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EVALUATION

Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

Regional Report, North Region

October 2016

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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

REGIONAL REPORT, NORTH REGION

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ACRONYMS

ARD	Associates for Rural Development
BACRIM	Criminal bands, Bandas Criminales (in the service of the narcotics trade)
CAR	Regional Autonomous Corporations, Corporaciones Regionales Autónomas
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CELI	Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
CELI Central	CELI program in the Central region
CELI MdM	CELI program in the Montes de María region
CELI Norte/Sur	CELI program in the North and South regions
CERAC	Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos
CNC	National Consulting Center, Centro Nacional de Consultoría
CNC-DoD	Crime and Narcotics Center, U.S. Department of Defense
CSDI	Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DNP	National Planning Department, Departamento Nacional de Planeación
DO	Development objective
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DPS	Department for Social Prosperity, Departamento para la Prosperidad Social
ELN	National Liberation Army, Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EVIDINCE	Research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FHH	Female head of household
GLAC	Local savings and loans groups, grupos locales de ahorros y crédito
GOC	Government of Colombia
HH	Household
IAG	Illegal Armed Group
IC	Illicit crops
ICO	Index of Organizational Competencies, Índice de competencias organizacionales
IDI	Integral Performance Index, Índice de desempeño integral
INCODER	Colombian Institute of Rural Development, Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural
JAC	Community Action Council, Junta de Acción Comunal
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MADR	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural

MdM	Montes de María
MHH	Male head of household
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc.
PAR	Regional Action Plan, Plan de acción regional
PMP	Performance management plan
PNCRT	National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy, Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial
SENA	National Learning Service, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SGP	General Participation System, Sistema General de Participación
SIJIN	Judicial police, Seccional de Investigación Judicial
SIMCI	Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos
SISBEN	Identification and Classification system for potential social program Beneficiaries, Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de potenciales Beneficiarios para programas sociales
TA	Technical Assistance
UACT	Territorial Consolidation Administrative Unit, Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial
UARIV	Victims' Integral Attention and Reparation Unit, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas
UMATA	Municipal Agricultural Extension Units, Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
URT	Land Restitution Unit, Unidad de Restitución de Tierras
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEO	Verification of Organizational Status, Valorización del Estado <i>Organizacional</i>

ABSTRACT

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

The evaluation team conducted 4,282 household surveys in the North region, including the 15 treatment municipalities of Valencia, Tierralta, Puerto Libertador, San José de Uré and Montelíbano in Córdoba and Anorí, Ituango, Briceño, Valdivia, Tarazá, Cáceres, Caucasia, Nechí, El Bagre and Zaragoza in Antioquia.

Economic Development

Perceptions of the economic situation in CELI municipalities has worsened. Beneficiaries continued to perceive that productive activities earned little money and that one of the only attractive productive options is that of illicit crops. However, CELI beneficiaries are less likely than the general population to say they are experiencing extreme poverty and they have a more positive outlook on future employment and job opportunities.

Credit use has fallen in both CELI and control zones, but respondents say that financial support has fulfilled a vital function for the development of savings and credit. In addition, the population recognizes the direct benefit of CELI interventions in tertiary roads and local level users, associations and Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs) have taken ownership of road projects. Advances in land titling and restitution in CELI municipalities continue to be limited in the face of the huge scale of land issues and the limitations of relevant state apparatus.

Institutional Development

More respondents voted in the last presidential election (from 76% to 87%) and fewer said someone they knew received money or gifts to vote (from 20% to 16%). However, circumstances have reduced citizens' overall trust in government since baseline. This is also the case in control municipalities. In addition, respondents cite problems with the municipal administration, including lack of public services and perceptions of corruption. However, CELI and control respondents were optimistic about the future of service delivery, government capacity, and economic growth.

Social Development

Respondents revealed negative expectations for the future about their trust of others in their communities, with most saying they saw those relationships worsening in the future. CELI North assisted numerous JACs across its municipalities in strengthening organizational capacity, helping them work with higher levels of government, and developing plans that represent constituent goals. JACs play a central role in providing access to state services. In remote *veredas*, they are key spaces for dispute resolution. Both victims' associations and women's organizations are growing, doubling since baseline.

Security

Perceptions of security in CELI North *veredas* and *corregimientos* have worsened since baseline. Respondents reported slight improvements in security quality but dramatic declines in police and military presence. Data also show an increase in illicit crops in the region, from 10% at baseline to 14.4% at midline.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics International, has worked through the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, ARD Tetra Tech, implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (Mdm) project. This volume reports on achievements and impacts to date in CELI Norte/Sur's North region.

Evaluation purpose

In 2011 USAID/Colombia's evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., designed an impact evaluation of the CSDI interventions. The design included two more measurements: midline and final. EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), carried out the midline. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline design, additional qualitative fieldwork, in-depth interviews with the CELI teams, and program satisfaction questions. Key audiences for the evaluation are the USAID/Colombia Mission Program and Technical Offices, who will use the results to plan follow-on programming.

Three guiding principles were set for uses of the evaluation, as follows:

1. *Measure the change in impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with target populations.*
2. *Inform decision-making processes with timely data, to identify components needing strengthening to achieve program goals.*
3. *Identify best practices and lessons learned to date, to inform future USAID programming.*

Project background

Based on the GOC's National Consolidation Plan and formalized in the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT in its Spanish acronym), the concept of "consolidation" refers to the expansion in the conflict zones of Colombia of the legitimate presence of the State. The policy, designed for implementation once minimal conditions for public safety were established, would create the necessary institutional mechanisms to provide basic human rights protections to the populations in those zones historically affected by conflict and illicit crops. The PNCRT was oriented to establishing the presence of State institutions capable of efficiently bringing necessary public goods needed for development.

The U.S. Embassy developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and, at the reduction of illicit crops and the presence of illegal armed groups in the conflict zones. The basic premise of the CELIs, one component of CSDI, is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of the State, and their activities are oriented to bolstering state institutions, generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life.

Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: *Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated*, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation–strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS FOR 2014-2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

Obviously, the CELIs are no substitute for the State. They were called upon to provide support to the PNCRT. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice services in the consolidation zones is a sine qua non condition for enabling the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation.

Evaluation questions, design, methods and limitations

The midterm evaluation took place in 32 CELI municipalities as well as in 16 municipalities from three regions (Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle and Putumayo) in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities. The midline, structured around the baseline completed by DevTech, examined changes since the baseline was completed across the institutional, social and economic indicators related to the interventions.

Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target population in the areas of interventions?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
3. Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities? ¹	IR 3.2
4. What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)	Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?	IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities?	Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
8. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

EVAl, working with its strategic partner the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), used a mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of the CELI interventions. The design closely followed the baseline, with additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, opinions and experiences of the population. Full design considerations are found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Limitations to the study are various and important to consider fully. There are limitations based on the design, such as the difficult and imperfect process of matching municipalities in a country which has an important history of isolation and variation among regions. The original design has also been deeply affected by the loss of the whole-of-government intervention, in which impact goals and indicators were set at a very high level, but the implementation has been far more limited than promised. Exogenous factors (such as the drop in world oil prices) and variations in implementation also condition the interpretation of the data. Please see the Limitations section of this volume as well as the methodology annex (Annex 3) to the main report for full details.

¹ This is answered in Annex 6 of the main report with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.

Findings and conclusions

How to read the findings and conclusions


This summary, like the report that follows, shares two key types of data: *trends* and *impacts*. Trends show the change over time in CELI municipalities, while impacts compare the change to control municipalities.

Details of trends and impacts are presented in the report at the *cluster* level: individual municipalities or small groups that are geographically and socioeconomically similar. The details often tell a very different story than at the regional level, so consult those for more local-level information on conditions, what works, and what has not.

We use the abbreviations FHH and MHH for female- and male-headed households, respectively. These two types of households are marked by important differences and generally greater vulnerability on the part of FHHs. Note these details for use in future planning to better reach all types of families.

The implementer of CELI North/South provided information of its achievements reached through June 30, 2016 compared with the goals established in its Project Management Plan (PMP), which includes such indicators as the number of organizations and governmental offices that have received support from the project, the level of product sales resulting from the project, and funds that have been leveraged. CELI North/South met or exceeded the majority of its indicators across three pillars, as of June 30, 2016: economic, social and institutional. Their compliance was highest among social and economic indicators. The latter are also the most numerous of the indicators for which the CELI was responsible. Additional indicators may be met before program close. The following figure presents a summary of their indicator achievement.

Figure 1.2. CELI North-South PMP indicator compliance



Economic Development

Based on the information gathered, the perception of the economic situation in CELI municipalities has worsened, but the trend is the same in control municipalities and certainly relates to factors out of reach for any intervention and that constitutes a structural poverty trap. Despite the difficulties in all of the consolidation zones, it is not uncommon to find communities' positive values with respect to their regions. This is an indication of the ownership inhabitants feel with respect to their territories and productive projects. They also demonstrate rejection of illicit activities in favor of a culture of legality.

We've been working with USAID for seven years now, producing cacao. We now sell to Luker chocolates. We've been involved through the whole trajectory: new plantings, amplification, quality improvements, and selling our cacao. Now we're working on the transformation part, with new machinery. (Productive association leader, Cáceres, CELI)

Direct CELI beneficiaries provide important, if mixed, exceptions to this negative perception. Compared to baseline, direct beneficiaries in the Norte region are around 4pp less² likely than the general population to say they are experiencing extreme poverty. CELI Norte direct beneficiaries had positive or neutral opinions of economic challenges in their regions. There was a 4pp positive impact on their perceptions of unemployment and lack of opportunity. Yet they continued to perceive that productive activities earned little money and that one of the only attractive productive options is that of illicit crops. The figures are not conclusive, and there is great variation among clusters for the measures of perceptions of the economic situation and food security. However, where views are more positive among direct beneficiaries, female-headed households form an important part of this optimism.

Women entrepreneurs were a large part of the CELI N/S focus, as well, with many participants taking on leadership roles within their communities and producer associations. In the North region, this was especially true with rubber and cacao in Antioquia and Cordoba. More than half of CELI N/S-supported beneficiaries are women, or approximately 45,000, with 3,500 of these women-headed households.³

We've worked closely with Colombia Responde and the Antioquia government: logistical support, equipment, trainings. Their support for our empowerment and sustainable development has been very good: the interest they've taken in us, in the whole region. (Producer, Cauca)

Food security is not guaranteed for households in CELI municipalities in the North region – a circumstance that has worsened since baseline. Control households were similar on these variables. As such, this appears to be a regional trend, rather than something attributable to any intervention. This report

² The data for direct CELI beneficiaries come from three different sub-samples, and therefore are presented as an approximate average impact. Please see the Limitations subsection of the Evaluation Design chapter on how direct beneficiaries are defined.

³ CELI N/S International Women's Day flyer, undated.


describes the great variation by cluster in these figures.

Support to producer associations

CELI support strengthens value that will mature in the medium or long term. The goal was to create long-term value that helps producers provide for themselves through their productive projects. The activities oblige beneficiaries to work with a long-term perspective, with all the costs and sacrifices that this implies. Respondents did however express concerns that they are currently experiencing short- and medium-term food insecurity.

Respondents reported associating more at midline than at baseline, in very strong trends:

Figure 1.3. Trends in reasons to associate for productive project activities



Gains are consistent across these activities and the magnitude is often double or more from the baseline responses. In the case of processing products and that of selling products, the gain is equal to 11pp of positive impact in CELI North areas, compared to control zones. For buying inputs, and for processing, selling, and transporting products, nearly all the gain from baseline to midline comes from homes with female heads of household (FHHs).

TA and marketing support help counteract low profitability, and respondents report that those problems are diminishing for their productive projects. However, trading requires markets with enough buyers and sellers and prices that are higher than production costs. The lack of access to wider markets in and outside the consolidation zones seriously hampers the tasks of the CELI and of the GoC.

They could give us all the crops you want, but if we don't have anywhere to sell them, what can we do? There is a big gap as far as this goes. (Producer, Cauca)

Credit, savings and financial services

Credit use has fallen in both CELI and control zones, but respondents say that financial support has fulfilled a vital function for the development of savings and credit. Revolving savings and credit funds have served as important instruments to support capitalization in rural areas, and provide an alternative to informal and predatory lending. Throughout project life cycle, more than 20,000 men and women have been mobilized in the 16 target municipalities to participate in Local

We have a revolving fund of around 60 million pesos. We take out the inputs and there is a small profit margin, allowing our resources to grow. So it has helped consolidation, especially organizational. (Producer association leader, Antioquia)

Savings and Credit Groups (GLACs in their Spanish acronym) in an effort to reduce poverty sponsored by the Banca de las Oportunidades. A 2013 case study on the growth of these schemes in Bajo Cauca showed how the *veredas* used the shared resources to address community needs such as buildings, pedestrian bridges or ventures such as drugstores or bakeries.⁴ Some 71% of GLAC participants are women, an important part of the intervention being directed toward them and a large number of women taking advantage of the schemes to improve their situations.⁵

Roads

The data show negative perceptions and experiences in terms of the quality of roads, with slight improvement since baseline. Local market deficiencies are tightly related to road conditions. The productive projects can attempt to break poverty traps, but the lack of roads reinforces the traps. It is clear that the task of the CELI is complementary to government actions, not a substitute. The population recognizes the direct benefit of CELI interventions in tertiary roads. Local level users, associations and JACs have taken ownership of roads projects.

Land tenancy

CELI N/S sponsored a local land titling office in alliance with the mayor's office in El Bagre; helped the URT in Valdivia to process 627 cases in the Register of Confiscated and Abandoned Land; and supported the updating of the property register and the establishment of a land committee to supervise the formalization and regulation of property titles. However, advances in titling and restitution in CELI municipalities continue to be

There have been no rural formalization processes, not proper campaigns, just individual cases. The Superintendent of the Notary announced a program with INCODER and nothing happened. (Government Secretary, Cauca)

limited in the face of the huge scale of land issues and the limitations of relevant state apparatus. Legalizing the rights acquired through succession or the land market remains a priority; such lands represent up to 86% in CELI and 96% in control municipalities, indicating that even where access is not a severe problem, formalization continues to be.

The evaluation team recommends *(for full details, please see the report)*

1. ***Make simultaneous improvements in production and trade.*** Quality, stable production gives better results when directed at adequate markets. This must be one of the most important concerns for post-conflict policies. International cooperation should lead small focused pilots that treat these interconnected structural failings holistically.

⁴ Transforming Lives: Rapidly Growing Community Banking Initiative Is About Much More Than Money

⁵ From conversations and email with Deputy Chief of Party of the CELI on the importance of women's involvement in the GLACs.

2. **Support an array of markets, actors and efforts.** Support projects in local and regional export markets. Intermediaries fulfill an economic function that would be difficult to replace, but of course cannot be monopsonistic.
3. **Plan for interim food security.** Provide traditional farm or other activities so as to combine short- to long-term returns, increase cash flow and ensure project sustainability.
4. **Reach FHH with interventions that work.** Benefits have differed for FHH and MHH, who learn and use their learning in different ways. Develop models that reflect this and provide services to take advantage of the characteristics and behavior of each.
5. **Maintain activities to expand financial services.** Revolving funds are a suitable instrument to deal with the communities' borrowing needs but they must be conditioned on the creation of collective savings and credit funds with strong governance principles.
6. **Use community models for the improvement of tertiary roads.** Reinforce the successful work with the JACs to create a community-based participatory model for the management of Colombia's tertiary road network, taking into account both international experience and the national context. Environmental impact must be assessed to minimize direct or indirect environmental risks or to design appropriate environmental protection models. It is equally important to develop adequate environmental plans for existing roads that require maintenance.
7. **Land restitution processes must be improved** to guarantee sound decision-making concerning the restitution and legalization of lands. Priority should be given to new relationships with national-level agencies in charge of land restitution, particularly those responsible for the functions of the defunct INCODER (e.g., the Rural Development Agency and National Land Agency). The Land Restitution Unit should also continue its work of strengthening institutions.

Institutional Development

Participation

Rural citizens valued the two most recent presidential elections, which focused on the end of the conflict. More respondents voted in the last presidential election (from 76% to 87%) and fewer said someone they knew received money or gifts to vote (from 20% to 16%, with 4pp positive impact.) Women's and victims' groups show increased participation and organizational savvy. There is a high level of acceptance of formal democratic channels, but more work can be done. The survey's participation index stayed about the same, 36 of 100 points, but bested control municipalities, for a 3.5 pp significant impact: citizens participated more in a CELI municipality.

More people are running. I have 200 people running for 15 Council seats. People have become motivated, people who work with the community and never would have run before. Of course, the ones with power don't want to give it up, but that's where we are. (Victims' association, Montelíbano, CELI)


Accountability

The CELI intervened to ensure that communities' needs are included in municipal development plans, and supported local government accountability. CELI actions gave citizens confidence that their petitions were heard. Unsuccessful petitions erode citizens' trust in government management and transparency: CELI interventions have been important for citizens' confidence in government.

However, accountability is still an emerging practice. The survey's index showed a seven-point drop from baseline to midline. There are examples of local governments not creating spaces for accountability and not inviting citizen input. North region CELI respondents were slightly more likely to participate in *veedurías* at midline, but those were still only 2% of respondents. However, there was an important improvement in the quality of participation: from 18% at baseline to 52% at midline said they participated in decision-making. Focus group respondents in Montelíbano cited the value of the CELI training they received, but lamented that the community had not made the activity long-term, because of transport and opportunity costs.

Among the problems respondents cite with municipal administration, there is progress in terms of public services and perceptions of corruption. Still, half of the North region said their municipality pays no attention to community requests.

Figure 1.4. Trends in perceptions of problems associated with municipal administration



Trust in institutions has declined across the board


In general, circumstances have worsened citizens' overall trust in government since baseline, creating an even worse environment than when the CELIs began. This is also the case in control municipalities, and the severity of the data suggests the election sloganeering may have contributed to very strong negative results for trust in the army, justice services, national government, departmental government, municipalities, the JACs, *personería*, and support bodies, such as the national training institutes. Still, in CELI zones, the *personería's* support rating lost less ground than in control zones, and qualitative evidence supports important strides with this key institution. The stagnant perceptions should be taken as a sign of the failure of the policies implemented to consolidate these regions.

We've benefited from Consolidation but I think it's the Colombia Responde team that made the difference. We meet with victims' association on nights and weekends so that many can come. It's like our extension service: they're getting trained, they're learning the laws. This helps us a lot to meet the protocol for attention to victims. (Personería, Cauca)

Service delivery

Perceptions of social services are stagnant, particularly on quality, contributing to the poverty trap discussed in the report. The capacity index based on survey data of citizen experiences and perceptions in the CELI North region saw an overall decline of 16%, or from 43 to 36 points. The figure shows its components and total score.

Figure 1.5. Trends in the government capacity index (points out of 100)



Negative findings aside, the CELI and control respondents were overwhelmingly optimistic about the future of service delivery, government capacity, and economic growth. This was true across geographic clusters, and quite robust: from positive expectations in the 60% range at baseline, the responses were near or over 90% at midline. It is quite possible the peace process gives these rural respondents hope for the future that they did not have before.

The evaluation team recommends (for full details, please see the report)


- 1. Continue to strengthen political participation through social organizations.** Strengthen citizens' knowledge of the channels of political participation and influence in public administration. Direct significant attention to women and youth organizations
- 2. Strengthen accountability.** Strengthen the ongoing practice of educating for accountability to improve public policy orientation, gain citizen trust and provide management oversight.
- 3. Strengthen citizen consultation and participation supply and demand.** Renew focus on consultation exercises and citizen participation. Strengthen the exercise of citizenship on one side, and on the other, intervene rigorously with local government institutions in the same capabilities the citizens are being trained to expect.
- 4. Continue to work with municipalities to improve service delivery, and involve citizens in oversight activities.** Focus on pilot-size activities with significant civil society involvement, and scaffold the local governments with consistent TA. Use scorecards to involve citizens in rating changes.

Social Development

The social capital index

The survey data shows a decline in trust between peers and neighbors, but greater participation in organizations. Focus group respondents showed higher levels of participation and much more positive opinions – but these are active participants and so they are more likely to perceive and take part in the construction of social fabric.

Figure 1.6. Trends in perceptions of trust between peers



Respondents revealed negative expectations for the future about their trust of others in their communities. Most said they saw those relationships worsening in the future. Interviews and focus groups told a more positive story, as these respondents were chosen not at random but to represent an array of active, participatory community members. As such, their responses demonstrate the value of participation in terms of creating social fabric and developing positive perceptions of government actions to involve the community. Survey respondents participated more in various types of associations, and more often did so at the decision-making level. During site visits, the research team found a range of organizations (producers, women, victims, youth, displaced persons, etc.) so the community is interested in associating for social and economic reasons.

For me the most important thing in all these projects is that they taught us to work as a team and to be united, because before, we weren't. I think this is the most important foundation for us to be able to continue and move forward as a community. (Producer, Caucasia)

Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs)

The CELI assisted numerous JACs across its municipalities in strengthening organizational capacity, helping them work with higher levels of government, and developing plans that represent constituent goals. The training and guidance provided by the CELI empowered JACs to enter into legal agreements for carrying out local community infrastructure projects. In the North region, the CELI made infrastructure grants to JACs throughout Bajo Cauca. Dozens of JACs have also taken on responsibility for managing and fulfilling the contractual terms of direct grants, providing these civic

The JAC has the Conciliation Committee. So we've never had to go tell someone in our community to do something or not do something. Everyone in the community has the right to dialogue and a resolution through the JAC. We've never had a serious problem, then, between families, we've never arrived at those extremes. (Citizen, Caucasia)


organizations with important experience in community management and infrastructure construction and maintenance.

Where security has allowed, and where the JACs have the confidence of the population, these organizations play a central role in providing access to state services: political participation, infrastructure improvements and social control. In remote *veredas* the JACs are key spaces for dispute resolution. This local resource resolves minor social conflicts at the *vereda* level, without the need to take cases to municipal or national bodies.

Reasons to associate

Among the most important incentives for forming associations are processing, transport, sales, and soliciting credit. Results were significant for CELI interventions and above all among FHHs. People continue to take part in associations but are now also involved in decision-making at higher levels than in control municipalities.

Figure 1.7. Trends in reasons for deciding to associate



The social capital constructed by the work of victims’ associations has fomented a sense of belonging and helped identify resources. CELI worked to support the implementation of

- *With Colombia Responde we’ve learned transparent processes, merit-based participation instead of picking friends, having an interdisciplinary committee with representation from the administration, from Consolidation, from Colombia Responde, and from our organization and the community.*
- *And how to make consensual decisions from our opinions, and we choose how we’ll staff ourselves, how we’ll make purchases. The projects have committees: operational and oversight. Having an oversight committee is really important because we’re bringing in the community so they can see how we’re executing resources.*
- *Now we have experience to say, yes, we can execute resources. This is an incalculable value and it means recognition for the organization. (Women’s organization respondents, Cauca)*

Law 1448 on victims and land restitution, concretely in the strengthening of municipal *personerías*. The associations enabled women, victims and others to generate income, create solidarity with others and build roots in the territories that received them. The CELI has particularly emphasized strengthening existing women’s organizations in the region, supporting one of the organization’s own projects, or proposing new projects.

The survey data show that victims’ associations are growing, doubling since baseline, as did participation in women’s organizations, from 3% at baseline to 8% at midline. More reported being active in decision-making (from 12% to 32% of North region respondents).


The evaluation team recommends *(for full details, please see the report)*

1. **Adapt programs to encourage trust.** Strengthen community ties to local government. Trust is outside the control of any program, but develop tools to confront the problem.
2. **Improve work with FHHs using participatory models.** Extend the positive results obtained for MHHs to FHHs, respective of their particular vulnerability and their associativity. Strong participants could guide other women to become involved.
3. **Support JACs' legitimacy.** Train in-board election processes and inclusive community participation tools to counteract legitimacy threats. Monitor JAC quality formally, and make results public. Mayors' offices should be involved in targeted programs.
4. **Make organizations more transparent.** Use a refined capacity tool to monitor and rank associations, with incentives for high rankers, and local authorities' involvement.

Security

In the North region, according to the evaluation survey, perceptions of security in the *vereda* or *corregimiento* have worsened since baseline, but even so, respondents there remain likely to recommend that a family member return to the area.

Figure 1.8. Trends in perceptions of security



Cluster results differ greatly, indicating that security gains are likely localized, and not stabilized, according to some respondents. A municipal functionary in Montelíbano feared that continuing armed actor presence might begin the cycle again.

Respondents in the North region municipalities reported slight improvements in quality, but dramatic declines in presence of the police and of the military. This was true across clusters. Evidence from the survey also shows an increase in illicit crops in the region, from 10% at baseline to 14.4% at midline.

