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EVALUATION

Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

Regional Report, Montes de María

October 2016

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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

REGIONAL REPORT, MONTES DE MARÍA

Management Systems International

A Tetra Tech Company

200 12th Street South

Suite 1200

Arlington, VA 22202, USA

www.msiworldwide.com

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ACRONYMS

ARD	Associates for Rural Development
BACRIM	Criminal bands, Bandas Criminales (in the service of the narcotics trade)
CAR	Regional Autonomous Corporations, Corporaciones Regionales Autónomas
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CELI	Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
CELI Central	CELI program in the Central region
CELI MdM	CELI program in the Montes de María region
CELI Norte/Sur	CELI program in the North and South regions
CERAC	Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos
CNC	National Consulting Center, Centro Nacional de Consultoría
CNC-DoD	Crime and Narcotics Center, U.S. Department of Defense
CSDI	Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DNP	National Planning Department, Departamento Nacional de Planeación
DO	Development objective
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DPS	Department for Social Prosperity, Departamento para la Prosperidad Social
ELN	National Liberation Army, Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EVIDINCE	Research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FHH	Female head of household
GLAC	Local savings and loans groups, grupos locales de ahorros y crédito
GOC	Government of Colombia
HH	Household
IAG	Illegal Armed Group
IC	Illicit crops
ICO	Index of Organizational Competencies, Índice de competencias organizacionales
IDI	Integral Performance Index, Índice de desempeño integral
INCODER	Colombian Institute of Rural Development, Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural
JAC	Community Action Council, Junta de Acción Comunal
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MADR	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural

MdM	Montes de María
MHH	Male head of household
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc.
PAR	Regional Action Plan, Plan de acción regional
PMP	Performance management plan
PNCRT	National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy, Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial
SENA	National Learning Service, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SGP	General Participation System, Sistema General de Participación
SIJIN	Judicial police, Seccional de Investigación Judicial
SIMCI	Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos
SISBEN	Identification and Classification system for potential social program Beneficiaries, Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de potenciales Beneficiarios para programas sociales
TA	Technical Assistance
UACT	Territorial Consolidation Administrative Unit, Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial
UARIV	Victims' Integral Attention and Reparation Unit, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas
UMATA	Municipal Agricultural Extension Units, Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
URT	Land Restitution Unit, Unidad de Restitución de Tierras
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEO	Verification of Organizational Status, Valorización del Estado Organizacional

ABSTRACT

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups.

The evaluation team conducted 2,871 household surveys in the Montes de María region. The four Montes de María municipalities surveyed were San Jacinto, Ovejas, San Onofre and El Carmen de Bolívar. The four control municipalities were Tolú Viejo, Galeras, Los Palmitos and Riohacha.

Economic Development

The perception of the economic situation in CELI municipalities has worsened. Some 13% of respondents said the economic situation where they live is good or very good, compared to 33% at baseline. However, control sites decreased even more, so there was an 8pp positive MDM impact since baseline.

Compared to baseline, direct beneficiaries are around 5pp less likely than the general population to experience hunger and 2pp less likely to see illicit crops as one of their only attractive economic options. According to the midline data, direct beneficiaries made approximately \$105 USD more per month than non-beneficiaries.

Support to producer associations. Gains are consistent across associative activities and the magnitude is often double or more from baseline responses. As trends were similar in control areas, no impact is attributed to CELI MDM.

Institutional Development

Participation. More respondents voted in the last presidential election (from 87% to 94%) and fewer said someone they knew received money or gifts to vote (from 35% to 23%). The survey's participation index stayed about the same, 36 of 100 points, the same as in control municipalities.

Accountability. CELI supported local government accountability and ensured that communities' needs are included in municipal development plans. There was a 2pp positive impact on the government accountability index compared to control municipalities.

Trust in institutions. In general, circumstances have worsened citizens' overall trust of government since baseline. This is also the case in control municipalities.

Social service delivery. Perceptions of social services are stagnant, but respondents were overwhelmingly optimistic about the future of service delivery.

Social Development

The social capital index. The survey data show a decline in trust between peers and neighbors, and stagnant participation in organizations in the MDM region.

Juntas de Acción Comunal. The survey data show that, on average, participation in JACs in the MDM municipalities declined from baseline to midline (47% to 36%), though decision-making rose (20% to 38%) among those who continued to participate. The patterns are similar in control zones; as a result, no impact is seen.

Reasons to associate. People continue to take part in associations but are now also involved in decision-making at higher levels than in control municipalities.

Security

In Montes de María, perceptions of security in the *vereda* or *corregimiento* have worsened since baseline, but they worsened more in control municipalities, and respondents remain likely to recommend that a family member return to the area.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics International, has worked through the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, ARD Tetra Tech, implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (Mdm) project. This volume reports on achievements and impacts of CELI Montes de María.

Evaluation purpose

In 2011 USAID/Colombia's evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., designed an impact evaluation of Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) interventions. The design included two more measurements: midline and final. Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL), a contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), carried out the midline. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline design, qualitative fieldwork, and program satisfaction questions.

Three guiding principles were set for uses of the evaluation, as follows:

1. *Measure the change in impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with target populations.*
2. *Inform decision-making processes with timely data, to identify components needing strengthening to achieve program goals.*
3. *Identify best practices and lessons learned to date, to inform future USAID programming.*

Project background

Based on the GOC's National Consolidation Plan and formalized in the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT in its Spanish acronym), the concept of "consolidation" refers to the expansion in the conflict zones of Colombia of the legitimate presence of the State. The policy, designed for implementation once minimal conditions for public safety were established, would create the necessary institutional mechanisms to provide basic human rights protections to the populations in those zones historically affected by conflict and illicit crops. The PNCRT was oriented to establishing the presence of State institutions capable of efficiently bringing necessary public goods needed for development.

The U.S. Embassy developed the CSDI to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and at the reduction of illicit crops and the presence of illegal armed

groups in the conflict zones. The basic premise of the CELIs, one component of CSDI, is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of the State, and their activities are oriented to bolstering state institutions, generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life.

Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: *Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated*, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation – strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS for 2014-2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

Obviously, the CELIs are no substitute for the State. They were called upon to provide support to the PNCRT. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice services in the consolidation zones is a *sine qua non* condition for enabling the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation.

Evaluation questions, design, methods and limitations

The midterm evaluation took place in 32 CELI municipalities and 16 municipalities from three regions in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities. Four Montes de María CELI municipalities were included, and four control sites. The midline, structured around the baseline completed by DevTech, examined changes since baseline across the institutional, social and economic indicators related to the interventions to answer eight evaluation questions.

Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target population in the areas of interventions?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting
3. Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities? ¹	IR 3.2
4. What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)	Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?	IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of territory from armed conflicts and illicit economic activities?	Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
8. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

¹ This question is answered in Annex 6 of the main report with data on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.

EVAL, working with the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), used a mixed methods approach – qualitative and quantitative – to examine a set of indicators for each CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of CELI interventions. The design closely followed the baseline, with additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, opinions and experiences of the population. Full design considerations are found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact.

Limitations to the study are various and important to consider fully. There are limitations based on the design, such as the difficult and imperfect process of matching municipalities in a country which has an important history of isolation and variation among regions. The original design has also been deeply affected by the loss of the whole-of-government intervention, in which impact goals and indicators were set at a very high level, but the implementation has been far more limited than promised. Exogenous factors (such as the drop in world oil prices) and variations in implementation also condition the interpretation of the data. Please see the Limitations section of this volume as well as the methodology annex (Annex 3) to the main report for full details.

Findings and conclusions

How to read the findings and conclusions


This summary, like the report that follows, shares two key types of data: *trends* and *impacts*. Trends show the change over time in CELI municipalities, while impacts compare the change to control municipalities.

Details of trends and impacts are presented in the report at the *cluster* level: individual municipalities or small groups that are geographically and socioeconomically similar. The details often tell a very different story than at the regional level, so consult those for more local-level information on conditions, what works, and what has not.

We use the abbreviations FHH and MHH for female- and male-headed households, respectively. These two types of households are marked by important differences and generally greater vulnerability on the part of FHHs. Note these details for use in future planning to better reach all types of families.

The EVAL project drew on CELI MdM final reports dating from March 2015 to determine that the project met the majority of its indicators across three pillars: economic, social and institutional. Compliance was highest among social and economic indicators. The latter are also the most numerous of the indicators for which CELI was responsible. The calculation of these figures is described in Annex 3.

Figure 1.2. CELI Mdm PMP indicator compliance



Economic development

Based on the information gathered, the perception of the economic situation in CELI municipalities has worsened. Some 13% of Mdm survey respondents said the economic situation where they live is good or very good, compared to 33% at baseline. However, control sites decreased even more, so there was an 8pp positive Mdm impact since baseline. At midline 62% said unemployment or lack of opportunity were problems, compared to 87% at baseline, but just 2% said their productive activities earned very little, compared to 76% at baseline. By clusters, San Jacinto showed the most positive gains, including significant income gains, while El Carmen de Bolívar demonstrated the most problematic trends.

Here the youth finish their high school and they leave because there is no supply of jobs, no opportunities. They go to Bogotá, Sincelejo, Medellín. (Tolú Viejo)

They all leave. They finish school and if they pass, maybe a university or SENA, but if not, they drive mototaxis. (San Jacinto)

In focus groups, respondents said the El Niño phenomenon had been devastating this year. They also lamented the lack of opportunity that they felt was driving youth from the region. Still, expectations among Mdm respondents were overwhelmingly optimistic for the future of their economic situation.

Direct CELI beneficiaries are a notable exception to the negative survey findings. Compared to baseline, direct beneficiaries in the Montes de María region are around 5pp less² likely than the general population to be experiencing hunger, and 2pp less likely to see illicit crops as one of the only attractive economic options open to them. Those listed as beneficiaries in the CELI Mdm roster had greater income than the rest of the population and greater income than at baseline – by 189,140 COP (approximately \$105 USD) per month.

At midline, 8pp more direct beneficiaries said they had a business or productive unit (which includes a plot of land for farming) than at baseline. Some 12pp report receiving training for

² The data for direct CELI beneficiaries come from three different subsamples, and therefore are presented as an approximate average impact. Please see the Limitations subsection of the Evaluation Design chapter on how direct beneficiaries are defined.


their business or productive unit, and that the training came with a practical component. The contrast with the rest of the samples is noteworthy and statistically parallel between male- and female-headed households. There are also positive trends in the perception of the problems they face. Lack of opportunities or employment and low income provided by productive activities have declined. Female-headed households form an important part of this optimism.

Food security is not guaranteed for households in CELI municipalities in the MdM region – a circumstance that has worsened since baseline in San Onofre and El Carmen. These appear to be regional trends, rather than something attributable to any intervention.

Support to producer associations. CELI support strengthens value that will mature in the medium or long term. The goal was to create long-term value that helps producers provide for themselves through their productive projects. The activities oblige beneficiaries to work with a long-term perspective, with all the costs and sacrifices that this implies.

Respondents reported associating more at midline than at baseline, in very strong trends:

Figure 1.3. Trends in reasons to associate for productive project activities



Gains are consistent across these activities and the magnitude is often double or more from the baseline responses. As the trends were similar in control areas, no impact is attributed to CELI MdM. For buying inputs, and for processing, selling, and transporting products, nearly all the gain from baseline to midline comes from homes with female heads of household (FHHs).

TA and marketing support help counteract low profitability, and respondents report that those problems are diminishing for their productive projects. However, trading requires markets with enough buyers and sellers and prices that are higher than production costs. The lack of access to wider markets inside and outside of consolidation zones hampers the tasks of CELI and of the GOC.

Savings, credit and financial services. Credit use has fallen in both CELI and control zones, but respondents say that financial support has fulfilled a vital function for the development of savings and credit. Revolving savings and credit funds have served as important instruments to support capitalization in rural areas, and provide an alternative to informal and predatory lending.

The CELIs have worked a double front to improve access to credit and bank use among their beneficiaries. In terms of bank use, CELI MdM supported over 7,200 people in opening a new bank product in a local institution, far exceeding (142%) their goal. These findings parallel those in the Consolidation Index, where the region is given full marks for having a number of financial entities that is equal to or better than those in similar municipalities.

We told them our priority was this small bit of the road that was bad. One of our neighbors had a terrible accident on it. [Colombia Responde] fixed that stretch of road, and we contributed 10 million in labor. The men worked on the road, the women cooked. Since we had even increased the amount our community would contribute, Colombia Responde also built in a wall to keep another part from sliding. (Beneficiary, San Jacinto)

Roads. The data show a slight improvement in perceptions of intramunicipal roads, but still only 20% call these roads good; opinions of intermunicipal roads fell to 31%. Local market deficiencies are tightly related to road conditions. The productive projects can attempt to break poverty traps, but the lack of roads reinforces the traps. The survey also asks about the time it takes for respondents' families to get to the nearest health clinic, which dropped more in MdM than in control zones, by almost 17 minutes. Another positive finding is that 31pp fewer respondents in CELI municipalities said that the high cost of transportation was a serious problem for their productive activities – from 73% to 42%. The population recognizes the direct benefit of CELI interventions in tertiary roads. Local level users, associations and JACs have taken ownership of roads projects.

