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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

Regional Report, PNCRT Zones

March 2017

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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

REGIONAL REPORT, PNCRT ZONES

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ACRONYMS

ARD	Associates for Rural Development
BACRIM	Criminal bands, Bandas Criminales (in the service of the narcotics trade)
CAR	Regional Autonomous Corporations, Corporaciones Regionales Autónomas
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CELI	Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
CELI Central	CELI program in the Central region
CELI MdM	CELI program in the Montes de María region
CELI Norte/Sur	CELI program in the North and South regions
CERAC	Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos
CNC	National Consulting Center, Centro Nacional de Consultoría
CNC-DoD	Crime and Narcotics Center, U.S. Department of Defense
CSDI	Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DNP	National Planning Department, Departamento Nacional de Planeación
DO	Development objective
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DPS	Department for Social Prosperity, Departamento para la Prosperidad Social
ELN	National Liberation Army, Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EVIDINCE	Research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FHH	Female head of household
GLAC	Local savings and loans groups, grupos locales de ahorros y crédito
GOC	Government of Colombia
HH	Household
IAG	Illegal Armed Group
IC	Illicit crops
ICO	Index of Organizational Competencies, Índice de competencias organizacionales
IDI	Integral Performance Index, Índice de desempeño integral
INCODER	Colombian Institute of Rural Development, Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural
JAC	Community Action Council, Junta de Acción Comunal
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MADR	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural
MdM	Montes de María

MHH	Male head of household
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc.
PAR	Regional Action Plan, Plan de acción regional
PMP	Performance management plan
PNCRT	National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy, Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial
SENA	National Learning Service, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SGP	General Participation System, Sistema General de Participación
SIJIN	Judicial police, Seccional de Investigación Judicial
SIMCI	Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos
SISBEN	Identification and Classification system for potential social program Beneficiaries, Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de potenciales Beneficiarios para programas sociales
TA	Technical Assistance
UACT	Territorial Consolidation Administrative Unit, Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial
UARIV	Victims' Integral Attention and Reparation Unit, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas
UMATA	Municipal Agricultural Extension Units, Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
URT	Land Restitution Unit, Unidad de Restitución de Tierras
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEO	Verification of Organizational Status, Valorización del Estado Organizacional

ABSTRACT

USAID/Colombia designed the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative (CELI) for the purpose of supporting the Government of Colombia (GoC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in zones under the control or influence of insurgent groups.

The Government of Colombia has prioritized eight regions for the implementation of its National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT), some of which were targeted by the CELIs. This report contains the results found in the following sixteen (16) PNCRT target municipalities which were not CELI beneficiaries (hereinafter PNCRT municipalities): Convención, El Carmen, Hacarí, San Calixto, Teorama and Tibú (Catatumbo); Florida and Pradera (Valle del Cauca); Caloto and Santander de Quilichao (Cauca); and Puerto Leguízamo, Puerto Asís, Valle de Guamuez and San Miguel (Putumayo).

Regional Context

Security. Security in the PNCRT zones improved as a result of the implementation of government policies. However, the armed conflict, the presence of IAGs, organized crime and common crime persist. Increases in coca cultivation are also of concern. Nevertheless, the improved provision of security services perceived by citizens has resulted in a more positive image of the police.

Illicit crops. Based on the perceptions of the respondents and interviewees, there is awareness in the PNCRT municipalities of the problems caused by illicit crops and the importance of replacing them. However, given that in a large percentage of cases illicit crops are grown based on economic rationality, replacement must be supported by infrastructure and public goods to enable farmers to market their products.

Human rights violations. Despite efforts to legitimize the presence of the State, there is still no significant reduction in human rights violations in these regions, the municipalities do not have the capacity to attend to all of the complaints, and shortcomings persist in access to formal justice services.

Economic Development

The economic situation for the average family is getting worse, even as the proxy for monthly income grew between the baseline and the midline. However, when midline income values are analyzed in absolute terms, they prove to be less than the legal minimum wage in effect for that year (\$644.350). In addition, support for productive projects declined in both the PNCRT municipalities and CELI municipalities.

Institutional Development

The community's participation in political processes grew, with more people intending to vote and actually voting. The respondents indicated that their votes are valuable and that the electoral process is important to them. Trust in institutions and their ability to exercise power decreased. The respondents in the three regions perceive that corruption has declined.

Social Development

With regard to social capital, there is a reduction in the community trust, mutual aid, and joint work capacity indices, which negatively affects associative processes and the cohesion of the social fabric.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/Colombia designed the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative (CELI) for the purpose of supporting the Government of Colombia (GoC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in zones under the control or influence of insurgent groups involved with illicit crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and terrorist activities.

Three implementers have developed this project in four regions: the first, Chemonics International, which operates in the North region (Bajo Cauca Antioqueño and Southern Córdoba) and in the South region (municipality of Tumaco in Nariño) through the CELI North/South project; the second, ARD Tetra Tech, operates in the Central Region (23 municipalities in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta and Tolima) through the CELI Central project; and finally, Global Communities, which in 2015 completed similar work through CELI Montes de María (MdM) in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and in Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar).

The Government of Colombia has prioritized eight regions for the implementation of its National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT), some of which were addressed by the CELIs. This report contains the results found in the following sixteen (16) PNCRT target municipalities which were not CELI beneficiaries (hereinafter PNCRT municipalities): Convención, El Carmen, Hacarí, San Calixto, Teorama and Tibú in Norte de Santander (Catatumbo); Florida and Pradera in Valle del Cauca; Caloto and Santander de Quilichao in Cauca (Cauca); and Puerto Leguizamo, Puerto Asís, Valle de Guamuez and San Miguel in Putumayo.



Purpose of the evaluation

In 2011, DevTech Systems, Inc., USAID/Colombia’s contractor, designed the impact evaluation of the interventions of the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), which includes two measurements in addition to the baseline: a midline and a final measurement. The EVAL Program (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), operated through a USAID contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), carried out the midline evaluation. This report contains the results of the evaluation for the 16 PNCRT municipalities, which was carried out using the baseline, qualitative fieldwork and questions regarding satisfaction with the programs implemented under this policy. The key audiences of the evaluation are the Program Office and Technical Offices of the USAID/Colombia Mission, which will use the results to design future interventions.

Three guiding principles were established for the uses of the evaluation:

1. *Measure the change in the impact indicators, determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with the target populations.*

2. *Provide timely data to the decision-making processes, in order to identify the components that need to be strengthened in order to achieve the program's goals.*
3. *Identify the best practices and lessons learned to date, in order to guide future USAID interventions.*

Background of the project

According to the National Consolidation Plan (PNC), which subsequently evolved into the National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT), the concept of “Consolidation” refers to the expansion of the legitimate presence of the State in the regions of conflict in Colombia. The Policy was designed to be implemented once the minimum security conditions are established for generating the institutional capacities necessary for access to, and protection of the fundamental rights of, the population in the territories historically affected by the armed conflict and illicit crops.¹ It is aimed at establishing the presence of State institutions that are capable of effectively delivering the public goods and services necessary for development.

The United States Embassy developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) in order to support the strengthening of the State's presence in strategic zones of the country, and to reduce inequality in historically marginalized regions, in which illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. The CSDI was conceived as a whole-government strategy, with a geographic focus whose objective was to maintain the advances in security and development, and the reduction in illicit crops and in the presence of illegal armed groups in conflict zones.

The basic premise of the CELIs, one of the components of the CSDI, is that armed conflicts and the illegal economy are closely related to the weak presence of the State and, therefore, its activities are aimed at strengthening the institutions, generating trust in them, building relationships between the communities and local governments, and supporting the enhancement of sustainable livelihoods.

Within the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), CELI was part of Development Objective (DO) 1: *Civil government present in consolidated CSDI zones*, focused on supporting the Consolidation process with respect to *the strengthening of the local government, formalization of property rights, social development, alliance between the community and the State, and rural development*. In the 2014-2018 CDCS, the CELIs form part of DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

It is important to mention that the CELIs do not replace the function of the State. They were created to provide support to the PNCRT. The minimum provision of public goods, advances in the formalization of property rights and access to justice by the State in the consolidation zones constitute a *sine qua non* condition to enable the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to operate and ensure that the resources serve as a catalyst for development and consolidation.

Design of the evaluation: guiding questions, methods and limitations

The midline evaluation was carried out in 33 CELI municipalities, and in 16 municipalities in three regions (Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle and Putumayo) in which the GoC intervened through the activities of the PNCRT (the PNCRT municipalities). The midline evaluation, structured on the

¹ <http://www.consolidacion.gov.co>.

basis of the baseline developed by DevTech, analyzed the changes through institutional, social and economic indicators related to the interventions. The research questions are presented below:

Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target populations in the intervention zones?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do the CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in supporting the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting
3. Does the GoC show the expected level of investment in consolidation areas after USAID's assistance in the PNCRT municipalities?	IR 3.2
4. What are the specific effects of the CELIs on changing the local government's capacities and provision of services (serving the local population, being accountable, expanding social services)?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by the CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacities of civil society organizations (CSOs) in local areas?	IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been made in the recovery and reconstruction of the territory affected by the armed conflicts (presence of IAGs) and unlawful economic activities?	Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
8. To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

EVAl, with support from the National Consulting Center (CNC), used a mixed-methods approach – qualitative and quantitative – to examine a set of indicators for each result of the CELIs. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunities, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of the CELI interventions. The design replicated the baseline methodology, and used qualitative methods to obtain information about the population's perceptions, opinions and experiences. Annex 3 of the main report presents the complete design considerations of the evaluation, which include an impact estimate.

The study has many limitations that must be taken into account. There are limitations based on the design of the evaluation (such as the difficulty of the process and results of the pairing of municipalities, in a country with a long history of isolation and differences between regions). The original design was also affected because the government did not have an intervention that was as broad as planned, in which goals and impact indicators associated with the original design were established.

The limitations based on exogenous factors (such as the fall in the price of oil and differences in the implementation of the project by the different operators) also condition the interpretation of the data. For more details, see the Limitations section of this report, as well as Annex 3 of the main report.

Findings and conclusions

How to read the findings and conclusions

This summary and the report below present two key types of data: *trends* and *impacts*. The trends reveal the changes over time in each variable analyzed in the PNCRT municipalities, while the impacts compare the changes in the variables in the municipalities analyzed with the changes in the control municipalities.

It is worth mentioning that the trends and impacts are also presented at a cluster level, that is, individual municipalities or small groups of similar municipalities from a geographic and socio-economic point of view. The results of the cluster analysis often differ from the regional results, and so their study is important for obtaining more focused information.

Regional context


Security. Security in the PNCRT zones has improved as a result of the implementation of government policies in this area. However, phenomena derived from the armed conflict, the presence of IAGs, organized crime and common crime persist. Also of concern is the growth of areas cultivated with coca in these regions, as evidenced by figures from the United Nations Integrated Illicit Crop Monitoring System (SIMCI).

Nevertheless, the improved provision of security services perceived by citizens has resulted in a positive image of the police.

Illicit crops and the culture of illegality. Based on the perceptions of the respondents and interviewees, there is awareness in the PNCRT municipalities of the damage caused by illicit crops and the importance of replacing them. However, given that in a large percentage of cases illicit crops are grown based on economic rationality, replacement must be supported by the minimum infrastructure and public goods necessary to enable farmers to market their products. Food security problems are frequent in these regions, so one strategy involves crops for self-consumption.

With respect to the culture of legality, the survey asks, “*How often do you act in compliance with the law?*” and “*How often do you believe that what is ordered by the law coincides with the way in which your community acts?*” A comparison of the baseline and midline responses reveals a significant downward trend in compliance with the law by the populations in these regions. They appear to have few incentives for adopting a culture of legality.

Figure 1.2. Trends in the perception of the levels of compliance with the law from individual and collective perspectives



Human rights, justice and the legitimacy of the State. Despite efforts to legitimize the presence of the State, there is still no significant reduction in human rights violations in these regions, the municipalities do not have the capacity to attend to all of the complaints in this regard, and shortcomings persist in access to formal justice services. Of note is the large number of cases in which there has been no institutional response to reported violations and no identification of those responsible, which represents significant challenges for the State in promoting a sustainable order that generates trust.

Land titling processes are critical and have been affected by security problems. The planned land restitution goals have not been achieved. On the one hand, they are subject to micro-targeting processes that depend on security agencies for determining the zones in which the Land Restitution Unit can intervene; and on the other, they impose a costly evidentiary burden on claimant families. Also, the restitution of property does not necessarily imply the existence of all of the conditions necessary for the return, and therefore comprehensive restitution.


The formalization processes have been affected by, among other things, the presence of armed actors, which prevents families from accessing productive assets. Consequently, the productivity and the income-generating capacity of their productive projects have declined.

Economic development

The average family's economic situation has worsened. Given the difficulty of establishing the income level of families in these regions, the study established, as a method of approximation, the population's level of expenses, assuming a low or non-existent savings capacity.

The proxy for monthly income grew between the baseline and the midline in the three regions: Cauca/Valle del Cauca by 44%; and smaller growth in Putumayo at 12%, and in Catatumbo at 11%. However, if the midline income values in the three regions are compared in absolute terms, as shown in Figure 1.3, they are in all cases less than the legal minimum wage in effect for that year (\$644.350), particularly in the case of Putumayo.

Figure 1.3. Trends in estimated monthly expenses (income proxy) in Colombian pesos




Support for productive projects. Support for productive projects declined in both the PNCRT municipalities and CELI municipalities. The general trend was to migrate from a type of theoretical support to a more practical model. The associative processes are increasingly more important for the respondents and interviewees, due to the positive effects of the technical assistance provided to the productive projects, through which the families seek to enhance labor productivity by adopting technological methods.

According to the reported data, the associative processes in general increased in the three PNCRT regions studied. The case of Putumayo is emblematic of this change, with greater effect in terms of representation, training and funding processes. In the case of the purchase of supplies and the processing of products, there was a positive impact, of 6pp and 4pp, respectively, in the PNCRT municipalities in Putumayo. (Figure 1.4)

There are many problems with the middlemen, they pay per month, pay per 15 days, not all, because [some] don't pay. When we were going to the trainings they told us that they were going to help us sell directly to the supermarkets, and they haven't gone back to having meetings... They were going to help market them in order to have a better price and everything. But so far they haven't done any of that for us. Just promises. (Women's focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

Figure 1.4. Trends in the reasons for creating associations in the Putumayo region




Markets and marketing. The markets in the Consolidation territories are local and regional. Small producers are negatively affected by the high cost of marketing that characterizes the inefficiencies of small markets, which provides very little incentive for greater production. An increase in production above the size of these markets collides with the rigidity of the local market and the lack of capacity to export to other regions.

However, as reflected in the Catatumbo data in the next figure, the respondents and interviewees believe that these problems have decreased thanks to the technical assistance provided.

Our products, the products of Valle de Guamez, of La Hormiga, are products that have suffered, they are products of an intense war, that distinction is important. Products of peace. We have asked the National Government many times to take a different approach to the products that come from Putumayo, from Valle del Guamez, from La Hormiga, maybe a kilo of cacao here has more meaning than in any other place. (Secretary of Economic Development, Valle de Guamez, Putumayo)

Figure 1.5. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Catatumbo region



However, markets with sufficient supply and demand, and prices higher than the costs of production and transportation, are required. Productive projects counteract the incentives for planting illicit crops, but the context of deficient markets, the pressures imposed by armed groups, the environmental crisis, and the persistent lack of access roads make it difficult for alternative development programs and policies to have the desired effects. These structural problems, which the GoC is responsible for solving, reduces the possibility that the PNCRT will produce sustainable effects.

Transportation and infrastructure. Road infrastructure is an unresolved issue. Access to the markets is affected by the deficit of tertiary roads and by the presence of intermediaries who play a leading role in the process of purchasing supplies and marketing the products, which reduces the profitability of farmers' crops.


Land. The factors inherent in land tenure require greater knowledge and public policy intervention with respect to the structure of land ownership and restitution. This policy must be consistent with the use of land for agricultural purposes, the legalization of property, titling and restitution, which require greater knowledge of the realities of those who own and possess land. One factor to be taken into account is the reduction in the payment of taxes by owners due to the low profitability of their crops.

The biggest conflict is knowing who [the land] belongs to... For us as a municipality or for any type of entity it is very difficult. The problem is when the need for legalization is already great. I also think that when you change from unlawful to lawful, you need the land to be yours. (Secretary of Rural Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)

The regional data of the Consolidation Index between 2011 and 2014 are not similar. The land use figures in Catatumbo are stable but low, while there is a steady growth trend in Putumayo. The Cauca/Valle del Cauca region received the highest score, despite the existence of contradictory data, according to the qualitative information available (Figure 1.6). Micro-targeting is low in Catatumbo and relatively higher and more stable in Putumayo.

We haven't had a basic land use plan since 2002. That is an issue that the Planning Office and the Municipal Council are working on. The Land Use Plan has to be worked on because there are some indigenous people here, the El Triunfo Cristal Páez and Nasa Kiwe indigenous reservations, which have had their own territories for many years. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

Figure 1.6. Territorial indicators and micro-targeting (Consolidation Index)



Recommendations

Improve agricultural production and marketing simultaneously, taking advantage of local opportunities, for which the GoC should endeavor to resolve the infrastructure and marketing deficiencies and establish programs to correct problems in producers' relationships with intermediaries and commercial partners.

Support market diversification programs. It is critical for the government to support projects with production and marketing components to enable them to supply not only the local market, but also regional and international markets. Projects like those supported by the CELIs (chocolate in Tumaco, rubber in Meta, and coffee in Southern Tolima) are replicable experiences.

Use community models for the improvement and sustainability of tertiary roads. Replicate the successful work carried out by CELI North/South in Bajo Cauca, Antioqueño and Sur de Córdoba in creating a participatory grass-roots community model for managing the tertiary road network in Colombia. It is important to take into account both the national context and the environmental element in order to minimize direct and indirect environmental risks or to design

environmental compensation models. It is also essential to have an adequate environmental plan for the existing road network, which requires significant maintenance work.

The land formalization and restitution processes require more effective management and public instruments, cadastral updating processes, and coordinated actions at a national level. There is a high likelihood that land proceedings will involve new forms of conflict over disputed plots of land in the post-conflict scenario, for which the government should develop adequate and clear responses for all stakeholders, including ethnic groups and farmers.

Institutional development

Participation. The community's participation in political processes has grown, in particular with regard to the intention to vote and the actual exercise of this right. The respondents indicated that their votes are valuable, and so their mobilization in electoral processes is important to them.

It is noteworthy that women in the three regions give high scores, above 96%, to the possibility of being leaders in their communities. Approximately 83% of young people stated that they have the possibility of being leaders.

On the other hand, the possibility of legitimizing an ex-combatant as a community leader is low, according to the respondents: below the baseline from 16% to 14% in Putumayo, still at 11% in Catatumbo, and slightly higher, from 18% to 19% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca.

Transparency and accountability. The accountability processes in these regions are still incipient and affect trust in the institutions. Despite the efforts made in the implementation of this practice, the expected effects have not been achieved, and there is no information that demonstrates the existence of a permanent, broad and visible exercise. Gaps also persist between citizen control and the organized oversight offices, despite a slight improvement in the performance of these mechanisms.

This administration [has improved] because the majority of council members are almost all from here, from the same municipality. Before they had the problem of coming from other places and becoming council members. The community is the one that chooses a council member, one or two council members are chosen from each area, so there are more ways to manage things. (Focus group, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)

Here they have citizen oversight offices for projects, and there has been very active support from the regional Comptroller's Office in Putumayo in advising the communities about how to create an oversight office... We meet with the people, I also do so, but the Comptroller's Office has also been very active in that aspect. (Municipal Solicitor's Office, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)

The respondents in the three regions perceive that corruption has declined. The responses regarding the lack of institutional services and the deficiency of residential public services have better scores in the midline survey.

However, the perception that the administration is not paying attention to the community's requests has grown, and distrust in public entities has increased in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca. The perception that the administration does not provide information about what it is doing stayed the same in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, but decreased in Putumayo.

The respondents gave uniformly lower scores to government performance at a municipal and departmental level. The figures in Putumayo are the lowest of the three regions.


Figure 1.7. Trends in the changes in respondents' perceptions of the government's performance

	Putumayo	Catatumbo	Cauca/Valle del Cauca
Good or very good performance by the Mayor's Office	-25%	-3%	-1%
Good or very good performance by the Governor's Office	-33%	-3%	-11%
Good or very good performance by the National Government	-12%	8%	-3%

Trust. Trust in institutions and their ability to exercise power decreased in the midline evaluation, which has implications for the legitimacy of the State as the guarantor and protector of rights. This affects the leadership processes required for the implementation of the State's interventions, and creates conditions for the reintroduction of armed groups. It also negatively affects the peace process, because the institutions' breach of their commitments persists.

When the respondents were asked whether they trust the mayor's or the JAC president's commitment to the implementation of a project, their perception declined with respect to the baseline, especially in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca.

Figure 1.8. Trends in the community's levels of trust in the mayor and the JAC president



The Comprehensive Performance Index (IDI) shows increases in all of the municipalities of the sample, with significant gains in management, effectiveness, and legal requirements. It is likely that the support of the CELIs and the Government, under the Consolidation Policy, in the preparation of the Development Plans and Action Plans has contributed to these increases. However, respondents' views of State services and users' experiences with these services is less positive.

Public and social services. The level of coverage of public and social services is relatively high in these three regions. The official data show high coverage for primary and secondary education, but low coverage for preschool-age children (younger than 5). The survey shows increases in the perceptions of the quality of education and health care in the three regions.

The quality of and access to residential public services increased with respect to the baseline. However, more than half the population still lacks sewer, water and gas service.

In order to access social services, households need to register with the System of Identification and Classification of Potential Beneficiaries for Social Programs (SISBEN). Unlike the other regions studied in this evaluation, Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca have a low percentage of households registered with the SISBEN. The respondents were asked about access to and the quality of the following public services. The figure below shows the variation between the baseline and the midline for Catatumbo.

Figure 1.9. Trends in the changes in perception of access to and quality of public services in the Catatumbo region

	Access (2015)	Change in access	Change in quality	Has it improved in the last two years?
Health center			2%	Yes
Children under 5 with access to care services	24%	13%	13%	Yes
Children between 5 and 11 who attend school	98%	2%	14%	Yes
People between 12 and 18 who attend an educational institution	76%	14%	22%	Yes

The trends in the opinions about primary schools in Putumayo were even more positive than in Catatumbo, and with positive impacts compared to the responses in the control municipalities. In all of the education-related figures presented here, the responses in Cauca/Valle del Cauca were less positive than in the other two regions. In terms of residential public services, the respondents reported improvements in access and quality in most cases. These figures coincide with those for the public services component of the Consolidation Index.

Recommendations

The State has to guarantee the human rights and security of the population. This is a *sine qua non* condition for the post-conflict era. The historically marginalized municipalities and regions will be the scenarios of new conflicts and criminality in the near future, and if they do not perceive the protection of national government entities, the residents will not feel that they are part of a new, peaceful Colombia.

Maintain the credibility of political participation processes and mechanisms, empowering the communities and their leaders. Strengthen the associations and leadership of women and young people in order to develop proposals to mobilize the electorate and strengthen democratic norms. In this regard, it is important to increase political participation through social organizations and reinforce citizens' understanding of political participation and its influence on public administration.

Actively support the transparency and accountability strategies promoted by the country. In its interventions, the PNCRT should be the promoter of the *National Comprehensive Anti-corruption Public Policy Strategy* established in CONPES Document 167 of 2013 and in the right of access to public information promulgated by Law 1712 of 2014.

In addition, accountability processes should provide information about what has been planned, executed and achieved, particularly with the public resources allocated to the territories. The implementation of these initiatives, which the country defined years ago, requires organized, decisive and sustainable actions and an interinstitutional coordination effort consistent with these

policies. The IDI and the Open Government Index (OGI), as well as the Consolidation Index, measure the processes more than the results that the public can perceive.


Use new tools to improve the service provision. Strengthen the citizen consultation and participation processes from the perspective of both supply and demand. It is necessary to emphasize the meaningful involvement of civil society, and at the same time support local governments with ongoing technical assistance. Balanced scorecards and other tools are very useful for mobilizing citizens and grading the provision of services, with the objective of learning from successes and failures. It is important to continue rigorous intervention to strengthen local government institutions in the same skills that they expect from the civilian population.