The peace process

Respondents in the North region gave us their opinions on the peace process and the post-conflict future. Fear and insecurity continue to be part of the discussion as agreements are

We foresee, based on the information we have, that these people are going to be displaced again because these people on the margins of the law are still present, putting pressure along their routes and spaces. We hope it doesn't happen. (Secretary Int. Montelíbano)

We're worried about post-conflict because these guerrillas are coming out. We hope they are contrite and don't continue what they did before. We're worried that it seems there's more institutional support for them than for victims. For me the psychological part is most important: If I've gotten over what was done to me, if I'm good and my family is good, then what I want is no more blood spilled. It's really what I'm hearing lately about the peace process: we can reconcile, we need that pardon, it's what the country really needs. (Victims' association representative, Montelíbano)

forged about how and where the guerrillas will demobilize. Nevertheless, the evaluation team heard a great deal of optimism as well. Respondents cited the propensity to associate, the region's diversity, and growing mutual trust as vital assets in constructing social fabric following an accord. Local efforts to facilitate peace were reported to be important for the post-conflict scenario. These grassroots regional initiatives are vital for making the accords sustainable and viable. Reconciliation between victims and victimizers will continue to be a point of contention and tension in the North region. The community will need to be involved in the process of pardoning the crimes of the victimizers.

INTRODUCTION

Background

After decades of conflict in rural areas with illegal armed groups (IAGs) and with increasing success in limiting their activities, the Government of Colombia (GOC) launched the National Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT) in 2009 to increase its presence and to reduce inequity in the historically marginalized conflict zones where IAGs and coca production coexist. The concept of “consolidation” refers to the expansion in the conflict zones of Colombia of the legitimate presence of the State. The policy, designed for implementation once minimal conditions for public safety were established, would create the necessary institutional mechanisms to provide basic human rights protections to the populations in those zones historically affected by conflict and illicit crops. The PNCRT was oriented to establishing the presence of State institutions capable of efficiently bringing necessary public goods needed for development.

The policy conceives of social, economic and institutional consolidation and social reconstruction as the result of a process of mobilization and continual strengthening of three pillars: (1) the territorial institutionalization of state institutions focused on guaranteeing security and creating the necessary capacities to institutionally manage the area; (2) the strengthening of citizen participation; and (3) the fostering of regional integration.⁶ The interaction of these three pillars on a base of territorial security and combined with coordinated collaboration with state entities would be the path to guarantee the fundamental rights of the citizenry.

The U.S. Embassy, for its part, developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and at the reduction of illicit crops and the presence of illegal armed groups in the conflict zones. It included significant investments in security, antinarcotics, access to justice, and eradication activities:

USAID is already coordinating closely with other Embassy entities, including the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), the Military Group, and the Department of Justice as well as the Political and Economic sections of the State Department to develop an integrated USG approach for the priority CSDI consolidation zones. Programs will include peace and

⁶http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/themes/danland/descargas/entidad/planeacion/POLITICA_NACIONAL_DE_CONSOLIDACION_Y_RECONSTRUCCION_TERRITORIAL_PNCRT.pdf.

*security, illicit crop eradication, access to justice, justice sector reform and humanitarian and development interventions targeted at a wide range of populations.*⁷

The multi-faceted nature of security and development problems required a coordinated response. The joint CSDI activities were designed to address the multiple challenges remaining across consolidation zones, including continued presence of armed groups and the illicit narcotics trade, enduring poverty, and the lack of rule of law. Working with the GOC and PNCRT, the goal of uniting USG agencies toward consolidation was:

*To reach a “tipping point” where state presence and positive perception of the government is sufficiently well-established so that communities decide to align with their government rather than illegal armed groups and the coca industry.*⁸

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) as one of the CSDI components and as the backbone of this integrated plan to bolster the PNCRT by supporting efforts to consolidate the State’s institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in the production of illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

The basic premise of the CELIs is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of the State, and their activities are oriented to strengthening state institutions, generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life. The CELIs clearly are no substitute for the State. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice services in the consolidation zones is a *sine qua non* condition for enabling the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation.

The CELIs, or *Colombia Responde* as the projects are known in the implementation zones, supported the GOC through three pillars that are similar (though not identical) to those of the PNCRT:

Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their CELI peers

PNCRT pillar	CELI pillar	CELI pillars defined as:
1 Territorial institutionalization	Strengthening institutional development	Improving local government response; formalizing property rights; processing cases of victims’ property rights; implementing a rural development strategy
2 Citizen participation and good government	Strengthening social development	Strengthening civil society organizations (CSOs); promoting alliances between the community and the State

⁷ USAID Colombia Solicitud de Aplicaciones Número 514-09-000005, “Montes de María – Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative;” Septiembre 15 de 2009, p. 5.

⁸ Ibid.

PNCRT pillar	CELI pillar	CELI pillars defined as:
3 Regional integration	Catalyzing economic development	Implementation of rural development programs and improving competitiveness

With this shared mandate and the assumption of the GOC's leadership role, the CELIs developed strategies for institutional, social and economic development in four of the seven corridors where the policy was implemented: 1) Montes de María, in the departments of Bolívar and Sucre; 2) the Southern Corridor in the municipality of Tumaco in the department of Nariño; 3) the Central Corridor in Meta, southern Tolima, and the Valle del Cauca as far as Buenaventura; and 4) the Northern Corridor in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia and southern Córdoba.

Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics International, has worked through the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, Tetra Tech ARD, implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (MdM) project.

Within USAID's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs were first situated within the Mission's Development Objective 1: *Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated*, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation–strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS FOR 2014-2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

CELI investments are targeted to Intermediate Results in supporting Development Objective 3, and have much in common with their original results framework in spite of the shift toward economic activities. The current framework, tied to the CELIs' common Performance Management Plan (PMP) prioritizes the following:

IR 3.1 More equitable and secure land tenure
Sub IR 3.1.1 Land restituted to displaced victims of conflict
IR 3.2 Increased private and public investment in the rural sector
Sub IR 3.2.1 Strengthened local governments' capacity to access and manage public funds for productive infrastructure
Sub IR 3.2.2 Increase private sector investment in target rural communities
IR 3.3 More effective producer associations benefitting smallholder farmers
Sub IR 3.3.1 Improve institutional capacity to producer associations

In 2011-2012 USAID/Colombia called upon its monitoring and evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., to design an impact evaluation of the set of CSDI interventions and collect the baseline survey data. DevTech worked with Econometria, S.A., to carry out this work.⁹ The design included two subsequent measurements: a midterm after two years of program implementation, and a final evaluation following completion of the program.

EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), has been charged with carrying out the midterm measurement, and reporting on CELI impacts to date. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline evaluation design, program satisfaction questions for participants, additional qualitative fieldwork and in-depth interviews with the CELI teams. The evaluation design included the collection of data in seven corridors in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities.

The midline examined changes since baseline across institutional, social and economic indicators and established three guiding principles for their use:

1. *Measure the change in impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with target populations.*
2. *Inform decision-making processes with timely data, to identify components needing strengthening to achieve program goals.*
3. *Identify best practices and lessons learned to date, to inform future USAID programming.*

The impact evaluation was originally linked to the full range of interventions within the framework of the CSDI. Unfortunately, funding for the other programming was curtailed, leaving the CELIs alone as only one component of the full strategy. Given this, it should not be expected that an impact evaluation designed for the larger initiative would detect results of aspects of the CSDI strategy that were never carried out.

This volume reports on achievements and impacts to date in CELI Norte/Sur’s northern region. It is also important to mention that the results of this study are also presented at the level of “clusters,” that is, individual municipalities or small groups of municipalities that are geographically adjacent and similar socioeconomically. At times, the results of the analysis at the level of the cluster differs from those at the regional level, and for this reason it is important to examine topics at the cluster level to obtain more focused information. For the case of CELI North, the region sample is made up of seven clusters, which will be referred to in the rest of the report where the survey data are disaggregated to the cluster level. The sites are as follows:

Figure 2.2. Seven North region clusters

Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
1	Valencia and Tierralta (Córdoba)	San Rafael (Antioquia)
4	Puerto Libertador, San José de Uré and Montelíbano (Córdoba)	San Pablo (Bolívar)

⁹ DevTech Systems, Inc. and Econometría S.A. 2013. “Impact Evaluation Methodology of the USAID Strategy in CSDI Zones - Final Methodology Report.”

Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
5	Anorí (Antioquia)	Remedios (Antioquia)
6	Ituango, Briceño and Valdivia (Antioquia)	Urrao (Antioquia)
7	Tarazá and Cáceres (Antioquia)	Campamento (Antioquia)
8	Caucasia and Nechí (Antioquia)	San Luís (Antioquia)
9	El Bagre and Zaragoza (Antioquia)	Sonsón (Antioquia)

EVALUATION DESIGN

How to read this report

An impact evaluation is a powerful tool but also includes important challenges and differences from other evaluation research.¹⁰ It is important to understand the different types of findings an evaluation like this generates and how they should be interpreted.

Four types of findings. The report has four types of findings, shown in figures and text in the report. Each figure starts with one of these words.

1. **Impacts.** These come from the survey and compare treated and control groups on key outcomes of interest. Impact is read as the percentage point (pp) difference between baseline and midline *that is attributable to the intervention*. Data tables show statistical significance with asterisks (*).
2. **Trends.** These come from the survey and show change over time, without comparison to controls. Trends are shown in graphics, not tables. In the text we use the percent sign (%) and absolute values.
3. **CELI performance.** These data come from the CELIs and they track CELI performance indicators.
4. **Secondary data.** These data come from other sources like government figures and indices, and they help to describe the context in which CELI interventions operate.

Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report

Table title:	In the text:	How to read:
Impacts	pp (percentage point)	Relative change over time (compared to control groups) attributable to the intervention
Trends	% (percentage)	Change over time in one sub-sample
Secondary data	Secondary data	Show context to support findings and/or to explain challenges
CELI performance	CELI performance	CELI progress toward performance goals

Whole sample and four sub-samples. The whole sample survey is approx. 19,000 households, divided into four sub-samples. These are respondents from: CELI municipalities, their controls, PNCRT municipalities and their controls. Sometimes we refer to the “*full sample*,” when results are similar across all 19,000 households.

Direct and indirect beneficiaries. Due to design challenges (see the Limitations section, below), households that were supposed to be direct beneficiaries at baseline did not always receive CELI interventions. As a result, this evaluation report looks at all residents of

¹⁰ Please see Design section at the end of the Executive Summary, Limitations there and in the main report, and Annex 3 for details.

veredas in treated municipalities as indirect beneficiaries. There is one exception, and that is in the economic development chapter, where we have been able to identify a population of direct CELI participants, and track their progress.

Methodology and design

EVAL, with the support of its strategic partner, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), used a mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization and security as a result of the CELI interventions. The design followed the baseline design from 2012-2013 very closely, with additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, experiences and opinions among treated (CELI and PNCRT) and control groups. Full design considerations can be found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact.

Evaluation questions

The baseline identified the evaluation questions in 2011, and have been slightly adjusted (per USAID; please see Annex 2 of the main report for the SOW) and are presented below.

Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target population in the areas of interventions?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting
3. Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities? ¹¹	IR 3.2
4. What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)	Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?	IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities?	Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
8. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

¹¹ This is answered in Annex 6 to the main report with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.

These questions serve both impact (1, 4-8) and performance evaluation (2, 3) goals, and the evaluation reflects this blended purpose with a mixed methods design (please see section on Methodology and its detailed annex in the main report for full details.) The interdisciplinary team used data from the quantitative, household survey (in a quasi-experimental pre-post design) and a range of qualitative instruments, secondary data search and multi-faceted analyses to answer these questions in this report. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Quantitative methods

The impact evaluation design included a quantitative survey of households in Consolidation municipalities, both with and without CELI interventions, with these data collected between July 20 and November 30, 2015. Control municipalities were selected using an advanced matching protocol, described in detail in the annexes to the original baseline report.¹² The original design included an oversample of 12% for each follow-on survey, to allow for attrition. In the field, the midline evaluation, following a panel design, revisited the same households in order to ensure comparability, and lost approximately 15% of the sample to attrition. Within CELI municipalities, not all *veredas* had CELI interventions, and this was reflected in the sample.

The survey instrument (Annex 8 to the main report) includes modules on demographics, justice and security, licit and illicit economic opportunities and performance, government legitimacy, social capital and participation in grassroots organizations, electoral behavior, social and public services, land rights and ownership, victims' rights, roads, social programs, and opinions about the future and about peace. Several indices are created from the data, including indices of social capital, government performance, and government accountability. In general, the survey measures perceptions (as in the case of security) which are important, but more sensitive to news and recent events. The survey is less adept at capturing actual experiences, in part because most respondents will not have had direct contact with the changes in institutions or security, for example. In this regard, there is subjectivity in the indicators that were designed at the time of the baseline survey.

The evaluation added several new items for the midline on satisfaction with interventions and a short set on victimization from the LAPOP¹³ survey. The survey was administered in


¹² From the baseline report: "The survey interviews occurred in two phases, with the first phase providing interviews for 65 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control households between March 27 and July 5, 2012. The second phase, providing the remaining 35 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control interviews, plus 100 percent of the direct beneficiary interviews, occurred between November 7, 2012, and May 25, 2013, with a break for the Christmas and New Year holidays." *Impact Evaluation of USAID's Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report. Volume 1: Summary of findings.* June 30, 2013.

¹³ The Latin American Public Opinion Project (<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/>), which has been implemented throughout Latin America by a team at Vanderbilt University for the past three decades.

person in households, workplaces and, when issues of security prevented deployment to *veredas*, in heads of municipalities.

The evaluation team conducted 4,282 household surveys in the North region, almost evenly divided between male (2,127) and female (2,155) respondents. Respondents reported a 77% literacy rate. Nearly 60% (2,531) self-identified as mestizo, as shown in Figure 2.5:

Figure 2.5. North region sample by self-identified ethnicity



Some 90% of survey respondents in the North region live in dispersed rural areas, 8% in a population center that is not the municipal capital, and just 2% in the municipal capital. Over a quarter (28%) recognized the activities of *Colombia Responde* in their municipalities. Respondents were highly optimistic about the future, with great majorities answering that they expected conditions to improve; women were even slightly more optimistic in their responses.

Other quantitative measures included the examination of key secondary data sources. These came from government sources and the EVIDINCE consortium¹⁴, which collects quarterly municipality-level data on outcomes of interest, such as police and judicial staff presence, among many others. GOC sources also provided updated data on major crimes including homicides, acts of terrorism, and massacres. The CELI implementing partners also provided data on their achievements to date in their performance management plan (PMP), including such indicators as numbers of organizations and government offices treated, sales of productive project outputs, and leveraged funds.

Qualitative methods

Qualitative methods included in-depth interviews with key informants at national, regional and local levels, in CELI and PNCRT sites, as well as control municipalities. The team conducted structured interviews with representatives from municipalities and *personerías*, in 21 sites chosen to capture variations between CELI and PNCRT sites and their control

¹⁴EVIDINCE is a research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level

zones. Also interviewed were heads of civil society organizations and producers' associations. Focus groups covered themes parallel to those in the survey and the participants were citizens in CELI and PNCRT zones, some of whom had received or participated in interventions, and others who had not. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Qualitative data were analyzed in Atlas.ti using thematic coding that mirrored the evaluation questions and allowed for emergent codes to cover issues not foreseen in the evaluation design. These codes were correlated to understand coincidence and patterns of importance to the evaluation's response to the research questions.

Limitations

The evaluation design followed in this study has certain limitations. These are grouped and discussed below, and a more detailed discussion can be found in Annex 3, Methodology.

Factors related to the evaluation design

1. **The CELIs were to be evaluated as part of a much larger and more comprehensive effort that failed to materialize.** The outcomes of interest are at a high level of generality in the Results Framework of USAID's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), relative to the investment, the interventions, and the duration of implementation to date. The evaluation was created to assess a set of programs, formerly called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), with broader funding and goals than the current set of interventions. CSDI included a whole-of-government approach from both the U.S. and Colombian governments – anti-narcotics, security and justice, regional and local institutions, economic development, regional integration and roads, and civil society interventions, across the same geographic intervention area. The Initiative as a whole dwindled to comprise only the Colombia Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative, run by USAID, with significant funding but without the wider approach initially envisioned. As a result, the impact evaluation design includes several indicator sets for which few or no targeted interventions were completed. No impacts can be detected for programs that no longer exist.

For CSDI to have produced detectable effects would have been an enormous feat; for the CELIs to do it without the other CSDI interventions, including the interventions promised by the GOC, was far too much to expect. As a result, impacts found by the evaluation as measured by rigorous statistical techniques are few and mostly at the local level with particular direct interventions with producer associations.

2. **Selecting the panel of respondents at baseline was a challenge, resulting in discrepancies in the list of “direct beneficiaries” at midline.** A further limitation in terms of determining and attributing impact involves the panel design of the baseline, followed closely at midline. Baseline data collection was carried out over 18 months, crossing various growing seasons and the three different starting dates

of the CELIs. In order to respond to the baseline team's request for lists of direct beneficiaries, CELI Central approached local leaders and called for meetings of potential local participants, who signed attendance lists. CELI N/S, which was already in progress, provided lists of those who were participating in their interventions at that time. These lists served as the sampling frames for the treatment sites, but they created a problem: attendees knew they would receive a program, thus violating the basic assumption of an impact evaluation baseline that *the intervention has not yet begun*. Knowing about the future benefit changes the population's perceptions, perspectives, decisions and expectations. To some extent, the changes begin to appear from the time of the meeting invitation, and such changes can no longer be observed when the baseline information is collected, so we do not know how this knowledge may have changed their responses, but the relevant literature suggests a social desirability bias in which respondents who think they are to receive some benefit will respond more positively, in an attempt to be amenable to researchers – who they may presume to be involved with the intervention. This makes it very difficult to detect small effects on certain variables, since the baseline measurement has already incorporated, or lost, such effects.

The midline evaluation found that some baseline respondents originally identified as direct beneficiaries did not participate (or did not recall or report participating) in CELI interventions. There were significant discrepancies between people who were classified as direct beneficiaries at baseline and the people who eventually participated in CELI programming. The evaluation team therefore recognized three definitions of “direct beneficiaries”: (1) direct beneficiaries per the baseline evaluation design (4,426 households); (2) respondents who answered a survey question about receiving an intervention from *Colombia Responde*, as the program was known in the field (2,198 households); and (3) direct beneficiaries from the baseline who are on the CELIs' own participant lists (2,015).

Random households in the municipalities were then selected as indirect beneficiaries, to complement the sample and to represent the wide-ranging set of indicators that the CSDI was to have impacted, such as economic integration through roads and markets, security and justice, and increasing and improving government presence.

None of the three “direct beneficiary” definitions provides a sufficiently reliable gauge of participation and, as a result, for analysis of the more diffusely applied components of CELI activities in governance, infrastructure support and social development, the indirect and direct beneficiaries of the baseline were combined into one group of beneficiaries. However, for certain activities, especially with respect to participation in producers' associations and other economically focused interventions, analysis was conducted on a separate “direct beneficiaries” subgrouping based on the three definitions just specified. When taken together, with no double counting (that is, counting a household only once, for example, when a participant fulfills more than one of the definitions such as by appearing on the original list and by responding “yes” to the survey question on *Colombia Responde* participation), there are 5,445 unique respondents among the three

definitions. The evaluation uses this larger group to examine economic impacts on participants, which represents a more rigorous standard. Where impacts are found on this group, they are generally much more positive than the rest of the citizen population.

The qualitative team's experience in the field conducting focus groups helps to understand why so few of those identified as direct beneficiaries actually reported being participants. The first and key questions in the focus groups were regarding participation in *Colombia Responde* activities, and few focus group participants said they had participated. The reasons for the problems with the *Colombia Responde* name are not precisely known, but the evaluators speculate that the following could have contributed: i) at GOC request, USAID hid its participation under the *Colombia Responde* name so that the beneficiaries would attribute the effects of the program to the GOC; ii) subcontractors have other names, and beneficiaries may have been confused about the identity of the benefactor in the first instance; iii) the results may suffer from recall bias, since the baseline was established between 2012 and 2013, and certain benefits ended a long time ago; and iv) a combination of these and other factors that are unobservable.

- 3. The category of indirect beneficiaries is imprecise, and capturing impacts at that diffuse level will take more investment and more time.** Several categories of CELI and PNCRT interventions – essential though they may be – are likely to be invisible to average respondents, and do not reach a minimum treatment threshold, for one of two main reasons. First, some public goods affect few residents of a given area, like the strengthening of justice services or work with municipalities or *personerías*, or some social or productive infrastructure projects. Internationally, only an average 6% of a given population ever accesses justice services in their lifetime, and only a fraction of that figure do so in a given year. Detecting perceptions of change among this “fraction of a fraction” is therefore very difficult. Second, as discussed above, the CELI programming had important goals and benchmarks across the pillars of social, economic and institutional development – such that the significant funding is fragmented across geographic sites and pillars. While a member of a treated productive association or civil society group knows well that they have benefited from an intervention, the “indirect” beneficiary is indeed very distant from the benefits. Their inclusion in the sample dilutes the impacts that can be detected by the evaluation design.

Had the robust set of CSDI and GOC whole-of-government interventions continued as planned, perhaps more impacts in these higher-order indicators would have been detected. As it stands, however, the “dose” of intervention is a fraction of what was planned, in far fewer sectors, and at great distance from the beneficiaries, particularly the indirect beneficiaries.

Factors outside the control of the interventions

- 4. Local contexts and the absence of public entities condition the effectiveness of the CELIs.** The intervention municipalities are historically economically isolated, with stagnant local markets, very limited road connectivity, armed illegal group

activity, minimal (and sometimes corrupt) government institutions, and deep intergenerational poverty. The households in these zones have limited access to land – in terms of either size or low productivity – and a deficit of human capital (education, health, nutrition, as shown in baseline statistics on education coverage, perceptions of service quality, and food security challenges¹⁵). The main consequence is low productivity and income from land and work, which are rural families’ two main factors of production. This constrains households in a logic of poverty perpetuation – the trap – in which poverty is reproduced as a consequence of low savings capacity, which prevents changing the initial amounts of capital, land and work. The cycles are reproduced in the short term, limiting the capacity to change the initial situation, and in the long term, limiting changes in the welfare of the next generation: young people cannot find opportunities and are pressured into migrating or joining illegal armed groups. In this context – and others related to unemployment and informality – violence, in its different forms, reinforces poverty traps.

The other face of this poverty trap context is communal: the municipalities lack access to roads, political representation and market formation. Weak political representation often dilutes attention by the central or departmental government, such that the investment in roads is insufficient to develop markets in which small farmers can sell their products above production and transportation costs. As such, poverty is not only individual: it is poverty at a municipal level that encompasses the collective. There is an evident absence of public goods that are essential for the development of communities and entire regions. The capacity of rural interventions to generate significant effects on economic and social development is closely linked to land tenancy and property rights. However, the State’s policy has had little success on this front, and the CELIs faced the same – or worse – institutional roadblocks.

5. **Exogenous contextual factors cannot be excluded.** Among exogenous factors,¹⁶ it is important to mention the inflation caused by the global economic slowdown and the sharp drop in oil prices, resulting in recession in economic activities associated with extraction. These effects occurred at the moment that beneficiaries’ perceptions of the performance of the CELIs and the PNCRT were sought.

¹⁵ See, for example, Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report Volume 1: Summary of Findings – All PNCRT Zones pp 30 and 42-43; Volume 2 p. 47-50 and 69-70; plus the regional baseline reports.

¹⁶ The role of the control municipalities is to ensure that exogenous factors do not bias results. Under perfect conditions, exogenous factors apply to both types of municipalities, so in principle these factors would “cancel out.” However, no quasi-experimental design is ever perfect, and as a result, the evaluation uses control co-variables and clusters in order to minimize possible biases.

6. **The CELIs’ relationship with the Consolidation Unit was not uniformly strong, based on political and other factors.** The Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial (UACT) was a newly created government body as the CELIs began, which benefited from CELI support for opening regional offices and for staff capacity building. The Unit had the function of coordinating government agencies to deliver the State’s programs to the consolidation zones. One of the great difficulties it faced in realizing this task was its lower (or at best equal) status within the government hierarchy with respect to those entities responsible for those State programs, which presented challenges for the CELIs as well. The national level and regional level offices were also not always in synch, according to some stakeholders, and one CELI COR reported better and more collaborative relationships at the regional than at the national level.

The UACT faced great obstacles in successfully carrying out its role in the territories, including limited budgets for meeting needs in a complex geographic area with deep social, economic and institutional challenges. It was in the context of these conflicts and complexities that the CELIs had to coordinate their tasks with the national-level GOC (although, as noted, regional and local contacts were reportedly much more operational.) The UACT was finally merged with the Social Prosperity Department (DPS, for its Spanish initials) in December of 2015 as a result of the termination of the National Policy of Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT for its Spanish acronym). Afterwards, the CELIs in essence lost their counterpart at this midpoint in their programming. Nevertheless, the CELIs continue working to articulate their efforts with responsible institutions.

Factors related to implementation

7. **The selection process for *veredas* in which to work faced challenges that could affect the evaluation results.** The selection of *veredas* is a crucial foundation for implementation and for evaluation. The selection of municipalities and *veredas* in which the work is ultimately performed has substantial effects on the results of the strategy – and, therefore, on the impacts measured. Implementing partners are guided in selection by USAID and GOC preferences, and the baseline team for this quasi-experimental design followed up by employing a municipality matching system. Such systems, while imperfect, allow for the modeling of a robust counterfactual – what would have happened in municipalities that did not receive the interventions.