Land tenancy. CELI launched the “Historical Analysis of Land Rights” Project to document the connection between the *campesinos* and the land, particularly victims of violence and displacement. The project also supported the Land Restitution Unit (URT in its Spanish acronym) in its focus municipalities, granting funds for personnel, office support and technical assistance to set up offices in Sincelejo and Carmen de Bolívar. They also worked successfully with Colombian Institute of Rural Development (INCODER) in the reconstruction, structuring and modernization of its archives.

At baseline, 18% of CELI zone respondents held title, with an average of 3.8 hectares. At midline, this figure had surged to 41% and almost 16 hectares. However, advances in titling and restitution in CELI municipalities continue to face the huge scale of the land issues, security concerns, overlapping claims, wealthy interests, and the limitations of the state apparatus. The scope is immense. In one priority area identified by the URT in Montes de María, there were some 3,000 petitions for restitution.

The evaluation team recommends *(for full details, please see the report)*

Make simultaneous improvements in production and trade. Quality, stable production gives better results when directed at adequate markets. This must be one of the most important concerns for post-conflict policies. International cooperation should lead small focused pilots that treat these interconnected structural failings holistically.

Support an array of markets, actors and efforts. Support projects in local and regional export markets. Intermediaries fulfill an economic function that would be difficult to replace, but of course cannot be monopsonistic.

Plan for interim food security. Provide traditional farm or other activities so as to combine short- to long-term returns, increase cash flow and ensure project sustainability.

Reach FHHs with interventions that work. Benefits have differed for FHHs and MHHs, who learn and use their learning in different ways. Develop models that reflect this and provide services to take advantage of the characteristics and behavior of each.

Maintain activities to expand financial services. Revolving funds are a suitable instrument to deal with the communities' borrowing needs but they must be conditioned on the creation of collective savings and credit funds with strong governance principles.

Continue focused work on roads. Reinforce successful support to the JACs pertaining to institutional strengthening and participative and community infrastructure.

Continue to expand work in terms of land tenure formalization. Facilitate relationships with INCODER's replacement as part of USAID's ongoing portfolio.

Institutional development

Participation. Rural citizens valued the two most recent presidential elections, which focused debate on the end of the conflict. More respondents voted in the last presidential election (from 87% to 94%) and fewer said someone they knew received money or gifts to vote (from 35% to 23%). There is a high level of acceptance of formal democratic channels, but more work can be done. The survey's participation index stayed about the same, 36 of 100 points, the same as in control municipalities.

Accountability. CELI intervened to ensure that communities' needs are included in municipal development plans, and supported local government accountability, and the evaluation's qualitative research confirms the importance of this support on both sides. CELI actions gave citizens confidence that their petitions were heard, and gave municipal offices much-needed funds and training. Unsuccessful petitions erode citizens' trust in government management and transparency: CELI interventions have been important for citizens' confidence in government. There was a 2pp positive impact on the government accountability index that is based on survey questions, when respondents in CELI municipalities are compared with those in control municipalities.


The municipality is poor. There are no businesses, so the municipality depends completely on what comes in from the nation, which barely covers operational expenses. The mayor has to work with the senators to get part of whatever projects he can. This is why we're so grateful to Colombia Responde, because they've supported our municipality. (Secretary of Government, San Jacinto)

However, accountability is still an emerging practice. The survey's index showed a seven-point drop from baseline to midline. There are examples of local governments not creating spaces for accountability and not inviting citizen input. CELI MdM respondents were slightly more likely to participate in *veedurías* at midline, but those were still only 2% of respondents. Respondents from a women's group in San Jacinto talked about their *veeduría*, and appreciated being able to have an eye on municipal spending. However, they reported as well

Legally, the Mayor has to be accountable and s/he's been doing it. Colombia Responde gave us a pamphlet on accountability and counseled us on a special scheme and a timeline, helped us choose what was to be presented, and on what the final product should be. (Secretary of Government, El Carmen de Bolívar)

that the mayor's office sometimes paid them no attention, even when they filed formal complaints. Among the problems respondents cite with municipal administration, there is progress in terms of public services; institutional goods like hospitals, schools and courts; and perceptions of corruption. Please see the figure below. Still, MdM respondents said their municipality pays no attention to community requests, nor do they have the capacity to do so. Responses in control zones were even worse, so it is reasonable to assume CELI's work with local governments may have had some positive outcomes, if not numeric impacts.


Figure 1.4. Trends in perceptions of serious problems with municipal administration



Trust in institutions. In general, circumstances have worsened citizens' overall trust of government since baseline, though the responses in Montes de María were slightly better than in other of the consolidation zones. This is also the case in control municipalities, and the severity of the data suggest the election sloganeering may have contributed to very strong negative results for trust in the national police, the *personería*, the JACs, and the mayors' offices. El Carmen de Bolívar had the most consistently negative responses to questions on trust in government bodies, while San Onofre and, to lesser extent, San Jacinto showed greater appreciation for at least three institutions.

Social service delivery. Perceptions of social services are stagnant, particularly on quality, contributing to the poverty trap discussed in the report. A capacity index, based on survey data of citizen experiences and perceptions, and in the CELI North region, the score declined by 5% or from 39 points to 37 points overall. The figure below shows its components and total score.

Figure 1.5. Trends in the government capacity index (points out of 100)



Access ratings from citizens showed slightly positive trends, while quality scores were more mixed: early childcare quality was seen to have improved, as had gas, water and sewage; while the health clinic’s quality, electricity service, and trash collection were said to have worsened. Qualitative data revealed CELI projects that had very positively affected the *veredas* where they had intervened.

Mixed findings aside, CELI and control respondents were overwhelmingly optimistic about the future of service delivery, government capacity, and economic growth. This was true especially in El Carmen de Bolívar and San Onofre, and very robust: from positive expectations in the 60% range at baseline, the responses were nearer or over 90% at midline. It is quite possible the peace process gives these rural respondents hope for the future that they did not dare have before.

The kids were practically like animals before, seated on the floor, a palm roof, bats, it was horrible. Colombia Responde helped us build the new school for the children. (Beneficiaries, San Jacinto)

The evaluation team recommends

Continue to strengthen political participation through social organizations. Strengthen citizens’ knowledge of the channels of political participation and influence in public administration. Direct significant attention to women and youth organizations.

Strengthen accountability. Strengthen the ongoing practice of educating for accountability to improve public policy orientation, gain citizen trust and provide management oversight.


Strengthen citizen consultation and participation supply and demand. Renew focus on consultation exercises and citizen participation. Strengthen the exercise of citizenship on one side, and on the other, intervene rigorously with local government institutions in the same capabilities the citizens are being trained to expect.

Continue to work with municipalities to improve service delivery, and involve citizens in oversight activities. Focus on pilot-size activities with significant civil society involvement, and scaffold the local governments with consistent TA. Use scorecards to involve citizens in rating changes.

Social development

The social capital index. The survey data show a decline in trust between peers and neighbors, and stagnant participation in organizations in the MdM region. Focus group respondents showed higher levels of participation and much more positive opinions – but these are active participants and so they are more likely to perceive and take part in the construction of the social fabric. The survey sample, which tells more about the wider population, more frequently said that their communities had the tradition of working together on community projects, but also said that they trusted neighbors or community members less than at baseline.

Figure 1.6. Trends in perceptions of trust between peers



At the same time, respondents revealed very positive expectations for the future about their relationships with their communities. When asked how they felt those relationships would evolve in the future, the survey found 10pp or more positive impact on responses, in three of the four MdM clusters.

JACs. CELI MdM developed strong commitments to work with the JACs over the course of their activities, both in building capacity to function as more effective community organizations. CELI MdM trained individual community JACs and associations grouping multiple JACs. For example, CELI MdM held 31 sessions in 17 communities, providing orientation in management practices, transparency, and trust building. The JACs learned skills and procedures that they applied to implementing projects and negotiating advantageous agreements with providers.

We used to have a JAC, but everyone had to leave. Some were killed. Now they're coming back to take the SENA classes that are being offered, on how to run a JAC. (Community leader, San Jacinto)


Interviews and focus groups showed some of the challenges faced by the JACs as a result of the armed conflict. Their leaders faced threats, community projects were suspended, and many individuals and families had to leave the area.

The survey data show that, on average, participation in JACs in the MdM municipalities declined from baseline to midline (47% to 36%), though decision-making rose (20% to 38%) among those who continued to participate in the JACs. The patterns are similar in control zones; as a result, no impact is seen.

Reasons to associate. Among the most important incentives for forming associations are processing, transport, sales, and soliciting credit. Results were significant for CELI interventions

and above all among FHHs. People continue to take part in associations but are now also involved in decision-making at higher levels than in control municipalities.

Figure 1.7. Trends in reasons for deciding to associate



There were similar improvements among MdM respondents’ claims for how their participation benefited them, their families, and their communities. At midline, over 90% said that associating had been fun, had allowed them to do what they like to do, had benefited the community, and would be a strength in the future. They also reported having improved their productive projects through their associations (78%, up from 53% at baseline) and allowed them to participate in community decision-making (85%, up from 62% at baseline). The trends across these questions were strong and positive, and parallel in control areas, so no impact was found.

I’m an artisan and I belong to the Luz y Vida group... I make bags, I iron, I wash clothes and that lets me support my family. I’m not from here, and I thank God that this place has welcomed me and that things have gone really well. I have friends and we all meet and when there is some activity or a celebration we take part and we are all happy. We’re fine, thank God, in spite of everything we’ve suffered. We keep struggling and everything turns out alright. (Participant, Bolivar, CELI)

Implementation of Law 1448 for victims and land restitution brought substantial change in the region, in that victims were made visible and also made aware of their rights. CELI worked to support the implementation of the law, concretely in the strengthening of municipal *personerías*. The social capital constructed by the work of victims’ associations has fomented a sense of belonging and helped identify resources. In some cases, producer associations are made up principally of women who are victims of the conflict and/or living in situations of displacement. As a regional secretary of government told us, “They might be women’s leadership groups, or agricultural, but really, they all started as victims’ groups.” These associations have enabled women to generate income, create solidarity with others and build roots in the territories that have received these people and families.

The survey data also show that victims’ associations are growing. In CELI MdM, the percentage of respondents who reported belonging to organizations of this kind rose from 13% to 18% (similar to the increase among control municipalities). The quality of participation also

improved, thanks to increased participation in decision-making (reported by 22% of Mdm respondents at baseline, and 26% at midline).

The evaluation team recommends

Adapt programs to encourage trust. Strengthen community ties to local government. Trust is outside the control of any program, but develop tools to confront the problem.


Improve work with FHHs using participatory models. Extend the positive results obtained for MHHs to FHHs, respective of their particular vulnerability but also associativity. Strong participants could guide other women to become involved.

Support JACs’ legitimacy. Train in board election processes and inclusive community participation tools to counteract legitimacy threats. Monitor JAC quality formally, and make results public. Mayor’s offices should be involved in targeted programs.

Make organizations more transparent. Use a refined capacity tool to monitor and rank associations, with incentives for high rankers and involvement of local authorities.

Security

In Montes de María, perceptions of security in the *vereda* or *corregimiento* have worsened since baseline, but even so, respondents there remain likely to recommend that a family member return to the area. (Figure 1.8)



In both CELI and control municipalities, perceptions of security worsened, but in control sites it worsened more than in CELI municipalities. As a result, two clusters showed positive impacts regarding security improvement, 25pp in San Onofre and 10pp in El Carmen de Bolívar. Not surprisingly, then, given the downward trend in perceptions of security, there were negative impacts in two clusters regarding whether or not the respondent would recommend that a family member return to the *vereda*.

Respondents in the Mdm municipalities reported that security forces had improved over the last two years – 5% in the case of police, and 7% in the case of military forces, both at statistically significant levels. When asked who they thought should be responsible for security in their *veredas*, respondents at midline tended more toward the police (from 30% at baseline to 52% at midline), and less toward the military (from 39% to 26%).

INTRODUCTION

Project background

Based on the GOC's National Consolidation Plan and formalized in the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT in its Spanish acronym), the concept of "consolidation" refers to the expansion in the conflict zones of Colombia of the legitimate presence of the State. The policy, designed for implementation once minimal conditions for public safety were established, would create the necessary institutional mechanisms to provide basic human rights protections to the populations in those zones historically affected by conflict and illicit crops. The PNCRT was oriented to establishing the presence of State institutions capable of efficiently bringing necessary public goods needed for development.