Social development

Social capital: Trust. With regard to social capital, there is a reduction in the community trust, mutual aid, and joint work capacity indices, which affects the associative processes and the cohesion of the social fabric.

The region with the greatest declines with respect to the baseline is Putumayo, in which the percentage of respondents who trust their neighbors or other people from the community is well below 50%. The tradition of working in groups is relatively high, but a decrease of eight points leads to the conclusion that the level of trust in one’s peers is declining.


Figure 1.10. Trends in the levels of community trust in Putumayo



Social capital: Citizen Participation. In all regions of the study, there was an increase during the period between the baseline and midline in the number of associations and organizations created, and in the participation quality. The creation of associations does not imply a successful participatory model per se. Through the data collected, the respondents indicated the value of participation for themselves, for the community, for families and for decision-making purposes. It should be noted that the perception of problems related to participation has fallen, but the absence of teamwork and lack of people’s interest are pointed out as weaknesses.

Despite the decline with respect to the baseline, the JACs, in which there is greater household participation today, are the most common mechanisms for encouraging associativity. An important element is the strengthening of decision-making processes. The benefits most perceived by the respondents have to do with the strengthening of the social fabric, meeting more people, mutual aid in cases of emergency, and recreational activities, as shown by the responses from Cauca/ Valle del Cauca below.

Figure 1.11. Trends in the perceptions of the benefits from belonging to social organizations in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region




However, there are still gaps with respect to the community’s interest in teamwork and in training in organizational processes. On the other hand, the community feels that significant obstacles persist, including authorities and political groups that create a sense of distrust.

Of particular note in these regions is the decline in the participation of women’s groups, which have not attained significant influence despite the importance of their role in their communities. For example, their participation in leadership processes within the JACs has declined, implying that community leadership positions in the Consolidation zones continue to be dominated by men. However, there was an increase in the participation of women in decision-making processes, which is encouraging. Respondents also stated that women can be leaders, they can influence the resolution of the armed conflict, and they can be decisive in the peace process.

Productive associations. Economic rationality is an incentive for associativity. Economic rationality is the best incentive for families to join associations and strengthen their participatory mechanisms. These families are, for the most part, households headed by women. For these communities, joining associations makes sense because products become easier to sell, and enables them to be trained and achieve greater representation as a group. The following chart for the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region shows the reasons why the population prefers to join associations:

Figure 1.12. Trends in the perception of the reasons for joining associations in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region



Recommendations

Adapt the government’s interventions in order to build trust. In order to stop the decline in the community’s trust in the government, it is essential for the government to guarantee the security and rights of the leaders. The benefits of associative schemes are clear because they rely on community dialogue and collective wisdom to develop and manage projects. In this regard, we recommend strengthening support to civil society and farmers in order to encourage community cohesion.

Increase work with households headed by women, using participatory models. Participatory and associative processes, mostly led by men, have shown impressive results in this region. Learning and experience are fundamental for mobilizing the participation of women, who have different needs and requirements due to their role in the nuclear family or their status as head-of-household mothers (for example, the provision of childcare). In this regard, we recommend focusing the support on strengthening new models of participation by head-of-household mothers, taking advantage of the experiences of existing organizations and community leaders whose commitment already represents social roots.

Continue to strengthen the JACs to improve development and consolidation. The continued progress of the JACs deserves special attention, as they are probably the most powerful civil society instruments for promoting citizen participation and dialogue with national, departmental and municipal governments. For example, current law² allows for the creation of multiple mechanisms for converting them into dispute resolution agents and promoters of conciliation for the development of peace, as well as implementers of infrastructure projects (tertiary roads with a participatory component, for example), administrators of community radio stations, and generators of public policy oversight and monitoring processes. In this regard, and in order to strengthen their performance, we recommend adapting the ICO-VEO instrument³ and making the results public, in order to ensure their legitimacy with the communities.

² Law 743 of 2002, which develops Article 38 of the Political Constitution of Colombia with regard to community action organizations, and National Decree 2350 of 2003, which regulates this law.

³ The Organizational Capacity Index (ICO) is a tool that is designed and adapted to record changes in organizations as a result of institutional strengthening processes related to key elements (organizational, administrative, financial, etc.). It is an assessment of the organizational state.

Strengthen cultural and sports initiatives in order to promote peaceful communities. Culture and sports programming have the potential to heal the community wounds by the conflict, especially concerning the destruction of social bonds and a lack of trust, integration and respect for others. Based on our findings, we recommend that future interventions include a cultural component.

INTRODUCTION

Background

According to the National Consolidation Plan (PNC), which evolved into the National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT) in 2011, the concept of “Consolidation” refers to the expansion of the legitimate presence of the State in the regions of conflict in Colombia. The Policy was designed to be implemented once minimum security conditions were established for generating the institutional capacities necessary for access to, and protection of the fundamental rights of, the population in the territories historically affected by the armed conflict and illicit crops.⁴ It is aimed at establishing the presence of State institutions that are capable of effectively delivering the public goods and services necessary for development.

The policy conceives of consolidation and social, economic and institutional reconstruction as the result of a process of mobilization and the permanent establishment of three pillars: (1) state institutions in the targeted territories in order to guarantee security and create the capacities necessary to control the territory institutionally; (2) strengthening citizen participation and local governance; and (3) promoting regional integration.⁵ The interaction of these three pillars, on the basis of Territorial Security, combined with close collaboration with state entities, would serve as the path for guaranteeing the fundamental rights of citizens.

The Consolidation Policy inherited the approach of Presidential Directive 01 of 2009, which during President Uribe’s second term prioritized territories that were strategic corridors for the trafficking of weapons and drugs. The objective was to cut off passage through these corridors by illegal armed groups, gain control of the territory by military means, and subsequently consolidate the permanent presence of the State and democratic institutions, as well as to ensure trust among citizens, in order to guarantee stability in these territories. Later, Decree 2933 of 2010 created the national consolidation system, which would finally give rise to the National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT).

The Consolidation Policy was established on three fundamental pillars: 1) institutionalization of the territory; 2) social participation and good governance; and 3) regional integration, which has the objective of integrating the consolidation regions with the social, economic and political dynamics of the rest of the country, through the provision of public services and goods. The PNCRT included the municipalities of Arauca, which had not been among the territories served by consolidation.

⁴ <http://www.consolidacion.gov.co>.

⁵ http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/themes/danland/descargas/entidad/planeacion/POLITICA_NACIONAL_DE_CONSOLIDACION_Y_RECONSTRUCCION_TERRITORIAL_PNCRT.pdf.

The Consolidation Policy operates with a traffic light that measures the levels of security in the target municipalities. Villages with green or yellow security levels have the minimum security levels necessary to carry out interventions.



Source: 2013 CSDI Strategy Baseline Impact Evaluation Report

In addition, the United States Embassy developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) in order to support the strengthening of the State’s presence in strategic zones of the country, and to reduce inequality in historically marginalized regions, in which illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. The CSDI was conceived as a whole-government strategy, with a geographic focus whose objective was to maintain the security and development advances and the reduction in illicit crops and in the presence of illegal armed groups in conflict zones. The policy included significant investments in security, access to justice, combating drugs, and eradication activities.

USAID is...coordinating closely with other Embassy entities, including the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), the Military Group, and the Department of Justice, as well as the Political and Economic sections of the State Department, to develop an integrated United States Government approach for the priority consolidation zones. Programs will include peace and security, illicit crop eradication, access to justice, justice sector reform, and humanitarian and development interventions targeted at a wide range of populations.⁶

The nature of the security and development problems required a coordinated response. The joint CSDI activities were designed to confront the multiple problems that persist in consolidation zones, including the continued presence of illegal armed groups (IAGs), illegal drug trafficking, structural poverty, and the lack of rule of law.

⁶ USAID Colombia Request for Applications Number 514-09-000005, “Montes de María – Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative;” September 15, 2009, p. 5.

In working with the GoC and the PNCRT, the objective of linking United States government agencies with consolidation was

To reach a “tipping point” where state presence and positive perception of the government is sufficiently well-established so that communities decide to align with their government rather than illegal armed groups and the coca industry.⁷

USAID/Colombia designed the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) as one of the CSDI components and as the backbone of this integrated approach for supporting the PNCRT, in order to support the consolidation of the institutional presence in zones under the control or influence of insurgent groups involved with illicit crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and terrorist activities.

The basic premise of the CELIs is that armed conflicts and the illegal economy are closely related to the weak presence of the State and, therefore, its activities are aimed at strengthening the institutions, generating trust in them, building relationships between the communities and local governments, and supporting the enhancement of sustainable livelihoods. The CELIs are not substitutes for the function of the State. The State’s minimum provision of public goods, advances in the formalization of property rights and access to justice in consolidation zones or corridors are basic premises on which the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, can operate and ensure that resources are used as a catalyst for development.

Through the permanent presence of the State and the provision of services, the PNCRT sought to break the circuits of the illegal economy and the economic and social development gaps of these territories, which are marginalized from the development dynamics of the rest of the country. It also had the objective of coordinating and mobilizing investments by different sectors. The PNCRT seeks to serve as a catalyst for local development and the strengthening of local institutions, so that institutional capacity and development are not merely premises, but rather goals to be achieved.

The CELIs, or Colombia Responde (CR) as this strategy is known in the territories, supported the GoC through three pillars that are similar (although not identical) to those of the PNCRT, as shown below.

Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their equivalents in the CELI

	PNCRT Pillar	CELI Pillar	CELI Pillars defined as:
1	Territorial institutionalization	Strengthen institutional development	Improvement in the response of the local government; formalization of property rights; processing of cases involving victims’ property rights; implementation of a rural development strategy
2	Citizen participation and good governance	Strengthening of social development	Strengthening of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs); promotion of alliances between the community and the State
3	Regional integration	Catalyze economic development	Implementation of rural development programs and improved competitiveness

⁷ Ibid.

With this shared mandate, and based on the leadership of the GoC, the CELIs created strategies for institutional, social and economic development in four of the policy’s seven corridors: 1) Montes de María in the departments of Bolívar and Sucre; 2) the South Corridor in the municipality of Tumaco in the Department of Nariño; 3) the Central Corridor in Meta, Southern Tolima and Valle del Cauca up to Buenaventura; and 4) the North Corridor in Bajo Cauca Antioqueño and Southern Córdoba.

Three implementers have executed the CELIs in these four regions: first, Chemonics International, which operates in the North and South regions through the CELI North/South project; second, ARD Tetra Tech, which executes the project in the Central region (23 municipalities in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta and Tolima) through the CELI Central project; and, finally, Global Communities, which completed similar work in 2015 through the CELI Montes de María (Mdm) in the municipalities of San Jacinto, Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and in Carmen de Bolívar (Bolívar).

It is important to mention that, within the Country Development Cooperation Strategy for Colombia (CDCS), the CELI formed part of Development Objective (DO) 1: *Civil government present in consolidated CSDI zones*, focused on supporting the consolidation process with respect to the *strengthening of local government, the formalization of property rights, social development, the alliance between the community and the State, and rural development*. In the 2014-2018 CDCS, the CELIs form part of DO3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

The CELI investments are aimed at the Intermediate Results of DO3, and have much in common with their original results framework, despite the change toward economic activities. The current framework is tied to the CELI’s Performance Management Plan (PMP), and gives priority to the following:

- | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IR 3.1 More equitable and secure land tenure |
| Sub IR 3.1.1 Land restituted to victims displaced by the conflict |
| IR 3.2 Increased private and public investment in the rural sector |
| Sub IR 3.2.1 Strengthening of local governments’ capacity to access and manage public funds for productive infrastructure |
| Sub IR 3.2.2 Increased private sector investment in target rural communities |
| IR 3.3 More effective producer associations that benefit small farmers |
| Sub IR 3.3.1 Improved institutional capacity of producer associations |

Between 2011 and 2012, USAID/Colombia tasked its Monitoring and Evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., with the design of an impact evaluation of the group of CSDI interventions and the collection of baseline survey data. DevTech worked on this with Econometría, S.A.⁸ The design included two subsequent measurements: one after two years of program execution, and a final evaluation upon completion of the program.

The USAID EVAL program (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), under a contract between USAID and Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), is responsible for carrying out the midline measurement, and for reporting on the impacts of the CELIs to date, which was done based on the design of the initial evaluation, program satisfaction questions posed to the participants,

⁸ DevTech Systems, Inc. and Econometría S.A. 2013. “Methodology for the evaluation of the impact of USAID’s strategy in CSDI zones - Final Methodology Report.”

qualitative fieldwork, and in-depth interviews with the CELI teams. The design of the evaluation included the collection of data in seven corridors in which the GoC implemented the PNCRT.

The midline evaluation examined the changes using institutional, social and economic indicators, and three main guidelines for their use were established:

1. *Measure the changes in the impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with the target populations.*
2. *Provide timely data to the decision-making processes, in order to identify the components that need to be strengthened in order to achieve the program's goals.*
3. *Identify best practices and lessons learned to date, in order to guide future USAID interventions.*

The impact evaluation that was originally designed was linked to the full range of interventions within the CSDI framework. Unfortunately, funding for the rest of the programming was reduced, leaving the CELIs alone as the only component of the entire strategy. It is therefore not possible to have a comprehensive evaluation of CSDI's results.

The results of this evaluation are also presented at the cluster level (individual municipalities or small groups of municipalities with similar geographical and socioeconomic traits), and that the results of the cluster analysis often differ from the results of the regional analysis, and so their study is important for obtaining more focused information.

In the case of the PNCRT municipalities, the surveys were conducted in three consolidation zones in which there were no CELI interventions – Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo – distributed in nine (9) clusters. The clusters of the 16 PNCRT municipalities and their control municipalities are presented below.

Figure 2.2. PNCRT Municipalities

Cluster	Consolidation Zone	Treatment Municipality	Control Municipality
10	Catatumbo	Tibú	Dabeiba (Antioquia)
11		Teorama, Convención, El Carmen	San Carlos (Antioquia)
19	Cauca/Valle del Cauca	Florida, Pradera	Coyaima (Tolima)
20		Miranda, Corinto	Cumbitarra (Nariño)
21		Caloto, Santander de Quilichao	Totoró, Cauca
29	Putumayo	Puerto Leguizamo	Santa Rosa (Cauca)
30		Puerto Asís	Puerto Concordia (Meta)
31		Valle de Guamuez	Algeciras (Huila)
32		San Miguel	Florencia (Caquetá)

The evaluation included all of the municipalities in which the PNCRT was implemented (except Arauca), but it should be noted that they were included under a more ambitious results framework, which was to evaluate the CSDI strategy as a whole. The CSDI was focused on 33 of the 51 consolidation municipalities. The CELI programs were designed to serve these 33 municipalities, and at the time of establishing the baseline, the decision was made to measure the same variables in the 18 consolidation municipalities, regardless of whether or not USAID was going to intervene in these municipalities, but this would also allow for the establishment of the impact of the CSDI strategy. In the end, the CSDI intervention was reduced to the CELI interventions.

At the end of 2012, the decision was made to conduct 19,220 surveys in 31 clusters in which the municipalities were grouped based on their characteristics. In the PNCRT regions, 7,050 surveys were conducted, that is, 2,350 in each of the three regions.⁹

How to read this report

An impact evaluation is a powerful tool that has significant challenges and differences in comparison with any other type of evaluation. These differences are described in the Limitations section, and are explained in greater detail in Annex 3 of the main report, which provides an understanding of the different types of results that this kind of evaluation generates, and how they should be interpreted.

Types of results. There are four types of quantitative results in the report, as described below:

1. **Impacts.** The impacts come from the analysis of the survey. They are the result of the difference-in-differences design and of the differences between the key results of the treatment and control groups. The impact figures are read as the difference in percentage points (pp) between the beginning and the midline that is attributable to the intervention. The impact data tables show the statistical significance with asterisks (*) and their titles begin with the word *Impact*.
2. **Trends.** These figures also come from the survey and show how *a sample* changes over time. The trends are shown in charts rather than tables, and the titles of the figures always begin with the word *Trends*. These figures are also mentioned in the text with a percentage sign (%), and in absolute values.
3. **Secondary data.** These data come from other sources, such as government figures and indices, and they help to describe the context in which the PNCRT and CELI interventions operate. The tables with these data are titled *Secondary data*.

Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report

Table title:	In the text:	How to read it:
Impacts	pp (percentage point)	Relative change over time (in comparison with control groups) attributable to the intervention
Trends	% (percentage)	Change over time in a sub-sample
Secondary data	Secondary data	Shows context to support the findings and/or explain the challenges

Entire sample and four sub-samples. From the survey, there is a large sample (of approximately 19,000 households), which is divided into four sub-samples, whose respondents correspond to the CELI municipalities and their control municipalities, and the PNCRT municipalities and their controls. Reference is occasionally made to the complete sample, when the results for the 19,000 households are similar.

Direct and indirect beneficiaries. Due to the challenges confronting the design of the midline evaluation (see the Limitations section below), it was not possible to confirm whether all of those identified as beneficiaries at the beginning of the study actually received benefits from the CELIs.

⁹ Impact Evaluation of USAID's CSDI Strategy. Baseline, May 2013.

As a result, in this evaluation report all residents of villages in the treatment municipalities are recognized as indirect beneficiaries, with the exception of those participants in the chapter on Economic Development, in which it is possible to identify a population of direct CELI beneficiaries and to observe their progress differently from the rest of the citizens of those municipalities. In the case of the PNCRT municipalities, no direct beneficiaries were identified, that is, all beneficiaries are indirect.

Evaluation design and methods

EVAL, with support from the National Consulting Center (CNC), used a mixed-methods approach – qualitative and quantitative – to examine a set of indicators for each result of the CELIs. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunities, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of the CELI interventions. The design replicated the baseline methodology, and used qualitative methods to obtain information about the population’s perceptions, opinions and experiences. Annex 3 of the main report presents the considerations of the complete design of the evaluation, which includes an impact estimate.

It should be recalled that the evaluation had a broader framework, which was to evaluate the CSDI strategy, and it included all 33 CELI municipalities and 18 PNCRT municipalities, for a total of 51 consolidation municipalities (with the exception of the municipalities in Arauca). At the time of establishing the baseline, the decision was made to measure the same variables in the 18 consolidation municipalities, regardless of whether USAID was going to intervene in these municipalities, as this would also allow for the establishment of the impact of the CSDI strategy. In the end, the CSDI intervention was reduced to the CELI interventions.

This document contains the results of the evaluation in the PNCRT municipalities that were not beneficiaries of the CELI interventions.

Evaluation questions

The baseline identified the evaluation questions in 2011, which were adjusted slightly (by USAID; see Annex 2 of the main report) and are presented below:

Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target populations in the intervention zones?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do the CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in supporting the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting
3. Does the GoC show the expected level of investment in consolidation areas after USAID’s assistance in the PNCRT municipalities?	IR 3.2
4. What are the specific effects of the CELIs on changing the local government’s capacities and provision of services (serving the local population, being accountable, expanding social services)?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by the CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacities of civil society organizations (CSOs) in local areas?	IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been made in the recovery and reconstruction of the territory affected by the armed conflicts (presence of IAGs) and unlawful economic activities?	Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
8. To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

These questions serve to measure impact (questions 1, 4-8) as well as performance (questions 2 and 3), and they adopt a mixed-methods design in order to achieve this purpose (see the Methodology section and Annex 3 of the main report for more details). The interdisciplinary team used data from the quantitative household survey (in a pre- and post-quasi-experimental design), a series of qualitative instruments, a secondary data search, and a multifaceted analysis in order to answer these questions, whose analysis is presented in this report.

Quantitative methods

The design of the impact evaluation includes a quantitative study of households in the consolidation zones, with and without CELI interventions. The control municipalities were selected using an advanced pairing protocol, which is described in detail in the Annexes of the original baseline report. The original design included an additional 12% sample, to account for the possibility of attrition. In the field, the midline evaluation, following a panel design, re-surveyed the same households in order to ensure comparability, but approximately 15% of the sample was lost due to attrition. Not all of the villages in the CELI municipalities had an intervention, a situation that was reflected in the sample.

The baseline was carried out at various times over two years.¹⁰ The timing of the midline evaluation was planned to be compatible with the increase in data captured in the baseline, and to prepare a seasonal timeline for the final evaluation. In that same discussion, it was felt that the midline evaluation could be more useful if carried out closer to the time when decisions about the new programming would be made. In that regard, the midline evaluation data were collected between July 20 and November 30, 2015. It is important to note that local elections (for mayors and governors) were held on October 25, 2015; it is possible that the atmosphere and the very politicized environment affected the respondents' opinions for both the treatment and control zones.

The survey instrument (Annex 8 of the main report) includes modules on demography, justice and security, lawful and unlawful economic opportunities and performance, government legitimacy, social capital and participation in community organizations, electoral behavior, social and public services, rights to land and property, victims' rights, roads, social programs, and opinions about the future and peace. Indices such as the social capital index, the institutional performance index,

¹⁰ From the baseline report: "The survey interviews were conducted in two phases: in the first phase, 65% of indirect beneficiaries and control families were interviewed between March 27 and July 5, 2012. In the second phase, the remaining 35% of indirect beneficiaries and control families, plus 100% of the direct beneficiaries, were interviewed between November 7, 2012, and May 25, 2013, with a break for Christmas and New Year's." *Impact Evaluation of USAID's Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report. Volume 1: Summary of findings.* June 30, 2013.

and the accountability index¹¹ are created from the data. In general, the survey measures perceptions (as in the case of security), which are important and more sensitive than news and recent events. The survey is less effective for capturing real experiences, because most of the respondents have not had direct contact with changes that have occurred in the institutions or in security matters, for example. In this regard, there is subjectivity in the indicators that were designed at the time of the baseline survey.

The evaluation added several new elements to the midline on the level of satisfaction as a result of the CELI intervention, and a small group of elements on victimization, extracted from the LAPOP survey.¹² The survey was applied personally in homes, workplaces, and the municipal centers when it was not possible to travel to the villages for security reasons.

The evaluation team carried out 5,671 household surveys in the three PNCRT regions studied, of which 2,718 were answered by men and 2,953 by women. The respondents reported unequal literacy rates, with the lowest in Catatumbo (75%) (Figure 2.5). In terms of ethnicity, the three regions have different self-identification behaviors, as can be seen in Figure 2.6. Cauca and Valle del Cauca, in the Colombian Pacific region, has a larger Afro-Colombian population, while the population in Catatumbo tends to self-identify as white or mestizo. In Putumayo, the largest percentage of the population self-identifies as mestizo. Indigenous communities make up a significant percentage of the population in Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo. What this information reveals is that the interventions should be differentiated in the regions. Standardized actions cannot necessarily respond to all population types.


Figure 2.5. Sample by sex, region and literacy levels

	Men	Women	Total	Reported literacy rate
Catatumbo	1,061	863	1,924	75%
Cauca/Valle del Cauca	717	1,107	1,824	82%
Putumayo	940	983	1,923	85%
Total	2,718	2,953	5,671	

¹¹ Accountability.

¹² The Latin American Public Opinion Project Survey (<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/>), which has been implemented throughout Latin America by a team from Vanderbilt University over the last three decades.

Figure 2.6. Sample by ethnicity



The vast majority of respondents in these three regions live in dispersed rural areas, while a small group lives in population centers that are not municipal seats. A small fraction lives in the municipal seat. (Figure 2.7)

Figure 2.7. Sample by rurality

	Dispersed rural	Population center	Municipal seat
Catatumbo	93%	6%	1%
Cauca/Valle del Cauca	81%	17%	2%
Putumayo	77%	19%	3%

The respondents were very optimistic about the future. The vast majority have hope that their conditions will improve. However, while approximately 90% of respondents in regions with some CELI intervention gave very positive answers about the future, the responses in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca ranged between 84% and 89%. There was very little difference between the responses of men and women, except in Putumayo, where women were slightly more optimistic.

It is worth mentioning that around 21% of respondents in Cauca/Valle del Cauca knew about the Colombia Responde program, which is reasonable given that CELI Central deployed its actions in these areas after completing the baseline.

Other quantitative measures include an examination of key sources of secondary data, including the government and the EVIDINCE consortium,¹³ which collects quarterly municipal data on results of interest, such as the presence of police personnel and judicial branch officials. The GoC sources also provided updated data on high-impact crimes, such as homicides, acts of terrorism and massacres. The GoC data used in the report also include the Consolidation Index, described in the chapter on Regional Context below.

¹³ A research effort associated with empirical studies of conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration that studies conflicts and insurgency at a sub-national level.