At least at the outset of the programs, the selection of *veredas* depended on the “stoplight” methodology, which relied on Colombia’s military for impartial classification of the danger of each *vereda* where the CELIs might potentially intervene. Stakeholders in USAID and the CELIs eventually sought a way out of this requirement, as they found the system highly politicized and, at times, the stoplight decision unjustified. Over time, the CELIs’ contracts were amended to allow implementers to amplify their reach to *veredas* in which local dynamics suggested potential positive relations – such as a shared productive project. In this way the CELIs could serve communities that were divided administratively but

shared common agricultural goals and could expand to *veredas* that they themselves had established as safe for project activities.

One hypothesis generated during the evaluation was that the *vereda* selection – guided by the “traffic light” methodology – tended toward the *veredas* closest to the municipal centers, with greater access, more resources, greater associativity, and greater social capital, etc., while the problems of illicit crops and armed groups were extended in more remote and dispersed geographic areas. In general, it can be asserted that the poorer the population, the greater the impacts of an intervention of this type. Thus, focusing on what was easiest operationally may have been counterproductive in terms of impact.

REGIONAL CONTEXT

The goal of consolidation was to establish and strengthen institutions, regional economic integration and social fabric in zones affected by Colombia’s armed conflict, on a basis of security gains made by Colombia’s security forces. As discussed, the CELI interventions were a part, but certainly not all, of that effort. The other elements that were to lead to that goal have been less than expected. Advances in security are important but not absolute; regional economic integration is promising but incomplete; and the presence of the State and good governance are still scarce in some areas, especially in the most rural. The confluence of conditions that nourished armed conflict and illegal groups has improved, but indicators within the regional context still do not present a perfect setting within which the CELI can fulfill its objectives.

The Consolidation Index

The Consolidation Index is a tool designed to measure and monitor the advances of municipalities in the process of consolidation and shows one considered viewpoint of the progress to date. This index is built from a set of 37 indicators in the three pillars of the national consolidation policy, each of which is in turn made up of a set of components, as shown in Figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1. Consolidation Index pillars and their components

PNCRT pillar	Components
1 Territorial institutionalization	Security, justice, property rights, and human rights
2 Citizen participation and good government	Good government, citizen participation, and social capital
3 Regional integration	Connectivity, social services, and economic growth


Each pillar is composed of a set of indicators that are reliably available, primarily from government sources – line ministries, defense and police bureaus, departments and municipalities. Indicators in the first pillar, for example, include indicators on security challenges and incidence of crimes, in particular conflict-related crimes, and indicators on access to justice mechanisms, human rights indicators, and figures on property rights. Pillar 2 includes data from municipal governments on their provision of spaces for citizen participation, their effective tax collection, their coverage of citizen oversight committees, the status of local civil society and *juntas de acción comunal* (JACs), and the Procuraduría General de la Nación’s Open Government Index. Pillar 3 on regional integration includes indicators on roads, electricity and cellular coverage, access to education and health services, hectares in cultivation and the presence of financial entities.

Scores on these indicators are summed to create scores for each pillar, and each pillar makes up one-third of the final score on a scale from 0 to 100. Since 2011, data for the Consolidation Index have been compiled into scores for each Consolidation municipality,

along with a set of comparison municipalities to which these are matched. The scores are disaggregated by pillar or by component indicators in each pillar, as well as over time, by geography (municipality, department and region), and by service provision versus sustainability indicators.

The Consolidation Index reports on the region of Nudo de Paramillo¹⁷ which corresponds to CELI North. Scores have trended positively since the Index was first measured in 2011, as shown in Figure 3.2:

Figure 3.2. Secondary data: Consolidation Index scores for the three pillars



Source: Consolidation index data, authors' calculations

Both sub-regions have seen improvements in the pillars and the overall Index. It is important to consider that the Index, like any measure, is composed of indicators that have strengths and weaknesses, as well as particular points of view. It is important to keep these points in mind when comparing advances in the Index to data from the evaluation fieldwork. First, the indicators in the Index generally come from government perspectives, and in many cases those reporting the raw data are municipal, departmental and national officials. This differs fundamentally from the citizens' perceptions of security, services, participation, etc., found in the survey data. Neither one is more "correct" than the other, but they also are not precisely comparable when measuring these same phenomena.

There are also decisions made behind the Index indicators that affect the results – first, the basis for many of the indicators is "principal population centers" – which are determined by those who report the data, which may be municipal officials or even local transportation companies, who report on road conditions. By contrast, the evaluation sample is 90% dispersed rural, 8% in population centers other than the municipal capital, and 2% in the municipal capital.

Second, the scores on many indicators are weighted to be compared to municipalities that have comparable socioeconomic levels and as a result may be given high marks even when their absolute scores are among the lowest in the nation. For example, in the indicator on

¹⁷ The Nudo de Paramillo region, for purposes of the Consolidation Index, is composed of fifteen municipalities: Montelíbano, Puerto Libertador, San José de Uré, Tierralta and Valencia in the Sur de Córdoba. The other ten are in Antioquia: Anorí, Briceño, Cáceres, Caucasia, El Bagre, Ituango, Nechí, Tarazá, Valdivia and Zaragoza.


open government (using the Colombian government’s own Open Government Index figures), the average 2014 score among ten municipalities in Antioquia is 56.9, but this is calibrated to 87.4 by the comparison with like municipalities. This is not a failing of the Index, but it is important to take into consideration that the scores are altered in this way before being added together to create the Index.

Security

The security component of the Index includes indicators on: police operations that do not involve the military, the implementation of a citizen security plan, subversive and terrorist acts, and density and changes in coca production. Each of those show improvement in the Index, even that of coca production, despite strong external data to the contrary. There is likely to have been a significant worsening when the 2015 data is complete, as well, because of the well-documented increase in coca production in Colombia: according to media reports, as much as doubling since 2013.¹⁸ In addition, due to quite a bit of missing data in the years prior to 2014, the trends for some of the component indicators are incomplete.

In the North region, according to the evaluation survey, perceptions of security in the *vereda* or *corregimiento* have worsened since baseline, but even so, respondents there remain likely to recommend that a family member return to the area. (Figure 3.3)

Figure 3.3. Trends in perceptions of security



Most respondents would still recommend that a family member or friend return to the region, as at baseline. However, only a third of respondents (34%) feel the security

¹⁸ The Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) of the Central Intelligence Agency produces an annual estimate of the area cultivated with coca for the Andean region. Its latest results were presented to the GOC in March 2016. The main conclusions – national statistics – were disseminated in the media. Coca cultivation in Colombia reached a historic low in 2013 (in both the SIMCI and CNC-DoD measurements). In the two years since, however, the growth has been sustained and drastic. In the last CNC measurement, cultivated hectares doubled, from 80,000 to 159,000, with a proportional increase in the production of cocaine, from 290 to 442 metric tons. The complete report is not accessible to the public. The statistics cited here are found in the articles published in the *El Tiempo* newspaper, *Semana* magazine and *El Espectador* newspaper on March 15, 2016 (<http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/ee-uu-y-canada/ee-uu-advierte-de-aumento-de-cultivos-de-coca-en-colombia/16537123>).

situation has improved over the last two years, a significant decline from baseline. Respondents in control zones increased in their perception that the security situation had improved (27% at baseline to 38% at midline).

At cluster level,¹⁹ the results are especially positive in Cluster 9, and Clusters 1 and 5 also show positive impact on perceptions of improvement in security. However, it is notable that most of the cluster calculations do not show impact, indicating that security gains are likely localized. (Figure 3.4)

Figure 3.4. Impacts on perceptions of security

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or corregimiento has improved	0.297***	0.0446	0.262***	0.0337	0.0771	0.0764	0.314***
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0.0198	0.0190	0.0708	0.104**	-0.033	0.00563	0.0879*


In an interview with a municipal functionary in Montelíbano, some people have voluntarily returned to their lands, but he feared that continuing armed actor presence might begin the cycle again:

We foresee, based on the information we have, that these people are going to be displaced again because these people on the margins of the law are still present, putting pressure along their routes and spaces. We hope it doesn't happen. (Secretary Int. Montelíbano, CELI)

The North region evaluation sample, disaggregated by stoplight level, has a mix of low, medium, high and critical security zones, similar to that in the whole sample. Of 303 *veredas* sampled in the North region, 26 were considered low risk, 90 medium risk, 128 high risk, and 59 critical. (Figure 3.5)

¹⁹ A table presenting the clusters in the North region for the evaluation appears as Table 3.4 on p. 4.

Figure 3.5. Security levels, North region *veredas* (left) compared to the entire sample (right)



To understand their perceptions of security, respondents were asked about a range of crimes. In almost all cases, North region respondents perceived these crimes as less frequent than at baseline:

Figure 3.6. Trends in perceptions of crimes

	CELI baseline	CELI midline
Homicides	28%	10%
Illegal armed groups	72%	31%
Antipersonnel mines	5%	3%
Displacement	19%	11%
Forced disappearances	4%	0%
Extortion	7%	4%
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	19%	9%
Forced recruitment	1%	0%
Sexual violence	1%	2%

This general decline is consistent with data across the country, and across consolidation zones (please see the main report for detail.) Only in the case of sexual violence did the perceptions figure increase in the North region since baseline. Respondents in the North report a decrease in illegal mining in their *veredas*, from 21% to 13%, which is consistent across clusters.

There is a perception of increased insecurity from illegal armed groups in Clusters 1, 4, 8 and 9, (Figure 3.7) and a decrease of such insecurity only in Cluster 5. Antipersonnel mines are on the decline, according to respondents in three clusters, as is citizen insecurity in five clusters. However, the latter shows a 46pp increase in Cluster 5. In Clusters 5, 6 and 8, there was positive impact of around 26pp when respondents were asked to say whether they felt there were no serious crime problems in their *veredas*. Only in Cluster 4 was the impact on this question negative, by 25pp. These breakdowns by crime and cluster paint a much

more mixed picture of the improved insecurity picture painted in regional and national level results.

Figure 3.7. Impacts on perceptions of crimes

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
Homicides	0.203***	0.0142	-0.0541	-0.0386	-0.140**	-0.0179	0.000948
Illegal armed groups	0.416***	0.375***	-0.549***	0.0166	-0.141*	0.614***	0.255***
Antipersonnel mines	-0.047***	-0.0187	-0.00526	-0.0112	-0.187***	-0.069***	-0.00667
Displacement	0.108**	0.0427	-0.186**	-0.0769*	-0.0119	0.0834**	0.0154
Forced disappearances	0.0408**	0.0337***	0.0544	-0.0965***	-0.0233	0.0130	0.0129
Extortion	0.0112	0.0144	0.0883	0.0257	-0.0762*	0.0452	0.106*
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	-0.531***	-0.299***	0.464***	-0.138**	-0.00374	-0.636***	-0.341***
Forced recruitment	0.00119	0.00867	0.0509**	-0.00163	-0.0300*	0.00460	0.0353*
Sexual violence	-0.0253	0.0159	-0.0449	0.00615	0.0162	-0.00693	0.000508

Respondents in the North region municipalities reported their perceptions of slight improvements in quality but dramatic declines in presence of the police and of the military. When asked who they thought should be responsible for security in their *veredas*, respondents at midline tended more toward individuals (from 10% at baseline to 18% at midline), and less toward the military (from 34% to 26%).


All clusters confirm the trend of perceived reduced police presence in their *veredas* in absolute terms. Five clusters report good or very good service from the police, but when explicitly asked if service has improved in the last two years, only Cluster 7 shows a positive impact. This contrasts with the Consolidation Index data on police movements without military support, which (though data are incomplete) show an increase in such police operations from 53 to 57% in Sur de Córdoba, and from 13 to 21% in the ten Antioquia municipalities.

Few respondents sought police services in these fifteen municipalities since baseline – there were 52 such reports at baseline (referring to the prior year) and 84 at midline. Of these, fewer said their report was attended to quickly (from 40% at baseline to 20% at midline). However, the sample size of people who reported a crime is too small to make generalizations about their police experiences.

Illicit crops and the culture of (il)legality

Evidence from the survey shows an increase in the reported presence of illicit crops in the North region, from a baseline of 10% to 14.4% at midline. Clusters 5 and 9 report small increases of the presence of coca in their *veredas* in absolute terms, but the rest of the clusters show small decreases. UNODC figures for the region include figures for nine of the ten municipalities in Antioquia (Caucasia is not shown in the Observatory data) and for the five municipalities of the Sur de Córdoba. Unfortunately, coca production is back to the levels seen in 2011, as shown in Figure 3.8:

Figure 3.8. Trends in hectares of coca, 2011-2015, Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba




Source: Colombia Drug Observatory, <http://www.odc.gov.co/sidco/oferta/cultivos-ilicitos/departamento-municipality>; authors' calculations

This source suggests that not only have the number of hectares increased in both regions, following the promising decline in 2013, but these fourteen municipalities now make up 94% of the production in the recorded areas of Antioquia and Córdoba departments – compared to 78% of that production in 2011.

At the same time, the baseline consensus in stated opinions against illicit crops has eroded, as shown in Figure 3.9:

Figure 3.9. Trends in attitudes about illicit crops (agree/strongly agree)




These figures showing the erosion of support for legality are well distributed across the North region clusters, though Cluster 4 has the lowest absolute losses, and fares better than its control municipality. For this reason, Cluster 4 has uniformly positive impact among CELI zones (Figure 3.10). Clusters 8 and 9 also had less decline in their agreement on the value of a culture of legality.

Figure 3.10. Impacts on attitudes about illicit crops (agree/strongly agree)

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0.0170	0.319***	0.00390	-0.00439	-0.0482	0.0719**	0.0656*
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0.00296	0.219***	-0.0709	-0.0202	0.0161	0.108***	0.0991***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0.0442	0.320***	-0.0919	0.0324	0.0586*	0.0847***	-0.00663
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	-0.0215	0.181***	-0.0735	0.0203	-0.0738*	-0.0443	0.0620*

Similarly, North region respondents were less likely than at baseline to profess strong belief in a culture of legality. At baseline, 94% said they always or almost always acted in accordance with the law, but that fell to 75% at midline. The great majority of baseline respondents – 82% – also said their communities acted in accordance with the law always or almost always. At midline, that figure had dropped to 60%. These figures paralleled those in the control municipalities. Somewhat more people were able to justify disobeying the law when asked about particular conditions, as shown in Figure 3.11. The increases were small but consistent across the battery of related questions; control municipalities had the same trends.

Figure 3.11. Trends in acceptable justifications for disobeying the law




The North region is home to some of the most important coca growing and transport corridors in Colombia, and is likely to be included among concentration points for demobilized FARC combatants (in Briceño and Tarazá) after the signing of an eventual peace accord.²⁰ There is also strong evidence of the presence of IAGs in these

²⁰ Semana., June 11, 2016. “Turbulencia antes del Día D del proceso de paz.” (In English: Turbulence prior to D-Day in the peace process.)

municipalities, since about a quarter of respondents reported either positive or negative effects of the IAGs on the functioning of municipal government (Figure 3.12):

Figure 3.12. Trends in perceptions of IAG effects on municipal functions




Small percentages of citizens report a violation of their human rights in the North region (6% at both baseline and midline) and more of these respondents say they do not know who was responsible, than at baseline. There was a strong trend not to do anything in response to such a violation (from 50% at baseline to 69% at midline). Those who said they took their case to the formal justice system dropped from 57% baseline to 11% at midline. In general, about half of respondents in the North were willing to denounce a crime to the authorities, about the same as at baseline. These figures suggest an erosion in the rule of law and confidence in the formal justice sector.

Justice and state legitimacy

In the North region, as elsewhere in Colombia, general State legitimacy decreased, for its failure to provide key state services and guarantees equally across the country. (Figure 3.13)

Figure 3.13. Trends in state legitimacy (agree/strongly agree)




Justice systems figure importantly in the survey, and in general the reports show little use of the formal justice institutions. Fewer say they would be willing to report some crimes, including robbery of livestock or produce, the presence of illicit crops, or kidnapping. More say that, facing a serious problem with a neighbor, they would simply meet with the person

to resolve it themselves (from 69% at baseline to 79% at midline); very few say they would go to the formal justice system (from 3.4% at baseline to 2.8% at midline).

At the same time, all respondents (whether or not they had had a case or report before the justice system) were asked about the presence and quality of the formal justice, alternative justice, and *Personería* services in their areas. In all three cases, respondents’ perceptions of the existence of these services in their areas dropped substantially (but equal to perceptions in control municipalities, so there was no impact.) Perceptions of quality were slightly better for formal justice and *Personería* services, as shown in the Figure 3.14:


Figure 3.14. Trends in perceptions of presence and quality of various justice services



The Consolidation Index and the quarterly EVIDINCE municipal data also report on justice services. The survey measures perceptions of Colombian justice, while the Consolidation Index reports on whether the “judicial apparatus” is present: formal judiciary, administrative, and (where applicable) indigenous jurisdiction, along with the *Personería* and *Defensoría*. Scores on the presence of these bodies averaged more than 70 points (over 100) in Sur de Córdoba, but without a pattern in the changes over time. In Antioquia’s ten municipalities, the score went from 77 to 99 in four years’ time.

The EVIDINCE quarterly panel data also measures the presence of judges and other officials on a given day, collected by locals who go to the offices to see if the officials are present and attending citizens. Figure 3.15 shows the data for all CELI (T1 in the table) and PNCRT (T2) municipalities and their controls (C1 and C2, respectively).

Figure 3.15. Secondary data: EVIDINCE panel data on attendance by state’s attorney, judge, ombudsman and notary, on the day of data collectors’ visit



Source: EVIDINCE quarterly panel data, authors’ calculations

These data show much more variability across the three years’ data collected. CELI municipalities show the most consistent increase, arriving at a level of over 2.7 on average (of the four officials whose activity is checked.) PNCRT municipalities from the study (which do not have CELI interventions present) and their controls were most volatile, and CELI’s control municipalities had the lowest continuous numbers of officials present and attending citizens.

Peace process

Respondents in the North region gave us their opinions on the peace process and the post-conflict future. Fear and insecurity continue to be part of the discussion as agreements are forged about how and where the guerrillas will demobilize:

We receive victims from many communities, not knowing who’s friend or foe. Now that post-conflict is upon us, we don’t know what’ll happen to existing organizations. The President speaks and it’s all lovely. But we know that once these people are demobilized, they’ll want their groups too. We’re at a disadvantage, with the government bending over backwards to help them back to society. I don’t even dare to talk about security openly. (Association member, Montelíbano, CELI)

Nevertheless, the evaluation team heard a great deal of optimism as well. Respondents cited the propensity to associate, the region’s diversity, and growing mutual trust as vital assets in constructing social fabric following an accord.

Peace is complex, of course, but our organization has organized 14,000 people who are rebuilding social fabric, believing in one another. Trusting enough to save and loan

together! Our lost values and trust may come back, allow us to believe in the word of another (Women's organization member, Caucasia, CELI)

We've got all kinds in our communities: displaced people from Urabá, indigenous people, blacks, Afro-Colombians, women heads of families, a real mix. Showing them that we all come from the country, that we can all work together in community, we strengthen our links. One thing the campesinos want is peace. I know they want it in the city, but they're looking at it from behind a barrier. We're the ones who live with it. We're part of it, with all the recruitment there has been. We have guerrillas, paramilitaries, soldiers – the majority of all these forces are campesinos. The President's not here facing the cannon. So what we want is to get our kids, our grandkids, out of this mess. (Producers' association member, Cáceres, CELI)

Local efforts to facilitate peace in line with the accords were reported to be important for the post-conflict scenario. These grassroots regional initiatives are vital for making the accords sustainable and viable. The Secretary of the Interior in Montelíbano related:

A local institution called Peace Network is very important here. They hold very good participatory, teaching sessions, sharing what's going on in Havana, focusing on post-conflict and the end of the war. Tomorrow they start here, after working across the sector: San Jorge, Caucasia, Zaragoza, Planeta Rica, Pueblo Nuevo. I found it very enriching. They invite the JACs, police, private sector, unions, people with disabilities, LGBTI people, victims, so that all of these people get out in the front lines of peace. (Secretary of the Interior, Montelíbano, CELI)

Reconciliation between victims and victimizers will continue to be a point of contention and tension in the North region. The community will need to be involved in the process of pardoning the crimes of the victimizers, according to a victims' association leader in the San Jorge Valley:

We're worried about post-conflict because these guerrillas are coming out. We hope they are contrite and don't continue what they did before. We're worried that it seems there's more institutional support for them than for victims. For me the psychological part is most important: If I've gotten over what was done to me, if I'm good and my family is good, then what I want is no more blood spilled. It's really what I'm hearing lately about the peace process: we can reconcile, we need that pardon, it's what the country really needs. (Victims' association representative, Montelíbano, CELI)

CELI INTERVENTIONS IN THE NORTH REGION


The CELIs included the following components to reach the results framework objectives, organized in order of greatest investment:

- Support for productive activities focusing on the agricultural value chain (such as technical assistance and training in farming, processing and marketing) and on support for youth entrepreneurial efforts in developing skills in business and commerce;
- Governance support to strengthen local and regional governments through training in planning, budgeting, taxes, royalties, project formulation and management, and accountability;
- Infrastructure support, providing assistance in building social goods (schools, roads, health posts, improved sanitation and electricity) and productive infrastructure (such as improving processing plants, warehouses, and marketing centers);
- Social capital development and the development of civil society, in terms of providing training and support for Community Action Councils (the *Juntas de Acción Comunal*), producers' associations, community councils in indigenous and Afro-Colombian areas, and others;
- Assistance in land issues for communities and individuals, including the formalization of land titles and private property rights, claims for restitution, regularizing the status of public lands, and dealing with special rights reserved for ethnic groups; and
- Support for the development of credit and financial institutions and programs in target areas.

The North region CELI is combined with the South region under one contract with Chemonics, in its USAID Performance Management Plan (PMP) reporting. The PMP has evolved and was eventually aligned with the two other CELI projects for a shared set of indicators to which all three projects reported. Indicators measured progress on key deliverables, which some of the data came from the CELIs themselves (public funds leveraged, number of people benefited by rural and economic development support, number of public-private alliances, etc.) and some from secondary sources (including this evaluation, and the GOC.)


CELI North/South met the majority of its indicators across three pillars, with data current as of June 30, 2016 for economic, social and institutional indicators. CELI compliance was highest among social and economic indicators. The latter are also the most numerous of the indicators for which the CELI was responsible. (Figure 4.1; the calculation of these figures is described in Annex 3)

Figure 4.1. CELI North-South PMP indicator compliance



The CELI’s committed funding, as recorded in USAID/Colombia’s MONITOR database, can be broken down as follows, by source (at left) and by type of intervention (at right).

Figure 4.2. CELI commitments (USD millions) by source and project type (approx. \$124.1M)



Source: MONITOR database, accessed May 1-9, 2016

The interventions are described in the subsections below.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation question: To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?

Findings and conclusions

Direct CELI beneficiaries

Direct beneficiaries of CELI economic development activities are highly positive about their participation, their learning, and their outcomes.

We've been working with USAID for seven years now, producing cacao. We made an association and now sell to Luker chocolates. We've been involved through the whole trajectory: new plantings, amplification, quality improvements, and selling our cacao. Now we're working on the transformation part, with new machinery. (Productive association leader, Cáceres, CELI)

I was an intern in Guatemala, and I belong to a rubber association. So I have to come back and share what I've learned, hand-in-hand with the Guatemalan expert coming here to spend a week with each association in Bajo Cauca. We'll train the staff, the producers, the children of producers, and anyone interested in growing rubber. (Producer association, Caucasia, Antioquia)

Women entrepreneurs were a large part of the CELI N/S focus, as well, with many participants taking on leadership roles within their communities and producer associations. This was as true with rubber and cacao in Antioquia and Cordoba as it was with cacao and shrimp in Tumaco, Nariño. More than half of CELI N/S-supported beneficiaries are women, or approximately 45,000, with 3,500 of these women-headed households.²¹ One example is the group of recyclers in El Bagre, Antioquia, who are part of nine women's organizations in the municipality. Some 550 women participate in day-to-day recycling efforts from collections along a route to delivery to a processor – also run by women. The CELI and the Department of Social Prosperity have worked together to improve the organizations' equipment and facilities, and augment their organizational capacity with training. The CELI has worked similarly with latex producers, about a quarter of whom are women, and with honey producers, of whom about half are women.²²

Compared to baseline, direct beneficiaries in the Norte region are around 4pp less²³ likely than the general population to say they are experiencing extreme poverty. On the other hand, their outcomes at midline are very mixed and inconclusive, even though they

²¹ CELI N/S International Women's Day flyer, undated.

²² CELI N/S Overview of gender and social inclusion in the municipality of El Bagre (Antioquia), undated.

²³ The data for direct CELI beneficiaries come from three different sub-samples, and therefore are presented as an approximate average impact. Please see the Limitations subsection of the Evaluation Design chapter on how direct beneficiaries are defined.

participated directly in the CELI activities. About 7pp more respondents said they had run out of food in the prior week for lack of money. However, the figures are not conclusive, and there is great variation among clusters for the measures of perceptions of the economic situation and food security.