The policy conceives of social, economic and institutional consolidation and social reconstruction as the result of a process of mobilization and continual strengthening of three pillars: (1) the territorial institutionalization of state institutions focused on guaranteeing security and creating the necessary capacities to institutionally manage the area; (2) the strengthening of citizen participation; and (3) the fostering of regional integration.³ The interaction of these three pillars on a base of territorial security and combined with a coordinated collaboration with state entities would be the path to guarantee the fundamental rights of the citizenry.

The U.S. Embassy, for its part, developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and at the reduction of illicit crops and the presence of illegal armed groups in the conflict zones. It included significant investments in security, antinarcotics, access to justice, and eradication activities:

USAID is already coordinating closely with other Embassy entities, including the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), the Military Group, and the Department of Justice as well as the Political and Economic sections of the State Department to develop an integrated USG approach for the priority CSDI consolidation zones. Programs will include peace and security, illicit crop eradication, access to justice, justice sector reform and humanitarian and development interventions targeted at a wide range of populations.⁴

The multi-faceted nature of the security and development problems required a coordinated response. The joint CSDI activities were designed to address the multiple challenges remaining across consolidation zones, including continued presence of armed groups and the illicit

³http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/themes/danland/descargas/entidad/planeacion/POLITICA_NACIONAL_DE_CONSOLIDACION_Y_RECONSTRUCCION_TERRITORIAL_PNCRT.pdf.

⁴ USAID Colombia Solicitud de Aplicaciones Número 514-09-000005, "Montes de María – Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative," Septiembre 15 de 2009, p. 5.

narcotics trade, enduring poverty, and the lack of rule of law. Working with the GOC and PNCRT, the goal of uniting USG agencies toward consolidation was:

To reach a “tipping point” where state presence and positive perception of the government is sufficiently well-established so that communities decide to align with their government rather than illegal armed groups and the coca industry.⁵

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) as one of the CSDI components and as the backbone of this integrated plan to bolster the PNCRT by supporting efforts to consolidate the State’s institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in the production of illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

The basic premise of the CELIs is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of the State, and their activities are oriented to strengthening state institutions, generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life. The CELIs clearly are no substitute for the State. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice services in the consolidation zones is a *sine qua non* condition for enabling the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation.

The CELIs, or Colombia Responde as the projects are known in the implementation zones, supported the GOC through three pillars that are similar (though not identical) to those of the PNCRT:

Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their CELI peers

PNCRT pillar	CELI pillar	CELI pillars defined as:
1 Territorial institutionalization	Strengthening institutional development	Improving local government response; formalizing property rights; processing cases of victims’ property rights; implementing a rural development strategy
2 Citizen participation and good government	Strengthening social development	Strengthening civil society organizations (CSOs); promoting alliances between the community and the State
3 Regional integration	Catalyzing economic development	Implementation of rural development programs and improving competitiveness

With this shared mandate and the assumption of the GOC’s leadership role, the CELIs developed strategies for institutional, social and economic development in four of the seven corridors where the policy was implemented: 1) Montes de María, in the departments of Bolívar and Sucre; 2) the Southern Corridor in the municipality of Tumaco in the department of Nariño; 3) the Central Corridor in Meta, southern Tolima, and the Valle del Cauca as far as Buenaventura; and 4) the Northern Corridor in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia and southern Córdoba.

⁵ Ibid.

Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics International, has worked through the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, ARD Tetra Tech, implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (MdM) project.

Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: *Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated*, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation – strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS for 2014-2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

CELI investments are targeted to Intermediate Results in supporting Development Objective 3, and have much in common with their original results framework in spite of the shift toward economic activities. The current framework, tied to the CELIs’ common Performance Management Plan (PMP) prioritizes the following:

- | |
|--|
| IR 3.1 More equitable and secure land tenure
Sub IR 3.1.1 Land restituted to displaced victims of conflict |
| IR 3.2 Increased private and public investment in the rural sector
Sub IR 3.2.1 Strengthened local governments’ capacity to access and manage public funds for productive infrastructure
Sub IR 3.2.2 Increase private sector investment in target rural communities |
| IR 3.3 More effective producer associations benefitting smallholder farmers
Sub IR 3.3.1 Improve institutional capacity to producer associations |

In 2011-12 USAID/Colombia called upon its monitoring and evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., to design an impact evaluation of the set of CSDI interventions and collect the baseline survey data. DevTech worked with Econometría, S.A., to carry out this work.⁶ The design included two subsequent measurements: a midterm after two years of program implementation, and a final evaluation following completion of the program.

EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), has been charged with carrying out the midterm measurement, and reporting on CELI impacts to date. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline evaluation design, program satisfaction questions for participants, additional qualitative fieldwork, in-depth interviews with CELI teams. The evaluation design included the collection of data in seven corridors in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities.

⁶ DevTech Systems, Inc. and Econometría S.A. 2013. “Impact Evaluation Methodology of the USAID Strategy in CSDI Zones - Final Methodology Report.”

The midline examined changes since baseline across institutional, social and economic indicators and established three guiding principles for their use:

1. Measure the change in impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with target populations.
2. Inform decision-making processes with timely data, to identify components needing strengthening to achieve program goals.
3. Identify best practices and lessons learned to date, to inform future USAID programming.

The impact evaluation was originally linked to the full range of interventions within the framework of the CSDI. Unfortunately, funding for the other programming was curtailed, leaving the CELIs alone as only one component of the full strategy. Given this, it should not be expected that an impact evaluation designed for the larger initiative would detect results of aspects of the CSDI strategy that were never carried out.

This volume reports on achievements and impacts in CELI Montes de María. It is also important to mention that the results of this study are also presented at the level of “clusters,” that is, individual municipalities or small groups of municipalities that are geographically adjacent and similar socioeconomically. At times, the results of the analysis at the level of the cluster differs from those at the regional level, and for this reason it is important to examine topics at the cluster level to obtain more focused information. For the case of Montes de María, there are four clusters within the region sample. Each cluster is composed of one CELI municipality and one control municipality, and these clusters have been matched since baseline according to a complex matching protocol (please see the Methodology Annex of the baseline report for details.) These clusters are:

Figure 2.2. Four Montes de María clusters

Cluster	CELI municipality	Control municipality
Cluster 12	San Jacinto	Tolú Viejo
Cluster 13	Ovejas	Galeras
Cluster 14	San Onofre	Los Palmitos
Cluster 15	El Carmen de Bolívar	Riohacha

How to read this report

An impact evaluation is a powerful tool but also includes important challenges and differences from other evaluation research.⁷ It is important to understand the different types of findings an evaluation like this generates and how they should be interpreted.

Four types of findings. The report has four types of findings, shown in figures and text in the report. Each figure starts with one of these words.

1. **Impacts.** These come from the survey and compare treated and control groups on key outcomes of interest. Impact is read as the percentage point (pp) difference between

⁷ Please see Design section at the end of the Executive Summary, Limitations there and in the main report, and Annex 3 for details.

baseline and midline *that is attributable to the intervention*. Data tables show statistical significance with asterisks (*).

2. **Trends.** These come from the survey and show change over time, without comparison to controls. Trends are shown in graphics, not tables. In the text we use the percent sign (%) and absolute values.
3. **CELI performance.** These data come from the CELIs and they track CELI performance indicators.
4. **Secondary data.** These data come from other sources like government figures and indices, and they help to describe the context in which CELI interventions operate.

Whole sample and four sub-samples. The whole sample survey is approx. 19,000 households, divided into four subsamples. These are respondents from: CELI municipalities, their controls, PNCRT municipalities, and their controls. Sometimes we refer to the “*full sample*,” when results are similar across all 19,000 households.

Direct and indirect beneficiaries. Due to design challenges (see the Limitations section, below), households that were supposed to be direct beneficiaries at baseline did not always receive CELI interventions. As a result this evaluation report looks at all residents of *veredas* in treated municipalities as indirect beneficiaries. There is one exception, and that is in the economic development chapter, where we have been able to identify a population of direct CELI participants, and track their progress.

Evaluation design and methods

EVAL, with the support of its strategic partner the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) used a mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of CELI interventions. The design followed the baseline design from 2012-2013 very closely, with additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, experiences and opinions among treated (CELI and PNCRT) and control groups. Full design considerations can be found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact.

Evaluation Questions

The baseline identified the evaluation questions in 2010-11, and these have been slightly adjusted (per USAID; please see Annex 2 for the SOW) and are presented below.

Figure 2.3. Evaluation questions

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target population in the areas of interventions?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
3. Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities? ⁸	IR 3.2
4. What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)	Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?	IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities?	Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
8. To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

These questions serve both impact (1, 4-8) and performance evaluation (2, 3) goals and the evaluation reflects this blended purpose with a mixed methods design (please see section on Methodology and its detailed annex for full details). The interdisciplinary team used data from the quantitative household survey (quasi-experimental pre-post design) and qualitative instruments, secondary data search and multi-faceted analyses to answer these questions in this report. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Quantitative methods

The impact evaluation design included a quantitative survey of households in Consolidation zones, both with and without CELI interventions, with these data collected between July 20 and November 30, 2015.⁹ Control municipalities were selected using an advanced matching protocol, described in detail in the annexes to the original baseline report. The original design included an oversample of 12% for each follow-on survey, to allow for attrition. In the field, the midline evaluation, following a panel design, revisited the same households in order to ensure comparability, and lost approximately 15% of the sample to attrition.

The survey instrument (Annex 8 to the main report) includes modules on demographics, justice and security, licit and illicit economic opportunities and performance, government legitimacy, social capital and participation in grassroots organizations, electoral behavior, social and public services, land rights and ownership, victims' rights, roads, social programs, and opinions about the future and about peace. Several indices are created from the data, including indices of social capital, government capacity, and government accountability. In general, the survey measures perceptions (as in the case of security) which are important but more sensitive to news and recent

⁸ This question is answered in Annex 6 with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.


⁹ From the baseline report: "The survey interviews occurred in two phases, with the first phase providing interviews for 65 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control households between March 27 and July 5, 2012. The second phase, providing the remaining 35 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control interviews, plus 100 percent of the direct beneficiary interviews, occurred between November 7, 2012, and May 25, 2013, with a break for the Christmas and New Year holidays." *Impact Evaluation of USAID's Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report. Volume 1: Summary of findings.* June 30, 2013.

events. The survey is less adept at capturing actual experiences, in part because most respondents will not have had direct contact with the changes in institutions or security, for example. In this regard, there is subjectivity in the indicators that were designed at the time of the baseline survey.

The evaluation added several new items for the midline on satisfaction with interventions and a short set on victimization from the LAPOP¹⁰ survey. The survey was administered in person in households, workplaces and, when issues of security prevented deployment to *veredas*, in heads of municipalities.

The evaluation team conducted 2,871 household surveys in the Montes de María region, of which 1,607 were male and 1,264 female respondents. Respondents reported a 67% literacy rate. Most respondents self-identified as either mestizo or indigenous. (Figure 2.4)

Figure 2.4. Sample by self-identified ethnicity



Almost half of respondents (48%) recognized the Colombia Responde activities in their areas, which was 50% among men and 45% among women respondents. Some 47% of survey respondents in the Montes de María region live in dispersed rural areas, 48% in a population center that is not the municipal capital, and just 5% in the municipal capital. Respondents were highly optimistic about the future, with great majorities (94% or more) answering that they expected conditions to improve. Women and men were equally optimistic in their responses.

Other quantitative measures included the examination of key secondary data sources. These came from government sources and the EVIDINCE consortium,¹¹ which collects quarterly municipality-level data on outcomes of interest, such as police and judicial staff presence, among many others. GOC sources also provided updated data on major crimes – this includes homicides, acts of terrorism, and massacres. CELI implementing partners also provided data on their achievements to date in their performance management plan (PMP), including such indicators as numbers of organizations and government offices treated, sales of productive project outputs, and leveraged funds.

¹⁰ The Latin American Public Opinion Survey (<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/>), which has been implemented throughout Latin America by a team at Vanderbilt University for the past three decades.

¹¹EVIDINCE is a research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level

Qualitative methods

Qualitative methods included in-depth interviews with key informants at national, regional and local levels, in CELI and PNCRT sites as well as control municipalities. The team conducted structured interviews with representatives from municipalities and *personerías*, in 21 sites chosen to capture variations between CELI and PNCRT sites and their control zones. Also interviewed were heads of civil society organizations and producers' associations. Focus groups covered themes parallel to those in the survey and the participants were citizens in CELI and PNCRT zones, some of whom had received or participated in interventions, and others who had not.

