for the majority of the years). This is substantially different from the survey's results and findings from the dispersed rural respondents presented above. The second indicator shows that there is an asphalt or paved road from the municipality to a main city. It should be reemphasized that the data from the Index are data supplied by non-primary sources.

When the data regarding the means used the most to reach their homes are reviewed, we find that the use of paved roads has declined in comparison to the baseline (from 43% to 36%) while the use of dirt roads has increased (from 27% to 31%). From these data, we can conclude that the roads have deteriorated. Of those surveyed, 28% said that they had access to their homes by river transport. This method is particularly important in Tumaco due to its geography and extensive river system (Figure 5.13). Support for improving the river systems was not an area that CELI South intervened in apart from facilitating oversight for a project financed through the Nariño Contract Plan.<sup>32</sup> That is why CELI is not expected to have any impact on roads.

One of the most critical issues in the region is undoubtedly their connection to the interior, to the department, and the rest of the country to improve the competitiveness of the territory. This is an important challenge for the GOC and for cooperation in the post agreement stage.




Upon reviewing the data on the means of transportation used, a notable increase in the use of buses/mini-buses and motorcycles and a decrease in the use of cars or jeeps can be seen, which is associated with families' economic situations. Nonetheless, among those who reported using a car or jeep, the percentage of those who mentioned that this means of transportation was

<sup>32</sup> Referenced in an exchange with the CELI North/South Deputy Chief of Party.

personally owned went from 1% to 5%. Those who used a motorcycle (personally owned means of transportation) went from 16% to 33%. It should be noted that, in absolute numbers, this figure is relatively low (Figure 5.15). Among the respondents, the use of a truck, bicycle, or animal for transportation is almost nonexistent.

**Figure 5.15. Trends in the means of transportation that are used**



From a qualitative point of view, the participants in the focus groups agreed with responses to the survey – that there are no roads and those that do exist are in very poor conditions. This increases production costs and makes marketing products difficult.

*There should be a study or a deposit, or I don't know what it is called, so that from that point there is a connection to a market ... Sometimes many things are raised here, for example, a chicken farm, and it raises two thousand chickens, and in three, four months, it is making a profit; the same things happens with fish, cachama is raised, there are many ways to work ... There are no roads. Part is moved over rivers, and the other part is moved by road, so there is no way to take it out, no way to transport it. (Amerindian leader, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 6: The road infrastructure is an unresolved issue.** Just as was identified in the “Case study: Tumaco” (2015) and in the main evaluation report, the high transportation costs constitute a very high barrier to gaining access to legal markets for small farmers. Access may even be impossible in some cases due to the lack of land routes or because river transportation is even more costly than land transportation. This situation also affects access to production supplies and, as a consequence, increases the costs of production.

The data show a low and constantly dropping opinion of the quality of the roads. Even though CELI's objective in this regard supplements the government's responsibility, Tumaco's isolation and its economic and social situation should be enough of a reason to reinforce the support for alternative technological solutions that will help reduce costs and extend multi-modal transportation services throughout the region. In the case of land routes, support for the implementation of participatory community-based models for managing a tertiary road system could be a very interesting alternative in the current peace-building scenario.

## Land

One of CELI's important contributions to Tumaco was opening a new land office. The purpose for this was to, on the one hand, coordinate with the institutional authorities who were responsible for the registration process and, on the other, make the public conscious of public services in this respect. In 2015, CELI N/S established an alliance with the Superintendency of Notaries Public and Registries (SNR in Spanish), which supervises the process of registering land titles in urban areas. They supported the hiring of surveyors and land experts in order to raise the visibility of pertinent institutions and improve their effectiveness in finding a remedy to



the land problem.<sup>33</sup> Through this alliance, “titles to 1,667 pieces of property have been registered to date in the municipalities of Tumaco, Valencia, Montelibano, and Puerto Libertador under Act 137/1959, which empowers municipalities to incorporate and cede unused urban property to vulnerable communities”<sup>34</sup> along with other assistance to the land sector. CELI N/S reports that approximately 3,000 more properties will have registered titles towards the end of 2016 with a special effort in Bajo Cauca’s municipalities.

One of the big problems that the Tumaco region has faced over the last decade is the migration of coca-growing settlers from Putumayo who appropriate land that is apparently unused or buy property that really belongs to the community councils:

*A large part of the 360,000 hectares, nearly 200,000, are located on land belonging to black communities, I think there no major difficulties with this. Here, in about the year ... in 2000, more or less, the land problems occurred when the whole process of eradicating coca began; people who came from Putumayo, Caqueta, to cultivate it, settlers with coca. So there were people...they began to interfere. There were even people from the same community... since there is a lot of land that is apparently vacant, they began to sell... There have been ownership problems, towards, mostly, the area of Mira River (Association of Cocoa Farmers, Tumaco, Nariño)*


In order to deal with this situation, issuing titles has been encouraged as a formalization mechanism. The data collected show that the title registration process has improved, increasing from 23% of the property with titles at baseline to 32%. This is consistent with the decline in the number of properties reportedly without legal titles. When land-use patterns are observed, an increase has been noted in the use of sharecropping contracts that have gone from 1% to 8%. In the hands of small farmers who know how to work the land, this allows versatility in agricultural work. It is noteworthy that there is a reported decrease of 11% in the use of land for agriculture compared to the baseline, decreasing from 81% to 70%. The decline in control municipalities is more drastic, decreasing from 68% to 37%. CELI has had a positive effect of 10pp. (Figure 5.16)

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<sup>33</sup> CELI N/S Annual Report, FY 2015, p. 45.

<sup>34</sup> Communications with CELI Deputy COP, 18 sept 2016.

**Figure 5.16. Trends in the use and status with respect to land ownership**




In the case of Tumaco, focus studies have been done to push the process of registering property ahead. However, one of the difficulties they have faced is that there are no updated survey maps of the region that would make it possible to set property boundaries. A local official from Colombia Responde told us:

*In some areas where there has been displacement or displaced people have arrived, it is necessary to do a study of the properties to see if those people who are there now are actually the owners of those properties in order to advance the process of title registration. And in that, on that topic, let's say action was taken along with IGAD; this topic is related to case studies and was done with Legal Option... I think that is what it is called. So, let's say, there is already a pilot that shows us where the main weaknesses are prior to starting to issue titles to those properties. One is the mapping issue. There is no survey map for a portion of the municipality to the north; like from Llorente or Guayacán on, there is no cartographic drawing, so the titles can't be issued. (Local official from Colombia Responde, Tumaco, Nariño)*

In addition to the above, when asked why they have not registered their ownership of the property, the most common answers are related to their belief that it is not necessary to expedite that process and the lack of funds to pay for it. Nevertheless, the response that it was not necessary was reported to a lesser degree than at baseline (from 34% to 28%) and the response that they did not register it due to lack of funds saw a similar decrease from 28% to 24%. In spite of the above, CELI generated a positive impact (12pp) on family awareness about considering registration a necessary step. (Figure 5.17)

**Figure 5.17. Trends in reasons why property has not been registered**



The focus groups stated that the situation for land restitution was quite complex since the small farmers in the Andean region, the community councils and reservations all owned land on the Pacific corridor. Rather than cases in which people are dispossessed or coerced into selling by armed groups, there are cases of abandoning the property due to the armed conflict:

*Our department has the highest number of restitution decisions, but is the one with the fewest hectares because Nariño small farmers are very poor. We have the image of a micro-farm ... people do not even own a hectare. Dispossession did not take place. What took place was abandonment. As a result of the widespread violence people were displaced since they ran away, but the property was not taken by anyone else. And there is also the problem of the second occupant, in which there is someone I want to evict from the land; so the unit has established measures so that this person does not end up living on the street, but rather receives help. (Land Restitution Unit, Pasto, Nariño)*

In comparison to the data gathered at the beginning of data collection in 2011, the Consolidation Index reports some improvements in the land processes carried out by the government. Tumaco has significantly ramped up its local zoning plan. However, also based on the Index, the municipality was not (2014) one of those that had been given priority in the selection of cases which are critical for land restitution.

It should be recognized that, with the support of Colombia Responde, the land registration process began in the municipality of Tumaco's urban area, with the expectation of extending it to the rural areas. Formalization is the first step to future title registration. CELI's support has also been important for the preparation of the municipality POT in order to have suitable planning for the territory:


*Today the Colombia Responde program is taking on the responsibility of registering almost 250 pieces of property ... There is also the possibility that this POT formulation will also help the municipality to undertake that process ... it makes it possible for the municipality to move on with removing barriers to growth on the mainland. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

On the road map for land restitution in the municipality of Tumaco, the process of registering the property is just beginning. The effort made to achieve institutional coordination has to be stressed.

*There is a subcommittee of land which is specifically very aware of the processes and procedures; Incoder, the notary public office, the housing office, the land office that was recently created to reinforce the process, and the Bureau of Planning, the Superintendency of Notaries and Registration are involved in this; [this has been] key. Coordinated work has been done specifically for the process of registration of land, on how it should be finalized. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*


Inheritance and purchase continue to be the most commonly reported mechanisms for ownership of property, as can be seen in Figure 5.18. The differences between what was reported at the baseline and this measurement are minimal.