CELI Norte direct beneficiaries had positive or neutral opinions of economic challenges in their regions. There was a 4pp positive impact on their perceptions of unemployment and lack of opportunity, but they continued to perceive that productive activities earned little money and that one of the only attractive productive options is that of illicit crops.

CELI Norte direct beneficiaries reported about 7pp more use of savings accounts, in contrast to other study regions where this figure tended to fall. They used financial services the same as or less than baseline, with 8pp fewer respondents saying they sought formal credit or paid for public services through a bank or non-bank entity.

In general, the problems beneficiaries perceived at baseline were somewhat diminished at midline. There was a positive impact of 5.5pp on their perception of abuse by intermediaries (that is, abuse by intermediaries dropped by that amount), and 7pp fewer said they got only low prices for their produce. Some 4pp fewer perceived the prohibition of coca as a problem in their areas. At the same time, the interference of armed groups appeared to have increased, with 5.5pp more direct beneficiaries saying this was a problem at midline.

CELI Norte direct beneficiaries reported generally very positive results from their associating with others in their productive projects, with special appreciation for associating to process their products (around 6pp positive impact), to sell their products (between 3 and 16pp positive impact) and in transporting their products (about 8pp positive impact.) Fewer direct beneficiaries report that roads in their municipalities are good or very good, decreasing 6.5pp since baseline. Some 9.5pp more say they reach their homes via a trail than at baseline, while 5pp to 9pp fewer say they reach their homes via an unpaved road.


The broader survey: Perceptions of economic conditions

However, across the wider survey – including direct and indirect beneficiaries, both interview and focus group respondents – all reports coincide in that the economic situation in the North region, particularly the Nudo de Paramillo area, is very grim.²⁴ Adolescents are encouraged to finish high school but have no job prospects upon graduating; displacement to the towns and cities is a drain on resources and opportunities; and despite the presence of mining, few make their living at it. While rural respondents with land for cultivation reported gratitude for their food security, those living in population centers or working in day labor had more trouble meeting their families' basic needs.

²⁴ Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Imagine our case: today, we worked and we earned 12,000 [COP] – and we don't even work every day. Just to buy lunch is 9,000. That leaves 3,000 for transport. It's very hard to live here. (Non-beneficiary, Montelíbano, CELI zone)

In the North region, only 17% of respondents said the economic situation where they live is good or very good, compared to 33% at baseline. For other economic questions, North region and control respondents reported improvements. Fewer respondents said unemployment or lack of opportunity were problems, and far fewer said their productive activities earned very little:



Source: Calculations from the baseline and midline databases, CELI evaluation²⁵

There is an apparent discrepancy between the negative opinions of the economic situation in general, and the positive perceptions that problems are reduced. One hypothesis is that CELI interventions in economic activities could have knock-on effects with infrastructure projects like produce collection centers, effects that benefit more than just the CELI direct beneficiaries. Another hypothesis is related to data from another survey module, the results of which show a general and significant improvement in expectations for the future. Given the advanced state of the peace talks at the time of data collection, it is not unlikely that those dialogues gave respondents a generalized optimism for future endeavors – even if they rate their situation as presently negative. More data on these improved expectations for the future is presented at the end of each chapter – economic, institutional and social – but it can be summarized that all samples showed major improvements in all categories of expectations for the future.

The reader is reminded that the North region sample is made up of seven clusters, which will be referred to throughout the report where the survey data are disaggregated to the cluster level. The sites are as follows:

²⁵ The source for all tables and graphics in the report is the database of baseline and midline survey data collected for the impact evaluation of the CELI interventions, unless otherwise noted.

Figure 5.2. Seven North region clusters

Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
1	Valencia and Tierralta (Córdoba)	San Rafael (Antioquia)
4	Puerto Libertador, San José de Uré and Montelíbano (Córdoba)	San Pablo (Bolívar)
5	Anorí (Antioquia)	Remedios (Antioquia)
6	Ituango, Briceño and Valdivia (Antioquia)	Urrao (Antioquia)
7	Tarazá and Cáceres (Antioquia)	Campamento (Antioquia)
8	Caucasia and Nechí (Antioquia)	San Luís (Antioquia)
9	El Bagre and Zaragoza (Antioquia)	Sonsón (Antioquia)

There are several impacts at cluster level on respondents' perceptions of the economic situation. Clusters 1, 6, 7 and 9 showed significant positive impact of around 10pp in each case, as shown in Figure 5.3. Only cluster 8 showed negative impact, though this was 19pp. In all North region clusters, respondents saw unemployment and lack of opportunities as somewhat less a problem than at baseline, but those in control municipalities were even more positive. As a result, there was a negative impact in CELI zones between 11 and 24pp for perceptions of those two problems, depending on the cluster.

Figure 5.3. Impacts on perceptions of the economic situation


Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
The economic situation is good or very good	0.115**	-0.0568	-0.0466	0.109**	0.106**	-0.19***	0.117***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0.169***	0.244***	0.188**	0.137***	0.160***	0.112**	0.226***
Productive activities earn very little money	0.116***	0.240***	0.0781	-0.16***	-0.105**	-0.00807	-0.0156
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0.00544	-0.11***	-0.33***	0.0598**	0.0255	0.0558**	0.201***

The trends on the question of whether productive activities earned very little were large and positive, in both CELI and control municipalities, across these clusters. However, since the control zones in some clusters were sometimes even more positive, the resulting figures show negative impact in CELI zones (Cluster 1, 12pp negative impact, and Cluster 4, 24pp negative impact). Clusters 6 and 7 exhibited more positive impact than their corresponding control zones in each cluster.

Similarly, when asked whether one of the only attractive economic options is illicit activity, the trends across the region and in the clusters are very positive: far fewer respondents agreed with this statement than at baseline. At midline, only tiny fractions said this was the case, in both CELI and control zones. However, this effect was more pronounced in control zones than the paired CELI sites for Clusters 7, 8 and 9, causing the positive trend to appear as negative impact for those regions. In Clusters 4 and 5, CELI respondents proved to be the more optimistic on this point, with 11 and 33pp positive impact, respectively.

Food security is not guaranteed for households in CELI municipalities in the North region – a circumstance that has worsened since baseline. Control households responded similarly on these variables. As such, this appears to be a regional trend, rather than something attributable to any intervention.

Figure 5.4. Trends in food security variables



In all clusters – including control municipalities – respondents report very strong trends of greater hunger and higher perception of living in extreme poverty. By cluster, the results on food security variables were somewhat better in Clusters 8 and 9, overall, where the survey found negative impact (that is, the negative conditions diminished) on the hunger families experience, concerns that they’ll run out of food, and (in Cluster 9) their perceptions that they lived in extreme poverty (Figure 5.5). However, this was frequently a result of even worse conditions in control zones, leaving CELI with positive impact but, unfortunately, all with worsening food security.

Figure 5.5. Impacts on perceptions of food security

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
The family is experiencing hunger	-0.0260	0.183***	-0.0514	0.101**	0.0269	-0.13***	-0.26***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty	0.224***	0.188***	0.375***	0.265***	0.166***	0.0359	-0.30***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	-0.21***	-0.0171	0.00669	0.0473	0.00253	-0.15***	-0.0111
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	-0.0595	0.0479	-0.216**	0.0701	-0.32***	-0.0233	-0.25***

Income among North region respondents, measured through their estimated monthly expenses, increased by approximately 12%, from 334,978 COP at baseline to 374,798 COP at midline (rising from \$120 to \$134 in U.S. dollars, using an exchange rate of 2800 COP/\$1.) This finding cannot be attributed as an impact of the CELI interventions, however, because the control sites increased even more. Differences were significant in only two clusters, with CELI sites doing better in Cluster 9 and control sites doing better in Cluster 7. The impacts are shown below in Figure 5.6.


Figure 5.6. Impacts on income

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	16,898	50,463	3,352	42,536	-101,549*	-1,553	88,021***

The income data from the remaining clusters were inconclusive, with no statistically significant results.

The Consolidation Index measures economic growth with two indicators: presence of financial services and cultivated hectares. Data for the first two years in both Antioquia²⁶ and Córdoba²⁷ are exactly equal, followed by increases in 2013 and differentiation in 2014. (Figure 5.7)

Figure 5.7. Secondary data: Economic growth scores, Antioquia (l) and Sur de Córdoba (r)



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors’ calculations

Rating economic growth through these two indicators is perhaps not as robust as might be preferred. There are questions within these data, such as the exactly equal scores in 2011 and 2012 for both questions in both sub-regions, and the odd fact that “49” is not a valid score according to the Consolidation Index definition of the cultivated hectares indicator.²⁸ There is also the question of the drop from a score of 86.5 to 65 on the financial entities score, as it seems unlikely that such entities would disappear so quickly once they were installed. But it does show improvement, in some cases substantial. The Index is also designed to be verifiable and based on existing and accessible data, rather than primary data collection such as through citizen perspectives.

The survey also poses a set of questions about the future, to understand respondents’ expectations. Cluster 6 had three negative impacts among these questions, with respondents

²⁶ Ten municipalities are included: Anorí, Briceños, Cáceres, Cauca, El Bague, Ituango, Nechí, Tarazá, Valdivia and Zaragoza.

²⁷ In Córdoba, the municipalities included are: Montelíbano, Puerto Libertador, San José de Uré, Tierralta and Valencia. All of these municipalities and those in the Antioquia set are included in the evaluation survey data.

²⁸ Only scores of 0, 50 and 100 are called for in the indicator description. USAID Public Policy Program, “Construcción de un Índice Sintético de la Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial. Informe Final.” June, 2013. AECOM and USAID, through contract AID-514-C-11-00001, p. 130.

who see the next two years as worse than the present day. Cluster 4 sat at the opposite end of the spectrum, with positive impacts indicating very optimistic expectations for the future. (Figure 5.8)

Figure 5.8. Impacts on expectations for the future

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0.0560	0.0542*	0.0235	-0.133***	0.00180	-0.0113	-0.0402
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	-0.0230	0.126***	-0.0630	-0.173***	-0.0058	-0.0386	-0.0204
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0.111***	0.109***	0.0216	-0.221***	0.0847*	-0.085**	0.103**
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0.0931**	0.113***	0.0240	-0.0709	-0.0083	-0.0490	-0.0188
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	-0.23***	0.119***	0.174	0.0655	0.190***	0.0938*	-0.0679

Four clusters had positive expectations about their local economies in the next two years (Clusters 1, 4, 7 and 9) and three said they planned to invest in their productive project (Clusters 4, 7 and 8), higher than in most other regions of the study.

Conclusion 1: The perception of the economic situation in CELI and PNCRT municipalities has worsened, but the trend is the same in control municipalities. This trend is certainly related to a series of factors out of reach for any intervention and that constitute a poverty trap that is almost impossible to escape. Despite the difficulties in all of the consolidation zones, it is not uncommon to find communities' positive values with respect to their regions. This is an indication of the ownership inhabitants feel with respect to their territories and productive projects. In some cases, they also demonstrate community level rejection of illicit activities in favor of a culture of legality. However, in sum, the results indicate that the economic situation in CELI and PNCRT regions parallels that across the country, with the hardships and needs of the inhabitants of remote rural zones who survive from day to day and face difficulties even in terms of basic food security.

Conclusion 2: Direct CELI beneficiaries are an important exception to this negative perception. The contrast with the rest of the samples is noteworthy and seems statistically parallel between households headed by men and women. Also among CELI households, there are positive trends in the perception of the problems they face, such as the lack of opportunities and the low income provided by their productive activities. The female-headed households form an important part of this optimism.

Assistance for productive projects

CELI interventions aim to reduce areas planted with illicit crops and support sustainable income generation. The CELIs made great investments to support smallholder associations, to improve land, to provide technical assistance and inputs for production, and to support commercialization. In Antioquia, for example, the greatest investments were made to

support rubber, cocoa and coffee production, and in Tumaco mainly for cocoa, coconut, rice and shrimp.

The CELIs provided technical assistance (TA) in efforts to improve the productivity and quality of specific crops, both with newer associations and with established productive projects that simply had weak links to buyers in the value chain (e.g., cacao in Tumaco and papaya in Cordoba.) The CELI projects emphasized organizational training and capacity building for producer associations. In CELI N/S, the team reported throughout FY 2015 that it continued to improve the institutional capacity of producer associations to provide effective services to their members and their communities. In Q3 2015, for example, they described supporting eight associations producing cocoa and three that had sold shrimp, rice, and honey.²⁹ A CELI North producer reported:

Initially we grew chili peppers, eggplant and rice... Thanks to the different programs... we are selling our own brand of rice now. (Producer, Antioquia, CELI)

We've worked closely with Colombia Responde and the Antioquia government... on the whole project: logistical support, equipment, trainings, they're helping us with training rubber rayadores. One from each association in Bajo Cauca is going to Guatemala for an internship. Four instructors are also coming from Guatemala in the same program to spend a week with each association. All this comes from Colombia Responde and the Antioquia government. I think their support for our empowerment and sustainable development has been very good: the interest they've taken in us, in the whole region. (Producer, Caucasia, CELI)


On the whole, each of the CELI intervention components was directed at counteracting the deficiencies or weaknesses that the producers faced in their regions: TA, for example, aimed to counteract low productivity and provide products with greater added value. Similarly, productive projects were designed so that producers could associate and have greater power of negotiation with the middlemen or buyers for marketing. In focus groups, respondents told stories about CELI learning and support for productive projects. The following text describes the process in one CELI N/S case:

I think the training has helped us a lot; I think they help society change its way of thinking. Before, we didn't know how to establish a crop; with these projects we have learned to establish rubber and cocoa as crops. So where we didn't know how to graft a plant for it to be more productive, now we have the technical methods, the technical guidelines for us in the fields... now we can improve our parcels of land by our own means, with citrus plants, cocoa, with all these products. So all their training workshops have given us the knowhow that has served to enrich our social and cultural level. We have enjoyed this part, it has been useful, and I think it is the most important thing... the most important thing is that our vereda has a different perspective of what the countryside can be. (Producer association leader, Valle del Río San Jorge, CELI)

²⁹ CELI N/S Quarterly Report FY2015 Q3, p. 5.


Some 30% of respondents in the North region said they had received support for their productive projects at baseline, and 34% at midline (Figure 5.9). Some 83% said they had received courses or trainings, which was the most frequently mentioned at both baseline and midline. Two-thirds said they received technical assistance. Figures for their control groups were roughly the same, however, showing that other productive project support is happening even where the CELIs are not active. As a result, no statistical impact was found.

Figure 5.9. Trends in type of assistance received



Respondents reported associating more at midline than at baseline, with strong trends. These trends are shown in Figure 5.10 below, but as the trends in control zones were similar, there was no impact attributable to the CELIs.

Figure 5.10. Trends in reasons to associate for productive project activities



Gains are consistent across these activities and the magnitude is often double or more from the baseline responses. In the case of processing products and that of selling products, the gain is equal to 11pp of positive impact in CELI North areas, compared to control zones. For buying inputs, and for processing, selling, and transporting products, nearly all the gain from baseline to midline comes from homes with female heads of household (FHHs).

Conclusion 3: The productive projects in CELI programs showed evidence of economic changes in the households and their productive projects. The beneficiaries are deeply appreciative of the TA that accompanies the CELI programs, and report that the support promotes assets and capital, which they will be able to enjoy in the long term.

Conclusion 4: CELI support goes directly to the strengthening of value that will mature in the medium or long term, whether they worked with newer associations and productive projects or established producers who had weak links to buyers in the value chain. The goal, along with improved institutional support, was to create long-term value and capacity that help producers provide for themselves through their productive projects. The purpose of these instruments is to strengthen savings and investment, as they oblige the beneficiaries to work and look after their crops with a long-term perspective, with all the costs and sacrifices that this implies. Respondents did however express concerns that they are currently experiencing short- and medium-term food insecurity.

Markets and trade

The main objective of rural development is the development of markets in a broad sense; that is, spaces where the transaction of products continues to expand. Small and underdeveloped markets have high transaction costs and communities become trapped in a vicious cycle in which small markets do not encourage greater production and, simultaneously, the increased production that exceeds the size of their markets collides with rigid local markets and with the lack of preparedness for exports to other regions. New phytosanitary requirements also pose a challenge for some producers.

Some focus group participants – in both treated and control municipalities – explain the serious problems smallholders face:

If we do not transcend this part of the transformation, of giving added value, of trade, we continue being the same. This is so not only with rubber but any product. (Producer, Antioquia, CELI)


They could give us all the crops you want, but if we don't have anywhere to sell them, what can we do? There is a big gap as far as this goes. (Producer, Caucasia, CELI)

The cattle business is suffering. Prices haven't gone up in ten years, but the inputs go up two times in a year, or even more. The balance is all off. (Producer, Caucasia, CELI)

The government demands that animals be killed in refrigerated conditions, which don't exist here. With milk, there's a new resolution that milk must be pasteurized. You can't sell raw milk anymore. But for us, we'd need at least 300 million COP for pasteurization equipment. Congress' laws affect us directly – they're against us. (Producers, Caucasia, CELI)


According to the survey, CELI respondents in the North region perceive fewer serious problems in production and marketing of their products. For all serious problems cited, fewer North region respondents report that these are problematic than at baseline. (Figure 5.11)

Figure 5.11. Trends in perceptions of problems related to production and sales of their products




The trends in where respondents take their products for sale and where they buy products indicate that local markets continue to be very important, and even dominant, for most citizens. Most frequently, they sell their products in the municipal capital or, to lesser extent, in the *vereda* or nearby *veredas*. There was some increase in sales outside the municipality, from 5% at baseline to 13% at midline. Figure 5.12 shows which sites are most important for respondents.

Figure 5.12. Trends in where respondents sell products




The tendency to sell their products in the municipal capital was repeated when respondents were asked where they buy their goods for consumption. Focus group data confirms this as well. There was also an increase in purchases made in nearest population centers, in absolute terms, from baseline to midline. Figure 5.13 shows these trends, which still concentrate consumption purchases in the municipal capital.

Figure 5.13. Trends in where respondents buy products



Sales to the public dropped for respondents in the North region, while sales to intermediaries increased sharply, from 35% to 61% (Figure 5.14). Sales to cooperatives, associations, and to the public at fairs, in markets, or in general were a very small percentage of sales.

Figure 5.14. Trends in to whom respondents sell products



Despite the trends in absolute terms, changes seen from baseline to midline rarely showed impact that was attributable to the CELI interventions. Most often, the trends present in CELI municipalities were similar in control municipalities. The data supports the assertion that local markets, especially in the municipal capital, remain the most important markets for productive activities.

Conclusion 5: TA and marketing support help counteract problems related to low profitability, and respondents report that those problems are diminishing with respect to their productive projects. However, trading such products requires markets with enough buyers and sellers and the establishment of prices that are higher than production costs. The lack of access to wider markets in and outside the consolidation zones seriously hampers the tasks of the CELI and the GOC. Similarly, the productive projects counteract the incentives to plant illicit crops, but with the deficient and partially depressed markets, pressure from armed groups and the lack of access roads (see the section on roads later in this chapter), it is difficult for the policies and programs to have the desired effects. It could be concluded that in the presence of structural problems – which are the GOC’s direct responsibility – it is difficult for CELI and PNCRT programs to produce effects that are sustainable in time.

Conclusion 6: The markets in consolidation territories continue to be local and regional markets, and export markets are small in terms of the proportion of sales. As such spaces

are limited, the producers tend to be affected by the high costs of trading that go along with the deficiencies typical of small markets. It is a circular relationship: small markets do not encourage greater production and, in contrast, greater production that exceeds the incentives of these markets clash with the rigidity of the local market and the lack of facility to export to other regions.

Credit, savings and financial services

Access to financial services and credit to strengthen the productive and licit value chains has been an intermediate goal of the three CELIs. They have created savings and credit groups, developed revolving funds within producer associations, and offered TA to associations to expand their skills in the use of financial information and tools. CELI N/S reports that it has spent over half of its total investment, or USD\$32 million,³⁰ in economic development, which includes rural financial services, the strengthening of producer associations and other local associations, and in supporting value chains.³¹ Throughout the project life cycle, more than 20,000 men and women have been mobilized in the 16 target municipalities to participate in Local Savings and Credit Groups (GLACs in their Spanish acronym) in an effort to reduce poverty sponsored by the Banca de las Oportunidades. A 2013 case study on the growth of these schemes in Bajo Cauca showed how the *veredas* used the shared resources to address community needs, such as buildings, pedestrian bridges or ventures, such as drugstores or bakeries.³² In 2015, CELI N/S expanded the GLAC program to help its members use savings to generate incomes and create other small ventures, such as micro franchises for small goods.³³ Some 71% of GLAC participants are women, an important part of the intervention being directed toward them, and a large number of women are taking advantage of the schemes to improve their situations.³⁴ According to the female participants interviewed in a 2015 CELI-commissioned study, women said they benefitted from GLAC participation in increasing confidence, learning to express themselves, and having their own projects.³⁵ They also report improvements in communication and integration within their families, and they appreciate it as an alternative to the *gota a gota* or *pagadiario* informal lending modes in their regions.

The CELIs have worked a double front to improve access to credit and bank use among their beneficiaries. In terms of bank use, CELI North/South supported nearly 37,000 people to make use of a financial product or service, far exceeding (141%) their goal.

³⁰ CELI N/S FY2016 Quarterly Report (Q1) p. 5.

³¹ CELI N/S Quarterly Report (Q2, FY2015), p. 21.

³² Transforming Lives: Rapidly Growing Community Banking Initiative Is About Much More Than Money.

³³ CELI N/S Quarterly Report (Q2, FY2015), p. 27

³⁴ From conversations and email with Deputy Chief of Party of the CELI on the importance of women's involvement in the GLACs.

³⁵ Ospina, Sofi. (2015). Saving, Adding and Developing: A study of the local credit and savings groups (GLAC). P. 5.

CELI interventions did not directly provide credit, though some participating associations created rotating funds to support their members. Many associations have a revolving fund that offers smallholders the possibility to obtain loans to deal with disasters (the conditions and rules of the loans are negotiated within each association), serving as a strategy for microcredit and micro-insurance:


Today, we have a revolving fund of around 60 million pesos; because we decided to use a rotating system for all the inputs that arrive [and] harvests that we sell. We take out the inputs and we are very clear about the fact that there is a small profit margin, allowing our resources to continue to grow. So it has helped consolidation, especially organizational. (Producer association leader, Antioquia, CELI)

There is a lack of formal financial institutions in the territories, which is a major factor in households’ inability to access services in the traditional financial sector. The possibility to access some type of credit is an important benefit for the households, given that their low savings and investment capacity and their lack of assets³⁶ stop rural households from being able to access services in the traditional financial sector.

Banco Agrario gives loans. I am going to give you an example in case you don’t know; the Banco Agrario loans you money, it loans money to the man with a plot of land; but it can’t lend me money. Why? Because I don’t have any land. (Producer, Antioquia, Control)

Respondents in the North region reported a decrease in household debt of approximately 80%, parallel to a decrease in control areas. The evaluation found no impact that can be attributed to the CELI interventions. Among all respondents, in CELI and control zones, fewer respondents report having debt – from around two-thirds at baseline to just over half at midline. But more CELI respondents had their debts through formal channels than at baseline. In absolute terms, the CELI municipalities report having a savings account more frequently, outstripping respondents from control zones for an impact of almost 8pp more frequent savings accounts. Other financial services are shown in Figure 5.15:

Figure 5.15. Trends in use of financial services



³⁶ Explained by the previously described poverty rate.

When asked about the support they received for their productive projects, 16% of respondents said they received a loan, and the average loan amount was down 21% at midline, from approximately 6,826,835 COP at baseline (a decrease of \$521 US).

At the cluster level, several of these measures show impact, as seen in Figure 5.15. Use of banks for savings accounts is down at significant levels in Cluster 1 (15pp) and Cluster 4 (12pp), and for checking accounts in Cluster 1 (6pp) and Cluster 8 (5pp). There is a positive impact of 4pp in checking accounts in Cluster 4.

Figure 5.16. Impacts on use of financial services

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
Have a savings account	-0.154***	-0.124**	0.0894	-0.0854	-0.0457	-0.0293	0.00195
Have a checking account	-0.061***	0.0416*	-0.0665	-0.0008	-0.0260	-0.051**	0.0251
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0.104*	0.0761	-0.251**	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.0836	0.428***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	-0.141**	-0.0947*	0.209**	-0.0307	-0.0630	-0.009	0.0694
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	-0.00253	0.132	-0.0900	-0.0105	-0.24**	-0.0168	-0.0867
Currently have debt (of any kind)	-0.126**	-0.0942	0.210**	-0.0117	0.0237	0.0535	0.0777

The trends show that more respondents have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities since baseline, in both CELI and control municipalities. However, the impact is mixed: Clusters 1 and 9 saw a greater and significant increase among CELI municipalities, and Clusters 5, 6 and 7 all saw greater increases among control municipalities. Active loans have fallen among both CELI and control zones.

Respondents report that they were not able to get formal loans without a land title, or a co-debtor:

The Agrarian Bank can't lend to me, because I don't have land. If I don't have land, I don't have the ability to pay. There are lots of us like that where I live. (Citizen, Tolú Viejo – Control)

As a result, informal lending has continued to be many residents' source for cash flow, with extortionate rates of 10-20% monthly interest. They make daily payments, generally to illegal groups who can be violent if the debt goes unpaid. These debts and the interest paid can easily exceed respondents' ability to pay, even when the debts are in small amounts for foodstuffs.