Qualitative data were analyzed in Atlas.ti using thematic coding that mirrored the evaluation questions and allowed for emergent codes to cover issues not foreseen in the evaluation design. These codes were correlated to understand coincidence and patterns of importance to the evaluation's response to the research questions.

Limitations

The evaluation design followed in this study has certain limitations. These are grouped and discussed below, and a more detailed discussion can be found in Annex 3, Methodology.

Factors related to the evaluation design

1. **The CELIs were to be evaluated as part of a much larger and more comprehensive effort that failed to materialize.** The outcomes of interest are at a high level of generality in the results framework, relative to the investment, the interventions, and the duration of implementation to date. The evaluation was created to assess a set of programs, formerly called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), with broader funding and goals than the current set of interventions. CSDI included a whole-of-government approach from both the U.S. and Colombian governments – anti-narcotics, security and justice, regional and local institutions, economic development, regional integration and roads, and civil society interventions, across the same geographic intervention area. The Initiative as a whole dwindled to comprise only the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative with significant funding but without the wider approach initially envisioned. As a result, the impact evaluation design includes several indicator sets for which few or no targeted interventions were completed. No impacts can be detected for programs that no longer exist.

For CSDI to have produced detectable effects would have been an enormous feat; for the CELIs to do it without the other CSDI interventions, including the interventions promised by the GOC, was far too much to expect. As a result, impacts found by the evaluation as measured by rigorous statistical techniques are few and mostly at the local level with particular direct interventions with producer associations.

2. **Selecting the panel of respondents at baseline was a challenge, resulting in discrepancies in the list of “direct beneficiaries” at midline.** A further limitation in terms of determining and attributing impact involves the panel design of the baseline, followed closely at midline. Baseline data collection was carried out over 18 months, crossing various growing seasons and the three different starting dates of the CELIs. In order to respond to the baseline team's request for lists of direct beneficiaries, CELI

Central approached local leaders and called for meetings of potential local participants, who signed attendance lists. CELI N/S, which was already in progress, provided lists of those who were participating in their interventions at that time. These lists served as the sampling frames for the treatment sites, but they created a problem: attendees knew they would receive a program, thus violating the basic assumption of an impact evaluation baseline that *the intervention has not yet begun*. Knowing about the future benefit changes the population's perceptions, perspectives, decisions and expectations. To some extent, the changes begin to appear from the time of the meeting invitation, and such changes can no longer be observed when the baseline information is collected, so we do not know how this knowledge may have changed their responses, but the relevant literature suggests a social desirability bias in which respondents who think they are to receive some benefit will respond more positively, in an attempt to be amenable to researchers – who they may presume to be involved with the intervention. This makes it very difficult to detect small effects on certain variables, since the baseline measurement has already incorporated, or lost, such effects.

The midline evaluation found that some baseline respondents originally identified as direct beneficiaries did not participate (or did not recall or report participating) in CELI interventions. There were significant discrepancies between people who were classified as direct beneficiaries at baseline and the people who eventually participated in CELI programming. The evaluation team therefore recognized three definitions of “direct beneficiaries”: (1) direct beneficiaries per the baseline evaluation design (4,426 households); (2) respondents who answered a survey question about receiving an intervention from Colombia Responde (2,198 households); and (3) direct beneficiaries from the baseline who are on the CELIs' own participant lists (2,015).

Random households in the municipalities were then selected as indirect beneficiaries, to complement the sample and to represent the wide-ranging set of indicators that the CSDI was to have impacted, such as economic integration through roads and markets, security and justice, and increasing and improving government presence.

None of the three “direct beneficiary” definitions provides a sufficiently reliable gauge of participation and, as a result, for analysis of the more diffusely applied components of CELI activities in governance, infrastructure support and social development, the indirect and direct beneficiaries of the baseline were combined into one group of beneficiaries. However, for certain activities, especially with respect to participation in producers associations and other economically focused interventions, analysis was conducted on a separate “direct beneficiaries” subgrouping based on the three definitions just specified. When taken together, with no double counting (that is, counting a household only once, for example, when a participant fulfills more than one of the definitions such as by appearing on the original list and by responding “yes” to the survey question on Colombia Responde participation), there are 5,445 unique respondents among the three definitions. The evaluation uses this larger group to examine economic impacts on participants, which represents a more rigorous standard. Where impacts are found on this group, they are generally much more positive than the rest of the citizen population.

This qualitative team's experience in the field conducting focus groups helps to understand why so few of those identified as direct beneficiaries actually reported being participants. The first and key questions in the focus groups were regarding participation

in Colombia Responde activities, and few focus group participants said they had participated. The reasons for the problems with the Colombia Responde name are not precisely known, but the evaluators speculate that the following could have contributed: i) at GOC request, USAID hid its participation under the Colombia Responde name so that the beneficiaries would attribute the effects of the program to the GOC; ii) subcontractors have other names, and beneficiaries may have been confused about the identity of the benefactor in the first instance; iii) the results may suffer from recall bias, since the baseline was established between 2012 and 2013, and certain benefits ended a long time ago; and iv) a combination of these and other factors that are unobservable.

3. **The category of indirect beneficiaries is imprecise, and capturing impacts at that diffuse level will take more investment and more time.** Several categories of CELI and PNCRT interventions – essential though they may be – are likely to be invisible to average respondents, and do not reach a minimum treatment threshold, for one of two main reasons. First, some public goods affect few residents of a given area, like the strengthening of justice services or work with municipalities or *personerías*, or some social or productive infrastructure projects. Internationally, only an average 6% of a given population ever accesses justice services in their lifetime, and only a fraction of that figure do so in a given year. Detecting perceptions of change among this “fraction of a fraction” is therefore very difficult. Second, as discussed above, CELI programming had important goals and benchmarks across the pillars of social, economic and institutional development – such that the significant funding is fragmented across geographic sites and pillars. While a member of a treated productive association or civil society group knows well that they have benefited from an intervention, the “indirect” beneficiary is indeed very distant from the benefits. Their inclusion in the sample dilutes the impacts that can be detected by the evaluation design.

Had the robust set of CSDI and GOC whole-of-government interventions continued as planned, perhaps more impacts in these higher-order indicators would have been detected. As it stands, however, the “dose” of intervention is a fraction of what was planned, in far fewer sectors, and at great distance from the beneficiaries, particularly the indirect beneficiaries.

Factors outside the control of the interventions

4. **Local contexts and the absence of public entities condition the effectiveness of the CELIs.** The intervention municipalities are historically economically isolated, with stagnant local markets, very limited road connectivity, armed illegal group activity, minimal (and sometimes corrupt) government institutions, and deep intergenerational poverty. The households in these zones have limited access to land – in terms of either size or low productivity – and a deficit of human capital (education, health, nutrition, as shown in baseline statistics on education coverage, perceptions of service quality, and food security challenges).¹² The main consequence is low productivity and income from

¹² See, for example, Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report Volume 1: Summary of Findings – All PNCRT Zones p. 30 and pp. 42-43; Volume 2 pp. 47-50 and pp. 69-70; plus the regional baseline reports.

land and work, which are rural families' two main factors of production. This constrains households in a logic of poverty perpetuation – the trap – in which poverty is reproduced as a consequence of low savings capacity, which prevents changing the initial amounts of capital, land and work. The cycles are reproduced in the short term, limiting the capacity to change the initial situation, and in the long term, limiting changes in the welfare of the next generation: young people cannot find opportunities and are pressured into migrating or joining illegal armed groups. In this context – and others related to unemployment and informality – violence, in its different forms, reinforces poverty traps.

The other face of this poverty trap context is communal: the municipalities lack access roads, political representation and market formation. Weak political representation often dilutes attention by the central or departmental government, such that the investment in roads is insufficient to develop markets in which small farmers can sell their products above production and transport costs. As such, poverty is not only individual: it is poverty at a municipal level that encompasses the collective. There is an evident absence of public goods that are essential for the development of communities and entire regions. The capacity of rural interventions to generate significant effects on economic and social development is closely linked to land tenancy and property rights. However, the State's policy has had little success on this front, and the CELIs faced the same – or worse – institutional roadblocks.

5. **Exogenous contextual factors cannot be excluded.** Among exogenous factors,¹³ it is important to mention the inflation caused by the global economic slowdown and the sharp drop in oil prices, resulting in recession in economic activities associated with extraction. These effects occurred at the moment that beneficiaries' perceptions of the performance of the CELIs and the PNCRT were sought.
6. **The CELIs' relationship with the Consolidation Unit was not uniformly strong, based on political and other factors.** The Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial (UACT) was a new government body as the CELIs began, which benefited from some CELI support for opening offices in the territory and staff capacity building. Being new, the Unit had to establish itself and had less authority than was likely necessary to impel relevant Ministries to undertake work to meet the Unit's own goals. The national level and regional level offices were not always in synch, according to some stakeholders, and one CELI COR reported better and more collaborative relationships at the regional than at the national level. The UACT was closed and changed to be an office within the Social Prosperity Department (DPS, for its Spanish initials) in December of 2015.

The UACT faced great obstacles in successfully carrying out its role in the territory, including limited budgets for meeting the needs in a complex geographic area with deep social, economic and institutional challenges. The UACT faced the bureaucracy and

¹³ The role of the control municipalities is to ensure that exogenous factors do not bias results. Under perfect conditions, exogenous factors apply to both types of municipalities, so in principle these factors would “cancel out.” However, no quasi-experimental design is ever perfect, and as a result, the evaluation uses control co-variables and clusters in order to minimize possible biases.

limitations of a new government agency charged with responsibility for “coordinating” more powerful ministries, but without the authority and power necessary to guarantee that collaboration. It was under these conflicts and complexities that the CELIs had to coordinate their tasks with the national-level GOC (though regional and local contacts were reportedly much more operational.) Now that the UACT has closed, the CELIs are working to articulate their efforts with the changed institutions.

Factors related to implementation

- 7. The selection process for *veredas* in which to work faced challenges that could affect the evaluation results.** The selection of *veredas* is a crucial foundation for implementation and for evaluation. The selection of municipalities and *veredas* in which the work is ultimately performed has substantial effects on the results of the strategy – and, therefore, on the impacts measured. Implementing partners are guided in selection by USAID and GOC preferences, and the baseline team for this quasi-experimental design followed up by employing a municipality matching system. Such systems, while imperfect, allow for the modeling of a robust counterfactual – what would have happened in municipalities that did not receive the interventions.

One hypothesis generated during the evaluation was that the selection – guided by the “traffic light” process – tended toward the *veredas* closest to the municipal centers, with greater access, more resources, greater associativity, and greater social capital, etc., while the problems of illicit crops and armed groups were extended in more remote and dispersed geographic areas. In general, it can be asserted that the poorer the population, the greater the impacts of an intervention of this type. Thus, focusing on what was easiest operationally may have been counterproductive in terms of impact.

At least at the outset of the programs, the selection of *veredas* depended on the “stoplight” process, which relied on Colombia’s military for impartial classification of the danger of each *vereda* where the CELIs might potentially intervene. Stakeholders in USAID and the CELIs eventually sought a way out of this requirement, as they found the system highly politicized and, at times, the stoplight decision unjustified. Over time, the CELIs’ contracts were amended to allow implementers to amplify their reach to *veredas* in which local dynamics suggested potential positive relations – such as a shared productive project. In this way the CELIs could serve communities that were divided administratively but shared common agricultural goals, and could expand to *veredas* that they themselves had established as safe for project activities.

REGIONAL CONTEXT

The goal of consolidation was to establish and strengthen institutions, regional economic integration and social fabric in zones affected by Colombia’s armed conflict, on a basis of security gains made by Colombia’s security forces. CELI interventions were a part, but certainly not all, of that effort. The other elements that were to lead to that goal have been less than expected.

The Consolidation Index

The Consolidation Index shows one considered viewpoint of the progress to date in the Consolidation municipalities. This index is built from a set of 37 indicators in the three pillars of the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT for its Spanish acronym), each of which is in turn made up of a set of components, as shown in Figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1. Consolidation Index (PNCRT) pillars and their components


	PNCRT pillar	Components
1	Territorial institutionalization	Security, justice, property rights, and human rights
2	Citizen participation and good government	Good government, citizen participation, and social capital
3	Regional integration	Connectivity, social services, and economic growth

Each pillar is composed of a set of indicators that are reliably available, primarily from government sources – line ministries, defense and police bureaus, departments and municipalities. Indicators in the first pillar, for example, include indicators on security challenges, incidence of crimes, in particular conflict-related crimes, and indicators on access to justice mechanisms, human rights indicators, and figures on property rights. Pillar 2 includes data from municipal governments on their provision of spaces for citizen participation, their effective tax collection, their coverage of citizen oversight committees, the status of local civil society and *juntas de acción comunal*, and the Procuraduría General de la Nación’s Open Government Index. Pillar 3 on regional integration includes indicators on roads, electricity and cellular coverage, access to education and health services, hectares under cultivation and the presence of financial entities.