**Figure 5.18. Trends in the mechanisms for acquiring land**



Few reported having paid property taxes in the last two years. At baseline, 5% stated that they had paid it and at mid-line only 3% did. Their willingness to pay went from 77% to 69%. The assertion that “paying taxes is a citizen’s duty” also fell from 53% to 49%. Nevertheless, the willingness to pay for regularizing the property rose 9%, going from 20% to 29%. It is notable that the percentage of families who are willing to pay taxes to carry out public works projects dropped from 12% to 3%. These aspects are related to the legitimacy of and confidence in public entities. (Figure 5.19)

**Figure 5.19. Trends in the willingness to pay taxes**



Those who did not pay justified it by saying that the land did not produce enough to pay those taxes (this went from 52% to 41%) or that no one else paid them (from 37% to 31%). At the mid-

line, those who say they have not paid because they are in the process of restitution has risen (from 1% to 3%).

**Conclusion 7: The factors inherent in the ownership of land demand greater knowledge and intervention on the part of public policy with respect to land, securing titles, and restoration.** CELI's progress is limited when compared against the huge numbers of requests for registering titles and restitution. While CELI is able to support the processes, in the end, it is the state that has to resolve differences between citizens and the interests involved in land issues.

The implementation of the restitution policy is being affected by threats which, in some cases, have resulted in people preferring to lose the land rather than undertake the process of legalizing the titles. This also comes along with the incentive the settlers have to formally take ownership of the land, which generates conflicts over ownership between the settlers, communities and reservations.

## Recommendations

- 1. Make simultaneous improvements in agricultural production and marketing by taking advantage of local opportunities (conclusions 1, 2, and 4)** Any increase in production should go hand-in-hand with an improvement in quality and better performance in marketing products. Intermittent or seasonal production and low quality production is not attractive for the national market. In this respect, CELI's activities have created alliances between the private sector and producers' associations and succeeded in making qualitative progress for both stakeholders and, therefore, fostering and reproducing them is recommended. The GOC must make sure to solve the infrastructure deficiencies as was mentioned above, as well fix market shortcomings, establish programs to improve relationships with intermediaries and business allies, and broaden and duplicate CELI's progress with cocoa, shrimp, and rice producers in Tumaco. This should be one of the key priorities in the country's post-conflict policy and in the Tumaco region.
- 2. Support an array of markets (conclusions 2, 3 and 4)** It is important to support commercialization projects designed to improve both regional markets and projects that export goods to other regions, which may provide a solution to local overproduction and low prices. In such cases, specific programs are needed that intentionally bring small-scale producers and intermediaries together in the productive process to work with broader marketing efforts to improve quality or to involve banks to increase access to working capital.
- 3. Emphasize additional coordination with national initiatives (conclusions 2, 3, and 4)** CELI's intervention to help production requires better coordination, use of technology, and innovation using instruments that the country has designed to improve productivity and encourage formalization. These instruments are related to the implementation of irrigation districts; drainage; collection points; refrigeration chains from the perspective of crops and harvests or production; access to services and financing and banking services; technical assistance that is coordinated with technological facilities; strategies for technological extension for those initiatives that show commitment and maturity;

access to document registration, etc. An analysis of the draft policy for the production development that the DNP is making progress on and a review of the instruments that are being designed there are recommended to correct market failures and improve the economic growth of these communities.

- 4. Plan for intermediate food security in productive projects (conclusion 1)** CELI and USAID should make concerted efforts to ensure that the programs that support productive projects also support food security. This situation should be anticipated by providing TA and traditional farm or other sustenance activities that minimize dependency. The productive projects must combine short- and long-term returns in order to ensure cash flow and project sustainability at the household level.
- 5. Reinforce initiatives for improving multi-modal transportation and, in the case of land infrastructure, use participatory models for improving tertiary roads (conclusions 3, 4, and 6)** To the degree that road and river infrastructure improves, access to the markets will improve and dependence on intermediaries for both purchasing supplies and selling final products will be reduced. USAID has been moving ahead on an analysis of the national policy for tertiary roads and proposes that the participatory mechanisms for maintaining the tertiary roads and the strengthening of the social fabric that CELI has been implementing be reinforced. Likewise, supporting the search for alternative technological solutions that would help reduce costs and increase the availability of water transportation services in the region is recommended.
- 6. The processes for land restitution need to be more effective (conclusion 7)** The process of land restitution requires greater efficacy in the management of public instruments, the updating of the property registry, and coordinated action on the national level to guarantee an informed process with respect to restitution and legally registering property. Facilitating new relationships with, on the one hand, state entities which replaced INCODER (the Agency for Rural Development and the National Land Agency) and, on the other, the already existing Land Restitution Unit should be a priority. As the post-agreement period draws closer, the government and cooperating agencies will have to keep in mind the possibility that there could be new types of conflicts over land and develop appropriate responses to all the interested parties: ethnic minorities, small farmers, and economic interests.

In this regard, CELI's intervention should be considered a function of encouraging the formal registration of property rights to land and furthering the development of productive activities and of profitable environmental services conforming to the categories of existing environmental regulation just as has been done in projects associated with the production of competitive varieties of cocoa and coconut.

- 7. Continue working to expand financial services (conclusion 5)** Rotating funds are a suitable instrument for meeting the loan needs that the communities and productive families have. CELI should strengthen these funds through guidelines for good fund management, monitoring systems, exchanging successful experiences, and performance-based incentives.

# INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

## *Evaluation questions:*

To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?

What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)

## **Findings and conclusions**

Overall, participation, transparency, accountability and trust show neutral or negative results in the midline evaluation. This coincides with the figures across the samples in the evaluation, and appears to be a trend encouraged by factors well outside the CELIs' influence.

### **Participation**

During the local election cycle towards the end of 2015, CELI made a significant effort to increase electoral participation, prevent vote fraud, improve transparency, and teach citizens to value their democratic rights. To that effect, activities were prepared that were oriented towards specific audiences such as young people, women, and leaders of social organizations and included a series of citizen-candidate dialogs with more than 4,000 participants to improve the quality of electoral participation, workshops with more than 1,500 participants to foster a culture of participation, a transparency strategy to teach 300 leaders about issues of vote fraud, and work with the media including traditional publications and communication by radio, theater, and soccer games.<sup>35</sup>


Participation was measured in the survey by an index that included variables such as participation in political parties, the JACs, and monitoring and oversight groups; the view of participation in the elections; voter registration; and actual voting in the last presidential election. The sum of these indicators does not show any significant changes since the baseline where it registered approximately 37.5 points over 100.

When the data from the surveys are seen, both the registration of ID cards in order to vote (from 91% to 97%) and the actual vote in the 2010 elections (88% to 96%) rose. The below covers almost all of those surveyed. (Figure 6.1)

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
<sup>35</sup> CELI N/S Annual Report FY 2015, p. 24, 53.

**Figure 6.1. Trends in the perceptions about the intention to vote and voting**



When the above figure is compared to reasons for voting, respondents say that “every vote counts,” that there are candidate proposals that are appealing, and that voting is a responsibility. While these perceptions showed no change or significant effects compared to what had been reported at baseline, they are still highly regarded. The data show that, to some degree, there is coercion or vote buying, a phenomenon that has historically been linked to the institutional structure of the municipality. (Figure 6.2)


**Figure 6.2. Trends in reasons for voting**



In addition, when those who did not vote are asked why they did not, there is a rise in the perception that voting is difficult. This went from 6% to 29% compared to what was reported at the baseline (Figure 6.3). Nevertheless, in absolute numbers, those who did not vote are only a fraction of the sample.




**Figure 6.3. Trends in the reasons for not voting**



Now, when the data regarding the emergence of new leadership are reviewed, the trend holds that both women and young people have legitimacy in the community, contrasting with the decrease (compared to what was reported at baseline) in support for the idea that ex-combatants could become potential political figures. (Figure 6.4)

**Figure 6.4. Trends in possible new leaders**



**Conclusion 1: New political projects can reinforce democracy.** The intention to vote and the real exercise of this right has increased, and the reasons for voting are associated with improving legitimacy. A viable option includes encouraging new leaders – including young people and women – who represent the evolution of voter communities and are developing innovative platforms. The democratic efforts CELI has carried out coincide with greater participation, which is why it can be inferred that those who attended CELI activities were better informed about the electoral process. Nevertheless, there is still a high perception that voting is difficult and that the state should reinforce democratic processes.

**Conclusion 2: The stigma of having been IAG combatants affects their legitimacy as potential community leaders.** In light of the peace process and in a post-conflict environment, there is no evidence that guerrillas can have credibility or provide representation in the communities where they have been operating.

**Transparency and accountability**

One of the components of transparency is the degree to which the citizens participate in the process of citizen oversight. In the South region, the respondents were a little more likely to participate in oversight efforts at mid-line, but only 5% of those surveyed participated. There was

a small rise in the percentage of those who participated in decision-making, going from 55% at baseline to 60% at mid-line, which indicates an improvement in the quality of their participation.