Qualitative methods

The qualitative methods include in-depth interviews with key informants at national, regional and local levels in zones with CELI interventions and government interventions through the implementation of the PNCRT, as well as in the control municipalities. The team conducted structured interviews with officials of the municipalities and municipal solicitor's offices in 21 select locations that enabled them to capture variations between the CELI and PNCRT interventions and their control zones. In the PNCRT regions, visits were made to the municipalities of Florida and Pradera in Valle del Cauca; Santander de Quilichao in Cauca; and Puerto Asís and Valle de Guamuez in Putumayo. Coyaima in Southern Tolima and Totoró in Cauca were also visited and serve as control municipalities.

In addition, EVAL conducted interviews with leaders of civil society organizations (CSO) and producer associations, and issues that were parallel to those of the survey were covered in focus groups of citizens from the CELI and PNCRT zones, some of whom participated in the interventions.

The qualitative data were analyzed in Atlas.ti¹⁴ using thematic coding that reflects the evaluation questions and allowed for the generation of emerging codes in order to cover issues that were not included in the design of the evaluation. These codes were correlated to understand the coincidence and patterns of importance for responding to the research questions.

The qualitative and quantitative data often have different results, because the quantitative sample is representative of the “average population,” while those who responded to the qualitative instruments were randomly chosen households in the village,¹⁵ in a randomly selected sample of the universe of villages in which the intervention will be developed.

Limitations

The design of the evaluation used in this study has the limitations described below and are detailed in Annex 3 of the main report:

Factors related to the design of the evaluation:

- 1. The CELIs were going to be evaluated as part of a broader and more complete initiative (CSDI) that did not materialize.** The interventions' results of interest are found in the more general levels of the Results Framework of USAID's CDCS. The evaluation was designed to evaluate a set of programs that formed part of the CSDI, for which several United States government agencies were responsible, with broader funding and objectives than the current set of interventions. CSDI, included in the same intervention zones, was a comprehensive approach designed by the United States and Colombian governments with regard to combating drugs, security and justice, regional and local institutions, economic development, regional integration, roads, and the strengthening of civil society. The initiative was reduced to the implementation of the CELIs, under the responsibility of USAID and with significant resources, but without the comprehensive approach that was initially envisaged. As such, the design of the impact evaluation includes sets of indicators

¹⁴ Qualitative data analysis software.

¹⁵ In accordance with the baseline methodology, village leaders were contacted and they helped to create a list of village households, and a random selection of households to be surveyed was made from the universe of residents. Taken from the 2013 baseline.

for which there was little or no intervention. Therefore, it is not possible to detect the impacts of programs that no longer exist.

If the originally planned effects had been produced, it would have been an enormous achievement for the CSDI. However, achieving the same impact only with the CELIs, without the interventions of the rest of the CSDI programs, and without the interventions promised by the GoC, is to expect too much. As a result, the impacts found in the evaluation, measured using rigorous statistical techniques, are few. The observable impacts occurred mainly at a local level, in direct interventions aimed at producer associations.

- 2. The category of indirect beneficiaries is imprecise, and capturing the impacts of that rather diffuse level will require more investment and more time.** Several categories of CELI and PNCRT interventions – although they may be a priority – are probably invisible to the average respondent, and do not meet the minimum requirements for being recognized as beneficiaries, for the following reasons. First, some public goods, such as the strengthening of justice services or work in the mayor’s or municipal solicitor’s offices, or some social or productive infrastructure projects, affect very few residents in a given area. For example, at an international level, an average of only 6% of a specific population routinely accesses justice services in their lives, and a fraction of that figure does so in a given year. Detecting perceptions of change among this “fraction of a fraction” is very difficult. Second, as previously mentioned, the programming of the CELIs had goals and important points of reference for each of the pillars (social, economic and institutional development), in such a way that the resources need to be distributed among geographic sites and pillars. While members of a benefited productive association or civil society group are clear that they are part of an intervention, indirect beneficiaries are very distant from the benefit itself. Their inclusion in the sample dilutes the impacts that can be detected by the design of the evaluation.

Had the broad set of global CSDI and GoC interventions continued as planned, perhaps more impacts on these higher-order indicators would have been detected. The “dose” of the intervention was only a fraction of what had been planned, in a much small number of sectors and beneficiaries, in particular indirect beneficiaries.

Factors beyond the control of the interventions

- 3. Local contexts and structural poverty condition the effectiveness of the PNCRT.** The intervention municipalities have historically been isolated with respect to their economies, with stagnant local markets, very limited land connectivity, activities by illegal armed groups, little presence of government institutions, and deep intergenerational poverty. The households in these areas have limited access to land – in terms of size or low productivity – and a deficit of human capital (education, health, nutrition), as shown in the reference statistics on education coverage, the perception of quality of services, and food security challenges.¹⁶ The main consequence is low productivity and minimum income from the land and labor, which are the two main production factors of rural families. This limits households because it keeps them in poverty – the poverty trap – in which poverty is reproduced as a consequence of low savings capacity, which prevents changes in the initial amounts of capital, land and labor. The cycles are repeated in short periods, which does not

¹⁶ See, for example, Impact Evaluation of USAID Colombia’s Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), Baseline Report Volume 1: Summary of Results - All PNCRT Zones, pp. 30 and 42-43; Volume 2, pp. 47-50 and pp. 69-70; as well as the baseline reports.

allow for the initial situation to change, and over the long-term they limit changes in the well-being of the next generation: young people cannot find opportunities and are forced to migrate or to join illegal armed groups. In this context – and others related to unemployment and informality – violence, in its different forms, reinforces the poverty trap.

The other side of the poverty trap is communitarian: the municipalities lack access roads, political representation, and market formation. Political representation is generally very weak, which dilutes the attention of the central or departmental government, such that investment in roads is insufficient for developing markets in which small farmers can sell their products above production and transportation costs. Poverty is not only individual: poverty at a municipal level encompasses the collective. There is an evident absence of public goods that are essential for the development of entire communities and regions. The capacity of the rural interventions to generate significant effects on economic and social development is closely linked to land tenure and property rights. However, the State's policy has had little success on this front, and the CELIs have faced the same – or worse – institutional obstacles.

4. **Exogenous contextual factors that cannot be excluded.** Among the exogenous factors,¹⁷ it is important to mention the increase in inflation, caused by the global economic slowdown and the sharp drop in oil prices, which results in recession in economic activities associated with the extraction of this mineral. This occurred when information was being collected about the beneficiaries' perceptions of the performance of the CELIs and PNCRT.

Factors related to the implementation

5. **The process of selecting villages in which to work faced challenges that could affect the results of the evaluation.** The selection of villages is the fundamental basis for the programs' implementation and evaluation. The selection of the municipalities and villages has substantial effects on the results of the strategy and, therefore, on the impacts. The baseline team employed a municipality pairing system for this quasi-experimental design. Such systems, while imperfect, can be used to define the contrasting hypothesis about what would have happened in municipalities that did not receive an intervention.

The selection of villages depended on the GoC's "traffic light" methodology,¹⁸ which the Colombian army used to make an objective classification of the villages based on risk level, and where the PNCRT interventions could potentially be carried out.

¹⁷ The role of the control municipalities is to ensure that the exogenous factors do not skew the results. Under perfect conditions, the exogenous factors are applicable to both types of municipalities, so that, in principle, these factors would cancel each other out. However, no quasi-experimental design is always perfect, and as a result, the evaluation uses covariate and cluster control to minimize possible biases.


¹⁸ The traffic light classifies the zones based on their level of security risk as follows: green: low risk; yellow: medium risk; orange: high risk; and red: critical risk.

REGIONAL CONTEXT

The objective of consolidation was to establish and strengthen State institutions in the territories, integrate the regions economically, and build the social fabric in the zones affected by the armed conflict in Colombia, based on the good security results attributable to the armed forces of Colombia.

The security advances are important, but not absolute; regional economic integration is promising but incomplete; and the institutional presence and good governance are still scarce in some zones, especially in rural areas. The set of conditions that fueled the armed conflict and illegal groups has improved, but the regional context indicators still do not show the existence of a perfect environment in which any intervention can achieve its objectives.

Catatumbo Region. The Catatumbo region is located in the northeastern part of Colombia, in the Department of Norte de Santander, between the eastern *cordillera* (mountain range) of Colombia and the border with Venezuela. For purposes of the PNCRT intervention, this region covers seven municipalities: Tibú, Hacarí, San Calixto, Teorama, Convención, El Carmen and El Tarra. It is a region that borders Venezuela. The border location of Catatumbo, as well as the natural corridors and means of communication toward the center and the Caribbean coast have facilitated the legal and illegal transit of merchandise and people between the two countries.¹⁹ In general, the municipalities in the Catatumbo region have been affected by drug trafficking, the presence of IAGs, and conflicts over land tenure.




Source: 2013 CSDI Strategy Baseline Impact Evaluation Report, Catatumbo Region

According to the UACT, more than 6 billion pesos was invested in this region in 2015, of which 73% was in rapid response and alternative development programs, and 27% was in other activities co-financed by different levels of government and international cooperation organizations.²⁰

¹⁹ <http://www.co.undp.org/content/dam/colombia/docs/Paz/undp-co-catatumbo-2014.pdf>.


²⁰ <http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/?q=content/m%C3%A1s-de-6-mil-millones-de-pesos-fueron-invertidos-en-el-catatumbo-en-2015>.

Cauca-Valle del Cauca. The Cauca-Valle del Cauca region is located in the western part of the central *cordillera* of Colombia. For the PNCRT, this region covers seven municipalities: Pradera and Florida in the Department of Valle del Cauca, and Miranda, Corinto, Toribio, Caloto and Santander de Quilichao in the Department of Cauca. According to the information on the UACT’s website, more than 39 billion pesos has been invested in the five municipalities in Cauca, of which 33 billion was directed to the Program against Illicit Crops, and 6 billion was directed to rapid response projects.²¹



Source: 2013 CSDI Strategy Baseline Impact Evaluation Report, Cauca-Valle del Cauca Region

Putumayo. The Putumayo region is located in the southeast of the country. The PNCRT intervention covers four municipalities: Puerto Leguizamo, Puerto Asís, San miguel and Valle del Guamuez.



Source: 2013 CSDI Strategy Baseline Impact Evaluation Report, Putumayo Region

According to the information published by the UACT, this region has received an investment of more than 50 billion pesos under the PNCRT, which includes 23 billion from the Program against Illicit Crops, 8.3 billion in rapid response projects, and 2.9 billion pesos in strengthening productive organizations.²²

The Consolidation Index. The Consolidation Index is a tool designed to measure and monitor advances in the consolidation process in the municipalities. This index is developed from a set of 37 indicators in the three pillars of the PNCRT, each of which has several components, as shown in Figure 3.1 below:

Figure 3.1. Index of consolidation pillars and their components

Pillar	Components
1 Territorial institutionalization	Security, justice, property rights and human rights
2 Citizen participation and good governance	Good governance, citizen participation, and social capital

²¹ <http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/?q=content/regional-cauca>.

²² <http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/?q=content/regional-putumayo>.

Pillar	Components
3 Regional Integration	Connectivity, social services, and economic growth

Each pillar constitutes a third of the final score on a scale of 0 to 100. Since 2011, Consolidation Index data have been compiled for each consolidation municipality, together with information about a group of corresponding comparison municipalities. The scores are disaggregated by pillar or through the indicators that make up each pillar: by time, by geography (municipality, department and region), and by type of service.


As mentioned above, the PNCRT regions included in this study are Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Cauca and Valle del Cauca, and Putumayo. Their municipalities are the following:

Figure 3.2. Secondary data: Consolidation Index: municipalities in the three PNCRT regions

Norte de Santander (Catatumbo)	Cauca/ Valle del Cauca	Putumayo
Convención	Caloto	Puerto Asís
El Carmen	Corinto	Puerto Leguizamo
El Tarra	Miranda	San Miguel
Hacarí	Santander de Quilichao	Valle del Guamuez
San Calixto	Toribío	
Teorama	Florida	
Tibú	Pradera	

There was a positive trend in the scores of the index for each of these regions between 2011 and 2014, with Catatumbo presenting the smallest increase and Putumayo the largest, as shown in Figure 3.3:

Figure 3.3. Consolidation Index: General scores by region



The index's general score for the municipalities analyzed grew during the period 2011-2014, with the exception of those in the Catatumbo region. Pillar 3 (regional integration) obtained the highest score of the three pillars and marks the general scores at various points. Pillar 1, territorial institutionalization, received the lowest score for the Catatumbo, Cauca and Valle del Cauca municipalities, while Pillar 2, good governance, was the weakest in Putumayo.

The Consolidation Index is made up of indicators, each of which has strengths, weaknesses and particular points of view that must be taken into account when making comparisons between the scores and evaluation data.

First, the Index's indicators are, in general, data from a government perspective, reported in many cases by municipal, departmental and national public officials, and are far from the perceptions reported by citizens with regard to the same issues of the survey (security, institutionality, etc.). Neither is more "correct" than the other, and they are not precisely comparable. Decisions made on the basis of one or the other case affect the results: On the one hand, many index indicators are based on data from the main population centers (reported in many cases by public officials and in other cases by citizens). In contrast are the data that come out of the survey, with 90% of its sample from dispersed rural areas, 8% from population centers other than the municipal seat, and only 2% from the municipal seat.

Second, the scores of many indicators are weighted in order to be compared with municipalities that have comparable socioeconomic levels, and as a result high scores are obtained even when the absolute scores are among the worst in the country. For example, in the Open Government indicator (figures from the GoC's Open Government Index), the Index score in 2014 in Tolima was 59.5, but this was adjusted or normalized to 90.8 for purposes of the comparison with similar municipalities. This is not an index flaw, but it is important to take into consideration that the scores are modified in this way before being added.

Security component. The security component of the Consolidation Index measures the percentage of a municipality's main population centers in which the police carry out control operations without the assistance of the military forces, the implementation of comprehensive citizen coexistence and security plans, the number of terrorist and subversive acts, and density and changes in the production of coca. The following findings were made in the period between the first measurement of the index and the midline (2014):

- In the Catatumbo region, although a citizen security plan had been formulated, there was a consistent downward trend in the rest of the indicators. There was an upward trend in the density of coca crops.
- In the Cauca/Valle del Cauca subregion, there were 59 terrorist and subversive acts in 2014, for an average of 24.95 in the measurement of these two indicators of the Consolidation Index.²³ At the time, there was only a general scheme for the security plan.
- The most positive indicator in Putumayo in 2014 was the total absence of subversive actions; the level of establishment of the Comprehensive Citizen Security Plan (PICS) for

²³ It should be noted that the indicator reaches 100 when there is a total absence of terrorist and subversive actions.

this region was 75%, on average.²⁴ The situation with respect to coca is very precarious, although slightly better than in 2013.


- The military presence in the four regions continues to be high in relation to the police presence.

It is likely that the 2015 data²⁵ will show a significant deterioration in the security indicators, and that they will evidence the increase in coca production that has already been reported by different media. According to various data sources, the area of coca cultivation in Colombia increased from 80,000 to 159,000 hectares between 2013 and 2015.²⁶

On the other hand, the respondents in the Catatumbo region perceive that the security situation has worsened. While 60% of the respondents in the baseline survey stated that the security situation in their place of residence was good or very good, only 45% did so in the midline survey. Only 28% responded that security had improved over the last two years, in comparison with 33% in the baseline survey. Eighty-six percent of respondents in the baseline survey stated that they would recommend that a relative return to the area, but this percentage fell to 81% in the midline survey.

In the Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca regions, the perception of security was stable between the baseline and the midline, while in Catatumbo, 14% more respondents in the midline believed that there was more insecurity (Figure 3.4). On the other hand, the percentage of respondents in Putumayo who thought that the security situation had improved over the previous two years rose from 23% in the baseline to 37% in the midline. The percentage of such respondents in Cauca/Valle del Cauca rose from 15% to 19% in the same period of time.

Figure 3.4. Perception of security (security is good or very good)




*Source: Data from the baseline and midline evaluations, authors' calculations*²⁷

²⁴ This is the result of the weighting of the measurement of the indicator for the implementation of the PICS in the four municipalities in Putumayo. Puerto Asís and Valle del Guamuez appear with 100% implemented, while Puerto Leguizamó and San Miguel have 50% implemented. It should be noted that these are the results obtained after the weighting made by the Consolidation Index.

²⁵ The Consolidation Index data had still not been published by the time this evaluation was completed.

²⁶ The Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) of the Central Intelligence Agency (USA) produces an annual estimate of the area cultivated with coca in the Andean region. Its latest results were presented to the GoC in March 2016. The main conclusions, from national statistics, were disseminated in the media. The cultivation of coca in Colombia reached a historic low in 2013 (in both SIMCI and CNC-DoD measurements). Over the next two years, however, the growth was sustained and drastic. In the last CNC measurement, the number of cultivated hectares doubled, from 80,000 to 159,000, with a proportional increase in the production of cocaine, from 290 to 442 metric tons. The complete report is not accessible to the public. The statistics cited here are found in the articles published in the El Tiempo newspaper, Semana magazine and the El Espectador newspaper on March 15, 2016 (<http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/ee-uu-y-canada/ee-uu-advierde-de-aumento-de-cultivos-de-coca-en-colombia/16537123>).

²⁷ The source for all of the report's tables and charts is the database of the baseline and midline surveys conducted for the impact evaluation of the CELI interventions, unless otherwise indicated.



Source: Data from the baseline and midline evaluations, authors' calculations²⁸

An important element to review with regard to security is illegal mining. The three regions reported a significant increase over what was reported in the baseline (Figure 3.6). That is, a higher percentage of respondents reported that illegal mining currently exists in their town or village.

Figure 3.6. Trends in illegal mining


	Baseline	Midline	Impact
Putumayo	2.2%	6.7%	0.0387**
Catatumbo	0.9%	5.9%	0.0628
Cauca/Valle del Cauca	5.7%	6.4%	0.0726

As mentioned above, the EVIDINCE consortium carried out an independent collection of data at a municipal level for a set of indicators related to security, good governance, citizen participation, social capital, and economic growth. Its security-related data have been added to an Insecurity Index, in which higher scores reflect higher insecurity. The information collected by EVIDINCE is related to such variables as the homicide, robbery and theft rates; informal or illegal mining managed by illegal armed groups; and the presence of notices or graffiti alluding to illegal armed groups in the municipal seat on the day of the data-collection visit.

The data below show the quarterly variations in the above-described index in the PNCRT municipalities (T2) and their control municipalities (C2) (Figure 3.7). The data show a sustained positive trend in security for the PNCRT regions, and greater volatility in the control zones, suggesting a positive impact due to the presence of the Territorial Consolidation Policy.

²⁸ Id.

Figure 3.7. Secondary data: EVIDINCE quarterly Insecurity Index




Nota: Índice creado usando el método del factor principal de las variables de presencia de homicidios, robos, hurtos, explotación de minera ilegal manejada por grupos armados ilegales y presencia de avisos alusivos a grupos armados ilegales en el municipio.

Note: Index created using the principal factor method for variables related to the presence of homicides, robberies, thefts, illegal mining exploitation managed by illegal armed groups, and notices alluding to illegal armed groups in the municipality

The three regions reported a decline in the presence of the police and military forces in the region. In Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, the respondents reported an improvement with respect to the quality of security services provided by the police and military forces in the places in which they remained. There was no major change in this indicator in Catatumbo between the baseline and midline surveys.

The data of the EVIDINCE consortium show that the police presence increased, at least in the municipal seats of the control municipalities. The municipal seats of the PNCRT municipalities experienced a slight reduction in police presence in 2015, as shown in the following figure:

Figure 3.8. Secondary data: EVIDINCE Insecurity Index



Nota: Logaritmo del número de policías que hay en la cabecera del municipio.


Note: Logarithm of the number of police in the municipal seat

Conclusion 1. Security policies have had a positive effect in these regions despite the persistence of common crime, extortion, forced recruitment, the presence of IAGs and illegal mining. Respondents have a more positive image of the police due to improvement in service delivery.

Illicit crops and a culture of legality. At the regional level, respondents in Putumayo reported a decline in coca crops in their villages, from 35% (baseline) to 33% (midline). Respondents in Catatumbo reported a significant increase, from 17% to 29%. Respondents in Cauca also reported an increase, from 6% to 8%, which is small in absolute terms.

In general, households' perceptions of the legality of coca crops worsened between the baseline and the midline, as they did in the control municipalities (Figure 3.9), and responses to the three survey questions on this topic show a similar pattern. As can be seen, a smaller percentage of respondents in the three regions (13% on average) believe that coca should not be cultivated because it is illegal. According to the data, there is a greater tolerance for cultivation. This finding coincides with the 2014 Consolidation Index data and other sources that indicate significant growth in coca cultivation in these regions over the last two years.


Figure 3.9. Trends: Perception that coca should not be cultivated because it is illegal (agree/strongly agree)



On the other hand, the respondents in Putumayo, like those in their control municipalities, indicated their willingness to report crimes at the same rate as in the baseline. They are more likely (around 80%) to report kidnappings or the theft of livestock or crops, and less likely (around 45%) to report illicit crops in the area. About 65% were willing to report extortion, bribery, and threats. The respondents in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca were 10 percentage points more likely in the midline to report all types of crime.


The preference for a culture of legality expressed by respondents in municipalities with Consolidation Policy interventions, their controls, and municipalities with CELI interventions decreased with respect to the baseline. They responded to two questions (Figure 3.10) related to their conduct and the conduct of their communities: (1) How often to you act in accordance with the law?" (left side of Figure 3.10); and (2) In your opinion, how often does your community act in accordance with the law?" (right side of the Figure 3.10). The decrease in the percentage of affirmative responses (always or almost always) is evident. That is, there was a significant deterioration (36 points in the worst case) in the culture of legality in regions where there had been some type of intervention, in this case by the government.

Figure 3.10. Trends: Opinions on the value of laws and compliance with them (always/almost always)



The survey asked about respondents' positions with regard to people who have negative opinions about the Colombian government. They were asked whether they approve of people who refer to the government in a negative way. The percentage of respondents who said "I approve" or "I strongly approve" increased in all regions in which the PNCRT was implemented (Figure 3.11). Also, several questions were asked about whether people who have negative opinions about the government should be able to vote, engage in peaceful protests, be elected to public office, and give speeches on television. The results were more positive than in the baseline, particularly in Catatumbo.

Figure 3.11. Trends: Perceptions about actors with negative opinions of the GoC




Conclusion 2. There is awareness about the benefits of crop substitution, but the efforts need to be supported. While the data demonstrate that the respondents in the midline measurement were more aware of the damage caused by illicit crops, a fact that could result in a reduction of plantings, the evaluation team believes that the eradication policy should be strengthened, as

should the provision of public goods necessary to generate lawful economies (road infrastructure, for example).

Another element analyzed by the evaluation team was respondents' perceptions of the impact of the presence of IAGs. The percentage of respondents in the PNCRT municipalities who believe that IAGs have a negative effect on municipal performance declined with respect to the baseline. (Figure 3.12)

Figure 3.12. Trends: Negative impact of the presence of IAGs on municipal performance



Human rights, justice and the legitimacy of the State. The Consolidation Index data show that human rights violations persist in the PNCRT municipalities, even though some of the following indicators have improved:

- No massacres or murders of leaders or high-profile authorities have been reported since 2011 in any of the four departments studied.
- In 2014, Catatumbo reported 3,900 displaced persons (more than triple the number reported in 2013), 14 mine incidents, and 10 cases of extortive kidnapping, with figures higher than the period 2011-2013. The implementation of Human Rights Committees in the municipalities in this region has progressed 30% to date, on average.
- Putumayo has a Human Rights Committee with good performance grades. The number of mine incidents and forced displacements has declined from previous years. However, the four municipalities in the zone have reported a total of 3,120 displaced persons. There were no extortive kidnappings in 2013, but there were two in 2014.
- In Cauca/Valle del Cauca, no kidnappings were reported in 2014, but the number of displaced persons (2,194) and mine incidents (8) increased with respect to 2013 (768 and 5, respectively.) Three municipalities have operating Human Rights Committees, while the implementation of these committees in the remaining four municipalities has progressed only 30%.

The survey data report low levels of human rights violations. Around 8% of the respondents in Putumayo reported having experienced some violation of their human rights, the same as in the baseline. In Catatumbo, the number rose from 4% to 7% between the baseline and the midline, and in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region it rose from 5% in the baseline to 6% in the midline.