Scores on these indicators are summed to create scores for each pillar, and each pillar makes up one-third of the final score on a scale from 0 to 100. Since 2011, data for the Consolidation Index have been compiled into scores for each Consolidation municipality, along with a set of comparison municipalities to which these are matched. The scores are disaggregated by pillar or by component indicators in each pillar, as well as over time, by geography (municipality, department and region), and by service provision versus sustainability indicators.

The CELI Montes de María region is scored and reported as part of the Consolidation Index, using data from the same four municipalities as are considered in the evaluation research. The

scores have trended positively since the Index was first measured in 2011, as shown in Figure 3.2:



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations

Pillar 1, institutionalization of the territory, shows a steady upward trend, representing steady gains in security, justice, property rights and human rights. Pillar 2 doubled in the four years of the Index, comprising indicators on good government, citizen participation and social capital. Pillar 3, regional integration (connectivity, social services, and economic growth), had a flatter overall outcome over the four years, moving from 84 to 87 on the scale, with a significant dip in 2013. Overall, Montes de María has the highest scores among the regions studied in the Index and in the evaluation.

It should be noted that the Index, like any measure, is composed of indicators that have strengths and weaknesses, as well as particular points of view. It is important to keep these points in mind when comparing advances in the Index to data from the evaluation fieldwork. First, the indicators in the Index generally come from government perspectives, and in many cases those reporting the raw data are municipal, departmental and national officials. This differs fundamentally from the citizens' perceptions of security, services, participation, etc., found in the survey data. Neither one is more "correct" than the other, but they also are not precisely comparable when measuring these same phenomena.


There are also decisions made behind the Index indicators that affect the results – first, the basis for many of the indicators is "principal population centers" – which are determined by those who report the data, which may be municipal officials or even local transportation companies, who report on road conditions. By contrast, the evaluation sample is 90% dispersed rural, 8% in population centers other than the municipal capital, and 2% in the municipal capital.

Second, the scores on many indicators are weighted to be compared to municipalities that have comparable socioeconomic levels, and as a result may be given high marks even when their absolute scores are among the lowest in the nation. For example, in the indicator on open government (using the Procuraduría General de la Nación's own Open Government Index figures), the 2014 score for El Carmen de Bolívar is 31.2, but this is calibrated to 100 (full marks) by the comparison with like municipalities. This is not a failing of the Index, but it is important to take into consideration that the scores are altered in this way, before being added together to create the Index.

Security

The security component of the Index includes indicators on: police operations that do not involve the military, the implementation of a citizen security plan, subversive and terrorist acts, and density and changes in coca production. Each of those show improvement in the Index, even that of coca production, despite strong external data to the contrary. There is likely to have been a significant worsening when the 2015 data are complete, as well, because of the well-documented increase in coca production in Colombia: according to media reports, as much as doubling since 2013.¹⁴ In addition, due to quite a bit of missing data in the years prior to 2014, the trends for some of the component indicators are incomplete.

Perceptions of security in the region have worsened since baseline, but even so, respondents there remain likely to recommend that a family member return to the area. (Figure 3.3)



Though no impacts were found on these questions at the regional level, the cluster-level analysis shows differences between the region's four defined clusters:

Figure 3.4. Impacts on perceptions of security

<i>Cluster:</i>	I2	I3	I4	I5
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	-0.0680	0.0767	0.254***	0.101*
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	-0.00137	-0.130***	-0.0368	-0.066**

In both CELI and control municipalities, perceptions of security worsened, but in control sites it worsened more than in CELI municipalities. As a result, two clusters showed positive impacts regarding security improvement, 25pp in Cluster 14 and 10pp in Cluster 15. Not surprisingly, then, given the downward trend in perceptions of security, there were negative impacts in two


¹⁴ The Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) of the Central Intelligence Agency produces an annual estimate of the area cultivated with coca for the Andean region. Its latest results were presented to the GOC in March 2016. The main conclusions – national statistics – were disseminated in the media. Coca cultivation in Colombia reached a historic low in 2013 (in both the SIMCI and CNC-DoD measurements). In the two years since, however, the growth has been sustained and drastic. In the last CNC measurement, cultivated hectares doubled, from 80,000 to 159,000, with a proportional increase in the production of cocaine, from 290 to 442 metric tons. The complete report is not accessible to the public. The statistics cited here are found in the articles published in the *El Tiempo* newspaper, *Semana* magazine and *El Espectador* newspaper on March 15, 2016 (<http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/ee-uu-y-canada/ee-uu-advierte-de-aumento-de-cultivos-de-coca-en-colombia/16537123>).

clusters (13 and 15) regarding whether or not the respondent would recommend that a family member return to the *vereda*.

The Consolidation Index reports that all security operations are now undertaken by the police alone, without military accompaniment, indicating greater civilian control. The Index data also report that the region has advanced in citizen security planning. Subversive and terrorist actions are at zero in the 2014 Index data, which also reports that there is no coca in the region.

The MdM evaluation sample, disaggregated by stoplight level, shows a lesser level of high or critical security zones compared to the rest of the sample. Of 198 *veredas* sampled in Montes de María, only 5 are considered high risk, and the rest about evenly divided between low and medium risk. The full evaluation sample, by contrast, is dominated by high risk *veredas*, with some low, some medium and some critical risk sites (Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5. Security levels, MdM *veredas* (at left) compared to the entire sample (at right)



To understand their perceptions of security, respondents were asked about a range of crimes. In almost all cases, MdM respondents perceived these crimes as less frequent than at baseline:

Figure 3.6. Impacts on perceptions of crimes

Cluster:	12	13	14	15
Homicides	0.0353*	-0.00417	0.0167	0.0353
Illegal armed groups	0.00459	-0.0116	-0.0891**	-0.0605**
Antipersonnel mines	0.00540	0.00783	0.00542	0.0133
Displacement	-0.0171	0.0357*	-0.0293	-0.0246
Forced disappearances	0.0102	0.0178*	0.0118	-0.00772
Extortion	0.00460	0.00955	0.0448	-0.0470*
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	-0.322***	-0.0803	-0.396***	-0.299***
Forced recruitment	0.00624	0.00838	0.00987	0.00184
Sexual violence	0.0279	-0.00210	0.0548**	0.0336

Each of the clusters has a different pattern of improvements, declines and static results for perceptions of crime. The question with the most common results was about citizen insecurity or delinquency, in which there were significant positive impacts of 30pp or more in three clusters. There were two clusters that also reported significant declines in the presence of illegal armed

groups (Cluster 14, at 9pp, and Cluster 15, at 6pp.) Three clusters showed positive impact when reacting to the statement, “There are no serious crime problems in the *vereda*.” These were Cluster 12 (24pp positive impact), Cluster 14 (16pp), and Cluster 15 (10pp).

This general decline is consistent with data across the country, and across consolidation zones (please see the main report for detail.) Only in the case of sexual violence did the perceptions figure increase in the Mdm region since baseline, which increase seems to have been concentrated in Cluster 14.


Respondents in the Mdm municipalities reported that security forces had improved over the last two years – 5% in the case of police, and 7% in the case of military forces, both at statistically significant levels. When asked who they thought should be responsible for security in their *veredas*, respondents at midline tended more toward the police (from 30% at baseline to 52% at midline), and less toward the military (from 39% to 26%). There were no significant impacts at cluster level when respondents were asked about improvements in police or state security services.

Illicit crops and the culture of (il)legality

Evidence from the survey shows a decline in illicit crops in Mdm, from a baseline that was already very small: from some 3.5% reporting coca cultivation in their *vereda* at baseline, by midline that figure was under 2.5%.

Montes de María has been more a transit corridor than a cultivation zone for coca and other illicit crops, and the area is not likely to be one of the concentration points for demobilized FARC combatants after the signing of an eventual peace accord.¹⁵ Nevertheless, there is some evidence of the presence of illegal armed groups (IAGs) in these municipalities, since about a quarter of respondents reported either positive or negative effects of the IAGs on the functioning of municipal government. (Figure 3.7)

Figure 3.7. Trends in perceptions of IAG effects on municipal functions




Of respondents who said that IAG presence had a positive effect on municipal functioning, they specified that the positive effects included: the IAGs make the municipality publicly accountable (74% at baseline to 81% at midline); the IAGs avoid the raiding of public funds (from 65% to

¹⁵ Semana., June 11, 2016. “Turbulencia antes del Día D del proceso de paz.” (In English: Turbulence prior to D-Day in the peace process.)

80%); they make the municipality serve the population (from 73% to 81%); and that the IAGs practice oversight on the activities of the municipality (from 75% to 88%).

Despite the generalized nationwide trend of increased coca cultivation, MdM’s respondents reported a decline, supported by the Consolidation Index data. However, the baseline agreement with statements against illicit crops has eroded. (Figure 3.8)

Figure 3.8. Trends in attitudes about illicit crops (agree/strongly agree)



These figures showing the erosion of support for legality are well distributed across the MdM clusters, with the exception of Cluster 14, which appears to have maintained its commitment to legality despite the regional trend. In the other three clusters, all impacts are negative and rather substantial in Clusters 12 and 15.

Figure 3.9. Impacts on attitudes about illicit crops (agree/strongly agree)

Cluster:	12	13	14	15
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	-0.215***	-0.0941***	0.181***	-0.139***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	-0.120***	-0.0308	0.145***	-0.133***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	-0.293***	-0.173***	-0.00633	-0.209***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	-0.117***	-0.0985***	0.197***	-0.0750**

Respondents report a slight increase in illegal mining in their *veredas*, from about one-half of one percent to a little over one percent. This, too, is consistent with nationwide trends. This is not differentiated by clusters.

Human rights, justice and state legitimacy


Small percentages of citizens report a violation of their human rights in MdM (3% at baseline, 4.5% at midline) and more of these respondents attribute the violation to *Bacrim* than at baseline. There was a strong trend not to do anything in response to such a violation (from 26% at baseline to 53% at midline). Those who said they took their case to the formal justice system dropped from 92% baseline to 37% at midline. In general, respondents were less willing to denounce a crime to the authorities, and less likely to report that they “generally act in accordance with the law” – from 82% to 72%.

Montes de María municipalities have suffered intense displacement as a result of the armed conflict. In San Jacinto, the mayor’s office estimated 19,000 displaced out of a population of less than 25,000. As the government attempts to return displaced people to the area, and to reconstitute land where applicable, land titling efforts are linked to security concerns. The Land Restitution Unit offers a year of accompaniment to ensure that restituted lands are not taken again. An organization leader in Tolú Viejo (control) expresses his concern:

For a year they’ll monitor the owner, the new owner, so the big landowner doesn’t come back and take the lands again. Those big landowners made everyone leave, made us sell at a low price.

In Montes de María, as elsewhere in Colombia, the State’s legitimacy is limited, for its failure to provide key state services and guarantees equally across the country. (Figure 3.10)

Figure 3.10. Trends in state legitimacy (agree/strongly agree)



Access to justice services are closely related to legitimacy. Survey results continue to suggest low levels of confidence in the system, as evidenced by the low and sinking percentage of respondents believing they’ll get a fair trial. There is also a continuing tendency to resolve conflicts outside the justice system, according to survey respondents.

At baseline, only 9% of respondents in MdM said they would go to the municipal justice entities to resolve a conflict, while at midline, the figure was only 5%. Similarly, fewer said they would use the JAC to help resolve a dispute (from 5% at baseline to 1% at midline.) Only 14% of MdM respondents said the justice services were present in their municipalities, down from 70% at baseline. Some 43% said at baseline that there were alternative justice bodies available in their areas, but only 10% affirmed that at midline.

This contradicts the Consolidation Index strongly, which reports a high level of justice authorities in attendance in Montes de María, which has improved over the four years under study. Judges, prosecutors, police inspectorate, family services, equity conciliators, and the *personerías* are said to all be attending the public. In addition, according to the Consolidation Index, an average of two-thirds of citizens without local access to these services have received a visit from a mobile justice brigade or equity conciliators.