The Consolidation Index also has indicators on citizen participation including the percentage of municipal funds that are subject to legal control mechanisms, but the data on Tumaco are lacking these numbers. At the same time, Tumaco increased the operational nature of their institutional areas for citizen participation with periodical meetings of the Municipal Council for Social Policy and the work of the Municipal Council for Rural Development that is in its early stages.

The survey questions were combined into a 100-point index of accountability. The survey asked to what extent the mayor kept citizens updated on public expenditures, the presence or absence of citizen oversight and the degree to which the local government took citizens' opinions into account when making decisions. Together, these indicators resulted in 22.6 points over 100 at baseline index, but this dropped to 16.2 points at mid-line. This also decreased in the control municipalities and no impact was found.

In the South region, what has been reported shows that the perception of the factors that affect the institutional structure are the lack of health services, education, childcare, and the deficiency in the availability of public utilities has improved with respect to the baseline (this went from 69% to 31%) and at the same time, 47% of those surveyed at baseline were of the opinion that there is a failure on the part of the municipality to respond to requests. Corruption, the lack of decisive action being taken in infrastructure and transportation and the lack of confidence in public entities become paramount in this evaluation as factors that affect the institutional structure. When these factors are reviewed for the control municipalities, better performance is seen. (Figure 6.5)

**Figure 6.5. Trends in perceptions of problems with the management of the municipality**

CELI		Control
↑	Distrust of public entities	↑
→	Municipal managers do not pay attention to requests from the community	↑
↑	The administration is not able to solve the community's problems.	↓
↓	The deficiencies of public utilities for households	↓
↑	Lack of highways	↓
↑	Corruption	↑
↓	The lack of institutional services: hospitals, schools, courts, and kindergartens	↓
↑	The municipal management does not report on what it is doing.	↓
↓	The municipal authorities invite the community to express their opinions about subjects that are of interest to the community	↓
↓	The municipal authorities take the opinions of the citizens into account when they make decisions	→

The Consolidation Index deals with four indicators related to good governance: collection of funds from projects that use royalties; Open Government Index, inherent to the government (IGA); and the percentage of eligible individuals who pay taxes (property and industry tax / commerce ICO tax). To finance projects that use royalties, Tumaco has the highest score required to get access to such funds. The region reported full compliance with the Industry and Commerce tax, but less than 20% with property tax payments. As noted above, the IGA score


for Tumaco is 34.9, adjusted to 55.8 when compared to that of similar municipalities for purposes related to the Consolidation Index.

One of the main contributions the Colombia Responde program in the municipality of Tumaco was their support for updating tax laws. The importance of having expert consultants who provided advice in this area and the current possibility that the municipality has to earn its own revenue and strengthen its ability to improve the provision of public utilities are also highlighted:

*It is important to try to update the tax statute, which was very relevant to strengthening revenue, meaning not only that of the municipality of Tumaco but also that of the entire coastal area ... I think that project, that agreement which has been signed with Colombia Responde, certainly with the support of expert consultants in the field of tax updating, is very important, and the tax statute was approved by the city council and that will help to increase the revenue for the municipality. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

The management of the municipal and national government remain low and fall considerably with respect to what was reported at baseline (Figure 6.6), which affects confidence in institutions and their exercise of power and has repercussions on the legitimacy of the state as the guarantor and protector of rights. This affects the leadership processes required for the implementation of government interventions and the recovery of territories from armed groups (Figure 6.7). It is likely that the result was affected by the fact that the survey was done during the election period.

**Figure 6.6. Trends in perceptions of the management of government entities**



When questioning respondents about accountability, there is also a low perception, which implies greater efforts to achieve greater governance (Figure 6.8). No impact was found on these indicators, because in general the control municipalities showed the same or similar trends.


**Figure 6.7. Trends in the citizens' perceptions of public management**

CELI		Control
↓	The municipal government's management is described as good or very good.	↓
↓	The administration of the Governor's office is described as good or very good	↓
↓	The National Government's management is described as good or very good	↓
↓	Have considerable / a lot of trust in the municipal government's commitment to managing a construction project.	↓
↓	Have considerable / a lot of trust in the chairman of JAC's commitment to managing a construction project.	↓

Consistent with the above, when those surveyed were asked about accountability, the level of positive management was very low, implying that greater effort is needed to achieve legitimacy for

the exercise of real governance (Figure 6.8). No impact on these indicators was found since, in general, the control municipalities showed the same or similar trends.

**Figure 6.8. Trends in the mechanisms for accountability**



Within the focus groups, it is clear that the processes of making local or national authorities accountable to the community are just beginning to be strengthened. However, there is growing awareness among the people regarding the need to monitor public projects and resources:

*There is a bit of carelessness in the political dimension because if all of our communities would join forces to look and help, then it could be said that the national and international programs would be run well ... Our communities have not yet learned to demand respect for our duties, nor for our rights. Because we are afraid of everything ... I go and I say, "Mr. Mayor what is your role, we need you to clarify this for us," I'm sure that any mayor would do very well, and if a good mayor does well then things will go well for everybody else. We are not talking only about the mayor, but also about the municipal, departmental, national governments because that's what's needed, that the government runs well so that things go well for all of us too. (Community Action Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

The problems that the implementation of the municipality's Development Plan has had, the prior consultations with the communities, and the difficulty of getting access to information were discussed in a community council. The Plan was discovered to have been plagiarized from another municipality. This was cause for a sanction issued by the Attorney General and, as a result, all the processes were delayed:

*When the municipality's Development Plan began, a bunch of workshops, workshops sponsored by community councils were held. Six months went by and that plan didn't get off the ground, there is no investment, we aren't doing anything. We seek information - the problem is that the Development Plan must have all the statistical information. That, at least, gives a notion of what the urban area, the rural area, is like in terms of productivity. Then, when we realize that the Municipality of Tumaco's Development Plan was vetoed because it was a copy ... Then, the agricultural investments were stopped; only the issue of infrastructure was stopped; the only issue that received attention were the ones related to children, education, and health ... Imagine what might be or where it might be, and what might be the future of a municipality on such a map. (Community council focus group, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 3: The processes for accountability still need to be consolidated; they are affecting confidence in the institutional approach.** In spite of the efforts to implement these practices that have been in development for a number of years and that have been taken over by CELI, positive effects have not yet been achieved. No exercise in participatory planning,


implementation, nor follow-up is evident. This is also affected by the gaps in the communities' participation in control and oversight even though an improvement in the performance of these mechanisms has been seen.

**Conclusion 4: The citizens' perceptions of the management and governance processes in Tumaco are still negative.** The drop across almost all of the measurements indicates that the efforts to consolidate the state's presence in this municipality have failed.

### Confidence

The low confidence in public institutions, which is widespread throughout the country, is reaffirmed in this region. Based on the responses of those surveyed, all of the institutions lost perceived trust, some of them by a considerable amount, such as in the case of the JACs and municipal government/mayor. (Figure 6.9)

**Figure 6.9. Trends in having confidence in institutions (considerable or a lot)**



In addition to the findings described above, more than a quarter of the sample in Tumaco responded that IAGs have positive effects on local government (from just 2% at baseline to 26% at mid-line). In contrast, the percentage of those who say that the presence of IAGs has a negative effect on municipal management dropped with respect to the figure reported at baseline (from 53% to 15%).

The data showed that phenomena attributable to corruption such as bribery of public officials were present. This went from 3% to 6% of reported cases, and the perception of their honesty went from 18% to 7%.

In addition, it can be seen that, within the focus groups, the local governments are perceived by the community as political strongholds in which projects and public offices are used to pay electoral favors:

*In my interpretation ... I tell you, zero confidence due to high levels of corruption, not only in Tumaco but all around the country ... People's perception is that this has not changed. I think that if you do a survey, I think people still think that the municipal government is a stronghold where favors are paid, when the municipal government should be seen as a development manager. (Secretary of Planning, Tumaco, Nariño)*

Institutional reinforcement programs have gradually allowed the community to develop greater confidence in local institutions since an historical distrust of state entities was the norm:

*The municipality has been carrying the baggage of historical distrust, what these programs and projects have made possible is for the municipality to begin to develop trust with its institutions, with its citizens, and to allow the structure of the territorial entity to be somewhat reorganized, and this has been very well received by the citizens. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

One thing that is particular to Tumaco is the large number of community councils in the territory. However, they lack the capabilities that would enable them to develop group projects in their communities. The institutional reinforcement of these local bodies would make it possible to have better coordination with regional and national policies:

*There is an institutional framework based on community councils that represents a high percentage, over 80% of the territory of Tumaco, and which are community-owned lands and are backed by the constitution and the law. One would expect that, twenty years after the enactment of Act 70, almost since 1993, the level of development in this would be like the development of indigenous territories, and there is a huge liability on the part of the state. I would also say that those who cooperate have failed to understand that developing those organizations institutionally is better than giving assistance to projects. (Secretary of Planning, Tumaco, Nariño)*

Some of the national institutions are perceived as bureaucratic entities which ignore the realities and processes experienced in the territories. To that extent, the proposals or guidelines given at the national level are seen as measures imposed on them that disregard the communities:


*The presence of institutions at the national level for the agricultural sector... totally ignore reality and don't make any effort to approach the communities, and in many cases disregard the decisions made by the region at its various levels, breaking agreements that have been defined by the regions. Here we have cases of some of the institutions. Incoder is here but it is bureaucratized; however, with ICA we have hardly done any better from the technical standpoint ... They have a problem. we are working out a proposal for the issue of coconuts and they say - no, no, it is not that way because that is not that way ... they are ignorant about the region ... they make decisions without knowing how the productive systems work, not knowing the needs, sometimes working for other interests. (Association of Cocoa Farmers, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 5: General confidence in institutions and their exercise of power has dropped** and has a direct impact on the legitimacy of the state as the guarantor and protector of rights. This affects the leadership that is needed to implement the interventions that the state is responsible for and the recovery of those territories from the hands of the armed groups. It also affects the peace process negatively. A failure to honor commitments still persists.