Citizens in PNCRT municipalities were less likely than residents of CELI zones not to report the violation of their rights. In the baseline survey, victims in Cauca were more likely to blame the guerrilla for the reported violations, and less likely to blame the military forces or state entities. Victims in Catatumbo were less likely to accuse state forces, and more likely to report being victims of the guerrillas, *bacrim* (criminal bands) or paramilitaries. Victims of these kinds of violations in Putumayo were more likely to report that they did not know who was responsible.


According to the information collected from focus groups, municipalities in the southeast part of Valle del Cauca faced a difficult security situation, due to the presence of common crime, drug trafficking and illegal armed groups. The police have few resources. The police station in the municipality of Florida was destroyed in a capture by guerrillas, and has not been rebuilt:

Three years ago I requested that Consolidation help me with the security part that Florida badly needs, it needs a new police station, it needs vehicles, it needs manpower strength, men... just plans, but nothing real. In the security part, the Army did its work with few resources, in the rural part, and the National Police in the urban part ... that's how security has arrived there little by little. So I say that Consolidation or Colombia Responde has not responded to me, as Secretary of Government, with security. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

An additional factor that affects regional security and the institutionalization of the territory is access to justice in cases of violations of citizens' rights. A majority of respondents in the PNCRT, CELI and control regions stated that they do not believe that the courts guarantee fair trials, despite slight increases in the number of respondents who do. This opinion rose from 5.5% to 8.3% in Putumayo; from 7% to 10.4% in Catatumbo; and from 7.3% to 7.5% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca.

The percentage of respondents who have resorted to the formal justice system to resolve their own or their family's disputes fell in Putumayo and Catatumbo, contrary to what occurred in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region. (Figure 3.13)

Figure 3.13. Trends: Where citizens resolve disputes




In both the baseline and midline surveys, the respondents in the three regions were inclined to resolve their disputes without support from any state entity or the JACs. Seventy percent of respondents in the baseline survey stated that there were formal justice institutions available in their zones of influence, but this percentage fell to 23% in Putumayo, 18% in Catatumbo and 4% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca in the midline.

It is interesting that among those who responded positively to the existence of justice institutions, there was a permanent increase between the baseline and the midline in the percentage who confirmed that these services had improved: from 16% to 18% in Putumayo, from 14% to 23% in Catatumbo, and from 11% to 36% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca.

The Consolidation Index also has access-to-justice indicators. In Figure 3.13, the Consolidation Index data show a high presence of the judicial apparatus in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, and a moderate presence in Putumayo. This would appear to contradict the survey responses regarding the presence of formal justice services, which fell by more than 70% on average in the three regions, to 23% in Putumayo, 18% in Catatumbo, and 4% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. Even so, between the baseline and the midline, each region reported an increase in the perception of the quality of justice services.

The justice brigades sent to rural areas comprise the second Consolidation Index indicator, which has low scores in the three regions, with the lowest in Catatumbo, where it was below 20%. In Putumayo the indicator peaked in 2013, and then dropped back to zero in 2014. The figure in Cauca/Valle del Cauca was better during the first two years in which Index data was collected, around 30%, but then fell again in 2013 and 2014.

Figure 3.14. Trends: Where citizens resolve their disputes, according to Consolidation Index data




The focus groups reported that the judicial system is perceived as slow and saturated with proceedings. The courts in the municipalities in northern Cauca are small, have few resources, and must deal with drug trafficking, public order crimes, extortion by armed groups, and common crimes (fights, domestic violence and civil proceedings). The criminal accusatory system seems to have collapsed:

Justice in Colombia, I see it as a very pachydermic system ... for me, this new system has collapsed, because it is a system of hearings. ... they catch more than two thousand kilos at the checkpoints on a daily basis ... So hearings for Law 30 (of 86) [National Narcotics Statute], hearings for domestic violence, hearings for failure to pay child support, hearings for personal injuries, hearings for thefts, here they have hearings for everything ... the Sectional Prosecutor should be working from Toribio, but he is working from here because there is no security there. (Municipal Solicitor's Office, Caloto, Cauca)

The legitimacy of the State in consolidation zones is limited by its weak capacity to equitably provide services in any region (Figure 3.15). The data on the perception of respect for the institutions fell between the baseline and the midline, which coincides with the findings related to citizens' trust in the government (see the chapters on institutional and social development). It is reasonable to assume that the local elections, which were held during the same period in which data was collected for this evaluation, negatively affected these figures.

Figure 3.15. Trends: Respect for national institutions




The question aimed at ascertaining whether the GoC should be supported received similar responses in the three PNCRT regions, with a downward trend in the Putumayo municipalities. The respondents were also asked their opinion about the protection of their basic rights in Colombia, and only 10.5% of the respondents in Putumayo answered in a positive manner, which represents a decline from the 13% of the baseline. The figures for Cauca/Valle del Cauca were similar, and the responses in Catatumbo were slightly more positive, rising from 12.3% in the baseline to 15% in the midline.

The Consolidation Index measures the presence of the “judicial apparatus,” that is, the formal judicial and administrative system, the Municipal Solicitor’s Office, the Ombudsman’s Office and (where applicable) the indigenous jurisdiction. The scores related to the presence of these bodies were on average 93 out of 100 in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, 69 in Catatumbo and 83 in Putumayo.

EVIDINCE collects information about the presence of judges and other officials on a given day.²⁹ Figure 3.15 shows the results of this survey for the PNCRT municipalities (T2) and their controls (C2). There was a more sustained upward trend in the PNCRT municipalities, despite variations in some years. There was a small increase between August 2012 and August 2015 in the number of officials present and attending to citizens, reaching an average of 2.5 out of the four (4) types of officials reviewed: prosecutor, judge, municipal solicitor and notary.

²⁹ The data are collected by local residents who go to the judicial offices to observe whether the officials are present and attending to citizens.

Figure 3.16. Secondary data: EVIDINCE survey data on the presence of justice sector officials in their jobs



Source: EVIDINCE panel of quarterly data, authors' calculations.

Conclusion 3. Despite efforts to achieve the legitimacy of the State, human rights violations by State actors have not decreased significantly, and deficiencies in access to formal justice services persist. According to the survey responses in these regions, the guerrillas are seen as the most responsible for human rights violations, with a growing number of violations being attributed to *bacrim*. But the most surprising fact is the poor capacity of the State to defend the population. The respondents indicated low levels of response by the competent entities to reported violations, and lack of recognition of those who violate the rights of citizens, which ultimately means less legitimacy of the formal justice system. Access-to-justice mechanisms continue to be a great challenge for promoting a sustainable order that generates trust.

Peace process

Approximately one third of the survey respondents (in all regions) supported the peace talks in Havana “a lot” or “very much”. The Montes de María region had the highest index of support for the peace process, with 41% of respondents giving positive responses with regard to the cause of peace with the FARC, followed by Tumaco with 38%. The regions with the lowest levels of approval of the peace talks were Bajo Cauca and Southern Córdoba, with 29%, and Catatumbo, with 31%. Around a quarter of the respondents reported very little support for the peace talks. It is worth mentioning that the data obtained by specialized companies varied a lot over the period during which their opinion polls were conducted, and so when this evaluation is completed in August 2016, the information collected in the field may be different from the opinion polls in some ways.

From a qualitative point of view, the evaluation team found that the government’s peace negotiations with the FARC guerrillas have had specific security-related effects for the communities in the regions of influence of this armed group. In Putumayo, the cessation of hostilities by the guerrillas made it possible to engage in productive and transportation activities that had not been possible because of the armed conflict.

...It started to change a little five months ago. I think that the conversations that the National Government has had with the illegal groups have had exceptional results. We are now fortunate that people can come even by the road from Puerto Vega, Teteyé, Campo Alegre, El Tigre, without any problem. This was impossible seven months ago. (Secretary of Rural Development, Valle del Guamuez, Putumayo)

In these regions, where the conflict has been experienced directly and has left a large number of victims, the peace agreement has been very positively received. For the population of Putumayo, peace is a necessity:

Peace... I mean, in the center of the country, I don't know, they don't see the need for it so much, but here in this territory it is impressive how... [the people] clamor for that and practically everybody is saying yes. If the government and the other people reach those agreements and those common agreements are good, and peace is signed in March, believe me, it will be sustainable, they themselves will sustain it. (Secretary of Agriculture of La Hormiga)

We are the ones who have suffered, we are the ones who have had to hide under the tree, under the bed, in a hole, with everyone on top of each other. So for us it is [better] for there to be no conflict, no armed confrontation. Since, ultimately –don't give us roads, don't give us I don't know what – but let us live in peace. I think that the peace process [is important] for us, we are begging all the spirits of life and God and whoever... because that is going to bring us tranquility, so that we can move ahead. I do believe that there is hope for the indigenous peoples here, because they have earned it and we hope that we will continue to strengthen ourselves. (Indigenous focus group, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)

However, there are concerns in the community about the incorporation of ex-guerrillas into society, and in particular there are great fears about the possible emergence of criminal bands from dissident portions of the FARC:

We have to look at the issue of production in the post-conflict era, what we are producing. And we will have to see what is going to happen with "those people," because someone who is taught to receive one, two, three million pesos a week, and they tell him, look, the government is offering you a minimum wage, and work, and the other with only an extortion call. So the government does have to look very carefully at what it is going to do, because the question is very difficult, for the post-conflict issue. (Municipal Solicitor's Office, Caloto, Cauca)

One of the primary needs of the communities with regard to the peace process is to arrive at the truth and to ensure that the perpetrators recognize their responsibility in order to return the dignity of the victims, in some way:

Well, as an organization, I mean us, I would have raised that concern with the committee, it's that at least now they are saying that they are going to disarm, they are talking about that now, after they sign the agreement. But as I said to the people, those on the committee, Will the guerrillas not recognize the victims, everyone whom they have victimized? (Leader, Victims' Association, Caloto, Cauca)

However, the residents of the southern part of Valle del Cauca, for example, are skeptical about the Havana peace talks, since they do not perceive changes in the security situation in their municipality, as armed groups, criminal bands and common crime are still present:

Yes, many threats, the FARC are here underground, the guerrillas, the Gabriel Galvis column is here underground. It's that the dialogues are just in Cuba, they are happy there in Cuba, there are in peace there, having breakfast, lunch and dinner, a nice breeze, good rum, good cigars and good sea. But here common citizens continue to be victims of landmines, here they haven't carried out humanitarian demining, peace is for those who are resting comfortably in the middle of an island where no one is going to attack them. I am the Secretary of Government, I am exposed, I don't have any type of security, neither does the community, there is a lot of common crime here... common because there is no investment by the State, the politicians come here only for votes, but not for anything else. (Office of the Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

Conclusion 4. The clarification of the truth generates positive effects. Memory-building processes are key for achieving true reconciliation. However, fears persist of a possible increase in violence after the demobilization.

Conclusion 5. There is hope in the peace process, but there are fears. The peace process is seen as an opportunity, but the population perceives the possibility of an increase in violence in the region after the demobilization.

Recommendations

- 1. Continue with strategies to guarantee security and the presence of the Public Forces and control bodies.** The security of the territory requires having effective regional information systems (about acts of terrorism, common crime, identification of the frameworks of operation of the IAGs, modalities, responsible parties), and mechanisms for responding to the communities' reports. EVAL recommends the development of an instrument that will enable detection of local justice needs in order to apply differential criteria in each region.
- 2. The technical assistance provided to productive processes should be sustainable.** The sustainability of productive processes by the communities is ensured to the extent that the interventions are based on rigorous knowledge of the communities' traditions and how they use the land, and to the extent that these characteristics are present throughout the chain in order to empower the farmers and to advance the crop substitution processes in a disciplined manner.

Another key element for the sustainability of the interventions is the transformation of realities based on effective training and communication processes, and the improved provision of public goods, such as road infrastructure, in order to increase market access.

- 3. The peace process must overcome the stigmatization of demobilized militants.** The regional contexts that the National Center for Historical Memory develops are essential for the truth-clarifying processes established in the Victims' Law and for reconciliation. It is recommended that future interventions incorporate these strategies in order to understand and strengthen community of demobilized militants.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT


Evaluation question: To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?

Findings and conclusions

According to the information from the respondents, the economic situation has been stable in the regions in which the National Territorial Consolidation Policy has been implemented and which have not had CELI interventions, although it has worsened in some cases. This reality is similar to that found in the control municipalities and even the CELI municipalities. Therefore, the lower development scores in these zones cannot be attributed to actions of the government through the PNCRT.

The opinions on the deterioration of the economic situation were most negative in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca. The situation is different in Catatumbo, where there was an increase of three percentage points in the responses to the question about whether the economic situation in the respondents' places of residence is good or very good. (Figure 4.1)

Figure 4.1. The economic situation in my place of residence is good or very good




On the other hand, the respondents in the PNCRT zones (like those in the CELI and control zones) were more optimistic than at baseline about problems related to their productive projects. Performance and lack of opportunities are considered less problematic than at baseline, and unlawful activities are considered as a less attractive option. To the question about whether the low income generated by the productive projects is a problem, only a fraction of those who responded in the affirmative in the baseline did so in the midline. Income has increased: the respondents reported monthly expenses that were 12% higher in Putumayo, 11% higher in Catatumbo and 44% higher in Cauca. These increases are not attributable to the PNCRT interventions or an improvement in conditions, since they were similar in the control zones.

On the other hand, the households perceived that there is less food security at midline than at baseline, as shown in Figure 4.2. The gray bars represent respondents whose families are experiencing hunger, based on their responses. This perception increased significantly in the three regions between the baseline and the midline: a little more than a quarter of the households stated that they are experiencing hunger. The red bars show the responses of families as to whether or not they are living in extreme poverty. The percentage of respondents who answered in the affirmative has tripled in the three regions. The light blue line represents the percentage of respondents who were worried about running out of food for lack of money during the week prior to the survey. More than three quarters of the families had this concern. The dark blue line, which corresponds to more than a quarter of the families surveyed, shows the number of households that stated that they ran out of food during the week prior to the survey because of a lack of money.

There is an upward trend in this indicator in all regions between baseline and midline. Respondent data in the control zones are similar, and so there is no impact.

Figure 4.2. Impact on the perception of food security




Similarly, it was found in the focus groups that the economic situation of small agricultural producers in southeast Valle del Cauca is quite difficult because of the low prices for their products, the costs of middlemen, and the difficulty of marketing directly:

There are many problems with the middlemen, they pay once a month, they pay once every 15 days, not all, because [some] don't pay... When we were going to the trainings they told us that they were going to help us sell directly to the supermarkets, to have another..., how it won't happen to us, and they haven't returned to have meetings ... they were going to help market them in order to have a better price and everything. But so far they haven't done any of that. Just promises. (Women's focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca).


Despite the negative findings regarding the economic situation, monthly income (measured in terms of estimated household expenses) has grown in the three regions (Figure 4.3). Cauca/Valle del Cauca reported the biggest improvement in income (44%). Catatumbo reported an 11% increase and Putumayo a 12% increase. However, in absolute values the three regions continue to be below the minimums established by the government of Colombia for exceeding the poverty line and the monthly minimum wage, particularly in Putumayo.

Figure 4.3. Trends in estimated monthly expenses (income proxy)³⁰ in COP



The Consolidation Index measures economic growth with two indicators: the presence of financial services and hectares cultivated. The Consolidation Index data show stable growth in financial services in Putumayo, and an improvement in the number of hectares cultivated (Figure 4.4). The most stable growth in the number of hectares cultivated is in Cauca.

Figure 4.4. Secondary data: Consolidation Index score with respect to the presence of financial entities and number of hectares cultivated



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations

From the point of view of development, the young population merits particular analysis. It can be concluded from the survey responses that the most critical situation is experienced by young people, primarily due to the lack of educational services that would enable them to access a professional or technical degree. Consequently, young people often take precarious and poorly paid jobs. This situation worries the mothers of these young people, because a lack of opportunities can lead to involvement in criminal activities:

[Finding work] is more difficult for men, at least where I live there are a lot of guys who are unemployed, guys who have finished high school and don't have the resources to enter a university.

³⁰ The survey asked about monthly expenses instead of income, since it has been demonstrated that income measurements are not reliable in household surveys. This phenomenon has been documented over decades in developed countries and in a large part of Latin America. Rural surveys tend to present the worst performance in correctly capturing family income, for several reasons: income comes from various sources; the households receive payments in kind; they receive irregular payments and their income changes based on the season; and illegal payments will probably not be reported, etc. Estimates show that reported expenses are in some cases higher than the income reported in the same survey (Rogers and Gray 1994; Jencks 1997; Sabelhaus and Groen 2000); Bruce D. Meyer and James X. Sullivan (2003), *Measuring the Wellbeing of the Poor Using Income and Consumption*. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series; Working Paper 9760, consulted on February 2, 2014 at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9760>, p. 18. Expenses are considered to be more precise because there are fewer reasons to under-report them. However, in order to obtain good estimates, very detailed instruments are needed, which adds some 20 to 30 minutes to a survey. We decided not to take this type of measurement, but rather to continue using the measurement established in the baseline, in order to preserve comparability and minimize the burden imposed by the instrument. See, for example, Pettersson, Hans. (2005), Chapter XXIV: *Survey design and sample design in household budget surveys*, in *Household Sample Surveys in Developing and Transition Countries*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, Studies in Methods Series F No. 96, available at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/pubs/gesgrid.asp?id=349>.

To work they can occasionally carry a load, but that isn't constant for them. If they send trainings for the young people, I think that we would lower [the number of ...] so many young people who are ruined by vice. (Women's focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

On the other hand, from a sectoral point of view, in the opinion of those interviewed in the qualitative analysis, one of the issues that affects the economic situation is the extractive industries. The focus groups stated that oil production in the Department of Putumayo has been a very important area of the economy, but the communities are critical of it because of its environmental consequences. They also believe that it generates precarious employment, and that it causes farmers to refrain from engaging in agricultural production:


One of the factors is that, anyway, the subsoil belongs to the State and the protection of that resource is the [responsibility] of the State. The other situation could be security with respect to the environment, so sometimes we say that we don't know whether or not it's a blessing to have the oil, the few jobs that it generates, the bad habits it causes people to adopt, those few who live in that situation, because it separates them from the land. (Secretary of Agricultural Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)

Conclusion 1. Families' economic situations have worsened. There was an increase in respondents' perceptions that their lives would always be marked by extreme poverty. However, in the midline survey they stated that they have greater opportunities and that their productive activities are more profitable. They also stated that they are aware of the positive effects of associative processes and assistance in adopting technological methods in their productive projects.

Support for productive projects


The pattern of support for productive projects in the PNCRT and CELI municipalities is similar, and the types of assistance received varied between the baseline and the midline. To illustrate the point, the support provided in Catatumbo through the provision of supplies, plant material and technical assistance, although moderate, experienced growth. However, there were significant declines in other support that is critical for the population, such as training and obtaining loans. (Figure 4.5)

Figure 4.5. Trends in the type of support received for productive project activities in the Catatumbo region



On the other hand, associative processes generally increased in the three PNCRT regions studied. In the Putumayo region, for example, producers seek to join associations primarily to obtain group representation. This means that their perception (24% of the respondents in the midline survey) is that they will be stronger within the chain as a group than as individuals. They also seek to improve their capacity to transport and sell their products and to obtain financing. It should be mentioned that the percentage of people who responded positively to all criteria for joining associations grew between the baseline and the midline. In the case of the purchase of supplies and the processing of products, there was an impact in the PNCRT municipalities of 6pp and 4pp respectively. (Figure 4.6)

Figure 4.6. Trends in the reasons for joining associations in the Putumayo region



The support provided in these associative processes has been very important in these regions. CELI Central, in partnership with local and departmental authorities, supported several coffee producer associations, mainly through the provision of supplies and improvements in environmental management in northern Cauca, a region with a large indigenous population in which the associative work model has deep cultural roots. It should be mentioned that CELI arrived in this region approximately two years ago to support the implementation of the PNCRT:

Colombia Responde has had a presence here for two years, I think... we are working hard with them on supporting productive projects, such as, in this case, coffee ...we receive many funds through the Association, the resources come from Colombia Responde, from the Municipal Administration of Caloto and from the Department, they are the three basic components that are injecting resources into those programs. (Indigenous focus group, Caloto, Cauca)

In the Department of Putumayo, international cooperation agencies and national programs have participated substantially in the substitution of illicit crops, introducing products such as heart of palm, cacao, rubber and peppers, which did not exist in the region and have been adapted to the conditions of the Amazonian foothills:

They told you what you were going to plant. They came to conduct a kind of survey depending on the land, they said there is this option ... In the case of hearts of palm, when they came, there wasn't any, nor was there any cacao... they were products that they came with and said that it was possible that they would work here, but, say, in the old days, no. (Producer focus group, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)

From the opinions of the focus groups, it can be concluded that the climatic conditions of the northern Cauca and southern Valle del Cauca regions allow for the production of citrus and other

fruits. Producer associations have emerged in this area in an effort to open markets for their products, avoid middlemen, and maintain a constant level of production:


I am the vice president of a citrus growers association that we have formed, and so through the association we also have the market for supplying Miranda and the Sexta supermarket ... that is how we subsist, we are 27 members and each member has his/her property ... if I don't have oranges, and another member has tangerines, we complement each other. One has to have the idea that one needs to join an association in order to get [the product] out, because if you are alone the suppliers will take advantage of you. (Producer focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

Conclusion 2. The frequency of support given to productive projects has diminished in the PNCRT municipalities, and the trend is toward more practical support. The growing importance of associativity is reflected in the benefits related to advantages for their agricultural projects, and improvements in production and marketing perceived by members of the associations.

Markets and marketing


According to the respondents in the three regions, the preferred place for marketing their products is the municipal center, through direct sales. In Catatumbo, more than a third (37%) of sales are made in this way, and 22% are made in the closest population center, a modality that had an increase of 12% over the baseline (Figure 4.7). Sales outside the municipality account for 28% of the cases, but, according to the surveys, preference for them declined with respect to the baseline. The trends are similar in the other regions studied.

Figure 4.7. Trend in marketing places in the Catatumbo region




In response to questions about who the biggest purchasers are, the respondents noted a decline in sales to wholesalers or middlemen in the three regions. (Figure 4.8)

Figure 4.8. Trends in sales to wholesalers or middlemen



From the point of view of purchasers, products continue to be purchased most often in the municipal seat, although sales in nearby villages have grown with respect to what was reported in the baseline in the three regions. The trend toward purchasing products in the same or nearby villages declined. The purchase of products in the municipal seat or nearby villages is related to issues of accessibility and infrastructure. (Figure 4.9)


Figure 4.9. Trends in places where purchases are made



The survey results show that some problems persist with the production and marketing of agricultural products, and that they vary based on the PNCRT region. In Putumayo, for example, the high cost of supplies and transportation, abuse by middlemen, and low sales prices for crops were reported by approximately 50% of the surveyed population.


One aspect of relevance is the scarcity of water due to the effects of environmental phenomena (Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle del Cauca), as shown in Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12. The increase in the perception of poor soil quality is particularly notable in Putumayo.

Figure 4.10. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Putumayo region




The perception of the following production and marketing problems decreased in Catatumbo, abuse by middlemen (from 81% to 49%), and very low product prices (from 94% to 63%) (Figure 4.11). The decrease in the problems of transportation costs and abuse by middlemen had a positive impact of 35pp and 27pp, respectively, due to the fact that the control municipalities had lower levels of decline.

Figure 4.11. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Catatumbo region



The perception of production and marketing problems in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region has decreased, especially with regard to transportation costs, very low product prices, abuse by middlemen, and access to credit. As mentioned, the surveyed population that perceives water scarcity as a problem increased from 49% in the baseline to 66% in the midline (Figure 4.12). Finally, there was a positive effect on access to credit in the three regions, with the most positive result occurring in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, where the perception of the lack of access to credit fell from 45% in the baseline to 10% in the midline.

Figure 4.12. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region



It is important to note that, in absolute terms, a large part of the population still perceives these situations as problematic, in spite of the declining trend. In most cases, the control zones experienced the same trends, so there was no observable impact by the PNCRT interventions.