CELI INTERVENTIONS IN MONTES DE MARÍA


The CELIs included the following components to reach the results framework objectives:

- Support for productive activities focusing on the agricultural value chain (such as technical assistance and training in farming, processing and marketing) and on support for youth entrepreneurial efforts in developing skills in business and commerce;
- Governance support to strengthen local and regional governments, such as through training in planning, budgeting, taxes, royalties, project formulation and management, and accountability;
- Assistance in land issues for communities and individuals, including the formalization of land titles and private property rights, claims for restitution, regularizing the status of public lands, and dealing with special rights reserved for ethnic groups;
- Infrastructure support, providing assistance in building social goods (schools, roads, health posts, improved sanitation and electricity) and productive infrastructure (such as improving processing plants, warehouses, and marketing centers);
- Social capital development and the development of civil society, in terms of providing training and support for Community Action Councils (the *Juntas de Acción Comunal*), producers associations, community councils in indigenous and Afro-Colombian areas, and others; and
- Support for the development of credit and financial institutions and programs in target areas.

As the first CELI, CELI MdM had its own Performance Management Plan (PMP) from the start of programming. The PMP evolved with the advent of the two other CELI projects to become a shared set of indicators to which all three projects reported. Indicators measured progress on key deliverables, with some data coming from the CELIs themselves (public funds leveraged, number of people benefited by rural and economic development support, number of public-private alliances, etc.) and some from secondary sources (including this evaluation).


CELI MdM met the majority of its indicators across three pillars: economic, social and institutional; their compliance was highest among social and economic indicators. The latter are also the most numerous of the indicators for which CELI was responsible. (Figure 4.1; the calculation of these figures is described in Annex 3)

Figure 4.1. CELI MdM PMP indicator compliance



The CELI's expenditures, as recorded in USAID/Colombia's MONITOR database, totaled approximately USD\$23,768,000 and can be broken down as follows, by source (at left) and by type of intervention (at right).

Figure 4.2. CELI MdM expenditures by source and project type



Source: MONITOR database, accessed May 1-9, 2016


That said, CELI Montes de María began and ended on an earlier schedule than that of the other two CELIs and was implemented as a cooperative agreement, while the other two CELIs are contracts. For these reasons and because of important contextual variations, the interventions in Montes de María were in some ways quite distinct. These interventions are described in the subsections below.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation question: To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?

Findings and conclusions

The Consolidation Index measures economic growth with two indicators: the number of financial entities per 10,000 citizens, and the number of hectares under cultivation. The data for the years 2011-2014 are shown in the following figure.



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations

The data show a positive trend in terms of available financial entities, which corresponds with what is known about CELI interventions in terms of bringing in national financial services, in a variety of formats (please see section below on financial services in CELI areas). Cultivated hectares, on the other hand, show a downward trend. This score goes down every time there is a decrease in cultivated hectares for the previous period. As a result, the economic growth indicators from the Index show mixed results.

In the Montes de María region, 13% of survey respondents said the economic situation where they live is good or very good, compared to 33% at baseline. Nevertheless, since the control sites decreased even more, there was an 8pp positive impact since baseline. In focus groups, respondents said the El Niño phenomenon had been devastating this year:

I'm a housewife and I work too. My companion is a farmer and this summer we lost practically everything. We had to take water on burros to where the cattle were, but they died, and so did the plantings. (Direct beneficiaries, San Jacinto)

There were also numerous quotes from MdM about the younger generation not being involved in local income generation, and instead going to regional cities to find jobs, despite one local initiative for ecotourism.

I don't know what's happened with our crafts – we're making the same products but they're terribly devalued. Now no one wants to make them, particularly the younger people. (Citizens, San Jacinto)

Here the youth finish their high school and they leave because there is no supply of jobs, no opportunities. They go to Bogotá, Sincelejo, Medellín. (Tolú Viejo)

They all leave. They finish school and if they pass, maybe a university or SENA, but if not, they drive mototaxis. (San Jacinto)

Direct beneficiaries

Compared to baseline, direct beneficiaries in the Montes de María region are around 5pp less¹⁶ likely than the general population to experience hunger, and 2pp less likely to see illicit crops as one of the only attractive economic options open to them. Those listed as beneficiaries in the CELI MdM roster had greater income than the rest of the population and greater income than at baseline – by COP 189,140 (approximately USD \$105) per month.

At midline, 8pp more direct beneficiaries said they had a business or productive unit (which includes a plot of land for farming) than did at baseline. Some 12pp report receiving training for their business or productive unit, and that that training came with a practical component. This finding is consistent with adult learning principles, and likely reflects the type of training the CELI undertook in the region.

Having a savings account was 11pp greater among those who said they had participated in Colombia Responde activities. Those identified as direct beneficiaries at baseline and at midline had more often paid for public services through a bank or non-bank entity, and direct beneficiaries were about 11pp more likely to have debt.

Despite gains in income and positive reports in qualitative interviews, MdM participants responded less favorably than at baseline when asked about the presence and influence of problems in production and sales. The survey showed about 8.5pp greater perception of abuse by intermediaries, 10pp greater problem with high transport costs, and 6pp more reporting problems with soil quality than at baseline. However, 8pp fewer said they lacked water. Respondents did not perceive low prices for their produce as a serious problem, nor did they cite armed group influence or lack of access to credit.


MdM direct beneficiaries gave slightly higher marks to roads from their municipality to other municipalities, with about 8pp of impact. This is consistent with 5pp more direct beneficiaries who say they reach their home via a paved road, and 10pp fewer who say they reach their homes via an unpaved road. When asked about the time it takes to reach the nearest health post, MdM direct beneficiaries cite between 8 and 17 fewer minutes than at baseline.

The broader survey: perceptions of economic conditions

For other questions on the economic situation, MdM beneficiaries across the board (“direct” and “indirect”) and control trends improved. Fewer respondents said unemployment or lack of opportunity were problems, and far fewer said their productive activities earned very little. (Figure 5.2)

¹⁶ The data for direct CELI beneficiaries come from three different subsamples, and therefore are presented as an approximate average impact. Please see the Limitations subsection of the Evaluation Design chapter on how direct beneficiaries are defined.

Figure 5.2. Trends in perceptions of the economic situation



Source: Calculations from the baseline and midline databases, CELI evaluation¹⁷

The reader is reminded that the Montes de María sample is made up of four clusters, which will be referred to in the rest of the report where the survey data are disaggregated to the cluster level. The sites are as follows:

Figure 5.3. Four Montes de María clusters

Cluster	CELI municipality	Control municipality
Cluster 12	San Jacinto	Tolú Viejo
Cluster 13	Ovejas	Galeras
Cluster 14	San Onofre	Los Palmitos
Cluster 15	El Carmen de Bolívar	Riohacha

There are several negative impacts at cluster level on respondents' perceptions of the economic situation. Clusters 13 and 15 showed significant negative impact of 9pp and 13pp respectively, as shown in Figure 5.4. For the remainder of questions in the figure, negative (and significant) impact figures mean the situation has improved, and fewer respondents report negative experiences.


Figure 5.4. Impacts on perceptions of the economic situation

	Cluster:	12	13	14	15
The economic situation is good or very good		-0.0620	-0.0888**	-0.0444	-0.131***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems		-0.204***	0.0588	-0.00331	-0.205***
Productive activities earn very little money		0.0231	0.0468	-0.0781*	0.237***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity		0.0600**	-0.00024	0.0180	0.036***

In Cluster 12, there was a 20pp positive impact on perceptions of unemployment and scarce opportunities. At the same time, more respondents said that one of the only attractive options is illegal activity (6pp). Cluster 13 had no other significant results among these questions, but in Cluster 14 there was one positive impact of 8pp, in that respondents were less likely to say that productive activities earn little money. Cluster 15 had mixed results, with 20pp positive impact on perceptions of unemployment and scarce opportunities, and 24pp negative impact regarding the low returns on productive projects.

¹⁷ The source for all tables and graphics in the report is the database of baseline and midline survey data collected for the impact evaluation of the CELI interventions, unless otherwise noted.

Food security is not guaranteed, similar to baseline, for households in CELI municipalities in MdM. Across the region, control households were quite similar, or somewhat worse, on these variables. In focus groups, beneficiaries spoke about price increases that were inhibiting their consumption: “we just have rice and eggs, we can no longer afford meat.” Where respondents had productive projects, according to respondents in San Jacinto, the prices they got for their goods was insufficient. Figure 5.5 shows those results.



By cluster, the results in Cluster 12 were promising, with 13pp positive impact about the family’s hunger, 17pp positive impact regarding the fear of running out of food, and 22pp positive impact regarding actually running out of food. Still, even with these positive impacts, there was 17pp negative impact when households were asked if their families’ conditions were of extreme poverty. Cluster 13 is similarly mixed, as shown in Figure 5.6 below, but Clusters 14 and 15 are more uniformly negative, with 16pp and 25pp more hunger reported.

Figure 5.6. Impacts on perceptions of food security

Cluster:	12	13	14	15
The family is experiencing hunger	-0.132**	-0.139***	0.157***	0.254***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty	0.165***	-0.245***	-0.0225	0.0413
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	-0.165***	0.118***	0.00702	-0.0302
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	-0.216***	-0.140**	0.114**	0.513***

Income among MdM respondents, measured through their estimated monthly expenses, increased by approximately 66%, from 402,033 COP at baseline to 667,645 COP at midline (\$144 to \$238 in U.S. dollars, using an exchange rate of 2800 COP/\$1.) This finding cannot be attributed as an impact of the CELI interventions, however, because the control sites increased even more. However, broken down by cluster, impact is found in El Carmen de Bolívar cluster:

Figure 5.7. Impacts on income

Cluster:	12	13	14	15
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	-52,311	-454,887	-122,998	331,077***

The income data from Clusters 12, 13 and 14 were inconclusive, with no statistically significant results. Only in Cluster 15 was impact found, and in this case it was a positive difference of 331,077 COP in favor of the households in CELI municipalities.

The survey also poses a set of questions about the future, to understand respondents’ expectations. Responses by cluster varied greatly and consistently across these questions, with Clusters 12 and 13 more neutral and 14 and 15, especially 15, more optimistic. (Figure 5.8)

Figure 5.8. Impacts on expectations for the future

Cluster:	12	13	14	15
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0.00115	-0.0472	0.0690**	0.127***
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0.0581	-0.0599	0.0575	0.0669*
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0.0451	0.0152	0.0894**	0.160***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0.0673**	0.00763	0.0937***	0.0964***
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0.0374	-0.123***	-0.109**	-0.0868**

In Clusters 12 and 13 there is almost no impact on expectations for the future, relative to baseline and to the control municipalities. Cluster 14 shows single-digit positive impact on several questions, but there is an 11pp negative impact on the concrete question about plans to invest in one’s productive project in the next two years. Cluster 15 is even more positive, with 13pp impact on a question about improved living conditions, 16pp impact on the question regarding improvements to the local economy, and 10pp when asked whether their housing conditions will improve. Cluster 15 respondents, however, showed a 9pp significant reduction when asked if they intended to invest in their productive project in the next two years.

Conclusion 1: The perception of the economic situation in CELI MdM and control municipalities has worsened, but the trend is the same in control municipalities. This trend is certainly related to a series of factors out of the reach of any intervention and that constitute a poverty trap, almost impossible to escape. Despite the difficulties in all of the consolidation zones, it is not uncommon to find communities’ positive values with respect to their regions. This is an indication of the ownership inhabitants feel with respect to their territories and productive projects. In some cases, they also demonstrate community level rejection of illicit activities in favor of a culture of legality. However, in sum, the results indicate that the economic situation in MdM and control regions parallels that across the country, with the hardships and needs of the inhabitants of remote rural zones who survive from day to day and face difficulties even in terms of basic food security.

Conclusion 2: Direct CELI beneficiaries are an important exception to these negative perceptions, as discussed in the full evaluation report. The contrast with the rest of the samples is noteworthy and seems statistically parallel between households headed by men and women. Across CELI MdM municipalities, with or without direct intervention, there are positive trends in the perception of the problems they face, such as the lack of opportunities and the low income provided by their productive activities. The female-headed households form an important part of this optimism.

Assistance for productive projects

CELI interventions aim to reduce areas planted with illicit crops and support sustainable income generation. The CELIs made great investments to support smallholder associations,¹⁸ to improve the land, to provide technical assistance and inputs for production, and to support commercialization. In Antioquia, for example, the greatest investments were made to support

¹⁸ A section on producers associations can be found in the chapter on social development.

rubber, cocoa and coffee production; in Córdoba, to support cocoa, plantain, rubber and papaya; and in Tumaco mainly for cocoa, coconut and shrimp.

The CELIs provided technical assistance (TA) in efforts to improve the productivity and quality of specific crops. All three CELI projects have emphasized organizational training and capacity building for producer associations. For instance, towards the end of the MdM project, a CELI partner operator helped strengthen ten producer associations through training in accounting, organizational, tax and business topics, and office management.¹⁹


Overall, each of the CELI intervention components was directed at counteracting the deficiencies or weaknesses that the producers faced in their regions: TA, for example, aimed to counteract low productivity and provide products with greater added value. Similarly, productive projects were designed so that producers could associate and have greater power of negotiation with the middlemen or buyers for marketing.