## Provision of services

Access to state services for the most vulnerable people implies having completed the procedures for obtaining an ID and having been a subject of the survey for (and later registration into) the Identification and Classification System for potential social program Beneficiaries, SISBEN (Spanish acronym), which is the way the GOC seeks to guarantee that the rights of the most vulnerable people in the country are met. In that regard, as can be seen in Figure 6.10 below, the perception that people have an ID is very close to 100%, as is to a lesser degree (but scoring highly) the perception of the number of vulnerable people who have been given the SISBEN survey, which facilitates the state's task of reaching them.


**Figure 6.10. Trends in identifying and registering for social services**



When the data reported by households with respect to the government's actions (which are intended to combat poverty) are reviewed, Families in Action, a program under the Colombia Institute of Family Welfare, ICBF (Spanish acronym), programs for assisting senior citizens, United Network (Red Unidos in Spanish), and the Network for Food Safety, ReSA (Spanish acronym) are the programs that have the greatest impact on the territory. Families in Action and the ICBF programs are the ones that respondents turned to the most. Nevertheless, the perception of an increase in beneficiaries rose for the former (41% to 59%) and dropped almost 50% for the latter (30% to 17%). Notably, the perception that there has been an increase in the number of beneficiaries of programs for senior citizens has also risen.

The design of the baseline included the creation of an index of governmental capacity based on a series of questions in the survey about access to and rating of services, quality in framing and implementing public policies, and a question about the perception of the honesty of officials in handling public affairs. Between the mid-line and the baseline, the score that citizens gave this index dropped 7 points. All of the associated indicators declined. (Figure 6.11)

**Figure 6.11. Trends in the government's capability index**



In terms of specific services, there are no impacts nor changes in absolute terms in the services that the survey asked about. For the following services, the interviewees were asked if they had had access to these services in the last two years. Figure 6.12 below shows the changes between the baseline and the mid-line. There was no impact since the trend was similar in the control areas.


**Figure 6.12. Trends in access to and quality of public services**

	Access (2015)	Change in access	Change in quality	Has it improved in the last two years?
Health Outpost			2%	No
Children under 5 years of age with access to health care services	49%	4%	3%	Yes
Children between 5 and 11 years of age that attend school	97%	0%	-16%	No
Individuals between 12 and 18 years of age that attend school	81%	-5%	-10%	No
Electricity	89%	-2%	-5%	Yes
Propane Gas	72%	7%	-2%	Yes
Water	11%	4%	-3%	Yes
Sewer system	4%	3%	-23%	No
Garbage collection	24%	0%	4%	No
Cell phone service	83%	-5%	-11%	No

The majority of the Consolidation Index numbers for the social services component are stable in Tumaco and very high. The indicators for education have the highest scores – in other words, equal to the control municipalities – for elementary, middle, and high school coverage and the teaching positions are filled. In health, the coverage of SGSSS also has the highest rating.

The Consolidation Index also measures the coverage of electricity and cell phone reception. The data in Tumaco show that electrical service is 100% available and cell phone service is growing as can be seen in Figure 6.13.

**Figure 6.13. Secondary data: Consolidation Index, electricity and cell phone service coverage**



Source: Consolidation Index data. Authors' calculations



When the reports of focus groups are reviewed, they indicate that sustained support for education is essential for Tumaco’s productive development. This is a way to generate new employment and income opportunities for the people. While the University of Nariño is already here, the National University and UNAD are beginning to establish themselves, and this should be coupled with providing technical education. Those interviewed stated that support for higher education is essential for developing productive sectors such as agriculture, fishing, and tourism:

*[We need] a lot of social investment in education, education that is fundamental for us, so that the young people have the opportunity to get access to higher education ... Sena has also been important in technical and technological studies... that we will be able to have a good opportunity to start processing products; that will be very important for generating income. Definitely, the challenge for the municipality is to try to rehabilitate the countryside, agriculture, and let's also include livestock ... agriculture, both small-scale and industrial fishing, and tourism. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

The educational level of the people has improved. Young people are interested in getting technical or professional education. However, there are few employment opportunities. The president of a Community Action Council explains the situation:

*People who really care about education, at least they strive to become professionals. There are many professionals in the neighborhood. Some work as teachers, others have their own garages, and go to work downtown. Others go to work at SENA. We had a very good relationship with Ecopetrol working on the good neighbor program. There we were given first place, and they have always been taken to work on tank repairs; on the roads they are also given work and in Ecopetrol steel structures, as drivers, mechanics, teachers. (President of the Community Action Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

From a more comprehensive point of view on issues related to the reinforcement of institutional capabilities intended to increase the provision of services, the communities say that Colombia Responde’s contribution is key since institutional strengthening is valued with regard to the modernization of administrative processes and procedures as well as to the possibility of expanding the number of workers in order to ensure proper attention to the municipality’s needs:

*The municipality is going through a process of administrative modernization. Also, with Colombia Responde’s assistance for the municipality, all that supply definitely becomes services in order to provide very good care for its citizens ... all processes and procedures that will enable the municipality to install a robust cargo plant that will at least be tailored to the needs of the municipality. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

In spite of the negative evaluations of the way services are currently provided, the interviewees tended to be optimistic. The data on the trend (appendix 2) showed almost universally positive expectations for the future which may be an effect of the possible peace treaty. This translates into a positive impact in two cases – when the interviewees reacted to questions related to the future of educational services and of public utilities. (Figure 6.14)

**Figure 6.14. Impact on expectations for future improvement in public utilities**

	CELI
Will access to health services improve?	-0.00488
Will access to education improve?	0.0445**
Will access to public utilities improve?	0.0784***
Will the roads to the municipal capital improve?	-0.00363

**Conclusion 6: The provision of public utilities remains low – at levels that do not guarantee the full enjoyment of their rights.** Although it is true that the coverage of public utilities reported in the official data is high (with the exception of the sewer system, handling of garbage, and final waste disposal), according to those surveyed, there have been negative changes in access to and quality of the services provided. Improving the capability of the local institutional structure should continue to be a priority and guarantee budgetary efficiency and suitable municipal planning.

## Recommendations

### 1. Maintain credibility in the processes and mechanisms of political participation and empower the communities and their new leaders (conclusions 1 and 2)

In support of the implementation of statutory Act 1475/2011,<sup>36</sup> CELI must encourage the application of the those norms oriented towards reinforcing the gender equality principle for participation in political activities, representation, and access to electoral debates in its intervention to foster participation and political activity, and to bring about consolidation in order to generate and consolidate proposals that would mobilize the electorate towards strengthening democracy.

This means continuing to strengthen political participation through social organizations and consolidation of expertise regarding the channels for political participation and influence on public administration as the observers from the ADAM project have done. These specific strategies and actions would provide support for those ends:

- Help young people and women in rural areas to get their identification documents and register to vote.
- Encourage women’s organizations to further their participation in all spheres of public life.
- Use schools as sites for training, discussing, and fostering values, practices, and democratic institutions among children and young people in general with a special emphasis on the importance of elections.
- Reinforce the transparency criteria for political parties to prevent the concentration of power.

### 2. Coordinate CELI’s work with strategies for transparency and accountability driven by the nation (conclusions 3, 4, 5, and 6) Be a promoter of the National Strategy for the Comprehensive Public Anti-Corruption Policy and the right to have access to public information. CELI (or other future USAID programs) requires action that is organized, decisive, sustainable, and coordinated with the government’s inter-institutional activities.

### 3. Use new tools in an effort to improve service provision (conclusions 3, 4, and 5) USAID and its implementing partners face a challenging task in reinforcing municipalities’ and departments’ procedures for providing services. Decentralization is a

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<sup>36</sup> Esta ley adopta reglas de organización y funcionamiento de los partidos y movimientos políticos, de los procesos electorales.

national imperative, but, the limited local capability persists and finances are limited on the municipal level. It is advisable that pilot program activities, understood from the point of view of the citizens' needs and considering an active participation factor, be emphasized. One interesting tool is the scoring table and other measures to get the citizens to rate the provision of services, conduct monitoring, and generate improvement.

# SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

*Evaluation question:* What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?

## Findings and conclusions

### Social Capital: Confidence


The index of social capital is composed of trust (60 points) and participation (40 points – see the next section of the report), for a total of 100 points. Trust was identified at different levels: family, neighbors, friends, the JAC, legal and state oversight bodies, development institutions, municipal and national government, and the police and military.

Note that several of the factors that affect the index are being handled by cooperation programs including CELI and should be considered indicators of contextual conditions. Nevertheless, an analysis of the CELI subcomponents makes it possible to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the social capital index.

According to the results of the survey, there is a drop in confidence from baseline in both Tumaco and the control municipalities. In Tumaco there was a decline in the index from 17/60 points at baseline to 14/60 points in the mid-line measurement. This score can largely be explained by the community’s loss of confidence in the government and the community’s loss of confidence in each other (see the preceding chapter).

Specifically, the main difference with respect to the baseline is represented by the indicator of the perception that neighbors are committed to helping each other with problems that may occur (from 27% to 18%). Another fact that 60% of the households have commented on and that has decreased by 6% in comparison with what was reported at baseline is the tradition of working together in groups to complete community projects. There is no evidence that CELI has had an impact on this area. (Figure 7.1)

**Figure 7.1. Trends in confidence in the community**



The respondents’ expectations regarding the future of their relationships with and feelings of trust toward their communities were optimistic. However, the control municipalities showed even more positive expectations. When asked about how they felt these relationships would evolve in the future, more than two thirds of the interviewees at baseline claimed to see an

improvement in these relationships. At mid-line, this figure rose to 94% of the people being optimistic about the future of these relationships. However, the control municipalities had a higher figure, which resulted in a 9pp negative impact.

The qualitative results and the information obtained in the survey reveal somewhat of a contrast. In the focus groups, the participants stated that their confidence has been affected by armed groups and violence, yet the community has managed to preserve bonds of trust, collaboration, and collective identity. This has been expressed through participation in different festivals, the local cuisine, and cultural activities:

*Although, well, we all know what we have gone through, but all of us are almost always happy, for x or y reason. We celebrate everything; we throw parties for any reason, dances for every reason, that's cool. In other words, we do not let the situation get us down, make us collapse, but we also get positive things out of it. I like the solidarity of the people in Tumaco; in Tumaco, if people starve, it's because they want to starve. Because any neighbor will give you a glass of water with sugar and bread for breakfast; any neighbor will give you fish, a plantain, so you can make sancocho soup. (Focus Group, Tumaco, Nariño)*

Despite the difficulties the municipality has, its living conditions are valued when compared to those in big cities, mostly due to the solidarity that facilitates cohesion among neighbors and relatives:

*In Tumaco, you can be with anyone and if you are facing any kind of problem, you go where any of your aunts' lives and your aunt will not let you starve. Or, if you want you can go to the bridge and know you will catch a fish and take it home and fry it; in other words, people here do not sit on their thumbs. The community is very united, right ... it doesn't let its neighbors die; if you lack something, someone will give you whatever it is, everyone shares. (Focus Group, Tumaco, Nariño)*

The rural communities in Tumaco have huge needs with respect to public utilities, governmental presence, and economic possibilities. Nevertheless, the participants emphasized and valued the solidarity and trust that they enjoy in their community. One participant told us:

*We have very vulnerable communities. We have suffered all the troubles in the world, but we live a quiet life. In these communities, we don't have electricity. We don't have drinking water; but we have peace. In that community, we do well because we lack nothing. It is a friendly community. That makes us strong on one side and vulnerable on the other. (Focus Group, Tumaco, Nariño)*

The influence of drug trafficking and illicit crops has had a severe effect on the communities, but mainly on the young people in the municipality. Easy money has changed young people's mentality and has brought about the loss of trust and traditional community values:

*About the social fabric, the truth is that family ties began to be torn apart. Money projects power. Then they feel entitled, or that they are right and have power over others; so this truly generates a certain attitude that ruptures the social fabric. The kids or boys begin to see, or to believe, that having money meant having power, and these young guys started to grow coca crops; so, their way of thinking changed and, instead of studying, they are growing coca. In other words, they changed the culture that we had before. (Community Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 1: Community confidence drops.** According to the results of the survey, the index of confidence that members of the community have in each other is trending downward and this reduces mutual help they give each other as well as the ability to work together to carry out projects, and makes cooperation efforts to strengthen the social fabric difficult. Drug-trafficking and “easy money” have had a negative influence on the young people who are dropping out of school and committing crimes. This tears families apart and ruptures the social fabric. Even so, there are those who still believe that the social fabric has remained intact under difficult circumstances.

### **Social Capital: Participation in associations**

According to the data from the Consolidation Index, there was a significant decline in the social activity of organizations in Tumaco compared to 2013. Only 56% of the civil society organizations renewed their Chamber of Commerce certificates compared to 100% in 2013. The indicator for active JACs also decreased and went from 91 to 39 points.


CELI South supported and reinforced different types of associations. To that end, the work focused on existing grassroots organizations such as the JACs, which are the main forum in the municipalities for participation in public life. But its work is also focused on strengthening association models and, as a consequence, on productive associations. Moreover, victims’ associations and cultural associations have received help to build confidence, group identity, and belonging in the territory anchored in the community’s intangible heritage.

In the results of the survey, the Community Action Councils remain the most commonly available mechanism for the formation of associations, despite the fact that their participation declined in comparison to baseline (from 76% to 30%). At the same time, the notable increase in community meetings as places to participate stands out (from 20% to 55%). The rest of the mechanisms do not have significant, positive changes and the groups of volunteers, political parties, etc. decreased compared to baseline. The IAGs’ threats against traditional leaders – such as the leaders of the JACs, community councils, and indigenous reservations – in recent years, could help to explain part of these changes in participation.

While participation, understood as attending or belonging to organizations, fell, the quality of the participation seems to have improved. This has repercussions on the above-mentioned social capital index where the score for Tumaco rose in the participation component and went from 6 points at baseline to 7 at mid-line. There was a similar change in the control areas and, therefore, there was no impact.


The participation mechanisms register positive results on the survey, which are similar to other regions of the country compared to what was reported at baseline. The groups that, to a greater extent, succeeded in getting their members to actively participate in decision-making are the JACs (from 15% to 44%), political parties (from 15% to 40%), victims’ organizations (from 1% to 25%), the youth groups (from 27% to 47%), and the producer or marketing associations (from 30% to 50%). The highest positive effect that can be attributed to CELI is the efficacy of the organizations for victims and political parties. (Figure 7.2)

**Figure 7.2. Trends in active decision-making in cooperative mechanisms**




Another positive fact is the perception that these mechanisms are useful for households who generally associate participating in any kind of social organization with obtaining some benefit. This is a specific impact CELI has had which, as a general trend, shows better management in overcoming problems that affect these organizational processes. (Figure 7.3)

**Figure 7.3. Trends in the reported benefits of belonging to social organizations**



Upon asking about what hinders good management in the formation of associations, the lack of teamwork, which was considered the most re-occurring factor at the baseline, stands out. Nonetheless, in this evaluation, failures due to people's distrust and their lack of interest in participating have been reported. (Figure 7.4)

**Figure 7.4. Trends in the reasons for non-participation in associations**



The rural population of Tumaco has enormous needs in the areas of health, education, infrastructure, and employment, the state is rarely active, and the armed groups make their presence constantly felt. However, the municipality’s rural areas have a large number of associations and social organizations, perhaps as a way of dealing with the scarcity and absence of the state.

*These societies, which are doomed to very low levels of education that are at the peripheries; to levels of dependence that, let’s say, are caused by high marginalization and unemployment ... There is a mass of gigantic social organizations and that’s what you call “social capital,” social organizations. The density of social organizations in Tumaco is the highest in the entire department. [It is explained by] the need to look for that what the state does not provide. (Secretary of Planning, Pasto, Nariño)*

A concern about getting young people involved in the social processes in the region has been raised. This is seen as a way to rebuild the social fabric, foster new leadership, and get communities out of the armed conflict:

*We are undertaking a project. We started to provide assistance to 300 young people in June, to prepare them for the post-conflict period along with the embassies of Sweden and Norway; education and training for 300 young people, 150 men and 150 women. They are going to be trained in working on local democracy in the post-conflict period. We are preparing them to hold positions in citizen participation entities, civic culture, [and] political culture. So one thinks, how can we pull the ground out from under the agents who cause violence, so that we can restore trust, can rebuild the social fabric? (Producers Association, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 2: The South region saw an increase in the quality of participation.** The participants consider that there is great value in and benefits in community participation. However, in some areas of the municipality, where there are differences of opinion with the IAGs, being active and being a leader imply major security risks.



CELI has succeeded in increasing the participation of families in the formation of associations that generate benefits for them. For example, today families are part of the decision-making in the different means of participation. It is striking that teamwork has been the feature that is most commonly considered a weakness.