From a qualitative point of view, the respondents in southern Valle del Cauca commented that, despite their proximity to Cali and Palmira and the existence of acceptable infrastructure, agricultural products have low prices and there are many difficulties in marketing them. This has resulted in the growth in marijuana cultivation in this region and in northern Cauca:

What do we gain with planting good fruits and good crops there in the village, if the government doesn't open markets for us, they can grow anything but not be able to sell it, what do we gain if we grow good yucca [cassava], good potatoes, and the best arracacha in the country, if the municipality's plaza does not have optimal conditions for selling the products...it is sad to say that yucca and vegetables don't give results that are as good as marijuana or illicit crops ... I invite you to stand in the traffic circle on the way to Florida... there you will see the marijuana greenhouses in the rural area, all because the people don't believe in crop substitution. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

Respondents in Putumayo maintained that there are great problems with the marketing of their products, due to the long distances, lack of infrastructure, and the remoteness of the centers of consumption. One of the ideas for improving marketing, prices and access to markets is to implement a differential treatment through a type of peace certification, which would represent a way for the communities to create a market for their products.

Our products, the products of Valle de Guamuez, of La Hormiga, are products that have suffered, they are products of an intense war, so that differential part is important... Products of peace. Yes, that is what we have been through, I mean, we have proposed a lot to the National Government that it take a differential approach to the products that come from Putumayo, from Valle del Guamuez, from La Hormiga, maybe a kilo of cacao here has more meaning than in any other place. (Secretary of Economic Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo).

Conclusion 3. The markets in consolidation territories are still local markets, and in some cases reach a regional level. Export products are still a limited proportion of sales. Small producers are affected by the high costs of marketing that is characteristic of the inefficiencies of small markets, which are not well developed or specialized and have very high transaction costs. Thus, communities are trapped in a vicious circle, in which there is little incentive for increasing


production, and when production increases above the size of the market, it collides with the rigidity of the local market and the lack of preparation for exporting to other regions.

Conclusion 4. Technical assistance and marketing support help to counteract the problems related to the low profitability of the productive projects, which undoubtedly encourages migration to a legal economy. However, this requires the creation of markets with sufficient supply and demand, a reduction in the costs of production and transportation, and improved product prices. For the respondents/interviewees, support has declined.

Savings, credit and financial services

The findings of the evaluation present a reduction, in both the treatment and control municipalities, in the number of families with a savings account, an increase in the number of families with a current account, and greater use of banks and non-banking correspondents for the payment of public services (Figure 4.13). The number of families that reported having applied for a loan is more stable, while the number of families that reported having a loan from a bank, NGO or cooperative rose in the three zones.

Figure 4.13. Trends in bancarization and access to credit



Conclusion 5. The percentage of bancarized households in these regions is still very low. The use of savings accounts decreased in all of the regions, and the growth in current accounts is very marginal. Formal credit, with a slight increase, is important for strengthening associative processes and the movement toward formality.

Transportation and infrastructure


Infrastructure is one of the factors that most affects commerce and access to markets. In the Department of Putumayo and the Amazon basin in general, the road infrastructure is very precarious, and tertiary roads are almost nonexistent. It should be noted that in many cases access is by waterway. This situation increases the costs of production, making productive projects in remote regions unviable:

Agricultural development has to be comprehensive, for example, you see that unmet basic needs are extremely high, here for example in the urban center, we don't have an aqueduct, we don't have

water, imagine that more than 40 and 65% of the population does not have electric service ... Fish farming cannot be developed with more advanced technological systems, yes, because we lack energy. There aren't even bridle paths, you have to go by river or by dirt roads. It is very difficult to get the products out. (Secretary of Agricultural Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)


The survey results show that the perception of the condition of the roads has improved since the baseline, not only from a municipal point of view (except in Putumayo), but from an inter-municipal point of view as well (except in Cauca/Valle del Cauca). However, the percentage of respondents who believe that road quality is good is very low, especially in Putumayo and Catatumbo (Figure 4.14). The information reported by the control municipalities is similar.

Figure 4.14. Trends in the perception of road quality



The Consolidation Index includes two road-related indicators in the pillars of Connectivity and Regional Integration. As shown in Figure 4.15, the first indicator measures the percentage of population centers that are connected with the municipal center (through roads, rivers or the sea). Based on the high percentages (100% in 2014), the Index would indicate that all of the population centers are connected. However, the definition of “population centers” is not clear. The survey data are far from these scores, and so we conclude that the discrepancy can be explained by the difference in the definition of “population center” for the two measurements. The second indicator measures the existence of a paved road from the municipality to a main city. These scores were very high in 2014 for Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo, and a little lower in Catatumbo.

Figure 4.15. Secondary data: Consolidation Index, roads



Source: Consolidation Index Data, authors' calculations

Conclusion 6. Road infrastructure is an unresolved issue. Access to new markets is limited because of the deficit of tertiary roads and the presence of middlemen, which continue to be one


of the most used channels for marketing and purchasing supplies, despite the fact that they increase costs and, therefore, reduce profitability.

Land

According to the baseline and midline survey data, land use is concentrated in agricultural activities, even though the percentage of respondents involved in such activities fell from 81% to 60% in Putumayo, from 74% to 72% in Catatumbo, and 61% to 36% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. Land tenure, that is, the proportion of households with land titles, increased moderately (by 4.5%, on average) in the three regions. Approximately 46% of respondents in the midline survey stated that they had land titles. Given the similar trend in the control municipalities, it is not possible to attribute this result to the implementation of the PNCRT.

Seventy-five percent of the respondents in Putumayo acquired their property through a purchase-sale process, as did 60% in Catatumbo and 30% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. Almost all of the other respondents acquired their properties through some type of inheritance.

Real property taxes constitute one way of measuring land ownership. There was a slight increase in the three regions in the proportion of households that have paid these taxes in the last two years (Figure 4.16). A comparison with ownership data leads to the conclusion that there is a lag in the payment of real property taxes in Putumayo, which poses significant challenges for the municipal administrations.




However, the proportion of households that were willing to pay real property taxes rose to 92%, and more than half of the respondents in the three regions would do so because it is a civic duty. Smaller fractions said that they would be willing to pay in exchange for the formalization of their properties (one quarter), or not to lose their properties (around 15%).

The above contrasts with the responses of those who would not pay taxes because “productive agricultural projects are not sufficiently profitable to enable this payment.” The percentage of respondents with this view increased from 36% in the baseline to 49% in the midline in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, and from 50% to 53% in Putumayo, and it declined from 54% to 40% in Catatumbo. Other reasons given for why they would not pay property taxes were: (1) nobody else does so; (2) rich people should do so; and (3) they do not trust the management of funds collected by the municipal government.

The Consolidation Index analyzes seven indicators related to property rights, including the following: (1) advances in land use planning and (2) micro-targeting for the land restitution process. With respect to the former, the Index reports low scores with a stable trend in Catatumbo, and a growing trend in Putumayo. Cauca/Valle del Cauca, on the other hand, had close to the

maximum scores in 2014. From a micro-targeting point of view, Catatumbo continues to have a stable trend with low scores, Putumayo has had no movement in four years, and Cauca/Valle del Cauca fell to zero between 2012 and 2014, which suggests to the evaluation team that there is an error in the collection of data. (Figure 4.17)

Figure 4.17. Consolidation Index: Advances in Land Use Planning and Micro-Targeting for the Land Restitution Process



complementary fashion, according to the qualitative information obtained from the focus groups, property title registrations in the Putumayo region are almost nonexistent. However, residents are well aware of the boundaries of their properties, such that disputes are resolved without intermediaries. An important factor has been that a large part of the property registration in the Amazonian foothills occurred with the arrival of the so-called “coca colonization,” in which the planting of coca led to great process of deforestation and destruction of the jungle. When farmers have access to illicit crop substitution programs, they understand the need for having title to their property:

The biggest conflict is knowing whose it is ... For us as a municipality or for any type of entity it is very difficult. The problem is when the need for legalization is already great. I also think that when you change from unlawful to lawful, you need the land to be yours. On the other hand, when there is an unlawful situation, with a crop that is not legal, you also have no interest in having that land. (Secretary of Rural Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo).

There are different forms of land use in the municipalities on the southeast slope of the Central Cordillera, which makes it difficult to design and implement an adequate land use plan: environmental reserves (Las Hermosas Páramo) coexist with armed actors (FARC), agricultural smallholdings in the mountainous areas, agroindustrial activity (sugarcane) in the flat area of Valle del Cauca, and indigenous reservations:

We haven't had a basic land use plan since 2002. But that is an issue that the Infrastructure Planning Office and the Municipal Council are working on. The guerillas wanted it for a quote-unquote peace territory, and I think that Consolidation was that they were looking to consolidate subversion here. But the Land Use Plan has to be worked on because there are some indigenous people here, the El Triunfo Cristal Pérez and Nasa Kiwe indigenous reservations, which have had their own territories for many years. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

However, according to the Consolidation Index data, northern Cauca has a score of 96 out of 100 with respect to land use planning, although in this case there are also smallholdings on State-owned land (*baldíos*) and semi-feudal forms of production, such as sharecropping (of colonial origin), which make land titling and land use planning processes very difficult.

Law 1551 [of 2012, “to modernize the organization and functioning of municipalities”] which has provided a little more order to this, because property in Caloto, one can be an owner, or tenant, or possessor, and in some situations an occupant in the case of government baldíos...but they come with false title histories because they haven’t done the paperwork, they haven’t done the succession, their grandparents own that part, some will be occupants of government properties, and others are holders, or sharecroppers who pay rent in order to farm the land. (Municipal Solicitor, Caloto, Cauca)

There are property disputes in this region because the indigenous Nasa communities claim, as part of their reservations, territories that they consider to be ancestral. But there are ranches on these lands today, as well as peasant smallholdings, and Afro-Colombian community settlements which seek to be recognized as Community Councils. In some cases the indigenous communities have resorted to occupying properties owned by these groups.

The Council of Toribio possesses [land], and it is registered with the Public Records Office as owner of that property. It would be subject to restitution, but there would have to be a procedure ... They haven’t wanted to make restitution because they say that if the property is for restitution, that precautionary measures have been ordered for its protection, so if the government is going to purchase it for the indigenous people... it could not be purchased (Municipal Solicitor’s Office, Caloto, Cauca)

Despite the difficulties, the residents remain hopeful that a post-conflict scenario, with a signed peace agreement with the FARC, will provide the conditions necessary for the return and restitution of land.

Here there are two points, let’s say very important, regarding displacement and restitution, here is where they carried out the two biggest massacres... We believe that we are the municipality with the greatest progress in land restitution ... their rights and their lands have been restored, and they are advancing ... The country’s biggest opportunity is after March, when rights will be restored without war, because it is very difficult to restore your land to you, and the next day... Many people are waiting for peace to be signed, in order to return. (Victims’ Association, La Hormiga, Putumayo)

Conclusion 7. The factors inherent in land tenure require greater knowledge and intervention by the public policies that address the problems in the territory. The implementation of the policy should more strongly address issues such as the vocation of the land, and enhancing the efficiency of the formalization, titling and restitution processes, which will require broad knowledge of the realities of landowners. The survey data evidence the low capacity of local entities to collect property taxes, which is a source of financing public goods. A high percentage of respondents noted the low profitability of production, and so it is fundamental to work on improving productivity and access to markets.

Recommendations

- 1. Improve agricultural production and marketing, taking advantage of local opportunities.** Any increase in production should be accompanied by improvements in quality and the marketing of products. Intermittent or seasonal production and low quality are not attractive for the national market. PNCRT activities that have promoted the creation of partnerships between the private sector and producer associations have achieved qualitative advances for both actors, and it is therefore recommended that they be strengthened and reproduced. The GoC should work to resolve infrastructure and market

deficiencies, and to establish programs to improve relations with intermediaries and commercial partners, and to expand and replicate the advances of the CELIs that have been implemented in other regions.

- 2. Support initiatives for opening new markets** in order to achieve a balance between supply and demand and adequate prices, and to generate profitability for producers. These kinds of programs entail the formation of partnerships between small producers and middlemen or merchants, improvements in product quality, the implementation of quality and/or phytosanitary standards required by purchasers, the gathering of market intelligence, and the production of goods with greater added value. The advantage of these kinds of partnerships is that the direct exporter, in the case of external markets, is not the producer, but rather the supplier that has the capacity to export, which strengthens the entire chain.
- 3. Use community models for improving tertiary roads.** Improvements to road infrastructure will improve access to markets and remove the need to depend on middlemen for the purchase of supplies for productive projects and the sale of final products. The mechanisms for achieving appropriation for the care and maintenance of tertiary roads, and the contracting model for the construction and maintenance of these roads together with the community, should be strengthened. The model that is being implemented by the CELIs has seen results.
- 4. The land formalization and restitution processes need to be more effective.** The land restitution processes require more efficiency in the public records offices, the updating of cadastral records, and coordinated action at a national level. In the post-conflict period, new forms of land conflicts should be taken into account, and timely responses should be developed for ethnic groups, farmers and economic groups.
- 5. Strengthen the activities for expanding financial services.** While the presence of banking at a regional level has grown, difficulties persist in accessing formal financial services. It is thus essential for the government and international cooperation agencies to encourage the financial sector to provide services where they still do not exist. Revolving funds are interesting because they enable communities to meet credit requirements, but it is necessary to strengthen their organization and management models with management guidelines, monitoring and control systems, an exchange of successful experiences, and performance incentives. For large projects, it is important to promote partnerships with banks in order to increase access to capital.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation questions:

To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and the institutionalization of the territory?

What are the specific effects of the CELIs on changing the local government's capacities and provision of services (serving the local population, being accountable, expanding social services)?

Findings and conclusions

The results of the variables associated with participation, transparency, accountability, responsibility and trust were stable between the baseline and the midline, with a downward trend in some cases. Following is an analysis of each of these factors, based on the data obtained from the survey, interviews and focus groups, as well as the information obtained through the Consolidation Index.


Participation

In this evaluation, citizen participation was measured through an index that includes indicators for perception and participation in political parties, participation on Community Action Boards, participation on citizen oversight committees, electoral participation, voter registration and actual voting in the last presidential election. The maximum possible score of the index is 100 points.

The index had a midline score of 37.7 in Putumayo, an increase of 0.8 points in relation to the baseline. Given that there were no differences in the control municipalities, it is not possible to attribute this increase to the implementation of the Consolidation Policy. There was a two-point decline in Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle del Cauca and their control municipalities. Catatumbo is the region with the lowest score (less than 30 points).

As shown in the chart below, all of the regions experienced an increase in willingness to vote (measured by registrations at the polls) and actual voting. The Catatumbo region had the largest growth in registrations, and Putumayo had the largest growth in actual voting. The increases were slight, but the scores were relatively high in percentage terms: a large percentage of the population registered to vote and actually voted. However, there is no evidence that the PNCRT had a significant impact on electoral practices, since there were similar increases in these scores in the control municipalities.

Figure 5.1. Trend in the number of people registered to vote (left chart) and the number of people who voted (right chart) in the 2014 presidential election



The most common reason why between 25% and 33% did not vote was lack of interest in the election issues. For the others who did not vote, the reasons ranged from not liking any candidate (<24%), difficulty to vote (<20%), and fear (<8%). There was a significant increase in the latter factor in Catatumbo. As for those who voted, the most common reason given for voting was the idea that “your vote counts” (more than 95% in the three regions).

In Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, fewer respondents than in the baseline indicated that they had received something in exchange for their vote (<4%), while in Putumayo this indicator increased from 1% to 4%.

The participants in the focus groups in Putumayo stated that electoral participation had increased in their region, and that today citizens have a greater interest in running for office, particularly with regard to the municipal councils. In the past, participation in the municipality’s public affairs was low due to the dominance of illegal actors and economies. However, the respondents now believe that there is greater political participation and interest in public affairs as a result of the migration to lawful economies:

This administration [has improved] because the majority of council members are almost all from here, from the same municipality. Before they had the problem of coming from other places and becoming council members. The community is the one that chooses a council member, one or two council members are chosen from each area, so there are more ways to manage things. (Focus group, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo).

As mentioned above, it is noteworthy that women’s perception that it was possible for them to become leaders in their communities surpassed 96% (in the three regions), and young people’s perception of their chances of doing so remained the same as in the baseline (approximately 83% in the three regions). This differs from the perception of the possibility that an ex-combatant could legitimately become a community leader, which fell from 16% to 14% in Putumayo, remained at 11% in Catatumbo, and increased slightly from 18% to 19% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca.

Conclusion 1. Participation in political processes increased in these regions in terms of the intention to vote as well as the actual exercise of this right, with the respondents stating that their votes are valuable.

Conclusion 2. The stigma of having been a member or combatant of an IAG affects one’s legitimacy as a potential community leader. It is not evident that in a post-conflict context the guerillas would be able to become credible representatives of the communities in which they have operated.

Transparency and accountability

One component of the Transparency indicator is the degree of citizen participation in the supervision and oversight of public activities. The survey incorporated questions that, taken together, constitute an Accountability Index, whose maximum score is 100 points.

The variables of this index measure the degree to which the mayor has informed citizens about public expenditures, the presence (or absence) of public opportunities to perform citizen oversight, and the degree to which the local government relies on citizens’ opinions in making decisions.

According to the index scores in the PNCRT regions studied, there were better practices in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, and a considerable decline in Putumayo. (Figure 5.2)

Figure 5.2. Trends in the Accountability Index scores

	Baseline Score	Midline Score	Change
Putumayo	31,270	25,382	-8,699
Catatumbo	20,266	34,327	2,717
Cauca/Valle del Cauca	21,314	32,775	2,873

Furthermore, the survey reported a slight increase in the number of households that participate on citizen oversight and supervisory committees. Even so, the percentage of households that participated on these committees was low in all cases: 1% of residents in Putumayo, 2% in Catatumbo, and little less than 4% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca.

Unlike other types of participation,³¹ and with the exception of Cauca/Valle del Cauca, those who participate on oversight committees were less likely in the midline survey to report their participation in decision-making within social organizations.


From the point of view of the Consolidation Index, good governance is measured on the basis of the following indicators: (1) the number of projects approved by the municipal OCADs and financed with specific and direct allocations from the regional compensation fund as a percentage of total allocations; (2) the Open Government Index; (3) the percentage of potential property tax payers who actually pay the tax; and (4) the percentage of potential ICA tax payers who actually pay the tax.

With respect to the first indicator, only Cauca/Valle had a positive trajectory with a constant trend. The figures for Putumayo rose drastically in 2013 and then fell almost to zero in 2014, while Catatumbo obtained only 29 points (Figure 5.3). It could be inferred that it is difficult to design projects for accessing these kinds of resources. It should be remembered that these projects are reviewed by the OCADS under strict selection standards.³²

³¹ See the chapter on social development for more details.

³² Administration and Decision Committees

Figure 5.3. Consolidation Index: Access to Royalties and Open Government Index



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations

With respect to the Open Government Index, as mentioned above, the GoC grades the municipalities and the scores are normalized in the Consolidation Index based on the scores for similar municipalities. While the “normalized” scores were in the “good” and “very good” range (Figure 5.4), the “raw” scores were in a more moderate range of achievements.


Figure 5.4. Average results of the OGI

	2011		2014	
	Raw score	Weighted score	Raw score	Weighted score
Catatumbo	46.6	69.8	60.9	94.7
Cauca/Valle	49.3	73.9	63.7	96.1
Putumayo	44.6	66.9	55.0	85.1

Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations

With respect to the third indicator, around half of those who are obligated to pay real property taxes do so, although compliance varies among the three regions. Compliance is a little more than half in Cauca/Valle, it has been growing in Catatumbo since 2011, but is still less than 50%, and there has been a fall of around 15% in Putumayo since 2012. (Figure 5.5)

Figure 5.5. Secondary data: Compliance with the payment of real property and ICA taxes



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations

In order to respond to the evaluation questions regarding Institutional Development, this study also measures citizens' perceptions of problems related to municipals organizations. According to Figure 5.6, which shows the incremental variation in the perception of problems in red, and the decreasing variation in green, respondents in the three regions perceive less corruption, a smaller shortage of institutional services, and fewer deficiencies in residential public services. But the perception of a

lack of attention to community requests has grown. Distrust of public entities has grown in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca.

The perception that institutions do not provide information about their activities remained the same in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, but declined in Putumayo. In some cases, these findings show an impact that is attributable to the implementation of the law, given that there were no differences in the control groups between the baseline and the midline. These cases are highlighted in bold, and the level of their impact is expressed in percentage points (pp) rather than percentages (%).

Figure 5.6. Trends in citizens' perceptions of municipal institutions

	Putumayo	Catatumbo	Cauca/Valle
Distrust of public entities	8%	-13%	13%
The administration does not pay attention to requests from the community	10%	6%	19%
The administration does not have the capacity to respond to requests from the community	0%	-7%	11%
Deficiencies in residential public services	-21pp	-25pp	-30%
Lack of roads	4%	-2%	-8%
Corruption	-8%	-4%	-3%
Lack of institutional services: hospitals, schools, courts, gardens	-12pp	-4%	-31%
The administration does not provide information about what it is doing	-4%	8%	3%
<i>There are no serious problems associated with the institutions</i>	4%	3%	1%

In grading municipal, departmental and national government performance, the respondents' perceptions declined in almost all cases (Figure 5.7), with the exception of the Catatumbo region, where the respondents' perception of the performance of the national government rose by 8% in the midline survey. It should be noted that the largest declines occurred in Putumayo, in which there was a negative impact of 10pp with regard to the perception of the performance of the Governor's office, in comparison with their control municipalities.

Figure 5.7. Trends in the perception of government performance

	Putumayo	Catatumbo	Cauca/Valle del Cauca
Good or very good performance by the Mayor's Office	-25%	-3%	-1%
Good or very good performance by the Governor's Office	-33%	-3%	-11%
Good or very good performance by the National Government	-12%	8%	-3%

At the same time, the participation module of the Consolidation Index measures the evolution of the following indicators: (1) the percentage of municipal public investments with legally established and registered oversight committees; and (2) the operability of institutional participation opportunities.

For the first indicator, Catatumbo reported a score of 31%, Cauca/Valle del Cauca had an average score of 33% and Putumayo recorded only 8% of public investments subject to oversight. Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo reported a level of operability of institutional opportunities for citizen participation of more than 80%, based on the minimum number of regular meetings of the Municipal Social Policy Council (COMPOS) and the Municipal Rural Development Council (CMDR). Catatumbo reported a level of operability of these opportunities of 64%, with almost all quarterly COMPOS meetings being held, and a much lower number of CMDR meetings.

According to the focus groups, Citizen Oversight Committees have been created in Putumayo to monitor public works, in which the role of the control bodies has been fundamental.

Here they have citizen oversight offices essentially for projects, and there has been very active support from the regional Comptroller's Office in Putumayo in advising the communities about how to create an oversight office... We meet with the people, I also do so, but the Comptroller's Office has also been very active in that aspect. (Municipal Solicitor's Office, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)

However, the local governments in southern Valle del Cauca are perceived as corrupt, since citizens are not clear about the management of public resources, and promises made to the community have not been kept, which generates distrust in State institutions and discourages participation:

We had the aqueduct, we had a meeting and they told us – now we're going to disburse 50 million pesos so that Tamboral can have a decent aqueduct and drinking water and water can be given to Santa Rosa. That money was diverted, it was lost ... they were trying to make the Las Cañas bridge for us and that money didn't appear. So then they made a sewer at the other entrance to Santa Rosa which apparently cost 50 million, and the first time that the river flooded it took out the sewer. (Focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

In southern Valle del Cauca, part of the population see the political participation processes as a way of obtaining individual benefits for supporting a candidate.

In Florida the people do not trust the institutions. Think that Florida was politicized and the people to not think socially, but rather politically ... The community learned to do what the big leaders or bosses do, to think politically, but not socially, to see how strategically to get more from here and more from there, how to get a cut for oneself. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

In Putumayo, relations between the local administrations and the community have improved due to the interaction with the JACs, which are consulted about the community needs and processes that can be supported, even for interaction with PNCRT instruments:

Here things are done with the Community Action Boards ...from eradication processes, alternative development processes, they go to the Community Action Board, now the [Territorial Consolidation] Unit, the rapid response projects are carried out based on the needs of the community ... They are planned with the administration and in the case of the Mayor, the liaison of the Unit or the entity that is intervening in the area. (Secretary of Agricultural Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)


Conclusion 3. The accountability processes need to be strengthened and consolidated. Their current operation affects trust in the institutions. Despite the efforts made over the years to implement these practices, positive effects have still not been achieved. While the focus groups stated that the accountability processes are better today than at the time of the baseline survey, there are no concrete data that evidence a permanent, broad and visible exercise in these regions. This is also affected by the gaps in community participation in control and oversight, despite the perception that the performance of these mechanisms has improved.