To survive, I might take out a gota a gota loan to get rice, at 1,500, 2,000 per pound. Then I make a daily payment. If I've borrowed 200, my daily payment is 140. (Citizen, Tolú Viejo - Control)

At the same time, a woman's organization representative in Bajo Cauca said that the producer association rotating funds had helped remove the need for the daily interest loans:

Another thing we can't fail to mention is that we've been uprooting the daily interest loans, which is what most straps our people financially. That is, the paying of 10% and 20%

interest, now they have an alternative to that and to the illegal sources of those loans. (Women's organization representative, Caucasia, CELI)

Another respondent reported the highly successful results of a study trip to another association:

I had the opportunity to take part and I returned with a totally new concept. They had six, seven million pesos saved, they had lent to their associates. We started from that idea and now we have, first, savings and loan groups.

[Her colleague continues:] We set a goal of 475 groups in the sub-region and at first we couldn't get any interest. We didn't bring funds ourselves, so organizations weren't interested. We then went in to Montelíbano, Puerto Libertador and San José de Uré and we ended up beating our expectations, attending more than 6500 people, with savings totaling more than 1,000 million pesos. [Our organization] went from being pretty small, a bit informal, to now having a team in the field, 19 facilitators and four coordinators and an accountant practically full-time. (Women's organization staffer, Caucasia, CELI)

Conclusion 7: According to the household survey, credit has fallen in both CELI and control zones. However, the information gathered in focus groups indicates that financial support has fulfilled a vital function for the development of savings and credit. Revolving savings and credit funds have served as important instruments to support capitalization in rural areas.

Conclusion 8: Informal credits contained in trading or illegal *gota a gota* loans will always exist unless financial services progress in rural areas. Theoretically, illegal credit problems can be resolved judicially, but the informal modalities arise when the broader economy fails to provide viable alternatives. Community credit or loans which are a product of programs such as CELI provide an alternative to informality.

Conclusion 9: Bank formalization has not increased; in fact, it is moving backwards across the region. Credit remains an important issue for respondents qualitatively but among respondents in both CELI and control zones loans have fallen.

Transportation infrastructure

The general conditions of roads in Colombian rural areas are poor, with insufficient access to markets and government services. Respondents reported that this continues to be a problem in the North region, despite interventions:

All the counterparts have come to establish crops, not for infrastructure... now that we have our products, we need roads to get them out. (Producer association leader, Antioquia, CELI)


With 60 liters of latex a day, [a producer] earns \$75,000 and he is paying his helper \$25,000. He is left with \$50 [thousand], but then he has to pay to manage this: he has to have it transported on an animal for 4, 5 kilometers to get it to the road. (Producer association leader, Antioquia, CELI)

At the same time, existing roads are not often well-maintained by the state. Some evidence surfaced in qualitative interviews about corrupt activities with regard to road maintenance:

Two years ago a compacting roller went in in the morning and came out in the afternoon. And what did they say? The road has been compacted. But it hadn't been. It was a waste of money, the roller went in at 6am and came out at midday and the only thing that mattered was to send a photo to the local government. (Producer, Antioquia, CELI)

Respondents' perceptions of roads did improve slightly in the North region, as shown in the following figure.


Figure 5.17. Trends in perceptions of roads



The survey also asks about the time it takes for respondents' families to get to the nearest health clinic, which dropped a few minutes according to North region respondents, from 62 to 58 minutes. Fewer respondents in CELI municipalities said that the high cost of transportation was a serious problem for their productive activities – from 76% to 65% - though in absolute terms this percentage is still very high. Since control municipalities saw a similar improvement, this change is not attributed to the CELI interventions.

The Consolidation Index includes two indicators on roads, in the component called Connectivity of the Regional Integration pillar. These data are shown in Figure 5.18.

Figure 5.18. Secondary data: Economic growth scores, Antioquia (left) and Sur de Córdoba (right)



The first Consolidation Index indicator reports on the percentage of the municipality's principal population centers that are connected (via roads, rivers or sea) to the municipal capital all year. The definition of principal population centers is not given, but the very high scores (100% in most years) for both sub-regions contrast strongly with the survey findings from dispersed rural respondents presented above. The second indicator reports on the

existence of an asphalted or paved road from the municipality to a principal city. These scores are higher among the ten Antioquia municipalities (from the 80s into the 90s over the four years of study), while in Sur de Córdoba, the statistic remains flat at 60%.

Montelíbano focus group participants reported on a CELI activity to improve tertiary roads at the *vereda* level, where residents were previously “almost completely cut off.” Other infrastructure efforts discussed in focus groups included school cafeterias, a children’s playground, and ferries across waterways.

Conclusion 10: The data shows negative perceptions and experiences in terms of the quality of the roads network, with a slight improvement since baseline. The deficiencies of local markets are tightly related to the state of roads. The productive projects can attempt to break poverty traps, but the lack of roads reinforces the traps. It is obvious that the task of the CELI is complementary to government actions, but it is not a substitute: the infrastructural problems must be solved by the State, and what CELIs do without this urgent GOC work may end up being a short-term palliative.

Conclusion 11: When there are roads and infrastructure, the population recognizes the direct benefit of CELI interventions. Local level users, associations and JACs have taken ownership of roads’ projects.

Land

An important element in the CELI vision is support to land formalization. This includes helping the rural residents ensure formal titling, supporting displaced families and communities to return to lands they had to abandon as a result of the armed conflict, and support governmental institutions who, ultimately, grant land tenure rights.

The main obstacle has been weak state institutions in this sector without clear and consistent processes. INCODER proved unable to fulfill the mandates of several attempts at land reform and was relatively impotent in the face of political processes resulting from extreme land concentration. The challenges in restoring land tenure rights or compensating victims are great.

That said, the Consolidation Index reports some improvements in government land processes since the beginning of their data collection in 2011. There are two municipalities of the ten in Antioquia and two in Sur de Córdoba that are part of the microfocalization process that precedes land restitution through that Unit, and increases in the local zoning planning. In the ten Antioquia municipalities the average score is 30 (over 100) and in Sur de Córdoba, 47.

The CELIs maintained records pertaining to restitution cases and the formalization of property ownership. The CELIs have reached or exceeded their goals in most, but not all,

cases.³⁷ The CELIs have supported State institutions involved in the land claims, despite the fact that the latter posed considerable challenges at times.³⁸

In FY2013, CELI N/S sponsored the establishment of a local land titling office in alliance with the mayor's office in El Bagre, Bajo Cauca. Within a short time span, the office "received 100 applications from *campesinos* for unregistered derelict land or unoccupied land owned by the State requested before INCODER, as well as 11 land titling applications for the public use of derelict land."³⁹ In the same period, this CELI helped the URT in Valdivia to process 627 cases in the Register of Confiscated and Abandoned Land.⁴⁰

The CELI also allied with the Superintendence of Notary and Registry in 2015, the body that supervises urban titling, and supported the contracting of topographers and land experts to increase the presence and effectiveness of relevant institutions at the local level.⁴¹ Through this alliance the CELI have supported the formalization of "1667 lots in the municipalities of Tumaco, Valencia, Montelíbano and Puerto Libertador, in the framework of Law 137 of 1959, which empowers municipalities to incorporate and cede urban lots to vulnerable communities,"⁴² among other supports to the land sector. CELI N/S further reports an additional nearly 3,000 lots that will be titled by the end of the present year, with special effort in the municipalities of Bajo Cauca.

Beyond institutional support, the CELIs have provided assistance to communities and organizations in specific cases of the legalization of property titles, and on supporting families in building their cases to request restitution. They supported civil society organizations (JACs, producer associations, and women's organizations) to help people understand the often complex steps involved in formally registering their land and guaranteeing their titles. For example, in 2014, CELI N/S mobilized Universidad Católica del Norte to create a specialized training program with 61 participants from seven producer associations who received 120 hours of training in the norms and rights involved in land ownership and how to gather the necessary documents to present to the authorities to obtain property titles and registers.⁴³

Land titling for CELI regions has been arduous, within the institutional structures and constraints available to citizens and the CELIs. There are security challenges (please see the regional context section, Chapter 2, of this report); cases where different individuals or families have worked the same piece of land in different moments in time; natural reserve conservation issues; wealthy interests at stake; and the difficulties of prioritizing sites

³⁷ CELI N/S "The goal of 2600 formalized properties supported in the CELI municipalities has not been reached," and there are only six months of the project left. For details on PMP indicator goal attainment, please see Annex 5.

³⁸ For example, in 2012 CELI N/S reported difficulties it faced reaching cooperation agreements with any State agencies involved in land tenure issues (CELI N/S, Quarter IV and Annual Reports 2012, Chemonics, Inc., p. 13).

³⁹ CELI N/S, Quarter IV Report, July-Sept 2013, Chemonics, Inc., p. 18.

⁴⁰ Registro de Tierras Incautadas y Abandonadas.

⁴¹ CELI N/S Annual Report, FY 2015, p. 45.

⁴² Communications with CELI Deputy COP, 18 Sept 2016.

⁴³ CELI N/S Annual Report 2015, AID-514-C-12-00001, Chemonics, Inc.

across a vast swath of lands in line for restitution. There are multiple institutional actors, each with their own mandates and timelines.

A secretary of government in Caucasia describes processes that are inhibited from the national government, and some success at least in housing in urban areas:

There have been no rural formalization processes, no proper campaigns, just a few individual cases. The Superintendent of the Notary announced a program hand-in-hand with INCODER and nothing happened. Here we've progressed with an aggressive legalization program for urban housing. It's been very effective and it's still ongoing. (Secretary of Government, Caucasia, CELI)

The *Personero* in Caucasia describes one restitution process:

There was one in El Tigre, the property of a JAC that had been displaced by armed groups and robbed of their land. They appealed to the Land Restitution Unit in Caucasia, which is a microfocalization site. They've received the restitution, that's it for near Caucasia. They've initiated microfocalization in Las Margaritas. (Personería, Caucasia, CELI)

The same respondent talks about two important structural obstacles to restitution in his municipality: first, the state's uncertain ability to guarantee the security of families who return, and second, the situation of absolute poverty in which returning families find themselves. Fear of reprisals can also limit applications for restitution, as can lack of knowledge. But local training has made a difference, including for women victims:

We've got to go to Montería to apply, and many people don't go out of fear. Their lands were taken: they think that if they put in this complaint, they'll be threatened again. So it was limited. Through what we've learned in trainings, and the high participation, people have opened up more. They learn step by step how to do it – including women, women whose husbands have died. The victims' roundtable just announced they're putting someone here to orient us on land restitution. (Women victims' association representative, Montelíbano, CELI)


The survey results show a wide problem in land titling, but one that has changed since baseline. In the North region, 15% of respondents said they had land title at baseline, with an average of 3.3 hectares. At midline, this had surged to 36% of respondents and an average of 22 hectares. The pattern was consistent in control municipalities, and as a result, no impact is attributed to the CELI interventions.

The priority continues to be legalizing the acquired rights through succession or the land market (sale or purchase); such lands represent up to 86% in CELI and 96% in control municipalities, indicating that even where access is not a severe problem, formalization continues to be.

Generally, the people don't have formal titles here. So much so that the municipal administration has lands that still aren't in the municipality's name. (Functionary, Antioquia, Control)

Among those who occupied land, but had no title, the chief reasons why they had not formalized the title continued to be the lack of resources and necessary information, as shown in Figure 5.19. However, fewer respondents said they lacked resources or information.

Figure 5.19. Trends in reasons for not titling their land



Less than 1% said they were involved in a land restitution case at baseline, while at midline, this figure was 4%.

The vast majority of households said they would be willing to pay property taxes (92%), just as at baseline, and more actually did so in the past two years (from 14% at baseline to 47% at midline). Over half said they would pay property tax because it is the duty of the citizen to do so (60%).

Conclusion 12: The informality in ownership rights sheds light on the limitations of the State. The communities deal with this problem through precarious ownership rights, based on fragile documents such as sales letters. The absence of formal ownership titles renders such documents invalid for use in guaranteeing credit, and discourages development of productive projects in the long term. The advances in the titling procedures in the CELI and PNCRT municipalities continue to be limited in the face of the huge scale of the problem. Although the CELIs can support such processes, it is ultimately a matter for the State to resolve.

Recommendations

- 1. Realistic expectations at a level that the operators can affect (conclusions 1-3, 6, 10 and 12)** The impact indicators are at a high level of generality in the results framework, relative to the investment and interventions, the short duration of implementation, and the problematic contexts. Given that the economic situation reflects regional trends and the regions' critical structural deficiencies, it is important to not consider lack of impact as representing a failure in programming.
- 2. Make simultaneous improvements in production and trade (conclusions 2-3, 5-7, and 10)** Increased production must go hand-in-hand with market improvements. Low quality, intermittent and seasonal production is not attractive for a market that exports goods to the rest of the country. In contrast, good quality and regular production has better results when that production is directed at adequate markets. Transport to markets is never guaranteed. The GOC must endeavor to resolve market and infrastructure inadequacies and establish programs that improve relationships with commercial allies and middlemen. This is and must be one of the most important concerns for post-conflict policies in Colombia. While support from international funding is certainly important, it

may be wise for the latter to lead small focused pilots that treat these interconnected structural failings holistically, or to support GOC efforts that do so, rather than dilute the effects by intervening across broad geographic areas with expansive mandates.

3. ***Support an array of markets (conclusions 5, 6 and 8)*** It is important to support commercialization projects designed to improve both regional markets and projects that export goods to other regions, which may provide a solution to local overproduction and low prices. In such cases, specific programs are needed that intentionally bring small-scale producers and intermediaries together in the productive process to work with broader marketing efforts to improve quality or to involve banks to increase access to working capital.

The middlemen can constitute the starting point for a good system of trade in the regions, given that they fulfill an economic function that would be difficult to replace. It is important, however, for the intermediary not to become monopsonistic in a way that reduces smallholders' bargaining power. The middlemen risk their capital in money and equipment and come up against insufficient quality and quantity in terms of what they buy from the producers. As such, specific programs have to be structured to understand their function and improve it to benefit the regions.

Better market information adjusted to local conditions would contribute to improving the communication of supply and demand, and to bridging the cost difference produced by intermediation. Regional market information systems should involve provincial centers or the Ministry of Agriculture's Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria (UMATA). Mobile phone access to up-to-date market information has been easy to implement and can function well, as seen in valuable experiences in other countries.

4. ***Plan for intermediate food security in productive projects (conclusion 4)*** It is recommended that the CELI and USAID make concerted efforts to ensure that the programs that support productive projects also support food security. This situation should be anticipated by providing TA and traditional farm or other sustenance activities that minimize dependency. The productive projects must combine short- to long-term returns in order to ensure cash flow and project sustainability at the household level.
5. ***Reach the FHH with interventions that work (conclusions 2 and 9, and the relevant section in the chapter on social development)*** Overall, the benefits have not been the same for FHH and MHH. Given that the two household types learn and use their learning in different ways, models should be developed that reflect this difference and provide different services to take advantage of the characteristics and behavior of each. The FHH attend training workshops and courses to a lesser extent, but on the other hand, report taking greater advantage of associations for different productive ends and for marketing.
6. ***Maintain activities to expand financial services (conclusions 7-9)*** Revolving funds are a suitable instrument to deal with the communities' borrowing needs but they must be protected against the risk of non-payment. While communities have access to other programs such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development's Productive

Alliances program, the communities should be supported in strengthening these revolving funds in the long term. Globally, credit decreased according to the household survey. However, according to focus group interviews, such forms of support have fulfilled a vital function for the development of savings and credit schemes, and they are important as long as they are conditioned or linked to the creation of collective savings and credit funds that maintain strong principles of governance to guarantee their sustainability. Such a framework avoids diluting resources by creating dependency.

Steps to undertake would include creating a system that monitors and follows-up on the communal or revolving funds, sets up discussion forums and exchanges of experiences, and creates incentives or awards for performance and draws attention to successful cases.

7. ***Continue focused work on roads (conclusions 5, 10 and 11)*** Although the improvement of the roads system is the responsibility of the central and local governments, the CELI programs should continue to reinforce the successful support they provide to the JACs pertaining to institutional strengthening and participative and community infrastructure.
8. ***Continue to expand the work in terms of land tenure formalization (conclusion 12)*** It is a priority to facilitate relationships with the new State organs that replaced INCODER, in order to continue work on land tenure as part of USAID's ongoing portfolio. To supplement current information, the evaluation team recommends a transparent monitoring system to focus attention on the issue. USAID should work with the GOC on their database of petitions, assessing the data over time, and compare regional performance. The database should register the location and the number of hectares, and produce management and resolution rates.

A corollary issue with land restitution is that, in the event of an eventual peace accord and a greater number of successfully resolved land restitution processes, conflict over given parcels may increase as new or changed GAI fight for local dominance. It will be important to consider these kinds of conflicts in connection with the security recommendations in that chapter.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation questions:

To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?

What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)

Findings and conclusions

Overall, participation, transparency, accountability and trust show neutral or negative results in the midline evaluation. This coincides with the figures across the samples in the evaluation, and appears to be a trend fostered by factors well outside the CELIs' influence.

Participation

Participation was measured in the survey by an index that included variables such as participation in political parties, JAC and oversight groups or *veedurías*; the perception of participation in elections; voter registration; and whether the respondent voted in the last presidential election. The average score across the CELIs was 36 of 100 points, with no change from baseline to midline and no impact compared to control sites. In the North region, the Participation Index stayed roughly the same, but the score in control municipalities dropped four points, for a significant impact of 3.5pp.

Though no impact was found in data on North region respondents' electoral practices, the trends over time are generally positive. More citizens say they have registered to vote (from 90% at baseline to 96% at midline, with 2pp positive impact compared to controls.) More respondents also say they voted in the last presidential election (from 76% to 87%). Among those who did not vote, more respondents said at midline that this was because they did not care for any candidate. Fewer said they or someone they knew had received money or gifts to vote (from 20% to 16%, with 4pp positive impact) or had been pressured to vote (from 4% to 2%).

CELI N/S undertook a set of electoral activities coinciding with the municipal elections in October, 2015, to train citizens in the use of their democratic rights and promoting a culture of participating politically. Targeting certain audiences in particular – youth, women, and organizational leaders – the CELI provided trainings and workshops (1,500 targeted participants), a transparency strategy taught to 300 leaders on electoral crimes, electoral debates with mayoral candidates which 4,000 attended, and a range of media communications from traditional publications and radio to outreach activities such as works of theater and football games.

Some qualitative respondents in the North region expressed optimism about changes in recent years in participation. A leader of a victims' organization in Montelíbano said that voters had become more conscious – through civil society trainings – of the need to vote and to vote without coercion of any kind. He also described a wider selection of candidates:

More people are running, in fact here I have 200 people running for the 15 Council seats. People have become motivated, people who work with the community and never would have run before. Of course, the ones with power don't want to give it up, but that's where we are. (Victims' association leader, Montelíbano, CELI)

The evaluation team heard of increased interest in women's political participation in interviews in Bajo Cauca. Women's associations there reported having created training plans to prepare women for political roles. A representative from one such organization in Cauca reported:

We are part of the territorial planning council and there's just not much representation of women at this level. We have a big idea, to take these women and train them in the whole political realm – politics, economics, social issues, campaigning. Because right now there's just one woman on a council of 15 seats, and she can't do it alone. We see it as our obligation – we're going to do four years' training. Why couldn't we have a woman mayor and 8 of those Council seats? (Women's organization leader, Cauca, CELI)

Political participation and running for office has tended to go through traditional political parties, but participation in these has been low, according to the survey. In the north Region just 1% reported participating in a political movement or party at baseline, but this rose to 11% at midline, with a positive and significant impact of over 4pp.

Conclusion 1: There is good voter turnout, regardless of interventions. The rates show that citizens in municipalities affected by the conflict think that the two most recent presidential elections were important – elections that have focused on the debate on the end of the conflict. There is a high level of acceptance of formal democratic channels.

Transparency and accountability

One component of transparency is the degree to which citizens participate in oversight processes. North region CELI respondents were slightly more likely to participate in *veedurías* at midline, but those who participate were still only 2% of respondents. However, there was an important increase in the percentage who participated at the level of decision-making in the organizations, from 18% at baseline to 52% at midline, indicating an improvement in the quality if not a great quantity of such participation. Focus group respondents in Montelíbano cited the value of the CELI training they received in citizen oversight, but lamented that community members had not banded together to undertake the activity long-term, because of transport and opportunity costs.

The Consolidation Index reports on the percent of municipal funds that are subject to legally registered oversight mechanisms. This indicator is self-reported by each municipality, once per year, from the Government Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasury. Averaged across the ten Antioquia municipalities, the percentage in 2014 was 36% (there were no data from prior years to base a comparison.) In Sur de Córdoba, the percentage rose from 13% to 62% over the four years of data. The indicator target is 10% - that is, a municipality that subjects 10% of its total public investments to oversight receives full marks.


This contrasts sharply with the survey data, perhaps because the survey's predominantly dispersed rural sample may not be as active in *veedurías* due to their distances from sites

where it might be practiced. However, in the North region, even the qualitative data indicated low participation in *veedurías*, calling into question the high percentages of reported oversight in the Index.

The survey instrument contained questions that were combined into an accountability index equal to 100 points. The survey asked to what degree the mayor kept citizens informed about public expenditures, the presence or absence of public spaces for citizen oversight, and the degree to which local government took citizens’ opinions into account in decision-making. In the North region, the score fell by 7 points over 100, or 14%, while in control municipalities, scores fell by 4 points.

In the North region, respondents’ perceptions of municipal government are mixed, with some improvements in trends since baseline (Figure 5.3). Two questions yielded positive impacts in CELI municipalities when compared to control municipalities: these are regarding the municipality’s tendency to inform on what it is doing (6pp positive impact), and on how well the municipality pays attention to citizen requests (7pp positive impact). There are also absolute improvements in perceptions of institutional and public goods and services.

Figure 6.1. Trends in perceptions of serious problems associated with municipal administration



The Consolidation Index reports on four indicators related to good government: capture of *regalías* project funding; the government’s own Open Government Index (IGA for its Spanish acronym); and the proportion of eligible people paying their taxes (property and industry/commerce). For project funding and the two tax indicators, Sur de Córdoba has declined since 2011, but the region gets full marks on its IGA indicator, in all five municipalities studied. This means that the IGA scores achieved are at least as good as comparable municipalities, not that they are 100% on all IGA indicators. In all four indicators, the ten Antioquia municipalities have declined since 2011.

According to the survey results for the region, there is slightly more trust in the commitment of the mayor’s office to manage a project but less trust in promises made by the JAC president. Some 40% of North region respondents say the performance of the

mayor's office is good or very good, compared to 32% at baseline, but the same respondents say the mayor's office, the departmental government and the national government have all worsened over the last two years. As the trend is the same in control municipalities, there is no attribution to any program.

Perceptions of municipal government varied across clusters, with Cluster 1 showing uniformly positive impacts, while Cluster 6 was almost uniformly negative. Interestingly, at the same time Cluster 6 respondents reported deterioration in the municipal authorities' work, there was a 27pp positive impact in their perceptions of the JACs. (Figure 6.2)

Figure 6.2. Impacts on perceptions of local government

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
The mayor's office runs well or very well	0.289***	-0.15***	0.159	-0.18***	0.158***	0.0429	0.204***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0.179***	-0.129**	0.103	-0.19***	0.310***	0.0703	0.141***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0.146***	0.0329	0.0841	-0.00879	-0.0387	0.205***	0.0328
Municipal authorities invite the community to express opinions on community interests	0.132***	-0.0115	0.0889*	-0.12***	-0.00950	0.0449*	0.0429
Municipal authorities take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0.142***	-0.00087	0.0624*	-0.07***	0.0508**	0.0542**	0.109***
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0.150***	-0.0400	0.133*	-0.0782*	0.113**	0.00827	0.114**
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	-0.00934	0.0295	-0.0788	0.270***	0.0686	0.0194	0.0168

Clusters 7, 8 and 9 showed some positive and some neutral impacts between baseline and midline, and compared to their control municipalities. In absolute terms, the degree to which mayor's offices were seen to report regularly on their expenses, to invite the community's participation, or to take the community's opinions into account were extremely low – rarely better than 3 or 4% of respondents in both CELI and control zones.

Respondents in three clusters reported negative expectations for the future performance of the municipal government as well – Clusters 6 (21pp negative impact), 8 (25pp) and 9 (9pp). The remaining clusters' responses showed no impact.

Respondents tended to be slightly more positive with respect to departmental and national government performance, as shown in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3. Impacts on perceptions of local government

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
The departmental government runs well or very well	0.288***	0.0359	-0.215*	-0.0915	-0.125*	0.134*	0.167**

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0.150***	0.0641	-0.122	-0.0799	0.0993*	0.0604	0.224***
The national government runs well or very well	0.140**	0.0552	-0.29***	-0.0180	-0.0826	0.0116	0.0589
The national government runs well or very well	0.119**	0.212***	-0.122	-0.097**	0.139**	0.0757	0.218***

Cluster 1 is, again, uniformly positive in its rating of departmental and national governments, at significant levels; Cluster 9 is also quite positive. Cluster 5 is negative, where it does show impact, while Cluster 6 is mixed, giving credit to both levels of government for improvement but without rating their performance as good or very good. While both levels of government have mixed results as to their current performance, where impact is found it is said to be better than two years ago. In absolute terms, no government body has convinced more than half the population with its performance.