### **Specific role of the Community Action Councils (JACs)**

CELI South became strongly committed to working with JACs over the course of their operations, strengthening their ability to work, developing more effective organizations, and training individual and associations of JACs. To that effect, CELI N/S made a commitment to the National Forum for Colombia to help 65 JACs and five umbrella associations in Tumaco reinforce their organizational capabilities, work with higher levels of government, and develop plans that represent the goals of their constituents.<sup>37</sup>

Parallel to the overall decline in the perception of participation, the participation in the JAC in Tumaco went from 76% at baseline to 30% at mid-line. The patterns are similar in the control areas. As a result, no impact is seen.

The above is understandable to the degree that corruption affects the mechanism and discourages its use and relevance. This fact causes operational difficulties since the budget depends on the municipal government, which uses it to secure political allies. In other cases, the chairmen of the boards use the scarce resources or items belonging to the board for their own benefit:

*There is no support from the mayor, because one as chairman may do what one is willing to do; but the one who handles the budget – if the mayor gives to two or three of his friends and the rest ... There is a lot of discontent because nothing has been accomplished, and also, the culture of people is such that Community Action Councils make money. So, for example, they gave us three scythes, and right now I don't have any of them, because they were taken, by a chairman with two or three who joined him... Before leaving the association, they were already dividing things up. That's the problem. The problem is that community action boards seek to be elected believing they will earn money. Speaking for my own board, I've never made a dime. So we in the associations are like that. There are five associations and all of us are inactive. (President of the Community Action Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 3: In spite of the decline in the number of associations registered at the Chamber of Commerce, the JACs are still the mechanism for encouraging the formation of associations.** Where the security situation allows and where the JACs have the people's confidence, this type of organization is the nucleus of political life and participation for the *veredas*. In cases like these, the JACs play a central role in giving access to what is available in terms of political participation, building infrastructure, and social control. Nevertheless, this does not always seem to be the case in Tumaco.

### **Associations and productive projects**


As was stated in the chapter on Economic Development, there are huge incentives to organize associations and successfully carry out productive projects. Even though it is true that training and financing were given as the main incentives at the baseline (19% and 16% respectively),

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<sup>37</sup> CELI N/S, FY 2016 Quarterly Report (Q1), December 2015. Bogotá, Colombia: Chemonics, pp. 26-27.

there is a general increase in the incentives that those surveyed were asked about. The most popular ones are training, financing, and transportation for products. (Figure 7.5)

**Figure 7.5. Trends in the reasons for joining forces**



When these data are broken down by sex, the households headed by women are the ones that report the use of associations for processing, selling, and transporting products. The households with a man at the head are more likely to report joining associations for training. There was a rise in participation and training in decision-making in these types of associations in Tumaco unlike other regions or the overall CELI sample, which saw a decrease in producer associations. CELI South saw high participation in marketing and cocoa production groups in particular but also in shrimp (the groups of women) and rice (detailed examples are in the chapter on Economic Development).

**Conclusion 4: The economic rationale is an incentive for associating.** There is a related economic rationale that acts as an incentive for families to join associations and reinforce the participatory mechanisms. CELI has had a positive impact on generating a common framework for training, sales of products, and for seeking financing for projects. CELI is recognized for its ability to provide technical assistance and make associations more sustainable. This rationale is also part of undertaking logistical challenges in the transportation and sale of products from the productive projects.

**Conclusion 5: The formation of associations is critical for all of CELI’s components, which should favor cooperation and not competition.** CELI’s efforts to encourage associations are distinguished by improving the effectiveness of the JACs as advocates of coexistence, partnering in administrative issues and technical assistance, exchanging experiences with other productive associations, reinforcing associations of small producers, empowering women and young people, and making grant funds conditional upon the presentation of projects by associations.

### **Associations of women, victims, and of vulnerable people**

Regarding women’s participation in the formation of associations, in spite of the fact that those

surveyed strongly believe that women could be leaders in their community (95% at baseline and 96% at mid-line), household participation in women's groups declined slightly in comparison to baseline and went from 10% to 9%. Furthermore, there has been progress in women's participation in politics with the report that 7% of the mayor's positions are held by women. Nonetheless, women's leadership of the JACs remains at 15%.

In the focus groups, the participants said that Tumaco's public policies on inclusion and the establishment of an office of social inclusion where issues related to the LGBTI community and women's organizations are discussed have allowed for the reinforcement and joint management of initiatives with local authorities:

*Today the office of social inclusion has been incorporated. This is an office in which they have been working together, specifically on the issue of the communities' needs for solutions. Today the municipality has been projecting that the local government can provide answers to the LGBT population, to women. By the way, the municipality today has a committee made up of very strong women who have a good opportunity to make decisions, a committee of women who propose, a committee of women who work together, a committee of women that is heard. They will be very important for the development of the municipality. (Secretary of Government, Tumaco, Nariño)*

CELI N/S worked to include and support women in businesses and in social efforts such as women's and victims' organizations, psychosocial support groups, organizations of young journalists, savings and loans groups, etc. An important aspect in terms of the formation of associations in Tumaco is the emergence and visibility of social groups that have been traditionally excluded. That is the case of the Rainbow Foundation, which brings together the municipality's LGBTI population:

*Let's create a Foundation that brings us together, that chooses us, that recognizes our rights. We've had some time – more or less 2 years. We've done very well. Doors have been opened for us. The school calls us to talk with us, and wherever we go the doors open for us, yes, even, what do you need, what support do you want from us. Because there is affirmative support from Cartagena, we have been told some things about Maria Fortaleza too, so at the Foundation of Santa Maria de Cali, USAID. (Focus Group, Tumaco, Nariño)*

Most of the associations in the municipality are made up of Afro-Colombians, who represent the majority of the population. These associations are engaged in different activities. There are associations of transporters that seek to organize people who are informal transporters and their goal is to provide better service and help them to lay aside their informal status:

*I represent a cooperative of Afro-Colombians, of country people. This cooperative was set up using private cars, with the so-called pirate cars. We tendered a bid and won. But what happened was, the gentlemen in the association, at the end were all peasants, and they don't have the culture to become legal, and they thought they could keep on working with those old cars and that's forbidden; they were told – put that car away and get another one even if it is used but ok for public service. That has been a huge struggle. (Community Action Council, Tumaco, Nariño)*

From the perspective of the victims, there is recognition that the armed conflict in Tumaco has been very serious, represents multiple forms of violence, and involves practically all of the armed parties. A basic role the programs have played has been to strengthen the victims' organizations that emerged with the passage of Act 1448/11. Organizing them so that their individual and collective rights are recognized as well as shedding light on the painful events that

occurred and highlighting the resistance efforts made by the communities with respect to armed agents has been a priority. One initiative that is worth emphasizing is the creation of “The House of Memory”:

*There is a House of Memory. It is part of the justice and peace division. The diocese of Tumaco has been taking possession in the sense of working with communities ... The sister went to tell the communities: there is a law that protects you. You can join forces, and then the state has some protection laws that say that this land is community property, and then, even if the group displaces me, it can't take away my property using false deeds from notaries because this property has a restriction and there is collective protection for everyone... In 2001, she was murdered on the orders of paramilitary groups.*

*It is the recovery of all data, facts, reports that we have made – all the pictures that we have taken and gathered all this time, because there it is not just about the victims but also about telling the story, the organizational process...Telling a little bit about the cultural practices of the communities and also the relationships that occur in spite of the situation. [...] If someone does not raise his voice, well, things will be worse. So, someone has to talk about what is going on, and say: well, we have a right to this. (Social worker, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 6: Women have not succeeded in securing leadership positions in spite of the importance of their role in their communities.** Although the results show that women can be a critical and influential stakeholder in solving conflicts and the peace process, their participation in leadership roles dropped and the representation of families in women's groups declined. An increase in political participation was seen but the leadership of the JACs remains the same.

**Conclusion 7: The organizations of vulnerable people – women, victims, community – have been reinforced by GOC and USAID programs and policies.** In comparison to other regions studied in this evaluation, progress in empowerment in Tumaco has not been as visible. Nonetheless, some associations show more confidence and commitment.

### **Cultural associations and other types of associations**

Approximately 12% of those interviewed reported that they participated in cultural, sports, or environmental associations. This number is 1pp higher than the baseline and better than in the control municipalities. More than half of the interviewees also reported that they had participated in decision-making, which is an 8pp improvement over the baseline (from 45% to 53%).

A basic objective the cultural associations have is to give the young people options that are far removed from violence and the armed groups. They seek to rebuild the social fabric by generating a place for expression and recognition as active social stakeholders in the community. In this respect, audiovisual and theater projects have emerged to channel young people's forms of expression in the municipality.