Trust

The low level of trust in public institutions (generalized throughout the country) is also evident in two of the three regions studied. According to the responses obtained in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, the perception of trust fell for almost all institutions, similar to the phenomenon in the control municipalities. In Putumayo, the decline in trust was generalized for all institutions, as shown


in Figure 5.8, similar to the case in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, with the exception of a 2% increase in the level of trust in the Municipal Council. In Catatumbo, there were slight increases in the level of trust in several national government agencies and in the JACs.

Figure 5.8. Trends in trust in institutions in Putumayo



To illustrate the reasons for the distrust, the survey examined the respondents' level of trust in the mayor's or JAC president's commitment to the implementation of a project. There was an evident increase in distrust of these actors in the three regions, particularly in Cauca/Valle del Cauca and in Putumayo. (Figure 5.9)

Figure 5.9. Trends in trust in the mayor's and JAC president's commitment to the implementation of a project



Conclusion 4. Trust in institutions has declined, affecting the legitimacy of the State as guarantor and protector of rights and the leadership needed for the implementation of the State's interventions and the recovery of territories held by IAGs.

Provision of services

The Comprehensive Performance Index. The measurement of the performance and institutional capacities of the municipal administrations is a crucial for achieving good governance and improving efficiency in the use of public resources. This is because municipal governments have


great responsibilities for public social expenditures, whose effective management depends in large part on social development goals.

With the definition and application of the methodology for measuring and analyzing performance, it is possible to evaluate municipalities' public management, public policy decision-making, and allocation of resources based on results and local problems. The GoC created the Comprehensive Performance Index (*Índice de Desempeño Integral – IDI*) to monitor the performance of mayors and governors in six dimensions: efficacy, efficiency, legal requirements, administrative capacity, fiscal performance and management.³³

This chapter analyzes the evolution of the IDI between 2012 and 2014. The IDI data were grouped and classified in the four groups of municipalities that were studied: CELI, PNCRT and their respective control groups (Figure 5.10).

In general terms, the IDI score for all groups was “good” in the CELI and PNCRT municipalities in the midline (2014),³⁴ which represents better performance with respect to the baseline (2012), in which the score in all cases was classified as “low.” Between 2012 and 2014, the CELI municipalities and their controls recorded an average increase of 7pp, while the PNCRT municipalities and their controls recorded increases of 8pp and 12pp, respectively. The changes in the index itself from one year to another are significant in some cases, which may be explained by the quality of the public officials during that period.

Figure 5.10. Secondary data: Comprehensive Performance Index for the CELI and PNCRT municipalities and their respective control municipalities, 2012-2014




Source: Comprehensive Performance Index data, National Planning Department

In the disaggregation of the index into its components, the most significant differences appear mainly in three dimensions: efficacy, legal requirements and management, as shown in Figure 5.11.

³³ The DNP explains the results, methodology and sources of information of the documents on the following website: <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Desarrollo%20Territorial/Docuemnto%20Desempe%C3%B1o%20Integral%202013.pdf>.

³⁴ The “good” rating is for municipalities with between 60 and 69 points, and the “low” rating is for those with between 40 and 59 points..

Figure 5.11. Secondary data: Comprehensive Performance Index, 2012 (left) and 2014 (right)



Source: Data from Integral Performance Index of the National Planning Department

Efficacy. The efficacy component analyzes the implementation of the Development Plan and the achievement of its goals. Between 2012 and 2014, there was an increase of between 20pp to 40pp in the scores in the municipalities analyzed.

Legal requirements. The score for the legal requirements component improved 4pp for the CELI municipalities, and 7pp for the control municipalities. This higher score reflects better management of resources from the General Participation System (SGP) in accordance with current budgetary regulations. This score was stable in the PNCRT municipalities.

Management. This component is used to evaluate the municipality’s capacity to manage resources and convert them into goods and services for the population, by measuring strategic planning, project monitoring and accountability tools. The score for the management component improved in the four groups of municipalities, and was the highest of the six IDI components.


Other components. The rest of the IDI components were relatively stable in the municipalities studied. Fiscal performance measures tax collections, debt management, and compliance with Law 617 of 2000 with regard to the sustainability of public finances. The fiscal performance scores were the most stable, and they increased between 1pp and 3pp between 2012 and 2014. The efficiency component evaluates the results obtained with SGP resources in the areas of health, education, water and sanitation, and it was also stable. Administrative capacity measures the stability of personnel, professionalization, the availability of computers, the automation of processes, and the implementation of models and control standards. The scores for this component remained stable and satisfactory.

Conclusion 5. The Comprehensive Performance Index shows progress at a municipal level throughout the sample, with significant increases in the management, efficacy and legal requirements components. This trend is common to the four groups of municipalities analyzed, so it is not possible to attribute the progress to any type of intervention.

However, it is reasonable to mention that the CELI and PNCRT interventions included support for the preparation and implementation of the Municipal Development Plans and for the Regional Action Plan (PAR). It is thus reasonable to conclude that these interventions may have helped to improve the IDI, especially given that the management component is the largest part of the index of progress.

In comparison, it is useful to examine the Governmental Capacity Index that results from the survey data of this evaluation, in order to balance the government’s perspective of the services that it provides, as measured by the IDI, with the experiences and opinions of the recipients of said services. In this regard, much remains to be done.

Residential public services and social services. The first step that households must take in order to access the State’s social services is registration in the *System of Identification and Classification of Potential Beneficiaries for Social Programs (SISBEN)*. Unlike what occurred in the other regions studied in this evaluation, in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca there was a decline in the percentage of households registered in the SISBEN (Figure 5.12). The trends in the control areas were similar, so it is not possible to attribute any impact to the interventions.



In absolute terms, there was no impact on the public services provided by the State, only some changes in the different services investigated in the survey.

The survey asked about access to health and education services (Figure 5.13), as well as changes in quality over the last two years. The following figure shows the changes between the baseline and the midline with regard to the services evaluated for Catatumbo, and it shows progress in the perception of the quality of services in the four cases analyzed. The changes in terms of access are representative in education for children between the ages of 5 and 11, and there was an 8% increase for ages 12 to 18. It is worth mentioning that similar results were obtained for the control municipalities, and so no impact is seen from the interventions.

Figure 5.13. Trends in access to and quality of public services in the Catatumbo region

	Access (2015)	Change in access	Change in quality	Has it improved in the last two years?
Health center			2%	Yes
Children under 5 with access to care services	24%	13%	13%	Yes
Children between 5 and 11 who attend school	98%	2%	14%	Yes
People between 12 and 18 who attend an educational institution	76%	14%	22%	Yes

In this regard, the Consolidation Index measures the provision of services with two health indicators and five education indicators:

- The two health indicators rose in Catatumbo with respect to previous years, with a coverage of 94% of the General System of Social Security in Health (SGSSS), and 86% in areas without clinics. In these regions, services are provided through health brigades. The gross coverage scores for primary and secondary education also increased, and there was a positive change in the index with respect to vacant teacher positions and school dropout rates.³⁵
- Cauca/Valle del Cauca and its control municipalities reported the maximum score in terms of the school dropout rate and vacant teacher positions. Their SGSSS coverage is 94%, and 81% in villages without clinics. Primary and secondary school coverage is greater than 90%.
- Putumayo reported the maximum score in terms of the school dropout rate and vacant teacher positions. Primary education coverage is 75%, and secondary education coverage is in the range of 85%. Close to 83% of residents in Putumayo are registered in the SGSSS, and the index reported that 92% of the villages without clinics have received visits by health brigades.

The respondents reported improvements in access to and quality of residential public services in most cases (Figure 5.14). The figures in green represent increases between the baseline and the midline, and the figures in red represent decreases:


Figure 5.14. Trends in the perception of access to and quality of public services

	Access (2015)			Improved Quality		
	Putumayo	Catatumbo	Cauca/Valle	Putumayo	Catatumbo	Cauca/Valle del Cauca
Electric power	63%	96%	98%	23%	21%	30%
Propane gas	60%	34%	57%	28%	9%	19%
Aqueduct	5%	38%	86%	31%	24%	22%
Sewer service	21%	28%	34%	13%	16%	16%
Garbage collection	26%	33%	45%	13%	22%	22%
Cell phone service	90%	98%	92%	17%	19%	17%

The figures for the public services component of the Consolidation Index show almost complete electric power coverage in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca. Putumayo had the worst scores and a decline since 2011 (Figure 5.15). These figures are relatively consistent with the information from the survey.

As for cell phone coverage, Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca received close to the maximum scores, while Catatumbo had a score of 66/100 in 2014, lower than what was reported in the survey.

³⁵ An increase in the Consolidation Index with respect to vacant teacher positions and school dropout rates means a reduction in the absolute values of these measurements.



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations

Conclusion 6. The provision of public and social services in the three regions are at relatively high levels, even though it is necessary to review some indicators, such as the low access to childcare services for children under five. The perception of quality is positive in the three regions.

There tends to be better access to and quality of residential public services than what was reported in the baseline. Even so, 50% of the population still does not have access to sewer, aqueduct and gas services. The quality of public services has also improved in most cases.

Victims' rights. Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca had increases in the percentage of households in which a family member suffered a violation of his/her rights in the previous twelve months. That percentage rose from 4% in the baseline to 7% in the midline in Catatumbo, and from 5% to 6% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. The figure in Putumayo remained stable, at around 8.5%.

A larger number of respondents in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca who experienced a violation of their rights do not know who the responsible party was. Fewer respondents in the three regions blamed the guerillas for recent violations of their rights. Because there were similar trends in the control municipalities, no impact was found.

The phenomenon of displacement and incidents with anti-personnel mines persist in these regions. According to the information reported, Human Rights Committees are still not fully operational in many municipalities.

It was observed that the focus groups valued the emergency humanitarian assistance provided to victims by the UARIV and the economic stabilization processes available to victims. However, one problem that concerned the participants, especially in southern Valle del Cauca, is the existence of a large number of anti-personnel mines that continue to claim victims in the rural and urban populations. The government's demining plans, which are considered to be an immediate necessity, have not yet been implemented:

The issue of victims in Florida I think has worked well for us and the assistance has been given, in the urban part [as well as the] rural part and the indigenous [territories]. But something else has not worked... humanitarian demining was just propaganda. Here they haven't demined even a 38-long shell that is in the main park. There have been many victims here in the urban part and the villages. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)

In regions that have suffered from the armed conflict for a long time, such as Putumayo, the implementation of Law 1448/11 faces great challenges. The number of applications for the registration of and assistance to victims has exceeded the capacities of the assigned officials:

The victims' office works relatively well, because it also has assigned another group of functions that do not correspond to it, so it works a little bit... It's overwhelmed ... its work is to provide guidance to the victims ... The service center, terrible... The people wait in line for hours. They arrive early, stay overnight and sleep. There are only two officials for three municipalities, San Miguel, Orito and Valle del Guamuez... We've taken almost 4,000 declarations in these four years, and we took them practically alone, my secretary and I, because there was no support. (Municipal Solicitor's Office, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)

According to the results of the focus groups, the displaced population in the municipalities of northern Cauca are generally located in the urban center, in self-built housing that lacks public services. It has been observed that, with emergency aid, these families are living in rented rooms in houses that have been converted into tenements, which are characterized by high levels of overcrowding. One of the programs that is most valued by the community involves the construction of housing for the displaced population, in which the local governments, the Ministry of Housing and the UARIV worked together:

Well, I would especially rescue the work done by the municipal administration with the Ministry of Housing and Territory with regard to the 300 homes built in the municipality for the victims of the conflict, in this case the displaced population, of those 300 homes they delivered 210 homes to the victims of forced displacement who reside here in the municipality... we had never seen a housing plan like the one that we just saw. (Municipal Solicitor's Office, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca)

Conclusion 7. Human rights violations persist in the three PNCRT regions evaluated.

According to all of the sources consulted, the violation of rights persists, although with different victimizers in some cases. It should be noted that, according to the study data, the State is the party least likely to be identified as victimizer in these regions. Also, the demand for services for victims, as well as for the most immediate services for displaced persons arriving in the capital cities, appears to have exceeded the institutional capacity of the Victims' Unit. Demining is a matter that requires an urgent solution in these regions.

Recommendations

1. Maintain the credibility of political participation processes and mechanisms, empowering the communities and their leaders. (Conclusions 1 and 2)

In support of the implementation of Statutory Law 1475 of 2011,³⁶ the interventions at a local level should encourage political participation in order to achieve the consolidation of the territory. They should also promote the application of standards aimed at strengthening the principle of gender equality and the inclusion of young people in political activities, representation and access to electoral debates, in order to generate and consolidate proposals that mobilize the electorate toward the strengthening of democracy.

This means continuing to strengthen political participation through social organizations, and reinforcing knowledge about the channels of political participation and advocacy in public administration, as has been done in the implementation of oversight projects. The following specific strategies and actions would support those aims:

³⁶ This law establishes rules for the organization and operation of political parties and movements, and electoral processes.

- Help rural youth and women obtain their identification documents and register in the electoral registries.
- Promote the participation of women's organizations in all areas of public life.
- Use the schools as sites for training, socialization and the promotion of democratic values, practices and institutions for children and youth in general, with a special emphasis on the importance of elections.
- Support the strengthening of the political parties under criteria of transparency in order to prevent the concentration of power.

2. Actively support strategies to improve transparency and accountability. Public policies to achieve transparency and effective accountability at the different levels of the State are broad and have been instrumentalized. It is recommend that the PNCRT interventions promote the National Comprehensive Anti-corruption Public Policy Strategy established in CONPES Document 167 of 2013, and the right to access public information enshrined in Law 1712 of 2014. This has been promoted by the Secretariat of Transparency, and proposals have been made for improving instrumentalization in the territorial entities in the coming months.

In addition, accountability should include the obligation to provide information about what is being planned, executed and achieved, particularly with the resources that are allocated to the territories. In this regard, it is important for the PNCRT and the programs that support its implementation to show local governments the importance of managing for results in order to ensure the effective delivery of public goods and social services. For the Consolidation Index, consideration should be given to using the raw scores of the Open Government Index in order to make a more rigorous estimate of the achievement of these goals.

Another recommendation is related to the GoC's ability to strengthen the mayor's offices and associations to enable them to incorporate contract oversight mechanisms that mitigate the risk of diverting public resources.

The implementation of the initiatives that the country has been defining for several years requires organized, decisive, sustained and coordinated interinstitutional action. The IDI and the IGA, as well as the Consolidation Index, tend to measure processes more than results that the public can perceive.

3. Use new tools in the efforts to improve the provision of services. There is a national imperative to enhance decentralization. However, local capacity remains low and municipal resources are limited. Emphasis should be placed on the meaningful involvement of civil society and on supporting local governments with ongoing technical assistance. Scorecards and other measures can be used to mobilize citizens to rate the changes in the provision of services, with the objective of learning about failures as well as successes, identifying best practices in different sectors and circumstances.

It is necessary to strengthen citizen participation, from the perspective of both supply and demand. The fact that citizens do not feel involved in decision-making and that trust in the institutions has declined requires that decisions be made on the basis of citizen consultation and participation. Local government institutions should be strengthened while generating capacities in civil society for the exercise of an active citizenship, such that people are more connected, better informed and more demanding.

- 4. Strengthening the country's health and education models.** In 2016, the country updated its Comprehensive Health Care Policy, in accordance with the Statutory Health Law and the Ten-Year Public Health Plan (Law 1751 of 2015), which provides for specific services for the territories with dispersed populations. It includes the Comprehensive Health Care Model (MIAS), which is formulated in response to the health situation of the communities (focused on personal, family, community and environmental aspects), and which seeks to make an impact on the population's state of health, guaranteeing greater attention to health events, with either collective or individual actions, and recognizing the communities' traditions, especially in cases involving ethnic groups.
- 5. The State has to guarantee human rights and security of the population.** This is a *sine qua non* condition for the post-conflict era. The historically marginalized municipalities and regions will be the scene of new conflicts and criminality in the near futures, and if the residents do not perceive that national government entities are protecting them, they will not feel part of a Colombia in peace.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation question: What changes have been produced by the CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacities of local CSOs?

Findings and conclusions


Social capital: Trust

The Social Capital Index, whose maximum score is 100 points, is comprised of indicators related to trust (60 points) and participation (40 points). Trust was measured at the level of family, neighbor, friend, Community Action Board (JAC), control bodies, municipal and national governments, police and army.

As is evident, many of the factors that influence trust are beyond the scope of individual programs, and should be considered as indicators of conditions of context. However, analysis of the subcomponents at a program level provides a greater understanding of their strengths and weaknesses.

The survey results show a decline in trust in Putumayo with respect to the baseline measurement in response to the three key questions regarding community trust (Figure 6.1). This decline in trust occurred in the other two regions as well, but with smaller differences between the baseline and midline than in Putumayo.

Figure 6.1. Trends in trust among members of the community in Putumayo



Conclusion 1. Low community trust. The indices of trust among community members have fallen, which in turn has reduced the provision of mutual assistance and the capacity to work together on projects, a phenomenon that affects associativity and construction of the social fabric.

Social capital: Participation in associations

The JACs continue to be the primary vehicle for participation in public life in the municipalities. The productive associations are also important in the villages, as are political groups, supervision and oversight groups, parents’ associations, and sports groups.

Citizens also participate in women’s associations, youth associations, victims’ associations and cultural, collective identity and territorial associations, rooted in the intangible heritage of the community.

Based on the survey results, the JACs remain the primary mechanism for generating associative

processes, despite the decline reported in relation to the baseline (from 89% to 67% in Putumayo, 91% to 84% in Catatumbo, and 83% to 40% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca).


There was a notable increase in the proportion of participants in the JACs who reported being involved in decision-making, from 23% to 45% in Putumayo, and from 19% to 44% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. This figure fell in Catatumbo from 42% to 33%. However, the quality of participation on the JACs rose, at least in two regions.

Participation increased in other types of associations, such as parents' associations, organizations of displaced or vulnerable persons, cultural and sports groups, volunteer groups, and associations of producers and marketers, and community meetings were encouraged. The respondents stated that they have participated more in decision-making in many cases, as observed in the JACs. This indicator rose substantially in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, but not so much in Catatumbo, which had the lowest score for the participation subcomponent of the Social Capital Index, with a decrease of almost 1pp in comparison with its control municipalities.

The Consolidation Index shows a significant decline in organizational dynamics in Catatumbo, and reports that the percentage of organizations that renewed their bylaws in the Chamber of Commerce fell from 100% in 2013 to 35% in 2014. However, that 35% included all of the Community Action Boards. Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca also reported that almost 100% of their JACs have been formalized, but only around one fifth of their organizations have renewed their bylaws.

Another positive fact is the perceived utility of these mechanisms for households, in which the general trend is that participation in a social organization has been useful for obtaining some benefit. The following figure shows the benefits for the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region and the changes since the baseline:

Figure 6.2. Trends in the benefits reported from belonging to social organizations in Cauca




Although there is a positive result in terms of improvements in the quantity and quality of participation in the PNCRT municipalities studied, there are still important challenges for associativity. The main problem perceived by respondents in the midline survey is that people are not interested in participating. The second problem identified, in order of importance, is the difficulty of working as a team, in all cases falling below the baseline. In Catatumbo, for example, it declined from 57% to 38%. In Putumayo, the perception of these problems declined significantly, while in Cauca/Valle del Cauca it remained the same.

The respondents also indicated that the authorities need to facilitate organizational processes. The

perception of this problem remained at 10%, as reported in the baseline.

The following figure shows the problems reported in Catatumbo, which, despite having lower participation in the midline, showed significant reductions in the perception of organizational problems:

Figure 6.3. Trends in the organizational problems reported in Catatumbo



Community leadership continues to be more male than female in consolidation zones. The percentage of female JAC presidents declined drastically in Putumayo, from 39% to 10%, while it remained at around 30% in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca.

Participation in women’s associations also fell in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, from 5% to 3% and from 10% to 7%, respectively. Nevertheless, members of women’s associations in Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo said that they had improved the quality of their participation by becoming involved in decision-making at higher levels than in the baseline. The results in Catatumbo were different, with participation in women’s groups increasing from 6% to 8%.

Conclusion 1. The regions saw an increase in the quality of participation. The data collected in the PNCRT municipalities show the value of participating for their inhabitants and the benefits perceived by the families. In general, participation in decision-making has been strengthened. It is noteworthy that the perception of participation-related problems has declined, but that teamwork and people’s lack of interest are indicated as greater problems or challenges.

Conclusion 2. The JACs encourage associativity. Despite a decline from the baseline, the JACs are the most common mechanism for encouraging associativity. Households have increased their participation in the JACs, which has had an impact on the benefits perceived by the families. In general, the process of making structured decisions in the JACs has been strengthened.

Conclusion 3. Women have not achieved positioning despite the importance of their role in their communities. Although the respondents stated that women can be leaders and influential in resolving conflicts and implementing peace, female leadership of the JACs and participation in women’s groups declined. The increase in women’s participation in decision-making is encouraging.

Productive associations


One of the conditions for gaining access to government resources is membership in a productive association, since by law the resources cannot be allocated to individuals. As a result, different

associations have arisen in northern Cauca linked to products such as pineapple, coffee, fruit trees and dairy products:

Well, associativity has been promoted in part, also since the Mayor began, he said “well, it is the only way that we can invest and allocate resources as ordered by the law.” ...The Mayor needs to allocate the investments always to a group, and not to individuals. (Productive association focus group, Caloto, Cauca)

The respondents indicated that there are economic incentives for joining associations and thus support their productive projects. The survey results in the PNCRT municipalities and their controls were very positive. In Cauca/Valle del Cauca, for example, 25% of the respondents in the midline sample joined associations in order to sell their products, train together, and be represented as a group, in comparison with 4% in the baseline. The respondents were also more likely to join associations in order to transport their products, seek financing for their projects, and apply for credit. (Figure 6.4)

Figure 6.4. Trends in the reasons for joining associations, Cauca/Valle del Cauca



The data disaggregated by sex show that female-headed households are driving this growth in associativity in order to process, sell and transport their products, as well as to obtain financing for their projects.

Conclusion 4. Economic rationality is an incentive for associativity. Economic rationality operates as an incentive for families to joint associations and strengthen the mechanisms of participation. Associativity around economic issues of female-headed households is a very important part of this finding.

Recommendations

- 1. Adapt the programs in order to build trust.** The fall in the indicators of trust in the government, neighbors and the community cannot be resolved with PNCRT programs only. The supply- and demand-related tools recommended in the institutional development chapter are part of the answer; guaranteeing the security and rights of leaders is another; and strengthening the associations and communities is a third part.

The benefits of associative schemes that favor dialogue and replicate the implicit knowledge of the communities have been demonstrated. They generate the roots of community identity and the effectiveness of project management. All initiatives, strategies, intentions, and actions

that are defined to increase associativity are key inputs for the consolidation of the democratic state and sustained and sustainable peacebuilding. This exercise can benefit from recognizing and coordinating national public policy efforts to promote the effective participation of different segments of the population, such as young people, and the generation of opportunities for them. Also, CONPES Document 173 of 2014 promotes the effective participation of women, and CONPES Document 3784 of 2013 provides guidelines for the prevention of risks, and the protection and guarantee of the rights of women victims of the armed conflict.

As indicated, associativity requires the promotion of cooperation and not competition. As such, it is important to reduce the incentive that exists for the creation of social organizations for the purpose of obtaining resources, and rather monitor the creation and maturation of existing associations in order to promote good practices and the consolidation of new productive orders.

2. Enhance the work of female-headed households through the use of participatory models.

The positive participation results achieved with male-headed households should be extended to female-headed households. While the latter take advantage of the services offered by cooperation agencies as well as the State, it is important to implement different mechanisms of differential attention that address the vulnerability of female heads of households, such as the provision of child care during meetings, or the scheduling of meetings when they have free time to participate more.

In addition, those who are already participating in women's, victims' or other groups can serve as guides to encourage other women to participate in the groups.

Moreover, the leaders of community associations and other groups, whose commitment and participation already represent greater levels of social roots, can serve as resources to advance this goal. The different ways of using this associative leadership resource should be investigated through activities that promote associativity with community members whose behavior indicates a growing isolation.

3. Continue to strengthen the JACs in an effort to develop and consolidate them. Current law³⁷ allows for the creation of multiple mechanisms for strengthening the role of the JACs as dispute-resolution agents. It is thus expected that they will promote conciliation for the development of peace. The JACs can also execute infrastructure projects (for tertiary roads, for example), manage community radio stations, and implement public policy oversight and monitoring processes, as well as serve as key agents for strengthening the social fabric.