Qualitative interviews and focus groups show that experiences with the CELI and national-level GOC support can be helpful for the legitimacy of efforts to increase transparency, as in this quote from a functionary in Caucasia:

What one notices is that people are believing more in institutions. It's coming along gradually. The truth is that the people here, traditionally, don't believe in the institutions, for many reasons. These programs have helped people believe again, and they come to us, they depend more on institutional services. (Secretary of Government, Caucasia, CELI)

Conclusion 2: Accountability is still an emerging practice. Responses to the survey questions about accountability were low and the index declined by seven points over 100 from baseline to midline in the North region. Lack of accountability has a negative effect on citizens' participation and effective control. There are examples of local governments not creating spaces for accountability and not inviting citizens, as well as examples of CELI-trained organizations valuing oversight without yet taking it on as a responsibility.

Conclusion 3: Participatory mechanisms are not yet widely effective. The CELI has intervened to ensure that communities' stated needs are included in development plans at the municipal level, and to support accountability from the local government. It appears that the participation of the CELI can give citizens confidence that their petitions are being heard. Unsuccessful petitions erode citizens' perceptions about government management and transparency, which in turn discourages participation, further weakening accountability. What the CELIs have done, then, is important for citizens' confidence in government.

Conclusion 4: In CELI North municipalities, trends since baseline are mixed starkly across clusters: some with very positive experiences of and opinions of government, and some whose loyalty seems to have transferred to the JACs.

Social capital: Trust

The crisis of confidence in Colombian local institutions has worsened in recent years among CELI and control respondents. In the CELI North region, respondents gave slightly higher marks at midline to the national police and the agricultural sector, but for every other

government body, trust worsened. This also happened universally in control municipalities. This generalized negative trend crosses army, justice services, national government, departmental government, municipalities, the JACs, *personería*, and support bodies such as the national training institutes.

Looking at trust at the cluster level, few patterns emerge. (Figure 6.4)

Figure 6.4. Impacts on trust – quite a lot or very much

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
Departmental government	-0.0258	0.0632	-0.0399	0.00517	-0.0681	0.203***	0.00433
National government	-0.0344	-0.0157	-0.152*	0.0127	-0.0445	-0.0795	-0.0597
Justice sector institutions	-0.0523	0.0396	0.0102	0.0463	-0.0515	0.160***	-0.0565
Alternative justice	-0.0160	-0.0227	-0.0640	0.0533	-0.0131	0.0588	0.00842
The agricultural sector	-0.200***	0.0703	0.413***	-0.0594	-0.0439	0.00499	-0.0388
Social organizations, NGOs	0.0318	0.0977	0.0396	-0.00288	-0.0459	0.119*	-0.0403
Training centers	-0.176***	0.0752	-0.126	-0.169***	0.0644	-0.0572	0.164**
Defensoría del Pueblo	-0.0281	0.000276	0.0165	-0.0198	-0.0827	-0.0141	-0.0136
The municipal council	0.0878*	0.0124	0.0257	0.0569	0.0137	0.0173	-0.0927
The national police	-0.0429	0.0623	0.00504	0.0689	0.0123	0.0275	-0.0571
The army	0.0328	-0.0486	0.0700	0.0156	0.0612	0.0614	0.0521
The navy	-0.0408	0.0977	0.00492	-0.180***	0.138**	-0.0124	-0.0035
The municipal <i>personería</i>	-0.0897	-0.0455	0.0323	-0.0587	0.0148	-0.0536	-0.0098
The mayor's office	0.140**	-0.0450	0.0815	0.0719	0.0161	0.0193	0.0822
The JAC	0.0278	0.0140	-0.0409	0.170***	0.0893	-0.114*	-0.13**

Cluster 1, so positive in other measures, reports 20pp negative impact on opinions of the agricultural sector and training centers. However, their opinion of the municipal council stays true to earlier responses, with 9pp positive impact, and 14pp positive impact on trust in the mayor's office. Cluster 5 shows a large 41pp positive impact in its trust of the agricultural sector, and no other significant changes since baseline. Cluster 6, also consistent, shows 17pp positive impact in its trust of the JAC, but negative or neutral results for other government bodies.

Qualitative data shows more promising results in terms of improved trust as a result of direct interventions.⁴⁴ In several cases discussed in interviews and focus groups, this support was provided to offices of the *personería*. In an example from the Nudo de Paramillo and San Juan Valley regions, heavily affected by violence and displacement, the *personero* reports:

⁴⁴ The contrast between quantitative estimates and the qualitative reports may be explained, at least in part, by the difference in samples: as a random exercise, the quantitative research shows the population average, while qualitative research reached out to active community members, who are not only easier to reach but are also more likely to have experience with the interventions.

I can tell you that the women in that neighborhood, the ones who participate in the project on violence against women, they themselves say they're seeing results.

I have a lot of functions, but I really don't have time for anything but victims. We're one of the biggest receiving and sending municipalities. Having Colombia Responde in meetings with the relevant institutions and with citizens, the community says there's been progress. (Personero. Montelíbano, CELI)

CELI work with roads was cited in an interview with the *personero's* office in Cauca as important for infrastructure and for security:

Colombia Responde, with US government funds and with Consolidation from the national government, tries to intervene and improve quality of life. Here in Bajo Cauca and in Cauca in the urban sector, there's been an investment in highways and bridges. This also generates security, because those places are now accessible. (Personería, Cauca, CELI)

In one case in Cauca, staff in the *Personería* cited the importance of support from CELI North:

We've benefited from Consolidation but I think it's the Colombia Responde team that made the difference. Consolidation helped us with logistical support, equipment, a computer. Colombia Responde has supported the human rights committee with a student activity called Human Rights Olympics since 2013. All the 9th graders participate. Colombia Responde has helped with those expenses considerably. (Personería, Cauca, CELI)

CELI support to *personerías* also supported work with victims' associations regarding the steps to reparation, inclusion, and taking advantage of the municipal victims' roundtable. The Cauca *personero* reported:


We meet with victims' association on nights and weekends so that many people can come and we can talk with them all at once. This helps us attend more people on the issue of the victims' roundtable, and it's like our extension service: they're getting trained, they're learning the laws. This helps us a lot to meet the protocol for attention to victims. (Personería, Cauca, CELI)

Conclusion 5: Trust in institutions depends on their ability to meet citizen needs, and in general that has worsened. Despite this general decline, the North region as a whole reported improved quality in two government bodies, and scattered improvements cluster by cluster. In general, however, circumstances have worsened citizens' overall trust of government since baseline, creating an even worse environment than when the CELIs began.

Service delivery


In terms of service delivery, the state's System for Potential Beneficiaries of Social Services (SISBEN) is the means by which the GOC works to guarantee the rights of the most vulnerable populations in the country. Registration in SISBEN is a key step for access to state presence and the provision of services; it requires the completion of an enrollment questionnaire and provides an identification document. As shown in Figure 6.5 below, the levels of registration are high.

Figure 6.5. Trends in citizen registration for social services



The evaluation survey included a set of questions on government capacity and service delivery from the citizens’ perspectives, and created an index of these indicators for the CELI PMPs. The index is composed of four elements, totaling 100 points, and includes access to services, quality of services, quality of public policy formulation and implementation, and perceptions of municipal actors’ honesty. The results for CELI North region municipalities coincide with scores in the control zones, and as such there is no impact by comparison. The CELI North region score declined by 15% or from 43 to 36 points in absolute terms. See Figure 6.6.

Figure 6.6. Trends in government capability index (points out of 100)



In terms of particular services, there are no impacts and few changes in absolute terms among the various services queried in the survey. For the following public services, respondents were asked whether they had access to the service, and if so, to rate its quality, and to say whether or not it had improved over the last two years. The figure below shows the changes from baseline to midline. There were no impacts, as the trends were similar in all control areas as well.

Figure 6.7. Trends in public service access and quality

	Access at midline	Change in Access	Change in Quality
Health clinic			4%
Under – 5s with access to quality child care	32%	10%	-7%
5-11 year-olds with access to quality education	98%	1%	14%
12-18 year-olds with access to quality education	79%	3%	12%
Electricity	89%	7%	-10%
Propane gas	48%	2%	7%
Water	16%	-1%	16%

	Access at midline	Change in Access	Change in Quality
Sewage	4%	-1%	14%
Trash collection	9%	1%	-7%
Cellular telephone	91%	3%	0%


There were slight changes in access, mostly positive, and some positive changes in the ratings citizens gave – particularly for water, sewage, and primary school. More negative results were seen for electricity quality, trash collection, and child care for under-5s.

Despite these marks for improved quality, when asked whether these services had improved in the last two years, fewer respondents said this was so than at baseline, for nearly all the services mentioned. Given the very strong trends of lower trust in government entities at all levels, this response may well reflect general attitudes toward service providers, as well as election campaigns emphasizing errors and omissions among the incumbency.

Consolidation Index figures on the component of social services have had some mixed gains. Secondary and high school education have shown increases since 2011, in both the Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba municipalities. Primary school coverage and coverage by the health system have remained high and stable as well, but in both sub-regions, Education Ministry data shows an increased rate of annual desertion or drop-out, and increased teacher positions left unfilled. In health, both regions also saw declines in the “extramural” or drop-in care services that the state provides in areas without clinics.

The Consolidation Index also measures coverage of electrical service and cell reception. In both sub-regions, the data show high levels of coverage that correspond, not to full or nearly full coverage, but to meeting the average for municipalities that are socioeconomically similar. The figures are also based on local actors’ definitions of principal population centers, which explains in part why the evaluation survey sample’s more dispersed rural respondents would cite lower levels of coverage.

Figure 6.8. Secondary data: Electric and cell coverage Antioquia (l) and Sur de Córdoba (r)



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors’ calculations

The data from survey respondents showed notable optimism for the future. Since this was also the case in control municipalities, not all impacts are positive: that is, sometimes the control zones showed even more optimism than did the respondents in CELI municipalities. This is especially notable in Clusters 6, 7, 8 and 9. (Figure 6.9)

Figure 6.9. Impacts on expectations for service delivery in the future

Cluster:	1	4	5	6	7	8	9
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0.141***	0.0405	0.0828	-0.107**	-0.21***	-0.136***	-0.136***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0.0324	0.104**	-0.0250	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.0501	-0.0517
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0.0331	0.00546	0.0755	-0.14***	-0.103*	-0.122**	-0.0815
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0.0468	0.0583	0.0893	-0.0811*	-0.14***	-0.265***	-0.0889*

Conclusion 6: There is no progress in government capacity, from citizen perspectives, except limited improvements shown in some clusters. The analysis shows that governmental capacity is a desirable characteristic but difficult to achieve, and very subjective, as it responds to structural and historical factors that can escape the reach of CELI interventions. However, the stagnation of perceptions of government capacity should be taken into account as a sign of the failure of the policies being implemented to consolidate these regions.

Conclusion 7: Perceptions of social services are mostly stagnant, especially with respect to quality. These indicators had little to do with CELI interventions, but do show a fairly stagnant set of perceptions about social services. Combined with the deterioration in public perceptions evident in the government capacity index and trust questions discussed above, it is clear that conditions for basic social services are largely unchanged. These conditions contribute to the poverty trap discussed in previous chapters.

Victims' Rights

The percentage of North region households where a family member has experienced a human rights violation is between 6% and 7%, as at baseline. The only variables that show impact on victims' rights indicators are, first, a 14pp decline in the proportion reporting that BACRIM were responsible for these violations. North region respondents were also 24pp more likely to say they did not know who was responsible for the violations of their rights. There was a 13pp impact on the proportion of HHs who say they did nothing when their rights were violated, reporting it to no one, but also about a 4pp positive impact in those who say they registered a *tutela*, and a 6pp impact in those who say they took their case to the *personería* or mayor's office.

The Consolidation Index reports very positive figures for these municipalities' human rights and victimization, improving each year since 2011. The municipalities now have a human rights committee, and rates for massacres and political homicides have fallen, in most cases to zero. Displacement has declined, though there were still nearly 3,500

displaced persons in Sur de Córdoba in 2014 and almost 5,000 in the ten Antioquia municipalities. Antioquia still suffers with antipersonnel mine accidents, while in Sur de Córdoba these have almost vanished from the data.

Recommendations

1. *Limit the scope of evaluation to the factors under implementers' manageable interest (low impact findings and contextual knowledge)* The CELIs were proposed as part of a whole-of-government intervention with coordinated GOC support, but on its own it is a complementary intervention. The design of the impact evaluation poses far higher impact gains than can be expected in such a situation. This does not imply that the interventions have not helped to improve participation, governance and institutionalization in local contexts; however, there are historic structural failings in the territories that prevent any such intervention from constituting a true model of governance for institutionalization.

The evaluation team suggests that impact analysis be focused on the reasonable and specific results that the intervention can be expected to make. It is the GoC that must lead efforts for the institutionalization of the territory. Where this institutionalization does not exist, the CELIs can only add support in limited ways.

2. *Continue to strengthen political participation through social organizations (conclusion 1)* The CELIs should continue to support social and political processes for association to strengthen citizens' knowledge of the channels of political participation and influence in public administration. These specific strategies and actions would support these ends:

- Help women and youth acquire identity documents and register for elections.
- Promote women's organizations to encourage participation in all spheres of public life.
- Use schools as a site for training, socialization and promoting values, democratic practices and institutions for children and youth with special emphasis on the importance of elections.
- Strengthen political parties and ensure their transparency to avoid the concentration of power.

3. *Strengthen accountability (conclusions 2 and 5)* Strengthen the ongoing practice of accountability to improve public policy orientation, gain citizen trust and provide management oversight:

- Train communities and local governments in the practice of setting priorities, performance indicators, and results-based management for day-to-day operations.
- Generate appropriate spaces in internal, external, vertical and horizontal levels to assist communities to keep tabs on progress on indicators and management.
- Strengthen information processes and coordinate with control entities to ensure that communities and authorities can promptly investigate and apply sanctions when mismanagement or corruption is detected. Prosecution is important when funds go awry.
- Accompany increased social and legal sanctions with sustained education policies to stimulate a culture of discrediting corrupt practices.
- Simplify administrative processes.

- Develop participatory budgets.
4. ***Strengthen citizen consultation and participation from supply and demand sides (conclusions 4 and 5).*** The fact that citizens do not feel involved and that trust in institutions has diminished requires a renewed focus on consultation exercises and citizen participation. Train and strengthen the exercise of citizenship from one side, while on the other, intervene rigorously to strengthen local government institutions in the same capabilities the citizens are being trained to expect.
 5. ***Continue to work with municipalities to improve service delivery, and involve citizens in oversight activities (conclusions 5, 6 and 7.)*** USAID and its implementers have a daunting task in their work to strengthen municipalities' and departments' service provision. There is a national imperative to decentralize, combined with low capacity and funding at municipal levels. Focus on pilot-size activities with significant civil society involvement, and scaffold the local governments with consistent TA. Use scorecards or other measures to involve citizens in rating the service provision changes, and learn from failures as well as successes what practices work best in different sectors and circumstances.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation question: What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?

Findings and conclusions


Social capital: Trust

The index of social capital is composed of trust (60 points) and participation (40 points – see the next section of the report), for a total of 100 points. Trust was identified at different levels: family, neighbors, friends, the JAC, legal and state oversight bodies, development institutions, municipal and national government, and the police and military.

As is apparent, many of the factors affecting the index are beyond the remit of cooperation programs such as the CELI and should be considered indicators of contextual conditions. Nevertheless, analysis of the subcomponents at program level provides an increased understanding of its strengths and weaknesses.


In general terms, the social capital index did not register any impact attributable to CELI interventions, but the trend is somewhat positive. In North region municipalities the index improved by 1 point over 100. The increase was found in the sub-index of participation, balancing out the negative effects on trust (described above). However, North region municipalities did not outpace the control municipalities, and so no impact was found.

Figure 7.1. Trends in the social capital index



The trust sub-index was constructed in part from the trust in government questions mentioned above, and the three survey questions, shown in the following figure. North region municipalities showed a decline in trust of neighbors and a larger decline of trust in others in the community; both CELI and control municipalities saw an increase in responses that the tradition of collective work on projects is part of their community life. In neither case impact was found, but these data show the trends from baseline to midline among CELI and control municipalities in the North region.

Figure 7.2. Trends in perceptions of trust between peers



At the same time, respondents revealed somewhat negative expectations for the future about their relationships and feelings of trust with their communities. When asked how they felt those relationships would evolve in the future, Clusters 6, 7 and 9 all said they saw those relationships worsening, at a significant level of 15-20pp. Only Cluster 1 responded that they saw those relationships improving, with a 13pp positive impact.

The trust index also included a battery of questions on how much trust respondents have in state institutions, from the national level to the local. Responses to these items were discussed in detail in the Institutional Development chapter of this volume. Summing up these results, citizens’ trust in government is low and in decline. None of the results can be attributed to the CELI or PNCRT interventions, and indeed, the general nature of the decline suggests issues that are far outside the reach of a given intervention.

While the survey shows no impact and somewhat negative trends in the levels of trust felt by members of the population towards their peers, in the qualitative fieldwork a different reality became apparent. According to the qualitative findings, save some exceptions, trust in institutions and in peers is a constant among the respondents, and was at times a direct result of participation with CELI Norte:

For me the most important thing in all these projects is that they taught us to work as a team and to be united, because before, we weren't. I think this is the most important foundation for us to be able to continue and move forward as a community. (Producer, Caucasia, CELI)

Conclusion 1: The survey data shows a marked decline in the level of trust that citizens have in most government bodies. This effect is not attributed to the CELI interventions, because it is common to the control sites as well. Among the more actively participating community members who were interviewed in qualitative data collection, there are reports of positive change and improved relationships between citizens and the state. However, the latter group of respondents is a select, positively biased group and much smaller.

Conclusion 2: The survey data also shows a decline in some trust levels between peers and neighbors. These figures contrast with the experiences narrated by the participants during the qualitative work, who had higher levels of participation and much more positive opinions of the social fabric – but, again, these are active participants and so, by design, they are more likely to perceive and take part in the construction of social fabric.


Social capital: Participation in associations

CELI North supported and strengthened different forms of association, as shown in the one-point increase in the participation sub-index (1 point over 40, or 2.5%). However, North region municipalities did not outpace the control municipalities, and so no impact was found in the index score. That is, participation also increased where the CELI did not intervene.

Breaking down the index score, there are important gains in the North region in participation in organizations. Respondents in CELI municipalities reported greater participation in community meetings (from 24% at baseline to 58% at midline), citizen oversight committees (1% to 2%), organizations for displaced or vulnerable people (4% to 10%), political movements or parties (1% to 11%), voluntary groups (11% to 21%), sport or cultural groups (7% to 9%) and women’s organizations (3% to 8%). Respondents reported reduced participation in the JACs (85% to 68%) and in producers’ associations (13% to 8%).

Interestingly, and in parallel to findings across the study, those who did participate, reported participating at a higher level, including decision-making. This was true for various types of organizations, as shown in Figure 7.3:

Figure 7.3. Trends in participation at the level of decision-making



So those who continued to participate did so at a level higher than they did at baseline. However, this pattern did not hold true for all organization types (notably, women’s organizations), the pattern is strongly in favor of greater participation. Also important to note is that these patterns are largely consistent with patterns in control areas, such that impact was found only for community meetings (9pp) and for parents’ associations (13pp).

The CELI undertook a range of interventions that focused on existing grassroots organizations such as the JACs, which are the prime instance of participation in public life in the municipalities. Productive associations have been created or strengthened. Another focus of intervention was the support provided to victims’ associations and cultural associations present in the areas of intervention; these operate as a way of building trust, collective identity and belonging in the territories, rooted in the intangible heritage of the community.


In the North region, the qualitative research team found a range of organizations, including those dedicated to production, to women, to victims, to youth, to displaced persons, etc., indicating community interest in associating for social and economic reasons:

At times one is resistant or just wants to see the money now – not go to a bunch of meetings. These processes are slow, but with time you start to see the results. As you keep going, and keep going, to the trainings, you're also giving more, and enjoying more just being in the association, and you get more out of it. (Producer, Montelíbano, CELI)

The Consolidation Index supports the findings of significant organizational activity, in an increase from 16% to 53% of organizations renewing their charters with their Chambers of Commerce, from 2011 to 2014 in Sur de Córdoba, and 27% in 2014 in Antioquia (there are no comparative data from 2011 to 2013 from those ten municipalities).

Also, among those who did participate, there were positive trends (mirrored in the control municipalities) in the benefits they reported from their participation. Respondents were asked if belonging to associations had served them in the following ways, and their responses were much stronger at midline, as shown in Figure 7.4:

Figure 7.4. Trends in benefits reported from participation in organizations



Conclusion 3: In the North region municipalities, participation in associations improved, and those who participated were more active (that is, they participated more at the level of decision-making). They also reported increased benefits of participation. This was also true in control municipalities, and so little or no impact was found.

The particular role of the Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs)

The *Juntas de Acción Comunal*, or community action councils, are the most local level of civil society recognized in Colombian law: voluntary associations in urban neighborhoods or rural *veredas* that can formally constitute for civic purposes. CELI North developed strong commitments to work with the JACs over the course of the activities, both in building their capacity to function as more effective community organizations, as well as through engaging the JACs in direct contractual relationships to carry out specific projects.

Among numerous related interventions, CELI N/S trained Bajo Cauca leaders in environmental management, land issues, communications and financial management.⁴⁵

The training and guidance provided by the CELI empowered JACs to enter into legal agreements for carrying out local community infrastructure projects. In the North region, the CELI made infrastructure grants to JACs throughout Bajo Cauca. In its December 2012 report, the project reported that of the 45 grant agreements approved in Córdoba in that quarter, 34 JACs and two JAC associations received funding to move forward with community projects.⁴⁶ Dozens of JACs have also taken on responsibility for managing and fulfilling the contractual terms of direct grants, providing these civic organizations with important experience in community management and infrastructure construction and maintenance.

Interviews and focus groups showed that the JAC's value in a community extends at times to resolving conflicts and maintaining a sort of local-level justice as necessary. A respondent from Caucasia explains how his JAC is run:

The JAC has its organization, its leaders and committees, and one of these is the Conciliation Committee. So we've never had to go tell someone in our community to do something or not do something. Everyone in the community has the right to dialogue and a resolution through the JAC. We've never had a serious problem, then, between families, we've never arrived at those extremes. (Citizens, Caucasia, CELI)

As noted above, participation in JACs in the North region declined from baseline to midline (85% to 68%), though decision-making rose (29% to 39%) among those who continued to participate in the JACs. The patterns are similar in control zones; as a result, no impact is seen.

Conclusion 4: Despite the fact that on occasions these entities are considered to have been co-opted by local political interests – in certain places a threat to their legitimacy – they continue to represent the gateway to state services and programs. Where the security situation has allowed, and where the JACs have the confidence of the population, this kind of social organization is central to political life and to participation in the *veredas*. In these cases, the JACs play a central role in providing access to, and enjoyment of, the services offered by the state in terms of political participation, infrastructural improvements and social control. In some regions the JACs are weaker, explaining why surveyed households report reduced levels of participation overall. However, JACs participants report more active participation at the level of decision-making.

Conclusion 5: In the *veredas* of geographically distant municipalities the JACs are the principal spaces in which disputes between neighbors are resolved, through direct negotiation. By having this local resource, minor social conflicts are resolved at the *vereda* level, without the need to take cases to municipal or national bodies. This is the case in

⁴⁵ CELI N/S 2013 Quarterly Report, April-June. Bogotá, Colombia: Chemonics, p. 16.

⁴⁶ CELI N/S Quarterly Report October-December 2012. Bogotá, Colombia: Chemonics, p. 9.

regions where the security situation allows it. However, participation can be affected in cases where threats are issued against leaders.

Associations and productive projects

The priorities set for the CELI changed from a focus on consolidation of the GOC's presence to what could be characterized as more traditional rural development objectives, with a focus on agricultural production and the strengthening of rural value chains. This is seen most clearly in the reassignment of the CELIs from their original focus on consolidation under DO 1, "Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated," to its present articulation as DO 3, "Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth." Throughout each project and especially since the revised Development Objective was released in June 2015, work with producers' associations has been a principal means for the projects to achieve their goals.

In carrying out this work, CELI North supported producers' associations in several ways: technical assistance and training; support work in developing marketing and commercialization (also often involving training); and assistance in financial services to support production and marketing. Considerable focus was placed on organizational training and capacity building, and TA on a range of crops, as described in the economic development chapter of this report. Training producers' associations covered a broad range of topics, including improving agricultural production, introducing new crops, strengthening the functioning of their organizations, and training youth to encourage the transfer of knowledge and resources to the next generation.