*We, in the theater and audiovisual arts, what we do is to focus on different issues that involve young people, of everything that has to do with the impact of all kinds of violence, and what we do is to create theater plays on different topics and then create awareness in young people or in the general population based on the works or audiovisual products ... It has been quite complicated to do some things since there is always little credibility, little credit regarding the issue of the youth when it has to do with the things run by young people, so it seems there is little faith in those actions ... That has been the most complicated thing, that boys, when we see them as*

*students, but when they graduate, there are other needs and they have to start [making a living]. There is an effort but they are not given that option of earning money. (Focus Group, Tumaco, Nariño)*

Sports, especially soccer, are part of the Tumaqueños' collective identity. There are different soccer schools in the municipality that the young people actively participate in. However, resources are scarce and opportunities to pursue a career in sports is difficult. This, added to the absence of prospects, affects the credibility and legitimacy of this activity as a tool for overcoming adversity. However, soccer players are role models for young people, a source of pride, and an example of achievement.

*I've seen that there are several football schools, where there are teachers. But what happens? The young people are discouraged right away. For example, there is a call for something, that someone will take them there, but in the end they aren't chosen. (Focus group of young people, Tumaco, Nariño)*

**Conclusion 8: The development of sports and cultural activities is a mechanism for generating resilience.** These activities are recognized by the community and the different groups as ones that push for coexistence, respect, solidarity, and incentives. Nevertheless, institutional backing is not evident, nor are sustainable support for training, use of free time, preparation for work, and generation of productive and social projects that are preserved over time. A factor that contributes to these activities is the cultural and sports tradition in the region.

## Recommendations

- 1. Adapt programming to build confidence (conclusion 1 and the related section in the chapter on Institutional Development)** The fall in the indicators of trust in the government, in neighbors, and in the community cannot be solved by cooperative projects. It is essential to continue efforts to find mechanisms to link communities to each other and to their governments with support from the coordinated intervention of international agencies. Tumaco has a large number of co-operating parties. However, their work, done with the best of goodwill and ability, is too scattered to be enough. Taking advantage of the good relationships and credibility that USAID program implementation partners have with the associations and communities is key to generating trust in institutions.

The benefits of association models that favor dialog and duplicate the communities' implicit knowledge, which is the root of their identity and the efficacy of project management, have been demonstrated. In this regard, any initiative, strategy, intention, and action that CELI or another cooperation program devise to increase working together is key to the consolidation of the democratic state and the sustained and sustainable construction of peace. For this exercise, CELI needs to recognize and coordinate national efforts that have been defined for the effective participation of young people and generation of opportunities as defined in CONPES 173/2014 and the effective participation of women as defined by CONPES 3784/2013. These give guidelines for risk prevention, protection, and guarantee the rights of women who are victims of the armed conflict.

As was indicated, the associations should foster cooperation and not competition. To this effect, it becomes important to review cooperation models that have been used historically, not just North American ones. The reason for this is that the incentive of getting access to resources encourages setting up the social organizations in such a way that they do not necessarily meet the objectives and are not sustainable over time. The design and implementation of monitoring systems should be a task that will guarantee, first, the sustainability of the organizations and, second, the consolidation of new productive models.

2. **Increase the work with households headed by women by using participatory models (conclusions 3, 4, and 6)** With respect to participation, the positive results seen with households where a man is the head of the household should be extended to ones where a woman is the head. They take advantage of the help offered by both cooperative agencies and the state. This can be duplicated to mobilize more women who are heads of their households. Helping them may require different processes, such as the provision of childcare when there are meetings or offering to have meetings when they have free time.

Furthermore, those that already participate in the victims' organizations for women and in other groups can serve as guides for other women who join groups in order to encourage their participation. Likewise, the leaders of community associations and other groups whose commitment and participation already represent high levels of social stability serve as a resource for furthering this objective. CELI workers should continue to investigate different ways of using this association leadership resource in the final months of their intervention and carry out outreach activities with members of the community whose behavior indicates a growing isolation.

3. **Continue to reinforce the JACs in order to augment their development and bring about their consolidation (conclusion 3)** The rule in effect allows for the creation of multiple mechanisms for reinforcing the role of the JACs as conflict resolution agents. That is how the JACs have been expected to encourage reconciliation and develop peace. The work the JACs do to implement infrastructure projects (tertiary roads with a participatory component, for example), manage community radio stations, and do oversight and monitoring of public policies could be a winner when it comes to strengthening the social fabric. The main report on the evaluation specifically recommends adapting the ICO-VEO instrument for the JACs and, along with other steps, making the results public to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of their communities.
4. **Reinforce cultural and sports initiatives for the development of scenarios and communities at peace (conclusion 8)** It has been demonstrated that culture and sports encourage gathering places and that the dynamics of the conflict have affected the communities across all of their dimensions, especially with the destruction of social links and ties, trust, integration, and respect for others. To that effect, CELI's intervention should be aligned with the cultural services offered through the Communication, Culture, and Innovation strategy which the Ministry of Culture has been implementing since June 2016, regarding issues of cultural diversity, access to

and circulation of information, communication skills, participatory citizenship, and education and innovation in communication and culture.

In the sports sector, it is recommended that USAID programing in these areas be coordinated with Coldeportes' Program for Coexistence and Peace, which seeks to provide children and young people with sports activities in order to improve coexistence, prevent violence, encourage respect for human rights, build peace to enhance participation through proper emotional control and conflict resolution.

# ANNEX I: RESULTS AT THE CLUSTER LEVEL: THE LIST EXPERIMENT

Results of the list experiment for the South region, which is made up of one cluster, are presented here.


<b>Cluster</b>	<b>Treated Municipality</b>	<b>Control Municipality</b>
23	Tumaco (Nariño)	Patía (Cauca); Policarpa (Nariño)

The responses to the question about contact with illegal armed groups and after that to the question about contact with illegal crops are shown. Three graphs on this region, which is its own cluster, are presented. The first shows the results at baseline, the second, the results at mid-line, and the third, the impact if there were one based on the calculation of difference in differences. In general, the responses that indicated contact with illegal armed groups and illegal crops decreased. They approach zero at mid-line. However, this trend in the treatment sites (CELI) matches the trend in the control sites which means that it cannot be attributed to any intervention.




# South Region, Cluster 23

## Contact with armed groups



## Contact with illegal crops



# ANNEX 2: DESCRIPTIVE DATA TABLES, CLUSTER LEVEL

This annex shows the tables with the descriptive data about the only cluster in the South region:

Cluster	Treated Municipality	Control Municipality
23	Tumaco (Nariño)	Patía (Cauca); Policarpa (Nariño)

## Cluster 23

CELI: Tumaco (Nariño)

Control: Patía (Cauca); Policarpa (Nariño)

Variable	Cluster 23				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Mid-line		
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
<b>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</b>					
Proportion of households that think that the economic situation in the area where they live is good or very good	0.491	0.409	0.096	0.097	-0.0954***
Proportion of households that think that one of the most serious problems associated with the living conditions is: going hungry	0.116	0.165	0.368	0.492	-0.0544**
Proportion of households that think that one of the most serious problems associated with the living conditions is: that their living condition is one of extreme poverty	0.367	0.312	0.845	0.877	-0.0856***
Proportion of households that think that one of the most serious problems associated with the living conditions is: unemployment or the lack of opportunities	0.946	0.907	0.665	0.651	-0.0208
Proportion of households that think that one of the most serious problems associated with the living conditions is: that the productive activities they are involved in provide very little money	0.847	0.907	0.064	0.074	0.0485***
Proportion of households that think that one of the most serious problems associated with the living conditions is: that one of the few attractive, productive options is illegal activities	0.220	0.096	0.010	0.017	-0.135***
Proportion of households that reported a concern in the past week that food would run out due to the lack of money	0.824	0.874	0.771	0.891	-0.0584***
Proportion of households that reported that, at some point in the past week, food ran out due to lack of money	0.286	0.710	0.351	0.781	-0.000996
Average household expenditure	298808	407655	362110	471045	-4,407
	Baseline		Mid-line		Dif-Dif (Impact)
<b>FINANCIAL SERVICES</b>	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Proportion of households that have a savings account	0.395	0.333	0.334	0.226	0.0360
Proportion of households that have a checking account	0.014	0.010	0.044	0.064	-0.0252**
Proportion of households that have paid for public utilities at banks or at non-bank correspondents	0.269	0.119	0.379	0.170	0.0525**
Proportion of households that have asked a bank, financial institution,	0.381	0.313	0.338	0.277	-0.00681