The main report of the evaluation recommends, in particular, adapting the instrument used by the CELIs to measure the organizational capacities of the JACs, and to make the results public, among other steps to ensure their legitimacy with their communities

³⁷ Law 743 of 2002, which develops Article 38 of the Political Constitution of Colombia with regard to community action organizations, and National Decree 2350 of 2003, which regulates that Law.


ANNEX I: LIST EXPERIMENT: CLUSTER-LEVEL RESULTS

List experiment results in this annex are presented by the four PNCRT regions studied and by the ten survey clusters that composed the regions. These clusters are:


Cluster	Region	DEPTO	Treatment	Control
2	CATATUMBO	N SANTAN	Hacarí, San Calixto	Simití, Bolivar
10	CATATUMBO	N SANTAN	Tibú	Dabeiba, Antioquia
11	CATATUMBO	N SANTAN	Teorama, Convención, El Carmen	San Carlos, Antioquia
19	CAUCA/V	V DE CAUCA	Florida, Pradera	Coyaima, Tolima
20	CAUCA/V	CAUCA	Miranda, Corinto	Cumbitara, Nariño
21	CAUCA/V	CAUCA	Caloto, Santander de Quilichao	Totoró, Cauca
29	PUTUMAYO	PUTUMAYO	Puerto Leguizamo	Santa Rosa, Cauca
30	PUTUMAYO	PUTUMAYO	Puertto Asís	Puerto Concordia, Meta
31	PUTUMAYO	PUTUMAYO	Valle de Guamuez	Algeciras, Huila
32	PUTUMAYO	PUTUMAYO	San Miguel	Florencia, Caquetá

Results are shown for the question on contact with illegal armed groups, and then for contact with illicit crops. For the region and then for each cluster, three graphs are presented. The first shows the results at baseline, the second at midline, and the third shows the impact, if any, using the differences in differences calculation. As will be seen across the graphs, there is an overall diminution of respondent reports that they have contact with either illegal armed groups or with illicit crops, in many cases approaching zero at midline. However, this trend crosses the treatment (PNCRT) and control sites, and as such, the trend cannot be attributed to any intervention.




Catatumbo Region: Contact with armed groups






Catatumbo Region: Contact with illicit crops






Catatumbo, Cluster 2 - Contact with armed groups






Contact with illicit crops






Catatumbo, Cluster 10 - Contact with armed groups






Contact with illicit crops




Catatumbo, Cluster 11- Contact with armed groups




Contact with illicit crops






Cauca Region: Contact with armed groups






Cauca Region: Contact with illicit crops






Cauca, Cluster 19 - Contact with armed groups






Contact with illicit crops






Cauca, Cluster 20 - Contact with armed groups






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
Cauca, Cluster 21 - Contact with armed groups




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


Putumayo Region: Contact with armed groups






Putumayo Region: Contact with illicit crops






Putumayo, Cluster 29 - Contact with armed groups






Contact with illicit crops






Putumayo, Cluster 30 - Contact with armed groups






Contact with illicit crops






Putumayo, Cluster 31 - Contact with armed groups






Contact with illicit crops



Putumayo, Cluster 32 - Contact with armed groups



Contact with illicit crops



ANNEX 2: DESCRIPTIVE DATA TABLES, BY CLUSTER

This annex presents the descriptive data tables for the 10 clusters in the PNCRT areas:

Cluster	Region	DEPTO	Treatment	Control
2	CATATUMBO	N SANTAN	Hacarí, San Calixto	Simití, Bolívar
10	CATATUMBO	N SANTAN	Tibú	Dabeiba, Antioquia
11	CATATUMBO	N SANTAN	Teorama, Convención, El Carmen	San Carlos, Antioquia
19	CAUCA/V	V DE CAUCA	Florida, Pradera	Coyaima, Tolima
20	CAUCA/V	CAUCA	Miranda, Corinto	Cumbitara, Nariño
21	CAUCA/V	CAUCA	Caloto, Santander de Quilichao	Totoró, Cauca
29	PUTUMAYO	PUTUMAYO	Puerto Leguizamo	Santa Rosa, Cauca
30	PUTUMAYO	PUTUMAYO	Puertto Asís	Puerto Concordia, Meta
31	PUTUMAYO	PUTUMAYO	Valle de Guamuez	Algeciras, Huila
32	PUTUMAYO	PUTUMAYO	San Miguel	Florencia, Caquetá

Cluster 2

PNCRT: Hararí, San Calixto (N de Santander)

Control: Simití (Bolívar)

Variable	Cluster 2				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,390	0,325	0,124	0,175	0.118**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,038	0,157	0,381	0,341	-0.151***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,403	0,058	0,907	0,513	-0.0474
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,891	0,821	0,827	0,780	0.0193
Productive activities earn very little money	0,938	0,997	0,127	0,105	-0.0798**
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,081	0,404	0,009	0,003	-0.335***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,703	0,841	0,731	0,806	-0.0589
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,263	0,398	0,375	0,459	-0.0826
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	490433	396175	435882	527940	227,421***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)

FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,415	0,392	0,356	0,420	0.103*
Have a checking account	0,034	0,013	0,031	0,105	0.105***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,059	0,382	0,201	0,666	0.137***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,446	0,455	0,483	0,519	0.0581
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,701	0,790	0,782	0,810	-0.0688
Currently have debt	0,743	0,879	0,656	0,729	-0.0313
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,473	0,263	0,502	0,301	0.0127
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,727	0,364	0,397	0,304	0.246***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,050	0,156	0,146	0,108	-0.152***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,040	0,076	0,015	0,115	0.0567**
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,034	0,057	0,022	0,086	0.0372
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,498	0,244	0,379	0,341	0.229***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,676	0,511	0,510	0,531	0.219***
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,160	0,278	0,530	0,280	-0.410***
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,221	0,180	0,285	0,153	-0.146***
The national government runs well or very well	0,534	0,368	0,452	0,324	0.0295
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,344	0,257	0,205	0,164	0.00567
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,121	0,094	0,232	0,125	-0.0930**
The national government	0,394	0,166	0,202	0,163	0.192***
Justice sector institutions	0,166	0,117	0,115	0,169	0.106**
Alternative justice institutions	0,236	0,173	0,118	0,151	0.0639
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,164	0,252	0,183	0,346	0.0600
Social organizations and NGOs	0,234	0,150	0,217	0,152	0.0555
Training centers	0,684	0,307	0,423	0,355	0.326***
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,382	0,138	0,213	0,254	0.290***
The municipal council	0,272	0,154	0,245	0,241	0.114**
The national police	0,149	0,115	0,191	0,180	0.0107
The army	0,442	0,151	0,287	0,188	0.190***
The navy	0,358	0,090	0,236	0,119	0.153***

The municipal personería	0,431	0,191	0,218	0,266	0.300***
The mayor's office	0,538	0,192	0,381	0,279	0.268***
The JAC	0,642	0,546	0,478	0,628	0.259***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,541	0,199	0,302	0,211	0.229***
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,861	0,879	0,876	0,911	0.0116
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,065	0,156	0,037	0,013	-0.0885**
Illegal armed groups	0,287	0,422	0,291	0,137	-0.281***
Antipersonnel mines	0,120	0,178	0,019	0,057	-0.0465
Displacement	0,046	0,044	0,022	0,073	0.0209
Forced disappearances	0,037	0,000	0,080	0,013	-0.0267
Extortion	0,361	0,044	0,115	0,006	0.255***
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,472	0,467	0,235	0,096	-0.138*
Forced recruitment	0,028	0,000	0,003	0,006	0.0239
Sexual violence	0,046	0,000	0,009	0,013	0.0440*
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,666	0,857	0,560	0,726	-0.0652
There is police presence	0,805	0,201	0,022	0,102	0.672***
The police here are good or very good	0,120	0,380	0,286	0,333	-0.0923
The police have improved in the last two years	0,102	0,163	0,429	0,063	-0.380**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,344	0,454	0,311	0,467	0.00739
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,192	0,043	0,103	0,086	0.152***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,891	0,874	0,903	0,765	-0.113***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,913	0,857	0,916	0,785	-0.0550
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,894	0,869	0,926	0,810	-0.0746*
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,770	0,696	0,862	0,798	0.0324
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,810	0,861	0,928	0,873	-0.111***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,830	0,611	0,913	0,863	0.161***

In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,768	0,522	0,904	0,809	0.155***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,811	0,596	0,907	0,898	0.218***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,737	0,529	0,873	0,847	0.185***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,554	0,411	0,811	0,803	0.119**
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,545	0,525	0,842	0,825	-0.00213
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,573	0,347	0,820	0,732	0.140***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,709	0,500	0,851	0,806	0.175***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,746	0,490	0,814	0,780	0.235***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,851	0,462	0,839	0,777	0.325***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,912	0,923	0,934	0,918	-0.0359

Cluster 10

PNCRT: Tibú (N de Santander)

Control: Dabeiba (Antioquia)

Variable	Cluster 10				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,272	0,159	0,160	0,290	0.229***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,125	0,040	0,358	0,171	-0.112***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,305	0,160	0,824	0,645	-0.0278
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,766	0,790	0,793	0,583	-0.221***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,785	0,800	0,086	0,093	-0.0173
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,022	0,090	0,003	0,019	-0.0491**
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,769	0,682	0,559	0,623	0.139***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,373	0,246	0,417	0,271	-0.0338
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	280569	503741	377574	515365	-75,322*
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,364	0,517	0,451	0,424	-0.167***
Have a checking account	0,009	0,059	0,040	0,140	0.0516*
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,370	0,408	0,552	0,474	-0.140**
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,358	0,380	0,417	0,386	-0.0598
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,655	0,525	0,726	0,661	0.0279
Currently have debt	0,546	0,664	0,469	0,486	-0.0983*
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,156	0,109	0,286	0,093	-0.152***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,131	0,076	0,112	0,100	0.0490
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,108	0,140	0,077	0,047	-0.0564*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,040	0,025	0,046	0,009	-0.0199
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,028	0,022	0,037	0,012	-0.0129
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,121	0,070	0,140	0,080	-0.00670
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,494	0,492	0,444	0,449	0.00397
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,448	0,178	0,618	0,179	-0.196***

The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,154	0,082	0,195	0,115	-0.0143
The national government runs well or very well	0,568	0,394	0,583	0,350	-0.0679
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,188	0,263	0,170	0,170	-0.0763
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (<i>a lot or very much</i>)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,313	0,083	0,299	0,070	-0.0203
The national government	0,411	0,190	0,305	0,188	0.0852
Justice sector institutions	0,219	0,113	0,235	0,156	0.00746
Alternative justice institutions	0,126	0,129	0,208	0,143	-0.0819*
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,346	0,153	0,298	0,206	0.120**
Social organizations and NGOs	0,194	0,196	0,225	0,132	-0.109**
Training centers	0,504	0,523	0,436	0,583	0.127**
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,299	0,202	0,302	0,249	0.0431
The municipal council	0,158	0,116	0,229	0,125	-0.0572
The national police	0,326	0,155	0,320	0,169	0.00877
The army	0,374	0,299	0,369	0,301	-0.00308
The navy	0,327	0,208	0,265	0,234	0.0499
The municipal personería	0,369	0,183	0,272	0,149	0.0690
The mayor's office	0,222	0,135	0,235	0,087	-0.0866**
The JAC	0,474	0,533	0,416	0,487	-0.00408
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,236	0,310	0,518	0,365	-0.223***
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,870	0,875	0,880	0,857	-0.00875
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,060	0,145	0,031	0,062	-0.0661
Illegal armed groups	0,482	0,315	0,046	0,153	0.276***
Antipersonnel mines	0,145	0,073	0,028	0,028	0.0791**
Displacement	0,048	0,040	0,043	0,044	0.0205
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,024	0,003	0,006	-0.0214
Extortion	0,084	0,065	0,009	0,022	0.0329
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,386	0,661	0,080	0,346	-0.0231
Forced recruitment	0,012	0,016	0,012	0,006	-0.00374
Sexual violence	0,024	0,065	0,022	0,034	-0.0292
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,744	0,614	0,821	0,555	-0.1000*
There is police presence	0,386	0,318	0,052	0,206	0.214***

The police here are good or very good	0,408	0,362	0,706	0,394	-0.260
The police have improved in the last two years	0,224	0,235	0,353	0,273	-0.103
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLCIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,038	0,130	0,036	0,234	0.111***
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,028	0,006	0,020	0,042	0.0436**
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,962	0,931	0,845	0,790	-0.0251
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,949	0,949	0,833	0,829	-0.0163
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,968	0,940	0,845	0,761	-0.0591
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,959	0,904	0,851	0,820	0.0149
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,857	0,817	0,728	0,847	0.162***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,806	0,766	0,917	0,916	0.0391
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,821	0,760	0,910	0,885	0.0453
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,833	0,769	0,938	0,935	0.0605
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,852	0,754	0,941	0,947	0.105***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,821	0,607	0,944	0,888	0.138***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,836	0,692	0,932	0,894	0.112***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,827	0,626	0,886	0,891	0.203***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,802	0,629	0,895	0,891	0.172***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,815	0,639	0,889	0,869	0.146***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,809	0,601	0,873	0,872	0.197***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,895	0,900	0,868	0,919	0.0422

Cluster II

PNCRT: Teorama, Convención, El Carmen (N de Santander)
Control: San Carlos (Antioquia)

Variable	Cluster II				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,191	0,353	0,160	0,198	-0.117**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,052	0,047	0,166	0,269	0.0881**
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,125	0,130	0,799	0,632	-0.175***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,770	0,879	0,740	0,876	0.0299
Productive activities earn very little money	0,780	0,997	0,028	0,025	-0.206***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,010	0,102	0,025	0,003	-0.124***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,611	0,814	0,524	0,836	0.0975*
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,166	0,334	0,245	0,452	0.00705
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	398569	393663	587737	463068	-111,001*
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,461	0,585	0,376	0,625	0.155***
Have a checking account	0,016	0,028	0,044	0,142	0.104***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,373	0,709	0,442	0,842	0.0903*
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,408	0,746	0,467	0,749	-0.0721
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,708	0,822	0,819	0,872	-0.0245
Currently have debt	0,599	0,876	0,639	0,811	-0.115**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,611	0,142	0,672	0,135	-0.0656
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,439	0,159	0,436	0,051	-0.0919*
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,085	0,084	0,197	0,065	-0.135***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,125	0,022	0,116	0,019	-0.00661
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,113	0,034	0,078	0,009	-6.85e-05
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,539	0,142	0,604	0,092	-0.118**

I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,740	0,572	0,625	0,505	0.0597
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,611	0,248	0,716	0,260	
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,226	0,106	0,310	0,085	
The national government runs well or very well	0,669	0,372	0,473	0,396	
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,236	0,172	0,153	0,139	
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,441	0,104	0,496	0,097	
The national government	0,540	0,244	0,331	0,178	
Justice sector institutions	0,348	0,136	0,293	0,134	
Alternative justice institutions	0,289	0,176	0,260	0,133	
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,442	0,271	0,345	0,244	
Social organizations and NGOs	0,331	0,181	0,399	0,109	
Training centers	0,558	0,409	0,681	0,454	
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,421	0,211	0,372	0,218	
The municipal council	0,319	0,133	0,316	0,117	
The national police	0,425	0,153	0,432	0,200	
The army	0,443	0,252	0,507	0,290	
The navy	0,413	0,188	0,435	0,144	
The municipal personería	0,595	0,182	0,472	0,173	
The mayor's office	0,541	0,178	0,619	0,115	
The JAC	0,682	0,555	0,659	0,559	
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,345	0,253	0,554	0,232	-0.237***
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,966	0,907	0,940	0,898	-0.00563
Serious security problems in the vereda:					
Homicides	0,068	0,170	0,013	0,003	-0.146***
Illegal armed groups	0,017	0,226	0,003	0,065	-0.154***
Antipersonnel mines	0,034	0,047	0,009	0,031	0.00465
Displacement	0,034	0,047	0,000	0,022	0.0219
Forced disappearances	0,017	0,094	0,000	0,022	-0.0592**
Extortion	0,034	0,123	0,019	0,040	-0.0777**
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,644	0,783	0,172	0,146	-0.0991
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,003	0.00353

Sexual violence	0,017	0,009	0,009	0,012	0.00800
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,815	0,672	0,806	0,768	0.102**
There is police presence	0,671	0,065	0,270	0,025	0.370***
The police here are good or very good	0,564	0,524	0,590	0,250	-0.277
The police have improved in the last two years	0,236	0,190	0,280	0,125	-0.121
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLCIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,029	0,055	0,015	0,207	0.171***
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,065	0,000	0,065	0,000	0.00372
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,936	0,975	0,818	0,946	0.0940***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,962	0,972	0,842	0,956	0.0989***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,969	0,959	0,823	0,876	0.0738**
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,980	0,858	0,861	0,914	0.176***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,887	0,873	0,884	0,920	0.0718*
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,837	0,700	0,893	0,882	0.122***
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,846	0,638	0,893	0,870	0.176***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,890	0,666	0,862	0,898	0.271***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,915	0,492	0,918	0,892	0.388***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,824	0,381	0,774	0,833	0.485***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,853	0,409	0,875	0,864	0.433***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,803	0,359	0,831	0,820	0.441***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,856	0,424	0,815	0,848	0.463***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,828	0,409	0,837	0,861	0.433***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,853	0,387	0,730	0,858	0.579***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,922	0,932	0,978	0,937	-0.0529*

Cluster 19

PNCRT: Florida, Pradera (Valle de Cauca)

Control: Coyaima (Tolima)

Variable	Cluster 19				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,431	0,268	0,132	0,258	
The family is experiencing hunger	0,361	0,140	0,711	0,252	
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,526	0,133	0,949	0,834	
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,952	0,960	0,476	0,599	
Productive activities earn very little money	0,800	0,827	0,029	0,056	
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,000	0,113	0,010	0,026	
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,961	0,672	0,907	0,619	
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,379	0,252	0,582	0,281	
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	297765	481651	228248	576919	
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,476	0,457	0,174	0,212	0.0327
Have a checking account	0,006	0,023	0,006	0,123	0.0941***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,334	0,450	0,302	0,649	0.197***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,228	0,427	0,125	0,397	0.0801
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,437	0,620	0,667	0,600	-0.188
Currently have debt	0,543	0,583	0,186	0,470	0.253***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,282	0,170	0,226	0,134	0.0336
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,327	0,148	0,073	0,145	0.262***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,141	0,070	0,084	0,053	0.0620*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,032	0,036	0,023	0,040	0.0234
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,023	0,026	0,016	0,026	0.0180
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,200	0,143	0,105	0,070	0.0473
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,486	0,514	0,275	0,275	-0.0134

The departmental government runs well or very well	0,331	0,243	0,295	0,227	0.00104
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,198	0,105	0,042	0,122	0.163***
The national government runs well or very well	0,530	0,461	0,464	0,321	-0.0608
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,284	0,218	0,099	0,129	0.125***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (<i>a lot or very much</i>)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,194	0,140	0,144	0,089	-0.00747
The national government	0,353	0,266	0,265	0,124	-0.0555
Justice sector institutions	0,254	0,193	0,188	0,099	0.00136
Alternative justice institutions	0,279	0,233	0,165	0,126	-0.00534
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,151	0,325	0,163	0,158	-0.157***
Social organizations and NGOs	0,178	0,290	0,155	0,108	-0.176***
Training centers	0,412	0,702	0,512	0,664	-0.0967
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,221	0,270	0,192	0,175	-0.0691
The municipal council	0,166	0,131	0,141	0,075	-0.0311
The national police	0,339	0,284	0,493	0,154	-0.242***
The army	0,503	0,427	0,546	0,318	-0.123**
The navy	0,408	0,412	0,285	0,278	-0.0108
The municipal personería	0,290	0,242	0,148	0,169	0.0665
The mayor's office	0,211	0,181	0,227	0,090	-0.0963**
The JAC	0,505	0,508	0,403	0,241	-0.158***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,162	0,182	0,161	0,201	0.0107
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,897	0,785	0,768	0,831	0.156***
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,050	0,158	0,093	0,083	-0.121***
Illegal armed groups	0,050	0,288	0,016	0,056	-0.204***
Antipersonnel mines	0,008	0,179	0,000	0,036	-0.114***
Displacement	0,033	0,130	0,039	0,073	-0.0590
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,027	0,003	0,003	-0.0307**
Extortion	0,017	0,027	0,006	0,060	0.0485*
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,934	0,739	0,476	0,526	0.232***
Forced recruitment	0,008	0,005	0,003	0,007	0.00829
Sexual violence	0,124	0,043	0,045	0,033	0.0922***
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,611	0,391	0,479	0,397	0.159***

There is police presence	0,762	0,563	0,167	0,268	0.286***
The police here are good or very good	0,340	0,385	0,442	0,420	-0.00496
The police have improved in the last two years	0,136	0,195	0,192	0,359	0.175**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,030	0,003	0,003	0,014	0.0327**
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,093	0,010	0,013	0,011	0.0705***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,955	0,966	0,764	0,606	-0.181***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,987	0,960	0,760	0,698	-0.0352
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,984	0,987	0,733	0,661	-0.0909**
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,941	0,953	0,760	0,767	0.00904
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,860	0,815	0,648	0,750	0.154**
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,595	0,742	0,942	0,927	-0.160***
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,556	0,722	0,923	0,894	-0.182***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,553	0,762	0,968	0,927	-0.258***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,633	0,738	0,974	0,930	-0.157***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,466	0,583	0,981	0,911	-0.209***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,537	0,629	0,984	0,911	-0.182***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,502	0,510	0,977	0,884	-0.128***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,592	0,540	0,974	0,921	0.00545
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,508	0,629	0,971	0,887	-0.203***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,508	0,560	0,958	0,874	-0.138***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,927	0,873	0,913	0,912	0.0594

Cluster 20

PNCRT: Miranda, Corinto (Cauca)

Control: Cumbitara (Nariño)

Variable	Cluster 20				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,532	0,299	0,113	0,183	0.313***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,084	0,058	0,319	0,162	-0.158***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,465	0,237	0,700	0,912	0.411***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,939	0,982	0,523	0,577	-0.0181
Productive activities earn very little money	0,926	0,737	0,081	0,021	0.115***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,290	0,032	0,019	0,004	0.245***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,829	0,637	0,719	0,687	0.149***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,268	0,229	0,332	0,239	-0.0789
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	251813	417308	440810	463666	-165,513*
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,348	0,465	0,290	0,370	-0.0512
Have a checking account	0,010	0,000	0,074	0,053	-0.0235
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,187	0,141	0,468	0,285	-0.135**
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,248	0,338	0,281	0,377	-0.0181
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,623	0,563	0,724	0,692	0.0434
Currently have debt	0,716	0,577	0,497	0,408	0.0428
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,199	0,279	0,397	0,269	-0.238***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,254	0,286	0,323	0,138	-0.246***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,048	0,116	0,165	0,056	-0.189***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,035	0,063	0,119	0,046	-0.129***
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,029	0,032	0,087	0,035	-0.0581**
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,157	0,272	0,296	0,261	-0.158***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,362	0,491	0,268	0,398	-0.0113
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,214	0,290	0,480	0,217	-0.392***

The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,172	0,162	0,258	0,091	-0.199***
The national government runs well or very well	0,287	0,457	0,570	0,313	-0.495***
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,205	0,318	0,336	0,100	-0.385***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (<i>a lot or very much</i>)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,074	0,143	0,151	0,090	-0.184***
The national government	0,116	0,282	0,277	0,180	-0.308***
Justice sector institutions	0,064	0,176	0,086	0,109	-0.106***
Alternative justice institutions	0,066	0,171	0,079	0,088	-0.123***
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,141	0,228	0,171	0,153	-0.121**
Social organizations and NGOs	0,151	0,224	0,096	0,130	-0.0249
Training centers	0,377	0,669	0,263	0,537	0.00138
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,116	0,281	0,178	0,170	-0.198***
The municipal council	0,157	0,144	0,136	0,138	-0.0135
The national police	0,069	0,294	0,135	0,264	-0.0833*
The army	0,124	0,504	0,214	0,349	-0.260***
The navy	0,073	0,463	0,134	0,177	-0.368***
The municipal personería	0,094	0,218	0,167	0,142	-0.186***
The mayor's office	0,140	0,291	0,306	0,239	-0.247***
The JAC	0,308	0,470	0,247	0,296	-0.133**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,288	0,155	0,384	0,198	
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,690	0,901	0,832	0,880	
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,115	0,098	0,090	0,039	-0.0166
Illegal armed groups	0,833	0,137	0,281	0,039	0.467***
Antipersonnel mines	0,173	0,039	0,100	0,018	0.0317
Displacement	0,404	0,059	0,200	0,039	0.182***
Forced disappearances	0,077	0,010	0,026	0,004	0.0520**
Extortion	0,128	0,010	0,071	0,011	0.0899**
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,276	0,765	0,123	0,292	-0.312***
Forced recruitment	0,006	0,000	0,010	0,000	0.00283
Sexual violence	0,013	0,039	0,026	0,018	-0.0463*
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,497	0,641	0,529	0,665	-0.00480
There is police presence	0,377	0,944	0,365	0,239	-0.652***