Some 22% of respondents in the MdM region said they had received support for their productive projects at baseline, and 33% at midline. Some 71% said they had received courses or trainings, which was the most frequently mentioned. More than half, or 57%, received vegetal material or other in-kind support, and 45% said they received technical assistance. These figures are just slightly lower than at baseline, which is consistent with the time passed since baseline – just prior to their interventions, most of which lasted between 9 and 15 months.

At midline, 8-15pp more respondents among the CELI municipalities said that their project support included practical elements, which is consistent with adult learning principles. Though this also improved in control zones, and cannot therefore be attributed to the CELI interventions, it is a positive trend.

Respondents reported associating more at midline than at baseline, with strong trends. These trends are shown in Figure 5.9 below, but as the trends in control zones were similar, there was no impact attributable to the CELIs.

Figure 5.9. Trends in reasons to associate for productive project activities



¹⁹ MdM Quarterly Report FY2015 Q1, p. 20.

Gains are consistent across these activities and the magnitude is often double or more from the baseline responses. For buying inputs, and for processing, selling, and transporting products, nearly all the gain from baseline to midline comes from FHHs.


Conclusion 3: The productive projects in CELI programs showed evidence of economic changes in the households and their productive projects. The beneficiaries are deeply appreciative of the TA that accompanies the CELI programs, and report that the support promotes assets and capital, which they will be able to enjoy in the long term.

Conclusion 4: CELI support goes directly to the strengthening of value that will mature in the medium or long term. The goal, along with improved institutional support, was to create long-term value that helps producers provide for themselves through their productive projects. The purpose of these instruments is to strengthen savings and investment, as they oblige the beneficiaries to work and look after their crops with a long-term perspective, with all the costs and sacrifices that this implies. Respondents did however express concerns that they are currently experiencing short- and medium-term food insecurity.

Markets and trade


According to the survey, CELI respondents in MdM perceive fewer serious problems in production and marketing of their products. The following figure shows the improvements in these responses almost universally among CELI respondents, and the mixed responses for their controls:

Figure 5.10. Trends in perceptions of problems in production and sales of their products




The trends in where respondents take their products for sale and where they buy products indicate that local markets continue to be very important, and even dominant, for most citizens. Most frequently, they sell their products in the municipal capital or, to lesser extent, right on their farms. Respondents at midline report selling their goods more at these two sites than they did at baseline. Figure 5.11 shows the degree to which these sites are most important for respondents.

Figure 5.11. Trends in where respondents sell products




The tendency to sell their products in the municipal capital was repeated when respondents were asked where they buy their goods for consumption. Focus group data confirm this as well. There was also an increase in purchases made in nearest population centers, in absolute terms, from baseline to midline. Figure 5.12 shows these trends, which still concentrate consumption purchases in the municipal capital.

Figure 5.12. Trends in where respondents buy products



Respondents tended to sell their products to intermediaries, at baseline and even more so at midline (Figure 5.13). Sales to cooperatives, associations, and to the public at fairs, in markets, or in general were a very small percentage of sales. Nearly all sales went through intermediaries in the MmM region.

Figure 5.13. Trends in to whom respondents sell products



Intermediaries were cited in focus groups as a drain on the prices the producers could get for their products.

What we want here is to be able to sell directly to our consumers. Here in town we could sell a kilo of honey at 18,000 pesos. But the intermediary, the best he gives us is 8,500/kilo. (Association leader, El Carmen de Bolívar)

What happens is, if we don't sell to the intermediaries, they come to the pueblo and tell buyers to buy at x price, which is what they would have paid. So if we then come in and try to sell at a small margin, the buyers are already alerted and they won't pay more than the intermediary was promising us. Then we lose what we paid for transport, too. (Beneficiary, San Jacinto)

Despite the trends in absolute terms, changes seen from baseline to midline rarely showed impact that was attributable to the CELI interventions. Most often, the trends present in CELI municipalities were similar in control municipalities. The data support the assertion that local markets, especially in the municipal capital, remain the most important markets for productive activities.

Conclusion 5: TA and marketing support help counteract problems related to low profitability, and respondents report that those problems are diminishing with respect to their productive projects. However, trading such products requires markets with enough buyers and sellers and the establishment of prices that are higher than production costs. The lack of access to wider markets in and outside the consolidation zones seriously hampers the tasks of the CELI and of the GOC. Similarly, the productive projects counteract the incentives to plant illicit crops, but with the deficient and partially depressed markets, pressure from armed groups and the lack of access roads (see the section on roads later in this chapter), it is difficult for the policies and programs to have the desired effects. It could be concluded that in the presence of structural problems – which are the GOC's direct responsibility – it is difficult for CELI and PNCRT programs to produce effects that are sustainable in time.

Conclusion 6: The markets in consolidation territories continue to be local and regional markets, and export markets are small in terms of the proportion of sales. As such spaces are limited, the producers tend to be affected by the high costs of trading that go along with the deficiencies typical of small markets. It is a circular relationship: small markets do not encourage greater production and, in contrast, greater production that exceeds the incentives of these markets clash with the rigidity of the local market and the lack of facility to export to other regions.

Savings, credit and financial services


Access to financial services and credit to strengthen the productive and licit value chains has been an intermediate goal of the three CELIs. They have created savings and credit groups, developed revolving funds within producer associations, and offered TA to associations to expand their skills in the use of financial information and tools. CELI MdM worked with the microfinance institute CREZCAMOS to deliver 7,352 microcredit loans, 11,000 micro-insurance policies, and almost USD\$9 million to the local economy to fund productive activities. Offices were set up in each of the project municipalities, and 116 local savings and loans groups (GLAC), to provide credit to their members.²⁰

The CELIs have worked a double front to improve access to credit and bank use among their beneficiaries. In terms of bank use, CELI MdM supported over 7,200 people in opening a new bank product in a local institution, far exceeding (142%) their goal. These findings parallel those in the Consolidation Index, where the region is given full marks for having a number of financial entities that is equal to or better than those in similar municipalities.

²⁰ Colombia Responde Quarterly Report July-September 2014, p. 26.

Survey respondents also reported an increase in household debt of approximately 32%, from 2,925,606 COP to 3,852,702 COP, or from \$1,045 to \$1,376. The evaluation found no impact that can be attributable to the CELI interventions. Among all respondents, in CELI and control zones, fewer respondents report having debt – from around two-thirds at baseline to less than half at midline. But more CELI respondents had their debts through formal channels than at baseline. Fewer, however, report having a savings account. Other financial services are shown in Figure 5.14:

Figure 5.14. Trends in use of financial services



When asked about the support they received for their productive projects, 17% of respondents said they received a loan, and the average loan amount was up 110% at midline, from approximately COP 2,605,778 at baseline (an increase of USD \$930). At the cluster level, several of these measures show impact, as seen in Figure 5.15:

Figure 5.15. Impacts on use of financial services

Cluster:	12	13	14	15
Have a savings account	-0.155***	0.106*	-0.0105	-0.0247
Have a checking account	0.0229	-0.0387**	-0.0600**	0.0173
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	-0.254***	0.0283	-0.0913*	0.0187
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	-0.128**	-0.0289	-0.00639	-0.154***
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	-0.221**	0.107	0.0546	0.0300
Currently have debt	-0.254***	-0.125**	-0.0441	-0.148**

The decrease in savings accounts across the region is clearer when reviewing the data by cluster, where there is a 15pp drop in accounts in Cluster 12 and a 10pp increase in such accounts in Cluster 13. Clusters 14 and 15 show no statistically significant change. Checking account usage dropped in the single digits in Clusters 13 and 14, and not at all in 12 and 15. Use of banks and non-bank entities to make public service payments dropped by 25pp in Cluster 12 and 9pp in Cluster 14, but there was no change in 13 and 15. Loan requests and active loans decreased, especially in Cluster 12, where the greatest losses in financial product usage occurred, and with 25pp negative impact on currently holding debt. The range of negative impacts here reflect that, in control areas, respondents continued to use financial services at a more stable rate, or decreased but less so than in CELI municipalities.

Informal credit continues to exist, with small loans that have high monthly interest of 10-20%:

In my vereda, the man has a car and he travels around in it every day, he takes the produce and he lends you 10,000, 20,000, whatever you need [to pay] per harvest, in one installment. (Montes de María, CELI)

Respondents report that they cannot get formal loans without land title, or a co-debtor:

The Agrarian Bank can't lend to me, because I don't have land. If I don't have land, I don't have the ability to pay. There are lots of us like that where I live (Citizen, Tolú Viejo, Control)

As a result, informal lending continues to be many residents' source for cash flow. They make daily interest payments, generally to illegal groups who can be violent if the debt goes unpaid. These debts and the interest paid can easily exceed respondents' ability to pay, even when the debts are in small amounts for foodstuffs.

I have from 5 to 8 daily payments, easy. If I don't pay, they call, or even take things from my house, like the television. (Citizen, San Jacinto)

To survive, I might take out a gota-a-gota loan to get rice, at 1.500, 2.000 per pound. Then I make a daily payment. If I've borrowed 200, my daily payment is 140. (Citizen, Tolú Viejo - Control)

Other respondents report taking informal loans for planting, but that they were now unable to repay the loans because of weather-related crop failures. There are few references in the focus group and interview transcripts of the use of rotating funds in associations for these purposes, despite the doubling in indebtedness cited above. The credit situation in MDM regions appears to be quite negative and exploitative.


Conclusion 7: According to the household survey, credit has fallen in both CELI and control zones. However, the information gathered in focus groups indicates that financial support has fulfilled a vital function for the development of savings and credit. Revolving savings and credit funds have served as important instruments to support capitalization in rural areas.

Conclusion 8: Informal credits contained in trading or illegal *gota a gota* loans will always exist unless financial services progress in rural areas. Theoretically, illegal credit problems can be resolved judicially, but the informal modalities arise when the broader economy fails to provide viable alternatives. Community credit or loans which are a product of programs such as CELI provide an alternative to informality.


Conclusion 9: Bank formalization has increased in MDM, despite having deteriorated in all other regions under study. However, households have decreased their use of credit.

Transportation infrastructure

The general condition of roads in Colombian rural areas is poor; Ministry of Transport data show that only 6% of roads in MDM are paved, and only 13% are considered "good" by the Ministry's own rating system. Responses to the survey questions on roads were mixed, as shown in the following figure.



The Consolidation Index has two roads indicators that show perfect scores in 2014. These indicators show the percentage of principal population centers that have a year-round connection to the municipal center (whether this is by road, river or sea), and whether a paved or asphalted road connects the municipality with a principal city. (Figure 5.17)



As the first indicator is based on what is a “principal population center,” the figures are skewed toward more urban sites, and further with the undocumented decision about how those sites are defined. On the other hand, the survey data come from primarily “rural dispersed” households, explaining why their approval of the roads in the municipality stands at 20% in 2015.

The survey also asks about the time it takes for respondents’ families to get to the nearest health clinic, which dropped more in MdM than in control zones, by almost 17 minutes. Another positive finding is that 31pp fewer respondents in CELI municipalities said that the high cost of transportation was a serious problem for their productive activities – from 73% to 42%. Since control municipalities saw a similar improvement, this change is not attributed to the CELI interventions. One such control municipality respondent said that roads had been improved there for the benefit of families who had been victims of the armed conflict. (Secretary of government, Los Palmitos)

San Jacinto focus group participants were especially thankful for a CELI activity to improve tertiary roads at the *vereda* level. They said they appreciated the community labor that neighbors contributed as counterparts:

We said that our priority was this small bit of the road that was bad. One of our neighbors had a terrible accident on it. [Colombia Responde] fixed that stretch of road, and we contributed 10 million in labor. The men worked on the road, the women cooked. Since we had even increased the amount our community would contribute, Colombia Responde also built in a wall to keep another part from sliding. (Beneficiary, San Jacinto)

Conclusion 10: The data show negative perceptions and experiences in terms of the quality of the roads network, with a slight improvement since baseline in intra-municipal roads. The deficiencies of local markets are tightly related to the state of the roads. The productive projects can attempt to break poverty traps, but the lack of roads reinforces the traps. It is obvious that the task of the CELI is complementary to government actions, but it is not a substitute: the

infrastructural problems must be solved by the State, and what CELIs do without this urgent GOC work may end up being a short-term palliative.

Conclusion II: When there are roads and infrastructure, the population recognizes the direct benefit of CELI interventions. Local level users, associations and JACs have taken ownership of roads projects.