cooperative, or a financial NGO for a loan					
Proportion of households that currently have a loan from a bank, cooperative, or NGO	0.676	0.621	0.702	0.524	0.144***
Proportion of households that have debts	0.629	0.589	0.431	0.409	-0.00912
	<b>Baseline</b>		<b>Mid-line</b>		<b>Dif-Dif (Impact)</b>
<b>GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	
Rate the municipal government's management as good or very good	0.192	0.180	0.102	0.080	0.00409
The municipal government's management has improved in comparison to two years ago	0.237	0.187	0.066	0.080	-0.0690***
The city mayor regularly informs the community about what the funds have been spent on and how	0.089	0.108	0.052	0.028	0.0388**
The municipal authorities invite the community to express their opinions about subjects that are of interest to the community	0.057	0.044	0.021	0.016	-0.0108
The municipal authorities take the opinions of the citizens into account when they make decisions	0.037	0.042	0.024	0.012	0.0111
Have quite a bit or a lot of confidence in the mayor of the municipality's commitment to managing a construction project	0.159	0.258	0.076	0.094	0.0648***
Have considerable / a lot of trust in the chairman of JAC's commitment to managing a construction project	0.490	0.405	0.298	0.268	-0.0662**
Rate the administration of the Governor's office as good or very good	0.220	0.233	0.178	0.156	0.0340
Think that the management of the Governor's office has improved in comparison to two years ago	0.181	0.184	0.057	0.091	-0.0300
Rate the National Government's management as good or very good	0.359	0.383	0.415	0.280	0.167***
Think that the management by the National Government has improved in comparison to two years ago	0.287	0.305	0.192	0.120	0.0865***
	<b>Baseline</b>		<b>Mid-line</b>		<b>Dif-Dif (Impact)</b>
<b>CONFIDENCE (considerable or a lot)</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	
Government of the Department (Province)	0.114	0.188	0.081	0.074	0.0799***
The National Government	0.209	0.273	0.230	0.134	0.149***
The institutions of formal justice	0.141	0.200	0.079	0.088	0.0349
The institutions of alternative justice	0.098	0.227	0.075	0.078	0.114***
The institutions and functions of the agricultural sector	0.194	0.238	0.131	0.109	0.0480**
Social organizations and NGOs	0.161	0.300	0.131	0.142	0.112***
Training and educational centers	0.474	0.614	0.367	0.501	-0.00861
Officials in the Ombudsman Office	0.225	0.274	0.156	0.145	0.0474*
City council	0.133	0.199	0.106	0.098	0.0670***
The National Police	0.154	0.257	0.147	0.155	0.0819***
The National Army	0.290	0.358	0.255	0.233	0.0777***
The National Navy	0.242	0.347	0.115	0.216	-0.0103
The municipal ombudsman's office	0.226	0.230	0.133	0.105	0.0233
The municipal government	0.173	0.210	0.083	0.061	0.0507**
JAC	0.465	0.370	0.258	0.195	-0.0293
	<b>Baseline</b>		<b>Mid-line</b>		<b>Dif-Dif (Impact)</b>
<b>SAFETY</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	
Safety in the <i>vereda</i> or township has improved	0.240	0.202	0.262	0.265	-0.0492*
You would advise a relative to return to the <i>vereda</i>	0.745	0.615	0.801	0.700	-0.0295
Major safety problems in the <i>vereda</i> :					
Homicides	0.215	0.252	0.143	0.136	0.0479*
Illegal armed groups	0.700	0.707	0.239	0.295	-0.0178
Landmines	0.109	0.038	0.062	0.036	-0.0354**

Displacement	0.227	0.306	0.106	0.237	-0.0508*
Kidnapping or forced disappearance	0.050	0.071	0.017	0.014	0.0262**
Extortion	0.191	0.129	0.037	0.039	-0.0608***
Lack of public safety (theft, holdups)	0.410	0.384	0.170	0.162	-0.0133
Forced Recruitment	0.004	0.006	0.002	0.015	-0.0121*
Sexual violence	0.012	0.017	0.014	0.010	0.0129
There are no major safety problems in the vereda	0.456	0.462	0.552	0.516	0.0458
State that there are public safety services provided by the police	0.557	0.623	0.320	0.191	0.184***
Rate the police services as good or very good	0.380	0.297	0.355	0.292	-0.0444
Think that the police services have improved in comparison to two years ago	0.151	0.229	0.115	0.201	-0.00922
	<b>Baseline</b>		<b>Mid-line</b>		<b>Dif-Dif (Impact)</b>
<b>ILLEGAL CROPS</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	
Report that currently there are illicit crops in the vereda	0.349	0.166	0.308	0.260	-0.123***
Report that illegal mining is currently being carried out in the vereda or township	0.154	0.010	0.104	0.019	-0.0708***
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca (poppy plants, marijuana) should not be grown because it is illegal	0.870	0.942	0.668	0.638	0.0969***
Production of coca (poppy, marijuana) affects the families who are cultivating it and the community negatively	0.852	0.953	0.679	0.684	0.0834***
Cultivating coca is not the only way to guarantee a livelihood for a family that is raising that crop	0.892	0.965	0.666	0.643	0.0856***
My family and friends think that growing coca is bad	0.803	0.885	0.699	0.672	0.0920***
	<b>Baseline</b>		<b>Mid-line</b>		<b>Dif-Dif (Impact)</b>
<b>EXPECTATIONS</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>CELI</b>	<b>Control</b>	
Are you thinking about making investments that will be key two years from now for the productive activity of your household's business?	0.775	0.939	0.626	0.800	-0.00296
Do you think that your living conditions will improve in the coming years?	0.747	0.848	0.861	0.928	0.0341
Do you believe that the income your household receives from the illegal activities you are going to be carrying out will increase?	0.680	0.805	0.833	0.907	0.0444*
Do you expect that the economic situation for the people in your vereda or township? In the next two years?	0.798	0.807	0.916	0.950	-0.0330*
What future changes do you think will occur in: Your living conditions?	0.694	0.794	0.911	0.967	0.0311
What future changes do you think will occur in: Access to health services?	0.658	0.681	0.920	0.943	-0.00488
What future changes do you think will occur in: Access to educational services?	0.683	0.745	0.933	0.948	0.0445**
What future changes do you think will occur in: Access to public utilities?	0.592	0.687	0.921	0.941	0.0784***
What future changes do you think will occur in: Communication channels to the municipality seat?	0.634	0.653	0.921	0.939	-0.00363
What future changes do you think will occur in: Relationships with your neighbors?	0.687	0.628	0.937	0.963	-0.0862***
What future changes do you think will occur in: Management of the municipal government?	0.659	0.672	0.931	0.938	0.00197
Do you believe you will continue to live at your current place of residence for the next few years?	0.877	0.863	0.887	0.913	-0.0276

# ANNEX 3: CALCULATIONS OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Below are tables specifying how indicators were grouped into the three categories of economic, institutional, and social for presentation in the CELI Midline Evaluation general and regional reports. The present grouping is admittedly arbitrary but represents the best judgment of the evaluators, recognizing that other arrangements are possible. In discussions with the implementers, the present grouping was acknowledged and confirmed.

## Economic Indicators

These are the sixteen indicators that were used to calculate the Economic Indicators pie chart. Indicators in yellow are reported by the implementers and those in green are taken from the midline survey data. While certain indicators provided by government sources were not included due to the irregular pace of reporting, indicators DO3-041 and DO3-040 had reliable numbers, compiled by government sources and reported by the implementers – since in all cases targets were met. DO3-038 was not included because of a lack of confidence in the numbers reported.

1	DO3-005 Avg monthly household income of USAID's beneficiaries
2	DO3-041 # of restitution cases supported in CELI municipios
3	DO3-040 # of formalized properties supported by CELI municipalities
4	DO3-036. Total value of CELI projects approved
5	DO3-037. Total value of CELI projects completed
	DO3-038. Total public investment in consolidation zones
6	DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones att to USG interventions
7	DO3-030 # of strategic rural and economic development programs with territorial approach implemented in CELI municipios
8	DO3-031 # & % of people benefitted by strategic rural and econ development programs with territorial approach, implemented in CELI municipios
9	DO3-034 # of rural households benefiting directly from USG interventions
10	DO3-032a Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG interventions
11	DO3-032b Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG interventions (for-profit, crops, social enterprises)
12	DO3-033a # of private-public alliances formed
13	DO3-033b # of private-public alliances formed

14	DO3-035 # of people with financial product includes mobile wallet, leasing, etc.
15	DO3-042 Community funds leveraged in CELI Zones attrib to USG Interventions
16	DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones

## Institutional Development

These are the six indicators included under institutional development:

1	DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones attributed to USG interventions
2	DO3-010 # of strategic national social programs implemented in CELI zones
3	DO3-011 # & % of people benefitted by national social programs impl in CELI municipios
4	DO3-012 # of beneficiaries receiving improved infrastructure services
5	DO3-013 Governance capacity index
6	DO3-028 Level of accountability in CELI municipios

Two indicators that would be included in this category but which were to be provided by the GOC were not updated and have been deleted and are not reported or counted:

D03-004 – Public Social Services Municipal Index

D03-009 – Amount and Average Percent of annual change in municipal own-source income

## Social Indicators

Six indicators included in the calculation of the Social Indicators pie chart:

1	DO3-008 # of rapid impact projects implemented by USG implementers
2	DO3-024 Social Capital Index
3	DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones
4	DO3-025 # of CSO members supported by USG assistance
5	DO3-026 (a) Change in Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG assistance
6	DO3-026 (b) Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG assistance

DO3-026(a) and DO3-026(b) are closely related. Information was partially available for both, and targets were met. For 26(a) this was listed as “not reported” for Montes de María and Central, but “exceeded” for CELI Norte/Sur. For 26(b), this was reported as exceeded for all three CELIs.

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