The police here are good or very good	0,160	0,322	0,339	0,529	0.0725
The police have improved in the last two years	0,114	0,146	0,265	0,254	-0.0906
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLCIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,461	0,046	0,352	0,056	0.120**
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,134	0,007	0,031	0,032	0.130***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,761	0,947	0,441	0,809	0.165***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,778	0,911	0,514	0,855	0.164***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,752	0,960	0,439	0,869	0.185***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,666	0,911	0,535	0,862	0.0527
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,770	0,764	0,612	0,683	0.0110
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,577	0,796	0,774	0,912	-0.0976*
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,474	0,718	0,755	0,880	-0.137**
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,548	0,697	0,874	0,933	-0.0794
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,448	0,736	0,890	0,937	-0.249***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,494	0,581	0,906	0,915	-0.0557
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,513	0,687	0,916	0,954	-0.126***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,468	0,592	0,903	0,923	-0.123**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,529	0,563	0,916	0,926	-0.0257
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,506	0,577	0,916	0,937	-0.0589
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,513	0,595	0,903	0,926	-0.0799
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,870	0,895	0,851	0,914	0.0520

Cluster 2I

PNCRT: Caloto, Santander de Quilchao (Cauca)

Control: Totoró (Cauca)

Variable	Cluster 2I				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,247	0,294	0,211	0,146	-0.122**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,094	0,114	0,143	0,304	0.143***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,342	0,279	0,825	0,939	0.193***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,919	0,990	0,753	0,761	-0.0436
Productive activities earn very little money	0,844	0,912	0,010	0,055	-0.0326
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,007	0,084	0,010	0,006	-0.0762***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,782	0,786	0,776	0,809	0.0740
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,295	0,304	0,273	0,411	0.149***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	282406	372912	351458	627401	65,405
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,399	0,382	0,584	0,188	-0.379***
Have a checking account	0,000	0,016	0,049	0,042	-0.0272
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,068	0,178	0,318	0,194	-0.246***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,461	0,388	0,558	0,382	-0.0927
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,613	0,617	0,733	0,729	-0.0972
Currently have debt	0,506	0,579	0,474	0,434	-0.108*
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,359	0,141	0,351	0,149	0.0211
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,312	0,190	0,247	0,060	-0.0383
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,169	0,104	0,071	0,052	0.0489
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,214	0,026	0,182	0,045	0.0580
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,143	0,026	0,162	0,045	0.00841
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,245	0,143	0,315	0,046	-0.180***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,366	0,508	0,321	0,364	-0.103*

The departmental government runs well or very well	0,215	0,172	0,189	0,167	0.0109
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,121	0,142	0,068	0,031	-0.0629*
The national government runs well or very well	0,363	0,356	0,292	0,282	0.00662
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,218	0,245	0,143	0,104	-0.0693
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (<i>a lot or very much</i>)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,079	0,078	0,065	0,064	-0.0194
The national government	0,151	0,167	0,140	0,162	0.0127
Justice sector institutions	0,124	0,107	0,130	0,089	-0.0244
Alternative justice institutions	0,101	0,177	0,081	0,064	-0.100**
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,203	0,214	0,134	0,138	0.000850
Social organizations and NGOs	0,085	0,147	0,061	0,151	0.0223
Training centers	0,519	0,530	0,448	0,497	0.0179
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,190	0,183	0,167	0,161	-0.00773
The municipal council	0,169	0,113	0,156	0,122	0.00297
The national police	0,289	0,155	0,263	0,205	0.0749
The army	0,369	0,236	0,279	0,336	0.236***
The navy	0,266	0,228	0,128	0,207	0.142***
The municipal personería	0,256	0,116	0,205	0,145	0.0676
The mayor's office	0,292	0,156	0,312	0,098	-0.0714
The JAC	0,426	0,458	0,406	0,379	-0.0766
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,094	0,114	0,182	0,165	-0.0398
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,938	0,806	0,932	0,880	0.0744**
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,127	0,243	0,039	0,081	-0.0658
Illegal armed groups	0,127	0,198	0,023	0,100	0.0324
Antipersonnel mines	0,007	0,011	0,003	0,013	0.0165
Displacement	0,007	0,017	0,026	0,032	0.00675
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,011	0,016	0,045	0.0232
Extortion	0,067	0,079	0,019	0,036	-0.00985
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,881	0,853	0,334	0,557	0.259***
Forced recruitment	0,007	0,006	0,000	0,010	0.00990
Sexual violence	0,045	0,068	0,081	0,100	-0.0266
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,565	0,427	0,614	0,353	-0.155***

There is police presence	0,727	0,346	0,127	0,210	0.478***
The police here are good or very good	0,294	0,242	0,692	0,400	-0.0672
The police have improved in the last two years	0,055	0,081	0,179	0,200	-0.0510
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,003	0,136	0,013	0,124	-0.0266
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda	0,007	0,077	0,010	0,095	0.0182
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,881	0,915	0,635	0,892	0.226***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,937	0,934	0,717	0,908	0.204***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,960	0,935	0,710	0,925	0.221***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,910	0,910	0,730	0,932	0.195***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,742	0,802	0,775	0,745	-0.102*
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,575	0,683	0,828	0,948	-0.00729
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,532	0,576	0,779	0,951	0.102**
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,516	0,638	0,890	0,971	-0.0568
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,526	0,618	0,896	0,971	-0.0456
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,451	0,563	0,873	0,961	0.00107
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,558	0,583	0,903	0,971	0.0476
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,442	0,502	0,886	0,968	0.00560
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,614	0,505	0,899	0,948	0.176***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,575	0,518	0,877	0,922	0.0712
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,565	0,498	0,899	0,948	0.113**
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,933	0,935	0,924	0,911	-0.0266

Cluster 29

PNCRT: Puerto Leguizamo (Putumayo)

Control: Santa Rosa (Cauca)

Variable	Cluster 29				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,407	0,325	0,066	0,208	0.223***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,029	0,087	0,403	0,316	-0.146***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,336	0,293	0,951	0,688	-0.186***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,946	0,769	0,770	0,680	0.117**
Productive activities earn very little money	0,863	0,852	0,037	0,030	-0.00167
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,021	0,031	0,008	0,009	-0.0178
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,728	0,736	0,724	0,753	0.0152
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,206	0,433	0,362	0,385	-0.188***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	264775	401266	272737	380520	-29,458
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,469	0,437	0,457	0,372	-0.0556
Have a checking account	0,000	0,030	0,016	0,043	-0.00712
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,016	0,048	0,510	0,342	-0.196***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,185	0,316	0,251	0,294	-0.112*
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,511	0,479	0,770	0,574	-0.0967
Currently have debt	0,510	0,377	0,420	0,377	0.0750
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,224	0,391	0,142	0,224	-0.0758
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,233	0,377	0,062	0,161	-0.0573
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,193	0,156	0,074	0,126	0.0946**
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,066	0,087	0,033	0,048	-0.00517
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,053	0,087	0,016	0,017	-0.0246
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,246	0,368	0,093	0,162	-0.0685
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,498	0,584	0,266	0,366	0.0240

The departmental government runs well or very well	0,156	0,346	0,156	0,266	-0.113*
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,134	0,270	0,057	0,121	-0.0741
The national government runs well or very well	0,373	0,571	0,311	0,360	-0.148**
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,155	0,305	0,105	0,137	-0.124**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (<i>a lot or very much</i>)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,068	0,213	0,038	0,105	-0.0707
The national government	0,198	0,447	0,132	0,123	-0.245***
Justice sector institutions	0,117	0,266	0,066	0,093	-0.116**
Alternative justice institutions	0,161	0,293	0,054	0,079	-0.118**
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,146	0,265	0,058	0,117	-0.0509
Social organizations and NGOs	0,149	0,300	0,091	0,128	-0.0813
Training centers	0,478	0,605	0,478	0,448	-0.183**
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,292	0,368	0,190	0,218	-0.0531
The municipal council	0,156	0,207	0,062	0,108	0.0187
The national police	0,184	0,288	0,135	0,178	-0.0539
The army	0,266	0,565	0,188	0,243	-0.240***
The navy	0,211	0,583	0,050	0,260	-0.170***
The municipal personería	0,299	0,250	0,102	0,204	0.143**
The mayor's office	0,263	0,458	0,076	0,193	-0.0779
The JAC	0,427	0,605	0,218	0,362	-0.0192
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,187	0,166	0,212	0,278	0.133**
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,881	0,944	0,728	0,918	0.143***
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,029	0,039	0,086	0,022	-0.0800
Illegal armed groups	0,162	0,176	0,062	0,017	-0.0895*
Antipersonnel mines	0,029	0,000	0,033	0,000	0.00945
Displacement	0,044	0,039	0,066	0,035	-0.0263
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,039	0,008	0,017	-0.0331
Extortion	0,000	0,078	0,016	0,013	-0.0832***
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,838	0,882	0,350	0,177	-0.197**
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,000	0,016	0,009	-0.00256
Sexual violence	0,015	0,000	0,012	0,026	0.0169
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,720	0,779	0,551	0,788	0.177***

There is police presence	0,831	0,459	0,128	0,372	0.640***
The police here are good or very good	0,309	0,423	0,194	0,341	0.00588
The police have improved in the last two years	0,138	0,183	0,161	0,198	0.0413
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,084	0,040	0,035	0,018	0.0510*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda	0,154	0,111	0,060	0,110	0.102**
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,909	0,869	0,586	0,619	0.0932*
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,905	0,917	0,623	0,635	0.00962
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,917	0,921	0,627	0,635	0.00773
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,871	0,907	0,616	0,658	0.00499
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,724	0,808	0,868	0,775	-0.149**
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,667	0,753	0,889	0,918	-0.0534
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,601	0,723	0,893	0,922	-0.104**
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,597	0,641	0,926	0,944	-0.0206
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,556	0,632	0,922	0,918	-0.0735
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,502	0,429	0,885	0,879	0.0682
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,506	0,541	0,889	0,896	-0.0315
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,490	0,416	0,897	0,870	0.0277
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,502	0,329	0,909	0,892	0.132**
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,502	0,576	0,905	0,948	-0.00994
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,535	0,610	0,881	0,874	-0.102*
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,909	0,908	0,899	0,944	0.0383

Cluster 30

PNCRT: Puerto Asís (Putumayo)

Control: Puerto Concordia (Meta)

Variable	Cluster 30				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,314	0,422	0,127	0,108	-0.113**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,065	0,060	0,339	0,347	0.00782
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,355	0,331	0,780	0,785	0.0276
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,905	0,880	0,737	0,669	-0.0272
Productive activities earn very little money	0,814	0,825	0,102	0,135	0.0256
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,100	0,084	0,030	0,004	-0.0141
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,695	0,813	0,640	0,789	0.0326
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,254	0,371	0,284	0,363	-0.0471
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	387252	303717	403835	377251	56,336*
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,453	0,434	0,538	0,319	-0.228***
Have a checking account	0,021	0,012	0,068	0,024	-0.0354
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,208	0,084	0,144	0,171	0.157***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,347	0,259	0,335	0,382	0.158**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,695	0,508	0,671	0,781	0.245**
Currently have debt	0,691	0,394	0,479	0,450	0.252***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,330	0,251	0,197	0,085	-0.0351
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,246	0,362	0,153	0,123	-0.143**
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,068	0,187	0,110	0,036	-0.189***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,102	0,032	0,038	0,024	0.0579**
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,076	0,024	0,030	0,020	0.0386
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,307	0,306	0,163	0,061	-0.0891*
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,470	0,624	0,392	0,388	-0.124*

The departmental government runs well or very well	0,395	0,264	0,487	0,187	-0.176***
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,200	0,259	0,251	0,145	-0.186***
The national government runs well or very well	0,341	0,444	0,343	0,265	-0.185***
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,164	0,266	0,187	0,168	-0.129**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (<i>a lot or very much</i>)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,240	0,197	0,268	0,082	-0.153***
The national government	0,242	0,310	0,227	0,085	-0.204***
Justice sector institutions	0,194	0,148	0,205	0,076	-0.0729
Alternative justice institutions	0,218	0,237	0,189	0,044	-0.150***
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,214	0,167	0,222	0,036	-0.131**
Social organizations and NGOs	0,146	0,208	0,223	0,071	-0.229***
Training centers	0,518	0,622	0,620	0,513	-0.185***
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,250	0,266	0,330	0,145	-0.174***
The municipal council	0,221	0,119	0,188	0,076	-0.00311
The national police	0,230	0,184	0,246	0,091	-0.106**
The army	0,425	0,363	0,424	0,160	-0.177***
The navy	0,282	0,333	0,330	0,126	-0.251***
The municipal personería	0,254	0,168	0,270	0,075	-0.0946*
The mayor's office	0,320	0,310	0,218	0,078	-0.128**
The JAC	0,426	0,687	0,454	0,419	-0.275***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,358	0,185	0,378	0,251	0.0539
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,856	0,924	0,822	0,888	0.0206
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,092	0,157	0,140	0,088	-0.115**
Illegal armed groups	0,796	0,169	0,144	0,064	0.546***
Antipersonnel mines	0,173	0,145	0,004	0,052	0.0733*
Displacement	0,051	0,096	0,051	0,072	-0.0183
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,024	0,008	0,020	-0.0146
Extortion	0,102	0,012	0,064	0,040	0.0801**
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,418	0,759	0,246	0,151	-0.445***
Forced recruitment	0,041	0,000	0,013	0,004	0.0328
Sexual violence	0,010	0,000	0,008	0,004	0.000949
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,585	0,669	0,593	0,749	0.0789

There is police presence	0,288	0,458	0,186	0,032	-0.352***
The police here are good or very good	0,368	0,155	0,357	0,375	0.272
The police have improved in the last two years	0,281	0,175	0,275	0,250	0.0982
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,244	0,442	0,145	0,412	0.102*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda	0,030	0,012	0,009	0,012	0.0228
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,885	0,766	0,884	0,660	-0.109**
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,828	0,780	0,775	0,595	-0.117**
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,902	0,780	0,809	0,580	-0.105*
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,848	0,720	0,797	0,602	-0.0823
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,783	0,711	0,828	0,742	0.0109
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,797	0,657	0,932	0,857	0.0318
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,708	0,578	0,881	0,837	0.0795
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,767	0,550	0,945	0,869	0.139***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,682	0,534	0,932	0,904	0.130**
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,585	0,422	0,890	0,869	0.126**
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,661	0,486	0,886	0,892	0.172***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,674	0,482	0,924	0,873	0.129**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,695	0,562	0,936	0,880	0.0846
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,636	0,562	0,894	0,888	0.0790
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,644	0,562	0,903	0,876	0.0480
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,783	0,903	0,888	0,903	-0.0934*

Cluster 3 I

PNCRT: Valle de Guamuez (Putumayo)

Control: Algeciras (Huila)

Variable	Cluster 3 I				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,183	0,522	0,183	0,061	-0.459***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,054	0,061	0,171	0,298	0.124***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,210	0,322	0,554	0,865	0.248***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,741	0,951	0,638	0,637	-0.195***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,933	0,873	0,013	0,065	0.108***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,098	0,086	0,000	0,008	0.0116
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,746	0,906	0,592	0,865	0.156***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,117	0,327	0,242	0,355	-0.0961*
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	437900	291020	444146	298204	-3,569
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,638	0,588	0,467	0,424	0.00337
Have a checking account	0,054	0,020	0,071	0,033	0.000157
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,600	0,310	0,483	0,482	0.258***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,604	0,343	0,613	0,408	0.0678
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,814	0,714	0,905	0,750	-0.0566
Currently have debt	0,846	0,608	0,733	0,478	-0.00955
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,295	0,406	0,288	0,160	-0.252***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,267	0,452	0,056	0,097	-0.145***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,146	0,118	0,213	0,094	-0.0965**
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,088	0,090	0,058	0,053	-0.0216
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,021	0,049	0,004	0,029	-0.0159
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,223	0,363	0,152	0,116	-0.193***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,397	0,536	0,613	0,391	-0.360***

The departmental government runs well or very well	0,344	0,378	0,281	0,237	-0.0502
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,156	0,411	0,046	0,094	-0.187***
The national government runs well or very well	0,470	0,444	0,277	0,435	0.174**
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,251	0,471	0,063	0,262	-0.0117
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (<i>a lot or very much</i>)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,132	0,199	0,054	0,082	-0.0308
The national government	0,227	0,217	0,067	0,178	0.126**
Justice sector institutions	0,100	0,096	0,032	0,057	0.0547
Alternative justice institutions	0,273	0,147	0,046	0,054	0.140***
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,292	0,193	0,106	0,066	0.0704
Social organizations and NGOs	0,104	0,151	0,054	0,053	-0.0474
Training centers	0,433	0,548	0,480	0,418	-0.140**
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,175	0,277	0,110	0,109	-0.101*
The municipal council	0,131	0,263	0,109	0,097	-0.114**
The national police	0,097	0,137	0,127	0,063	-0.0952**
The army	0,236	0,212	0,269	0,138	-0.112**
The navy	0,111	0,195	0,077	0,113	-0.0319
The municipal personería	0,218	0,257	0,092	0,105	-0.0165
The mayor's office	0,222	0,388	0,127	0,071	-0.228***
The JAC	0,435	0,587	0,536	0,326	-0.339***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,366	0,295	0,172	0,467	0.362***
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,867	0,861	0,725	0,833	0.126**
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,135	0,218	0,008	0,053	-0.00907
Illegal armed groups	0,191	0,613	0,133	0,180	-0.370***
Antipersonnel mines	0,416	0,266	0,050	0,114	0.201***
Displacement	0,191	0,242	0,025	0,143	0.0440
Forced disappearances	0,022	0,008	0,008	0,016	0.0130
Extortion	0,112	0,032	0,025	0,106	0.146***
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,404	0,508	0,283	0,237	-0.105
Forced recruitment	0,034	0,000	0,004	0,004	0.0383**
Sexual violence	0,011	0,000	0,008	0,012	0.0180
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,629	0,494	0,658	0,482	-0.0470

There is police presence	0,146	0,453	0,033	0,216	-0.156***
The police here are good or very good	0,235	0,225	0,714	0,269	-0.487**
The police have improved in the last two years	0,059	0,149	0,286	0,226	-0.176
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,000	0,296	0,008	0,272	-0.0446
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda	0,000	0,004	0,004	0,057	0.0480***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,962	0,879	0,538	0,700	0.226***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,966	0,896	0,587	0,679	0.148***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,991	0,876	0,642	0,688	0.153***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,974	0,888	0,636	0,643	0.0788
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,928	0,900	0,845	0,833	0.0621
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,846	0,910	0,850	0,910	0.0160
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,804	0,820	0,854	0,910	0.0511
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,829	0,890	0,917	0,927	-0.0247
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,825	0,853	0,875	0,922	0.0276
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,700	0,816	0,829	0,894	-0.0588
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,742	0,849	0,838	0,922	-0.0181
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,742	0,788	0,846	0,914	0.0417
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,796	0,898	0,850	0,918	-0.0268
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,646	0,841	0,867	0,922	-0.147***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,713	0,914	0,888	0,935	-0.161***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,955	0,886	0,951	0,898	0.0320

Cluster 32

PNCRT: San Miguel (Putumayo)

Control: Florencia (Caquetá)

Variable	Cluster 32				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,278	0,551	0,124	0,070	-0.337***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,040	0,037	0,316	0,218	-0.0696
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,241	0,326	0,739	0,872	0.0447
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,848	0,959	0,709	0,700	-0.112**
Productive activities earn very little money	0,826	0,876	0,064	0,091	-0.0247
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,009	0,161	0,000	0,004	-0.146***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,615	0,934	0,684	0,823	-0.162***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,282	0,230	0,363	0,309	0.00212
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	420247	245872	366154	386601	182,462***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Have a savings account	0,568	0,638	0,419	0,424	-0.0456
Have a checking account	0,034	0,021	0,047	0,062	0.0216
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,402	0,247	0,466	0,436	0.125**
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,496	0,284	0,385	0,317	0.158**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,655	0,623	0,833	0,701	-0.0630
Currently have debt	0,573	0,481	0,517	0,416	0.0385
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,131	0,139	0,071	0,092	0.0129
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,131	0,250	0,009	0,088	-0.0483
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,162	0,119	0,073	0,115	0.0851*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,021	0,058	0,004	0,025	-0.0189
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,017	0,037	0,000	0,016	-0.00154
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,122	0,157	0,048	0,071	-0.00761
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,552	0,496	0,526	0,329	-0.163**

The departmental government runs well or very well	0,171	0,200	0,107	0,189	0.0814
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,161	0,194	0,014	0,099	0.0734
The national government runs well or very well	0,466	0,295	0,251	0,341	0.285***
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,193	0,377	0,064	0,175	-0.0727
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (<i>a lot or very much</i>)	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
The departmental government	0,205	0,079	0,056	0,095	0.189***
The national government	0,447	0,186	0,073	0,110	0.320***
Justice sector institutions	0,183	0,085	0,052	0,060	0.121***
Alternative justice institutions	0,268	0,069	0,066	0,044	0.192***
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,269	0,158	0,113	0,044	0.0534
Social organizations and NGOs	0,289	0,043	0,127	0,036	0.193***
Training centers	0,722	0,518	0,514	0,307	-0.0104
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,413	0,141	0,193	0,110	0.213***
The municipal council	0,104	0,098	0,122	0,071	-0.0347
The national police	0,288	0,042	0,176	0,046	0.121***
The army	0,543	0,104	0,341	0,105	0.209***
The navy	0,549	0,059	0,198	0,065	0.355***
The municipal personería	0,231	0,171	0,107	0,073	0.0392
The mayor's office	0,150	0,151	0,108	0,055	-0.0460
The JAC	0,496	0,488	0,586	0,275	-0.299***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,211	0,236	0,129	0,339	0.207***
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,962	0,856	0,726	0,798	0.170***
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,000	0,209	0,017	0,074	-0.136***
Illegal armed groups	0,019	0,500	0,077	0,284	-0.262***
Antipersonnel mines	0,010	0,547	0,013	0,263	-0.303***
Displacement	0,019	0,176	0,013	0,226	0.0595
Forced disappearances	0,010	0,041	0,009	0,045	0.00416
Extortion	0,010	0,061	0,017	0,074	0.0184
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,981	0,466	0,312	0,206	0.434***
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,007	0,004	0,016	0.00238
Sexual violence	0,000	0,000	0,009	0,016	0.00755
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,560	0,391	0,654	0,387	-0.116*

There is police presence	0,453	0,469	0,141	0,169	0.0155
The police here are good or very good	0,412	0,051	0,182	0,205	0.399***
The police have improved in the last two years	0,225	0,052	0,030	0,100	0.258***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,027	0,487	0,022	0,577	0.0996*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda	0,000	0,004	0,000	0,025	0.0189*
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,910	0,786	0,536	0,564	0.150**
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,906	0,759	0,619	0,591	0.123**
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,918	0,868	0,679	0,668	0.0405
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,883	0,792	0,723	0,621	0.0106
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	PNCRT	Control	PNCRT	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,841	0,895	0,740	0,764	-0.0443
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,791	0,790	0,889	0,914	0.0206
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,731	0,737	0,838	0,860	0.0185
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,658	0,831	0,940	0,922	-0.185***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,684	0,679	0,936	0,905	-0.0345
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,410	0,646	0,885	0,909	-0.207***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,517	0,708	0,876	0,918	-0.152***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,530	0,626	0,885	0,868	-0.100*
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,650	0,811	0,906	0,901	-0.147***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,615	0,671	0,944	0,897	-0.0907*
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,538	0,728	0,923	0,938	-0.169***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,876	0,925	0,963	0,919	-0.0881**

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