One of the principal measures of assistance to producer associations from *Colombia Responde* has been the entrepreneurial approach they have learned from trainings and other activities. A participant in Cáceres reports:

We've had a productive alliance with the Ministry, the departmental government, and Colombia Responde. [They taught us to] see our parcels as a business. We weren't monitoring our expenses, we just went out to work. But we learned in the trainings how to do it. (Producer. Cáceres, CELI)

Another respondent in a focus group discussed the importance of the empowerment her association had gained by taking part in the *Colombia Responde* support to producer associations.

Colombia Responde has pushed us in that they've given us the power to manage, to believe in ourselves and to manage our resources. They said we, as campesinos, were capable to not let anyone else manage us. In this administrative part they've strengthened us such that they've been a catalyst for us. Consolidation has been involved as well with us and others, and we have the full machinery we need from them, in hand with USAID. (Cacao producer, Cáceres, CELI)

Respondents also recognized the variety of programs available to them, in a way that had not been the case previously.


I got involved with a Consolidation productive project, making organic fertilizer and vegetable gardens. Through Consolidation and SENA we got technical training and

everything. In the process I learned what Consolidation was. (Producer, Montelíbano, CELI)

As noted above, 13% of respondents at baseline said they participated in producer associations, but only 8% at midline. At the same time, those who remained participated more at the level of decision-making: from 34% at baseline to 43% at midline.

Survey results suggest there is an economic rationality behind respondents’ associativity, though the results are common across treated and control municipalities, and therefore show no impact. CELI respondents said that the associations were useful to their productive projects for several fundamental reasons, and at much greater percentages than at baseline, as shown in Figure 7.5:

Figure 7.5. Trends in reasons for deciding to associate



Data at the national level strongly suggests that female-headed households (FHHs) make up much of these increases: it appears that women see this economic rationality very clearly and associate in order to take advantage of the opportunities that associating can confer. For two of these reasons for deciding to associate, the difference was statistically significant in comparison to the control households (Figure 7.6). The impact for both associating to process their products and associating to sell their products was about 11pp.

Figure 7.6. Impacts on reasons for deciding to associate

Variable	CELI
Decided to associate in order to process their products	0.106*
Decided to associate in order to sell their products	0.111*

Focus group respondents in Cáceres said that associating was important:

Our strength is cacao, and we have the campesino vocation. We want members to have love for the land, and for working in groups. We’re aiming for collective work, cycling our families to spread out the season and earning. It’s not just the individuals – it’s about having mutual respect. (Producers’ association members, Cáceres, CELI)

Conclusion 6: Among the most important incentives for forming associations are processing, transport, sales, and joint training. These results have been more significant in the CELI interventions and above all among FHHs. People who participated at baseline continue to take part in associations, but are now also involved in decision-making at

higher levels than in control municipalities.

Conclusion 7: At the same time, overall household participation in these associations has declined. This contradiction might strengthen the hypothesis that households seek out benefits and that once these have been achieved, participants lose interest in the organizations.

Women's and victims' associations

Implementation of Law 1448 for victims and land restitution brought substantial change in the region, in that victims were made visible and also made aware of their rights. CELI worked to support the implementation of the law, concretely in the strengthening of municipal *personerías* (please see also the Institutional Development chapter).

In some cases, producer associations are made up principally of women who are victims of the conflict and/or living in situations of displacement. As a regional secretary of government told us:

They might be women's leadership groups, or agricultural, but really, they all started as victims' groups.

These associations have enabled women to generate income, create solidarity with others and build roots in the territories that have received these people and families. CELI N/S worked to include and support women in a range of entrepreneurial and social endeavors, such as women's and victims' organizations advocacy, psycho-social support groups, a young journalists' organization, and local savings and credit groups, among others.⁴⁷ In interviews and focus groups, respondents report improvements to the functioning of their associations in the North region, such as these women's association representatives from Caucasia:

With Colombia Responde we've learned transparent processes, merit-based participation instead of picking friends, having an interdisciplinary committee with representation from the administration, from Consolidation, from Colombia Responde, and from our organization and the community.

And how to make consensual decisions from our opinions, and we choose how we'll staff ourselves, how we'll make purchases. The projects have committees: operational and oversight. Having an oversight committee is really important because we're bringing in the community so they can see how we're executing resources.

Exactly, and now we have experience to say, yes, we can execute resources. This is an incalculable value and recognition for the organization. (Women's organization respondents, Caucasia, CELI)

⁴⁷ CELI N/S Women's Day flyer, social change agents, undated.

The CELI has particularly emphasized strengthening existing women's organizations in the North region. At times this has involved supporting one of the organization's own projects, or proposing new projects.

Colombia Responde arrived within the framework of territorial consolidation, and put our interests center-stage. They researched what we do and who we are. We told Dr. José Félix that we had a project for strengthening women in the six municipalities of Bajo Cauca, but we lacked funding. We told him when we met him: there's an organization like ours in each of the municipalities of Bajo Cauca, a second-level organization that brings together the grassroots organizations of that municipality. And he said yes. We created the sub-regional network of women of Bajo Cauca, five delegates from each municipality, who represent the network's organizations. When we finished, Colombia Responde asked if we would undertake a project with them - grupos locales de ahorro y crédito. We thought, 'Maybe they'll give us resources we can lend to our women and their organizations so they can start productive projects.' We saw how it worked in María la Baja and we joined in. (Women's association representative, Caucasia, CELI)

The survey data show that victims' associations are growing. In CELI North, the percentage of respondents who reported belonging to organizations of this kind rose from 4% to 8%. Participation in women's organizations also increased, from 3% at baseline to 8% at midline. More respondents reported participation in decision-making (from 12% to 32% of North region respondents).

Organizations for displaced, returned or vulnerable people were said to have transformed into organizations of another kind that have expanded their identities and their sense of what they should seek to achieve, without losing sight of the reasons they were originally founded. Frequently, in order to generate income for their members and for the organizations, victims' associations established complementary productive projects.

Having heard of *Colombia Responde* in Montería, a woman in Montelíbano worked with her peers to put together a proposal for organizational strengthening support to multiple organizations in her own municipalities.

My colleagues and I went to Montería and proposed the project. They took our information and in a month we had an answer: Colombia Responde would help us. All our partner organizations found their counterpart funding. Colombia Responde arrives and strengthens our organizations, in our case with \$15,300,000 pesos. In other organizations it was a machine to make closed shoes that was lacking, or help improving an office. A rural group needed a motor to prepare their rice crops for sale. It was successful not only in [financial] support, but in the training, the follow-up, the help with Chambers of Commerce, help with taxes or if we needed a lawyer, whatever it was. So I think it was a great success because by supporting the organizations, we all stand up and grow, we don't beg from anyone, like the mayor's office. We prefer our independence and don't want their politics. We just want a shot at the opportunities out there. (Victims' association, Montelíbano, CELI)

Conclusion 8: The social capital that has been constructed as a result of the work of victims' associations has permitted the creation and strengthening of other kinds of organizations in a process that has encouraged an expansion of their reasons for existing and their aims, fomenting a sense of belonging and identifying new resources.

Conclusion 9: Participation in victims' associations and organizations of vulnerable groups

increased in the North region, and the CELIs have had a small but significant positive impact on participation in women's groups. Respondents can describe the qualitatively important function of their CELI participation for productive and other ends.

Cultural and other associations

The North region has a wide ethnic and cultural diversity, much of this affected by the armed conflict. CELI supported associations that had disappeared as a result of the conflict. Such associations, based in culture, reconstruct trust and identity relations within and between communities. Youth participation is especially important, for the conservation of cultural legacies. A cultural leader from an association in Caucasia explains:

Women have the role of conserving our tradition, la tuna Tambora. There were something like 18 women and 5 men involved from the organization. The dance tradition mustn't be lost – it's ancestral, since the first populations arrived in Cáceres. Since then there's been a lot of mixing – lots of cultures, lots of influences. (Women's association member, Caucasia, CELI)

Another important type of cultural association is the community councils of Afro-Colombian communities, and the indigenous *resguardos* or *cabildos*. CELI worked closely with a range of organizations that represent these ethnic groups to strengthen their organizational capacity, promote new leadership (for example, among women and youth), and help them develop action or development plans in line with their own priorities. One case where CELI has done so is with the nine member councils of the El Bagre region. At the regional level, half of the leadership council is women, and in the member councils, women hold some 40% of leadership posts as well. In support of these organizations, CELI works with the leadership to take their development plans to the municipal government in El Bagre, with a focus on gender and social inclusion.⁴⁸

Cultural associations are fundamental to communities as a conduit for self-awareness and to feel pride in their history and their traditions. CELI projects worked with community elders to recuperate lost practices and customs, and with youth to encourage saving the culture's importance among the next generation.

Conclusion 10: CELIs have supported different cultural associations, enabling the reconstruction of community values damaged by the armed conflict. Returning to activities such as dance, music or traditional artisan production has permitted communities to create a cultural identity in which they are able to recognize themselves and feel pride in their traditions; it has also acted as a form of resistance against armed actors. CELI interventions have strengthened these cultural organizations, enabling the re-emergence of social ties. The high levels of social capital that have been constructed in the regions have been added to the equation, as a result of the presence of victims' associations, which establish the foundations of trust on which the participation of social organizations is based.

⁴⁸ CELI N/S Overview of gender and social inclusion in the municipality of El Bagre (Antioquia), undated.

Conclusion 11: The support provided to associations that preserve and reproduce the intangible cultural heritage of a community is enormously important because it produces transformations in the communities by assigning value to collective identity. Cultural associations have helped to inspire processes of symbolic renewal in communities of victims of the conflict.

Recommendations

- 1. Adapt programs to encourage trust (conclusion 2 and trust section findings in Institutional Development chapter).** The unprecedented overall decline in trust of the government cannot be resolved by development alone, but it is important to develop ways to strengthen community ties to mayors' offices and local government bodies. Despite international development interventions, the population feels less trust toward local government than they did two years ago, and less trust between neighbors. These indicators are highly sensitive to factors outside the control of any program, but interventions can and should develop tools to confront the problem.
- 2. Improve work with female heads of household using participatory models (conclusion 3)** In terms of participation, the positive results obtained for MHHs need to be extended to FHHs. Efforts should be made to benefit this population that has traditionally been immersed in unfavorable socioeconomic conditions and has had less free time available to dedicate to associations. FHHs who already participate in victims', women's and other groups could serve as guides for other women to become involved and to increase their participation. Similarly, the community leaders of associations and other groups, whose commitment and participation represent higher levels of social embeddedness, could serve as a resource to advance this aim. The CELIs should continue investigating different ways of using this resource of association leadership and practice in the final months of the intervention, engaging in outreach activities with community members whose behaviors indicate increasing isolation.
- 3. Support the legitimacy of the JACs (conclusions 1, 4 and 5)** In order to strengthen the JACs, the CELIs should continue training leaders in board election processes and community participation tools to counteract the risk of the organizations losing legitimacy. Support of the JACs to encourage wider participation in local affairs – including women's participation, that of victims, and other marginalized groups – should be a priority, so as to generate horizontal communication between neighbors and vertical relations between communities and local authorities.

Programs should monitor the quality of community associations such as the JACs, in ways similar to how producers' organizations are monitored. The ICO should be adapted to meet organizational and community expectations for these groups, and to ensure that programs involve the JACs, communities and local government. In cooperation with mayors' offices and officials responsible for community or administrative affairs (the *secretarios de gobierno*), work should continue to establish special programs focused on the JACs to improve their management capacities and their representativeness. Monitoring results should be made public to generate community incentives to play an active role in holding JACs to account.

The component competencies of the ICO should be evaluated to determine which aspects work well and which do not. Given the differences of opinion that exist concerning its usefulness, Chatham House rules could be used for such a discussion, in which parties express their opinions openly and identify weaknesses or gaps in the measuring tools without fear that their views will become public.

4. ***Strengthen the role of the JACs in the resolution of conflicts (conclusion 5)*** The CELIs should support the strengthening of the tools currently available to the JACs in their conflict resolution role with training for leaders in the *veredas*. Other interventions, local and regional *personerías*, the police and the *Defensoría* or even groups such as the Chambers of Commerce, could also be involved.
5. ***Make organizations more transparent (conclusions 6 and 7)*** To improve the quality of the associations, use a refined ICO as a monitoring and ranking system for associations. Make results public and give greater access to programs and benefits to the highest ranking associations, with local authorities' involvement.
7. ***Loosen the requirement that beneficiaries must be grouped into associations (conclusions 6 and 7)*** In future programs, the possibilities that intervention might not rely strictly on the creation of associations should be examined. It is not always necessary to require that potential beneficiaries form an association. If an association is to be authentic, it should emerge from the initiative of individuals who decide whether they wish to take part or not and who wish to gain individual advantages (for example, improved sales for their products). This represents a contrast with the JACs, whose objectives are based on public goods and proposals (such as parks, bridges, child-care facilities, road improvements, etc.).

Similarly, programs such as CELI should support private initiatives. Small businesspersons improving their businesses may be a ripe target for support, as did happen in some cases under the CELIs. Cases also exist where the obligatory formation of new associations is not appropriate, for cultural, social or historical reasons.

8. ***Increase collaboration with associations whose objectives may or may not be at their root productive (conclusions 8-11)*** Social organizations are also candidates for interventions like CELI because of their high levels of social capital, and they are increasing in number in the zones of intervention. Such organizations (that are not necessarily producer associations) should be supported to become autonomous and financially sustainable. Such activities could be developed in cooperation with the DPS, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA) and the municipal agricultural technical support units (UMATAs).

ANNEXES – REGIONS AND CLUSTERS


ANNEX I: CLUSTER-LEVEL RESULTS, LIST EXPERIMENT

List experiment results in this annex are presented first for the North region, and then for the clusters that make up the North sample. These clusters are:


Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
1	Valencia and Tierralta (Córdoba)	San Rafael (Antioquia)
4	Puerto Libertador, San José de Uré and Montelíbano (Córdoba)	San Pablo (Antioquia)
5	Anorí (Antioquia)	Remedios (Antioquia)
6	Ituango, Briceño and Valdivia (Antioquia)	Urrao (Antioquia)
7	Tarazá and Cáceres (Antioquia)	Campamento (Antioquia)
8	Caucasia and Nechí (Antioquia)	San Luís (Antioquia)
9	El Bagre and Zaragoza (Antioquia)	Sonsón (Antioquia)

Results are shown for the question on contact with illegal armed groups, and then for contact with illicit crops. For the region and then for each cluster, three graphs are presented. The first shows the results at baseline, the second at midline, and the third shows the impact, if any, using the differences in differences calculation. As will be seen across the graphs, there is an overall diminution of respondent reports that they have contact with either illegal armed groups or with illicit crops, in many cases approaching zero at midline. However, this trend crosses the treatment and control sites, and as such, the trend cannot be attributed to any intervention.

North region: Contact with armed groups






North region: Contact with illicit crops






North region, Cluster I

Contact with illegal armed groups






Contact with illicit crops






North region, Cluster 4




Contact with illegal armed groups






Contact with illicit crops



North region, Cluster 5 Contact with illegal armed groups






Contact with illicit crops






North region, Cluster 6

Contact with illegal armed groups




Contact with illicit crops




North region, Cluster 7


Contact with illegal armed groups




Contact with illicit crops



North region, Cluster 8 Contact with illegal armed groups




Contact with illicit crops




North region, Cluster 9

Contact with illegal armed groups



Contact with illicit crops



ANNEX 2: DATA TABLES, CLUSTER

This annex presents data tables for the clusters that make up the North region sample. These clusters are:

Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
1	Valencia and Tierralta (Córdoba)	San Rafael (Antioquia)
4	Puerto Libertador, San José de Uré and Montelíbano (Córdoba)	San Pablo (Antioquia)
5	Anorí (Antioquia)	Remedios (Antioquia)
6	Ituango, Briceño and Valdivia (Antioquia)	Urrao (Antioquia)
7	Tarazá and Cáceres (Antioquia)	Campamento (Antioquia)
8	Caucasia and Nechí (Antioquia)	San Luís (Antioquia)
9	El Bagre and Zaragoza (Antioquia)	Sonsón (Antioquia)

Cluster I

CELI: Valencia and Tierralta, Córdoba

Control: San Rafael, Antioquia

Variable	Cluster I				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0.333	0.290	0.273	0.148	0.115**
The family is experiencing hunger	0.096	0.181	0.181	0.303	-0.0260
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0.234	0.464	0.838	0.830	0.224***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0.852	0.952	0.745	0.686	0.169***
Productive activities earn very little money	0.818	0.819	0.144	0.030	0.116***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0.014	0.015	0.005	0.004	0.00544
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0.667	0.830	0.444	0.794	-0.206***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0.204	0.374	0.199	0.447	-0.0595
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	333579	292157	435486	348256	16,898
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0.454	0.559	0.227	0.475	-0.154***
Have a checking account	0.032	0.011	0.028	0.054	-0.0613***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0.449	0.176	0.713	0.320	0.104*
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0.412	0.353	0.356	0.419	-0.141**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0.708	0.537	0.831	0.713	-0.00253

Currently have debt	0.574	0.649	0.375	0.572	-0.126**
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	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0.424	0.293	0.556	0.165	0.289***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0.315	0.362	0.230	0.109	0.179***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0.093	0.127	0.176	0.069	0.146***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0.051	0.067	0.125	0.022	0.132***
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0.019	0.052	0.111	0.011	0.142***
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0.325	0.260	0.373	0.168	0.150***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0.612	0.471	0.537	0.433	-0.00934
The departmental government runs well or very well	0.427	0.382	0.613	0.274	0.288***
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0.203	0.310	0.144	0.102	0.150***
The national government runs well or very well	0.455	0.550	0.511	0.459	0.140**
The national government runs better than two years ago	0.188	0.423	0.073	0.208	0.119**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0.266	0.198	0.230	0.194	-0.0258
The national government	0.342	0.388	0.207	0.278	-0.0344
Justice sector institutions	0.303	0.267	0.192	0.210	-0.0523
Alternative justice institutions	0.248	0.226	0.189	0.196	-0.0160
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0.444	0.237	0.239	0.217	-0.200***
Social organizations and NGOs	0.212	0.290	0.223	0.231	0.0318
Training centers	0.584	0.493	0.485	0.521	-0.176***
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0.328	0.294	0.274	0.264	-0.0281
The municipal council	0.171	0.200	0.222	0.180	0.0878*
The national police	0.273	0.315	0.232	0.325	-0.0429
The army	0.346	0.491	0.272	0.397	0.0328
The navy	0.370	0.410	0.229	0.293	-0.0408
The municipal personería	0.414	0.296	0.250	0.192	-0.0897
The mayor's office	0.290	0.307	0.289	0.156	0.140**
The JAC	0.552	0.517	0.473	0.430	0.0278
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0.333	0.435	0.540	0.341	0.297***
I would recommend that a family member return	0.926	0.830	0.921	0.811	0.0198

to the vereda					
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0.022	0.252	0.014	0.041	0.203***
Illegal armed groups	0.089	0.767	0.014	0.256	0.416***
Antipersonnel mines	0.044	0.000	0.005	0.004	-0.0466***
Displacement	0.000	0.201	0.009	0.080	0.108**
Forced disappearances	0.000	0.031	0.009	0.002	0.0408**
Extortion	0.022	0.069	0.014	0.015	0.0112
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0.822	0.245	0.130	0.056	-0.531***
Forced recruitment	0.000	0.006	0.005	0.002	0.00119
Sexual violence	0.044	0.006	0.014	0.015	-0.0253
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0.792	0.658	0.852	0.677	0.0773
There is police presence	0.773	0.976	0.032	0.262	-0.0310
The police here are good or very good	0.344	0.423	0.167	0.438	-0.188
The police have improved in the last two years	0.199	0.236	0.000	0.189	-0.0616
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0.025	0.031	0.019	0.068	-0.0523**
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda (Agree or strongly agree)	0.132	0.000	0.025	0.000	-0.114***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0.924	0.965	0.892	0.919	0.0170
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0.967	0.961	0.915	0.885	0.00296
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0.981	0.974	0.929	0.867	0.0442
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0.995	0.961	0.925	0.918	-0.0215
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0.857	0.898	0.556	0.831	-0.228***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0.824	0.903	0.889	0.920	0.0560
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0.838	0.839	0.894	0.927	-0.0230
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0.755	0.890	0.907	0.948	0.111***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0.755	0.862	0.926	0.959	0.0931**
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0.653	0.811	0.917	0.946	0.141***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0.699	0.794	0.898	0.959	0.0324
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0.602	0.699	0.875	0.942	0.0331
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0.708	0.804	0.880	0.948	0.0468
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0.620	0.776	0.884	0.944	0.129***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0.653	0.774	0.875	0.940	0.0690

Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0.952	0.941	0.865	0.915	-0.0677*
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Cluster 4

CELI: Puerto Libertador, San José de Uré, Montelíbano Córdoba Control: San Pablo, Bolívar

Variable	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0.413	0.416	0.128	0.198	-0.0568
The family is experiencing hunger	0.133	0.094	0.436	0.246	0.183***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0.351	0.415	0.922	0.791	0.188***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0.858	0.941	0.761	0.627	0.244***
Productive activities earn very little money	0.692	0.871	0.142	0.098	0.240***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0.180	0.066	0.009	0.013	-0.111***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0.817	0.845	0.748	0.806	-0.0171
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0.239	0.349	0.381	0.464	0.0479
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	452821	337029	521835	341447	50,463
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0.514	0.353	0.440	0.377	-0.124**
Have a checking account	0.014	0.011	0.106	0.059	0.0416*
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0.220	0.159	0.344	0.194	0.0761
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0.394	0.327	0.385	0.366	-0.0947*
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0.500	0.520	0.679	0.560	0.132
Currently have debt	0.752	0.638	0.578	0.523	-0.0942
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0.195	0.183	0.033	0.173	-0.154***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0.400	0.439	0.061	0.219	-0.129**
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0.161	0.078	0.170	0.072	0.0329
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0.018	0.020	0.005	0.024	-0.0115
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0.014	0.013	0.009	0.011	-0.000868
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0.212	0.203	0.084	0.113	-0.0400
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0.681	0.594	0.507	0.374	0.0295

The departmental government runs well or very well	0.197	0.224	0.239	0.238	0.0359
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0.158	0.235	0.147	0.159	0.0641
The national government runs well or very well	0.557	0.553	0.415	0.384	0.0552
The national government runs better than two years ago	0.290	0.492	0.245	0.230	0.212***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0.079	0.160	0.098	0.129	0.0632
The national government	0.383	0.385	0.242	0.258	-0.0157
Justice sector institutions	0.194	0.231	0.104	0.131	0.0396
Alternative justice institutions	0.354	0.368	0.071	0.120	-0.0227
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0.179	0.218	0.182	0.160	0.0703
Social organizations and NGOs	0.426	0.348	0.336	0.172	0.0977
Training centers	0.649	0.613	0.620	0.509	0.0752
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0.421	0.332	0.269	0.202	0.000276
The municipal council	0.100	0.135	0.116	0.136	0.0124
The national police	0.157	0.251	0.184	0.226	0.0623
The army	0.392	0.391	0.295	0.333	-0.0486
The navy	0.309	0.372	0.301	0.258	0.0977
The municipal personería	0.344	0.291	0.174	0.172	-0.0455
The mayor's office	0.185	0.230	0.066	0.151	-0.0450
The JAC	0.696	0.602	0.477	0.380	0.0140
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0.346	0.518	0.321	0.443	0.0446
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0.899	0.817	0.853	0.765	0.0190
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0.098	0.164	0.046	0.074	0.0142
Illegal armed groups	0.427	0.786	0.307	0.259	0.375***
Antipersonnel mines	0.146	0.105	0.060	0.035	-0.0187
Displacement	0.085	0.177	0.110	0.129	0.0427
Forced disappearances	0.000	0.005	0.023	0.000	0.0337***
Extortion	0.085	0.105	0.050	0.044	0.0144
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0.646	0.145	0.266	0.070	-0.299***
Forced recruitment	0.000	0.000	0.018	0.011	0.00867
Sexual violence	0.012	0.005	0.032	0.007	0.0159
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0.624	0.521	0.486	0.647	-0.248***

There is police presence	0.853	0.667	0.115	0.135	-0.213***
The police here are good or very good	0.201	0.214	0.120	0.468	-0.369***
The police have improved in the last two years	0.141	0.183	0.120	0.403	-0.299***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0.355	0.192	0.341	0.217	-0.0173
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda	0.116	0.243	0.063	0.106	0.0860**
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0.807	0.930	0.819	0.624	0.319***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0.844	0.943	0.840	0.726	0.219***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0.834	0.936	0.864	0.632	0.320***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0.730	0.888	0.812	0.784	0.181***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0.863	0.894	0.913	0.806	0.119***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0.830	0.885	0.959	0.974	0.0542*
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0.720	0.856	0.954	0.976	0.126***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0.702	0.843	0.940	0.980	0.109***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0.739	0.856	0.977	0.991	0.113***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0.505	0.658	0.858	0.989	0.0405
In the future, will access to education improve?	0.468	0.673	0.858	0.980	0.104**
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0.495	0.643	0.826	0.985	0.00546
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0.550	0.688	0.881	0.974	0.0583
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0.651	0.749	0.839	0.976	-0.0257
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0.596	0.756	0.830	0.978	0.0155
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0.914	0.907	0.935	0.906	0.0318

Cluster 5

CELI: Anorí, Antioquia

Control: Remedios, Antioquia

Variable	Cluster 5				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,299	0,282	0,201	0,268	-0.0466
The family is experiencing hunger	0,172	0,099	0,164	0,113	-0.0514
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,320	0,676	0,761	0,761	0.375***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,914	0,972	0,642	0,507	0.188**
Productive activities earn very little money	0,820	0,746	0,224	0,085	0.0781
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,383	0,056	0,015	0,028	-0.333***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,642	0,493	0,545	0,394	0.00669
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,440	0,127	0,224	0,099	-0.216**
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	548236	390676	608687	452634	3,352
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0,418	0,437	0,246	0,183	0.0894
Have a checking account	0,067	0,000	0,037	0,070	-0.0665
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,515	0,408	0,687	0,817	-0.251**
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,239	0,338	0,291	0,211	0.209**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,500	0,583	0,564	0,800	-0.0900
Currently have debt	0,649	0,676	0,515	0,338	0.210**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,258	0,369	0,226	0,172	0.159
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,219	0,323	0,161	0,188	0.103
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,134	0,183	0,142	0,127	0.0841
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,067	0,085	0,067	0,028	0.0889*
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,022	0,070	0,030	0,014	0.0624*
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,233	0,338	0,077	0,044	0.133*
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,467	0,618	0,427	0,606	-0.0788
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,585	0,327	0,505	0,458	-0.215*
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,366	0,255	0,307	0,333	-0.122

The national government runs well or very well	0,448	0,303	0,240	0,386	-0.293***
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,366	0,258	0,106	0,140	-0.122
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,263	0,183	0,262	0,204	-0.0399
The national government	0,291	0,121	0,206	0,177	-0.152*
Justice sector institutions	0,136	0,103	0,131	0,100	0.0102
Alternative justice institutions	0,180	0,113	0,106	0,113	-0.0640
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,238	0,358	0,495	0,190	0.413***
Social organizations and NGOs	0,147	0,203	0,140	0,170	0.0396
Training centers	0,635	0,391	0,653	0,534	-0.126
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,182	0,317	0,245	0,362	0.0165
The municipal council	0,154	0,288	0,153	0,245	0.0257
The national police	0,218	0,229	0,200	0,157	0.00504
The army	0,331	0,296	0,286	0,145	0.0700
The navy	0,315	0,327	0,253	0,190	0.00492
The municipal personería	0,256	0,270	0,221	0,208	0.0323
The mayor's office	0,256	0,348	0,168	0,141	0.0815
The JAC	0,404	0,544	0,457	0,569	-0.0409
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,180	0,296	0,395	0,268	0.262***
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,507	0,704	0,709	0,817	0.0708
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,798	0,432	0,254	0,014	-0.0541
Illegal armed groups	0,881	0,135	0,276	0,127	-0.549***
Antipersonnel mines	0,000	0,162	0,000	0,197	-0.00526
Displacement	0,294	0,027	0,127	0,056	-0.186**
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,081	0,007	0,028	0.0544
Extortion	0,138	0,189	0,104	0,056	0.0883
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,165	0,784	0,187	0,380	0.464***
Forced recruitment	0,009	0,027	0,015	0,000	0.0509**
Sexual violence	0,000	0,000	0,015	0,056	-0.0449
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,187	0,479	0,545	0,493	0.280***
There is police presence	0,985	0,366	0,276	0,056	-0.404***
The police here are good or very good	0,310	0,136	0,472	0,250	0.0767
The police have improved in the last two years	0,258	0,136	0,351	0,500	-0.191

ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,000	0,197	0,040	0,061	0.200***
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda	0,705	0,279	0,528	0,266	-0.210**
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,970	0,886	0,817	0,716	0.00390
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,978	0,899	0,863	0,824	-0.0709
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,978	0,855	0,854	0,794	-0.0919
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,993	0,841	0,952	0,851	-0.0735
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,441	0,932	0,482	0,783	0.174
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,694	0,732	0,918	0,944	0.0235
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,687	0,690	0,925	0,958	-0.0630
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,649	0,662	0,918	0,915	0.0216
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,679	0,746	0,896	0,944	0.0240
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,657	0,746	0,903	0,930	0.0828
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,694	0,718	0,888	0,915	-0.0250
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,582	0,704	0,836	0,901	0.0755
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,746	0,915	0,858	0,930	0.0893
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,560	0,704	0,896	0,958	0.0687
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,612	0,789	0,873	0,930	0.124
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,858	0,781	0,901	0,848	-0.0385

Cluster 6

CELI: Ituango, Briceño, Valdivia, Antioquia

Control: Urrao, Antioquia

Variable	Cluster 6				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,239	0,327	0,226	0,182	0.109**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,063	0,136	0,252	0,216	0.101**
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,309	0,414	0,770	0,613	0.265***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,865	0,900	0,774	0,708	0.137***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,807	0,824	0,013	0,186	-0.162***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,040	0,111	0,000	0,006	0.0598**
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,611	0,665	0,549	0,554	0.0473
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,168	0,284	0,274	0,301	0.0701
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	334872	457551	467385	494788	42,536
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,469	0,431	0,341	0,372	-0.0854
Have a checking account	0,018	0,050	0,040	0,061	-0.000795
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,509	0,474	0,606	0,725	-0.149***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,398	0,439	0,336	0,426	-0.0307
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,600	0,591	0,803	0,807	-0.0105
Currently have debt	0,619	0,745	0,473	0,626	-0.0117
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,321	0,301	0,102	0,217	-0.177***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,406	0,296	0,015	0,081	-0.193***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,053	0,080	0,088	0,117	-0.00879
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,159	0,065	0,000	0,019	-0.116***
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,115	0,063	0,000	0,017	-0.0732***
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,230	0,250	0,067	0,152	-0.0782*
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,526	0,604	0,604	0,433	0.270***
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,474	0,463	0,587	0,638	-0.0915
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,191	0,283	0,081	0,254	-0.0799

The national government runs well or very well	0,478	0,459	0,419	0,432	-0.0180
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,234	0,238	0,041	0,127	-0.0967**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,236	0,294	0,314	0,338	0.00517
The national government	0,281	0,323	0,210	0,217	0.0127
Justice sector institutions	0,254	0,208	0,210	0,125	0.0463
Alternative justice institutions	0,258	0,225	0,207	0,125	0.0533
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,324	0,356	0,262	0,325	-0.0594
Social organizations and NGOs	0,233	0,220	0,276	0,288	-0.00288
Training centers	0,599	0,591	0,462	0,620	-0.169***
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,309	0,255	0,291	0,264	-0.0198
The municipal council	0,229	0,261	0,207	0,168	0.0569
The national police	0,354	0,248	0,362	0,210	0.0689
The army	0,460	0,315	0,403	0,255	0.0156
The navy	0,430	0,281	0,173	0,237	-0.180***
The municipal personería	0,399	0,377	0,216	0,260	-0.0587
The mayor's office	0,286	0,347	0,178	0,142	0.0719
The JAC	0,509	0,592	0,545	0,447	0.170***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,320	0,324	0,357	0,300	0.0337
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,845	0,755	0,881	0,719	0.104**
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,112	0,203	0,071	0,180	-0.0386
Illegal armed groups	0,225	0,599	0,128	0,474	0.0166
Antipersonnel mines	0,079	0,316	0,013	0,229	-0.0112
Displacement	0,112	0,096	0,040	0,108	-0.0769*
Forced disappearances	0,090	0,006	0,013	0,015	-0.0965***
Extortion	0,101	0,136	0,018	0,045	0.0257
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,506	0,215	0,243	0,095	-0.138**
Forced recruitment	0,011	0,011	0,004	0,006	-0.00163
Sexual violence	0,034	0,034	0,000	0,006	0.00615
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,606	0,617	0,655	0,420	0.264***
There is police presence	0,296	0,554	0,031	0,149	0.143***
The police here are good or very good	0,362	0,338	0,667	0,500	0.145
The police have improved in the last two years	0,293	0,162	0,143	0,275	-0.279

ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,051	0,347	0,024	0,525	-0.198***
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,079	0,208	0,020	0,266	-0.137***
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,955	0,841	0,970	0,856	-0.00439
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,960	0,859	0,931	0,852	-0.0202
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,978	0,879	0,970	0,840	0.0324
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,959	0,785	0,980	0,794	0.0203
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,873	0,851	0,881	0,814	0.0655
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,854	0,803	0,827	0,900	-0.133***
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,792	0,723	0,827	0,929	-0.173***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,872	0,703	0,823	0,883	-0.221***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,801	0,723	0,894	0,909	-0.0709
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,752	0,617	0,885	0,844	-0.107**
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,832	0,693	0,912	0,916	-0.155***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,743	0,582	0,885	0,874	-0.144***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,792	0,721	0,872	0,881	-0.0811*
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,783	0,597	0,881	0,890	-0.197***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,858	0,660	0,858	0,879	-0.207***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,872	0,902	0,895	0,927	-0.00480

Cluster 7

CELI: Tarazá, Cáceres, Antioquia

Control: Campamento, Antioquia

Variable	Cluster 7				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,261	0,332	0,188	0,143	0.106**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,103	0,160	0,227	0,305	0.0269
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,328	0,459	0,812	0,791	0.166***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,902	0,950	0,860	0,756	0.160***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,853	0,743	0,072	0,084	-0.105**
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,142	0,173	0,010	0,007	0.0255
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,700	0,822	0,628	0,738	0.00253
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,372	0,338	0,184	0,486	-0.319***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	418166	364488	434082	450323	-101,549*
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0,483	0,411	0,420	0,356	-0.0457
Have a checking account	0,034	0,009	0,034	0,033	-0.0260
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,565	0,229	0,889	0,640	-0.149***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,329	0,312	0,372	0,363	-0.0630
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,676	0,507	0,740	0,697	-0.242**
Currently have debt	0,681	0,582	0,657	0,481	0.0237
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,281	0,178	0,433	0,167	0.158***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,265	0,298	0,387	0,071	0.310***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,155	0,024	0,135	0,029	-0.0387
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,126	0,062	0,087	0,018	-0.00950
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,058	0,051	0,068	0,004	0.0508**
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,236	0,156	0,332	0,103	0.113**
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,544	0,579	0,562	0,523	0.0686
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,461	0,427	0,568	0,609	-0.125*
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,228	0,320	0,247	0,205	0.0993*

The national government runs well or very well	0,420	0,474	0,474	0,574	-0.0826
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,207	0,352	0,211	0,180	0.139**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,260	0,223	0,313	0,316	-0.0681
The national government	0,261	0,288	0,278	0,332	-0.0445
Justice sector institutions	0,211	0,191	0,161	0,158	-0.0515
Alternative justice institutions	0,202	0,186	0,156	0,146	-0.0131
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,390	0,287	0,400	0,339	-0.0439
Social organizations and NGOs	0,196	0,255	0,240	0,264	-0.0459
Training centers	0,639	0,541	0,731	0,530	0.0644
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,265	0,246	0,236	0,246	-0.0827
The municipal council	0,237	0,149	0,250	0,157	0.0137
The national police	0,259	0,177	0,302	0,217	0.0123
The army	0,276	0,334	0,298	0,273	0.0612
The navy	0,250	0,291	0,289	0,194	0.138**
The municipal personería	0,302	0,236	0,293	0,194	0.0148
The mayor's office	0,274	0,160	0,298	0,162	0.0161
The JAC	0,487	0,509	0,513	0,468	0.0893
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,272	0,385	0,360	0,387	0.0771
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,826	0,809	0,802	0,829	-0.0326
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,333	0,194	0,058	0,134	-0.140**
Illegal armed groups	0,698	0,749	0,155	0,393	-0.141*
Antipersonnel mines	0,444	0,123	0,145	0,051	-0.187***
Displacement	0,095	0,128	0,068	0,110	-0.0119
Forced disappearances	0,032	0,024	0,000	0,009	-0.0233
Extortion	0,079	0,071	0,034	0,073	-0.0762*
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,190	0,223	0,116	0,125	-0.00374
Forced recruitment	0,048	0,005	0,010	0,009	-0.0300*
Sexual violence	0,032	0,057	0,000	0,007	0.0162
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,696	0,536	0,681	0,530	-0.00933
There is police presence	0,585	0,864	0,068	0,086	0.234***
The police here are good or very good	0,429	0,211	0,857	0,282	0.390**
The police have improved in the last two years	0,171	0,144	0,692	0,231	0.513***

ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,265	0,190	0,234	0,390	-0.198***
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,061	0,337	0,044	0,293	0.0602
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,900	0,894	0,849	0,910	-0.0482
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,901	0,905	0,887	0,892	0.0161
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,931	0,948	0,946	0,904	0.0586*
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,920	0,850	0,881	0,880	-0.0738*
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,690	0,882	0,745	0,754	0.190***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,710	0,866	0,773	0,921	0.00180
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,609	0,826	0,739	0,932	-0.00579
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,614	0,831	0,792	0,916	0.0847*
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,667	0,787	0,845	0,947	-0.00830
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,715	0,659	0,792	0,916	-0.213***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,758	0,712	0,831	0,927	-0.156***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,671	0,622	0,797	0,879	-0.103*
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,705	0,626	0,812	0,870	-0.138***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,643	0,695	0,734	0,912	-0.165***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,647	0,655	0,831	0,888	-0.0301
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,846	0,927	0,920	0,915	0.0902**

Cluster 8

CELI: Cauca, Nechí, Antioquia

Control: San Luís, Antioquia

Variable	Cluster 8				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,310	0,144	0,144	0,187	-0.193***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,137	0,050	0,185	0,247	-0.131***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,346	0,409	0,801	0,869	0.0359
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,854	0,943	0,727	0,710	0.112**
Productive activities earn very little money	0,756	0,759	0,088	0,103	-0.00807
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,049	0,125	0,000	0,019	0.0558**
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,667	0,776	0,486	0,744	-0.151***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,185	0,284	0,269	0,385	-0.0233
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	429681	384845	476019	428013	-1,553
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0,486	0,449	0,352	0,348	-0.0293
Have a checking account	0,032	0,028	0,014	0,058	-0.0513**
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,472	0,378	0,523	0,473	-0.0836
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,370	0,320	0,361	0,329	-0.00898
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,488	0,430	0,718	0,634	-0.0168
Currently have debt	0,574	0,576	0,560	0,510	0.0535
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,294	0,262	0,218	0,159	0.0429
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,227	0,304	0,107	0,107	0.0703
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,056	0,088	0,218	0,037	0.205***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,051	0,088	0,028	0,011	0.0449*
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,032	0,071	0,023	0,004	0.0542**
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,270	0,222	0,148	0,119	0.00827
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,505	0,548	0,429	0,473	0.0194
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,433	0,387	0,530	0,354	0.134*

The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,170	0,268	0,159	0,178	0.0604
The national government runs well or very well	0,502	0,559	0,289	0,339	0.0116
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,171	0,365	0,042	0,139	0.0757
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,215	0,232	0,369	0,194	0.203***
The national government	0,346	0,312	0,176	0,253	-0.0795
Justice sector institutions	0,176	0,250	0,208	0,159	0.160***
Alternative justice institutions	0,252	0,284	0,171	0,165	0.0588
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,295	0,269	0,239	0,230	0.00499
Social organizations and NGOs	0,227	0,322	0,210	0,195	0.119*
Training centers	0,625	0,579	0,622	0,600	-0.0572
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,336	0,291	0,240	0,235	-0.0141
The municipal council	0,216	0,199	0,167	0,168	0.0173
The national police	0,257	0,248	0,309	0,252	0.0275
The army	0,341	0,398	0,387	0,385	0.0614
The navy	0,317	0,356	0,258	0,295	-0.0124
The municipal personería	0,407	0,278	0,280	0,226	-0.0536
The mayor's office	0,273	0,254	0,170	0,161	0.0193
The JAC	0,502	0,508	0,363	0,485	-0.114*
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,316	0,464	0,413	0,472	0.0764
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,944	0,822	0,889	0,766	0.00563
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,091	0,114	0,037	0,065	-0.0179
Illegal armed groups	0,020	0,886	0,005	0,249	0.614***
Antipersonnel mines	0,091	0,007	0,023	0,002	-0.0690***
Displacement	0,020	0,200	0,005	0,077	0.0834**
Forced disappearances	0,010	0,014	0,000	0,002	0.0130
Extortion	0,010	0,129	0,019	0,065	0.0452
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,879	0,171	0,213	0,114	-0.636***
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,007	0,005	0,004	0.00460
Sexual violence	0,051	0,014	0,037	0,002	-0.00693
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,542	0,699	0,727	0,649	0.264***
There is police presence	0,833	0,774	0,255	0,041	0.138***

The police here are good or very good	0,283	0,327	0,490	0,684	-0.104
The police have improved in the last two years	0,152	0,202	0,055	0,421	-0.262**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,045	0,053	0,037	0,067	-0.0290
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,273	0,251	0,168	0,295	-0.166***
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,929	0,972	0,933	0,879	0.0719**
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,972	0,985	0,976	0,874	0.108***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,972	0,985	0,925	0,833	0.0847***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,975	0,961	0,909	0,911	-0.0443
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,866	0,905	0,856	0,785	0.0938*
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,852	0,888	0,917	0,948	-0.0113
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,856	0,817	0,944	0,942	-0.0386
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,815	0,843	0,833	0,940	-0.0850**
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,787	0,832	0,861	0,953	-0.0490
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,634	0,710	0,741	0,938	-0.136***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,685	0,738	0,861	0,938	-0.0501
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,644	0,660	0,810	0,929	-0.122**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,694	0,662	0,718	0,929	-0.265***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,630	0,738	0,792	0,942	-0.0518
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,681	0,688	0,685	0,927	-0.247***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,904	0,912	0,953	0,941	0.00681

Cluster 9

CELI: El Bagre, Zaragoza, Antioquia

Control: Sonsón, Antioquia

Variable	Cluster 9				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,190	0,197	0,190	0,091	0.117***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,067	0,092	0,176	0,460	-0.264***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,440	0,400	0,583	0,871	-0.300***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,775	0,959	0,681	0,640	0.226***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,785	0,801	0,009	0,059	-0.0156
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,005	0,201	0,009	0,000	0.201***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,579	0,858	0,500	0,790	-0.0111
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,181	0,371	0,102	0,519	-0.245***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	403338	458444	456000	430604	88,021***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0,579	0,356	0,421	0,239	0.00195
Have a checking account	0,023	0,013	0,056	0,028	0.0251
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,454	0,468	0,741	0,358	0.428***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,495	0,381	0,463	0,314	0.0694
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,664	0,544	0,790	0,736	-0.0867
Currently have debt	0,657	0,689	0,588	0,559	0.0777
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,237	0,293	0,307	0,178	0.204***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,237	0,309	0,153	0,065	0.141***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,130	0,138	0,106	0,081	0.0328
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,106	0,121	0,046	0,011	0.0429
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,046	0,129	0,037	0,013	0.109***
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,244	0,284	0,191	0,112	0.114**
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,565	0,555	0,533	0,543	0.0168
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,325	0,462	0,564	0,536	0.167**
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,142	0,311	0,166	0,095	0.224***

The national government runs well or very well	0,388	0,489	0,349	0,389	0.0589
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,153	0,318	0,127	0,056	0.218***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,225	0,266	0,261	0,331	0.00433
The national government	0,262	0,252	0,213	0,282	-0.0597
Justice sector institutions	0,219	0,229	0,170	0,252	-0.0565
Alternative justice institutions	0,182	0,279	0,125	0,240	0.00842
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,378	0,256	0,393	0,349	-0.0388
Social organizations and NGOs	0,221	0,265	0,241	0,351	-0.0403
Training centers	0,529	0,552	0,655	0,555	0.164**
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,262	0,268	0,253	0,281	-0.0136
The municipal council	0,253	0,204	0,190	0,233	-0.0927
The national police	0,433	0,198	0,409	0,232	-0.0571
The army	0,481	0,360	0,487	0,308	0.0521
The navy	0,468	0,319	0,435	0,264	-0.00351
The municipal personería	0,355	0,301	0,283	0,270	-0.00979
The mayor's office	0,340	0,321	0,266	0,196	0.0822
The JAC	0,570	0,446	0,455	0,511	-0.129**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,147	0,375	0,311	0,220	0.314***
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,907	0,805	0,907	0,708	0.0879*
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,120	0,293	0,046	0,246	0.000948
Illegal armed groups	0,000	0,746	0,032	0,506	0.255***
Antipersonnel mines	0,020	0,054	0,009	0,038	-0.00667
Displacement	0,000	0,068	0,037	0,093	0.0154
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,020	0,005	0,008	0.0129
Extortion	0,040	0,220	0,032	0,095	0.106*
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,860	0,293	0,394	0,163	-0.341***
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,044	0,000	0,006	0.0353*
Sexual violence	0,020	0,029	0,005	0,000	0.000508
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,769	0,566	0,560	0,403	-0.0190
There is police presence	0,421	0,794	0,153	0,042	0.490***
The police here are good or very good	0,415	0,293	0,606	0,389	0.115
The police have improved in the last two years	0,183	0,177	0,188	0,150	0.116

ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,020	0,064	0,042	0,225	-0.159***
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,047	0,378	0,011	0,493	-0.172***
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,967	0,962	0,916	0,857	0.0656*
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,948	0,970	0,939	0,872	0.0991***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,986	0,977	0,845	0,863	-0.00663
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,966	0,968	0,924	0,867	0.0620*
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,886	0,859	0,829	0,887	-0.0679
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,792	0,843	0,755	0,871	-0.0402
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,699	0,820	0,704	0,858	-0.0204
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,727	0,822	0,810	0,822	0.103**
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,713	0,837	0,810	0,928	-0.0188
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,681	0,684	0,773	0,867	-0.136***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,708	0,729	0,833	0,892	-0.0517
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,653	0,669	0,810	0,881	-0.0815
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,741	0,703	0,833	0,841	-0.0889*
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,653	0,686	0,745	0,898	-0.157***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,699	0,672	0,824	0,858	-0.0848*
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,888	0,929	0,851	0,970	-0.091***

ANNEX 3: CALCULATION OF INDICATOR FIGURES

Reporting on CELI Indicators

Below are tables specifying how indicators were grouped into the three categories of economic, institutional, and social for presentation in the CELI Midline Evaluation general and regional reports. The present grouping is admittedly arbitrary but represents the best judgment of the evaluators, recognizing that other arrangements are possible. In discussions with the implementers, the present grouping was acknowledged and confirmed.

Economic Indicators

These are the sixteen indicators that were used to calculate the Economic Indicators pie chart. Indicators in yellow are reported by the implementers and those in green are taken from the midline survey data. While certain indicators provided by government sources were not included due to the irregular pace of reporting, indicators DO3-041 and DO3-040 had reliable numbers, compiled by government sources and reported by the implementers - since in all cases targets were met. DO3-038 was not included because of a lack of confidence in the numbers reported.

1	DO3-005 Avg monthly household income of USAID's beneficiaries
2	DO3-041 # of restitution cases supported in CELI municipios
3	DO3-040 # of formalized properties supported by CELI municipalities
4	DO3-036. Total value of CELI projects approved
5	DO3-037. Total value of CELI projects completed
	DO3-038. Total public investment in consolidation zones
6	DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones att to USG interventions
7	DO3-030 # of strategic rural and economic development programs with territorial approach implemented in CELI municipios
8	DO3-031 # & % of people benefitted by strategic rural and econ development programs with territorial approach, implemented in CELI municipios
9	DO3-034 # of rural households benefiting directly from USG interventions
10	DO3-032a Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG interventions
11	DO3-032b Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG interventions (for-profit, crops, social enterprises)
12	DO3-033a # of private-public alliances formed
13	DO3-033b # of private-public alliances formed

14	DO3-035 # of people with financial product includes mobile wallet, leasing, etc.
15	DO3-042 Community funds leveraged in CELI Zones attrib to USG Interventions
16	DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones

Institutional Development

These are the six indicators included under institutional development:

1	DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones attributed to USG interventions
2	DO3-010 # of strategic national social programs implemented in CELI zones
3	DO3-011 # & % of people benefitted by national social programs impl in CELI municipios
4	DO3-012 # of beneficiaries receiving improved infrastructure services
5	DO3-013 Governance capacity index
6	DO3-028 Level of accountability in CELI municipios

Two indicators that would be included in this category but which were to be provided by the GOC were not updated and have been deleted and are not reported or counted:

DO3-004 – Public Social Services Municipal Index

DO3-009 – Amount and Average Percent of annual change in municipal own-source income

Social Indicators

Six indicators included in the calculation of the Social Indicators pie chart:

1	DO3-008 # of rapid impact projects implemented by USG implementers
2	DO3-024 Social Capital Index
3	DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones
4	DO3-025 # of CSO members supported by USG assistance
5	DO3-026 (a) Change in Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG assistance
6	DO3-026 (b) Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG assistance

DO3-026(a) and DO3-026(b) are closely related. Information was partially available for both, and targets were met. For 26(a) this was listed as “not reported” for Montes de María and Central, but “exceeded” for CELI Norte/Sur. For 26(b), this was reported as exceeded for all three CELIs.

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