Land

At the beginning of its project, CELI MdM found hundreds of abandoned properties in its municipalities due to displaced communities and the many problems of informal titling and a lack of understanding in terms of ownership rights. The CELI worked closely with the relevant agencies, prior to the adoption of the Victims and Land Restitution Law, in 2011. CELI MdM launched the “Historical Analysis of Land Rights” project²¹ to document the connection between the *campesinos* and the land, particularly victims of violence and displacement. This study served as a basis for subsequent work in terms of creating methods, checklists and templates to trace a map of the multiple routes that the communities and the families would have to follow to obtain legalization and compensation.²²

CELI MdM similarly provided support in the positioning of the URT in its focus municipalities, granting funds for personnel, office support and technical assistance to set up offices in Sincelejo and Carmen de Bolívar.²³

CELI MdM supported the Colombian Institute of Rural Development (INCODER, with its Spanish acronym), the GOC agency charged since 2003²⁴ with supporting rural communities, in the reconstruction, structuring and modernization of its archives. This support grew out of INCODER’s limited funding, limited management capacity, and dispersed documentation. INCODER had not successfully tackled this cataloguing of its data, nor ensured access to the registries, and it was estimated that some 80% of the registry was at risk.

Beyond institutional support, the CELIs have provided assistance to communities and organizations in specific cases of the legalization of property titles, and on supporting families in building their cases to request restitution. They supported civil society organizations (JACs, producer associations, and women’s organizations) to help people understand the often complex steps involved in formally registering their land and guaranteeing their titles.

Land titling for CELI regions has been arduous, within the institutional structures and constraints available to citizens and the CELIs. Some progress appears to have been made in MdM, in the face of the multiple challenges. There are security challenges (please see the regional context section, Chapter 2, of this report); cases where different individuals or families have worked the same piece of land in different moments in time; natural reserve conservation issues; wealthy interests at stake; and the difficulties of prioritizing sites across a vast swath of lands in line for restitution. There are multiple institutional actors, each with their own mandates and timelines.

²¹ Análisis Histórico de Derechos sobre la Tierra.

²² Colombia Responde MdM Final Report, Global Communities, April 2015, pp. 22-26.

²³ Colombia Responde MdM Final Report, Global Communities, April 2015, p. 26.

²⁴ INCODER was abolished in December, 2015, and its responsibilities divided among six new government entities (<http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/noticias/gobierno-liquidacion-incoder-y-crea-seis-entidades-para-sector-rural>).

And the scope is immense. In one priority area identified by the Land Restitution Unit (URT) in Montes de María, there were some 3,000 petitions for restitution.

A secretary of government in El Carmen de Bolívar describes a disordered restitution process that angers even those whose lands are restituted:

The campesinos themselves are marching, because restitution is not taking the lands from the predators or insurgents to give it back to the dispossessed, but from other campesinos. There are clever people out there, taking advantage of the high victim percentages here to get in line for benefits. The big landowners are the ones who have lost the least land.

In other cases, landowners took advantage of displacement and dispossession to offer low sale prices to *campesinos*, who thereby lost their land rights. The Tolú Viejo *personero* describes one such case:

There is a pathetic case here, with a large company, Argos [Cementos]. They have over 6,000 hectares here in Ovejas, that is, in Montes de María. They're about to get another pieces as well. They didn't push people off of their land but they took advantage of people's displacement from this epicenter of violence to buy their land, offering them a really low price. They were under tremendous pressure, encroachment, and this huge company got some intermediaries working for them and went in and bought their land up.

At times *campesinos* arrived at these tracts at different moments, and they each have a right to the land, and they are all victims of the conflict:

It's campesino against campesino, victim against victim. As a functionary you feel like you're almost re-victimizing this other family group, because we have to remove this other family that is also victim of the armed conflict, and bought at a low price because that was all they had. Obviously, if they were millionaires, they wouldn't be there. (Personería. El Carmen de Bolívar)

Another complicating factor is the set of mandates for conservation of natural reserve zones in the region. El Carmen de Bolívar's secretary of government relates:

There are 274 hectares that are in process with the Ministry and the Mayor's office to create a reserve. It's for park protection, against the indiscriminate cutting of the forest, because some exotic animals are on the road to extinction.

CELI has supported the mapping and diagnostics of the land situation in the region. This included the formalization of the lands on which schools sit. The secretary of government in El Carmen de Bolívar relates the details of CELI support:

Most of the parcels that contain schools aren't ours. They often belong to local landholders who donated the parcels. Others were indebted, either as a result of 10 or 12 years of violence or because of two periods when our administrative resources were embargoed. Colombia Responde inventoried the deficit, supported us for the entire process, and now, we've received about ten adjudications from INCODER. We couldn't have gotten a topographer on our own.


The survey results show a wide problem in land titling, but one that has changed since baseline. In the MdM region, 18% of respondents said they had land title at baseline, with an average of 3.8 hectares. At midline, this had surged to 41% of respondents and an average of almost 16 hectares. The pattern was consistent in control municipalities, and as a result, no impact is attributed to the CELI interventions.

The Consolidation Index gives MdM full marks in its two indicators on property rights, including 100 points for its progress in zoning planning, and 100 points for all four

municipalities being microfocalized by the URT of the GOC. However, as microfocalization is the initial step in land restitution, problems like those stated above by the Secretary of Government in El Carmen de Bolívar are not factored into this indicator.

Among those who occupied land but had no title, the chief reasons why they had not formalized the title continued to be the lack of resources and necessary information, as shown in Figure 5.18. However, fewer respondents said they lacked resources or information, and fewer said they didn't think it was necessary.

Figure 5.18. Trends in reasons for not titling their land



Only 2% said they were involved in a land restitution case at baseline, while at midline, this figure was 10%.

Though the vast majority of households said they would be willing to pay property taxes (around 93%), very few among CELI municipalities actually did so in the past two years (7%), which was even fewer than said so at baseline (13%). Just over half at baseline said they would pay property tax because it is the duty of the citizen to do so (52%), while nearly 64% said they would do so at midline.

Conclusion 12: The informality in ownership rights sheds light on the limitations of the State. The communities deal with this problem through precarious ownership rights, based on fragile documents such as sales letters. The absence of formal ownership titles renders such documents invalid for use in guaranteeing credit, and discourages development of productive projects in the long term. The advances in the titling procedures in the CELI and control municipalities continue to be limited in the face of the huge scale of the problem. Although the CELIs can support such processes, it is ultimately a matter for the State to resolve.

Recommendations

1. Realistic expectations at a level that the operators can affect (conclusions 1-3, 6, 10 and 12)
 The impact indicators are at a high level of generality in the results framework, relative to the investment and interventions, the short duration of implementation, and the problematic contexts. Given that the economic situation reflects regional trends and the regions' critical structural deficiencies, it is important to not consider lack of impact as representing a failure in programming.

2. Make simultaneous improvements in production and trade (conclusions 2-3, 5-7, and 10)

Increased production must go hand-in-hand with market improvements. Low quality, intermittent and seasonal production is not attractive for a market that exports goods to the rest of the country. In contrast, good quality and regular production has better results when that production is directed at adequate markets. Transport to markets is never guaranteed. The GOC must endeavor to resolve market and infrastructure inadequacies and establish programs that improve relationships with commercial allies and middlemen. This is and must be one of the most important concerns for post-conflict policies in Colombia. While support from international funding is certainly important, it may be wise for the latter to lead small focused pilots that treat these interconnected structural failings holistically, or to support GOC efforts that do so, rather than dilute the effects by intervening across broad geographic areas with expansive mandates.

3. Support an array of markets (conclusions 5, 6 and 8) It is important to support commercialization projects designed to improve both regional markets and projects that export goods to other regions, which may provide a solution to local overproduction and low prices. In such cases, specific programs are needed that intentionally bring small-scale producers and intermediaries together in the productive process to work with broader marketing efforts to improve quality or to involve banks to increase access to working capital.

The middlemen can constitute the starting point for a good system of trade in the regions given that they fulfill an economic function that would be difficult to replace. It is important, however, for the intermediary not to become monopsonistic in a way that reduces smallholders' bargaining power. The middlemen risk their capital in money and equipment and come up against insufficient quality and quantity in terms of what they buy from the producers. As such, specific programs have to be structured to understand their function and improve it to benefit the regions.

Better market information adjusted to local conditions would contribute to improving the communication of supply and demand, and to bridging the cost difference produced by intermediation. Regional market information systems should involve provincial centers or the Ministry of Agriculture's Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria, UMATA. Mobile phone access to up-to-date market information has been shown easy to implement and can function well, as seen in valuable experiences in other countries.

4. Plan for intermediate food security in productive projects (conclusion 4) It is recommended that CELI and USAID make concerted efforts to ensure that the programs that support productive projects also support food security. This situation should be anticipated by providing TA and traditional farm or other sustenance activities that minimize dependency. The productive projects must combine short- to long-term returns in order to ensure cash flow and project sustainability at the household level.

5. Reach the FHHs with interventions that work (conclusions 2 and 9, and the relevant section in the chapter on social development) Overall, the benefits have not been the same for FHHs and MHHs. Given that the two household types learn and use their learning in different ways, models should be developed that reflect this difference and provide different services to take advantage of the characteristics and behavior of each. FHHs attend training workshops and courses to a lesser extent, but on the other hand, report taking greater advantage of associations for different productive ends and for marketing.

6. Maintain activities to expand financial services (conclusions 7-9) Revolving funds are a suitable instrument to deal with the communities' borrowing needs but they must be protected

against the risk of non-payment. While communities have access to other programs such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development's Productive Alliances program, the communities should be supported in strengthening these revolving funds in the long term. Globally, credit decreased according to the household survey. However, according to focus group interviews, such forms of support have fulfilled a vital function for the development of savings and credit schemes, and they are important as long as they are conditioned or linked to the creation of collective savings and credit funds that maintain strong principles of governance to guarantee their sustainability. Such a framework avoids diluting resources by creating dependency.

Steps to undertake would include creating a system that monitors and follows-up the communal funds or revolving funds, sets up discussion forums and exchanges of experiences, and creates incentives or awards for performance and draw attention to successful cases.

7. Continue focused work on roads (conclusions 5, 10 and 11) Although the improvement of the roads system is the responsibility of the central and local governments, the CELI programs should continue to reinforce the successful support they provide to the JACs pertaining to institutional strengthening and participative and community infrastructure.

8. Continue to expand the work in terms of land tenure formalization (conclusion 12) It is a priority to facilitate relationships with the new State organs that replaced INCODER, in order to continue work on land tenure as part of USAID's ongoing portfolio. To supplement current information, the evaluation team recommends a transparent monitoring system to focus attention on the issue. USAID should work with the GOC on their database of petitions, assessing the data over time, and compare regional performance. The database should register the location and the number of hectares, and produce management and resolution rates.

A corollary issue with land restitution is that, in the event of an eventual peace accord and a greater number of successfully resolved land restitution processes, conflict over given parcels may increase as new or changed IAG fight for local dominance. It will be important to consider these kinds of conflicts in connection with the security recommendations in that chapter.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation questions:

To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory? And

What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services)

Findings and conclusions

Overall, participation, transparency, accountability and trust show neutral or negative results in the midline evaluation. This coincides with the figures across the samples in the evaluation, and appears to be a trend fostered by factors well outside CELIs' influence.

Participation

Participation was measured in the survey by an index that included variables such as participation in political parties, JAC and oversight groups or *veedurías*; the perception of participation in elections; voter registration; and whether the respondent voted in the last presidential election. The average score across the CELIs was 36 of 100 points, with no change from baseline to midline and no impact compared to control sites. In Montes de María, the Participation Index dropped two points over 100, but the score in control municipalities dropped four points.

Though no impact was found in data on MdM respondents' electoral practices, the trends over time are generally positive. More citizens say they have registered to vote (from 92% at baseline to 97% at midline) and more say they voted in the last presidential election (from 87% to 94%). Among those who did not vote, more respondents said at midline that this was because they did not care for any candidate, because voting did not matter to them, and because the voting process was difficult. Fewer said they or someone they knew had received money or gifts to vote (from 35% to 23%) or had been pressured to vote (from 6% to 2%). Trends in the control municipalities were very similar, and for this reason no impact was found.

A community leader in San Jacinto reported:

They come and they're asking for, well, some ask for 100,000 pesos, others 50,000. Others say they need so many bags of cement. We can't do that. A lady came to see me and said, look, I need 100,000 pesos and I'll give you my vote. Horrible! (Community leader, San Jacinto)

Political participation and running for office has tended to go through traditional political parties, but participation in these has been low, according to the survey. In MdM the trend is a slight increase, from 2.4% to 6% reporting that they have participated in a political movement or party, similar to what has happened in the control municipalities. A victims' association leader in Tolú Viejo (control) reported that their leadership did not want to get involved in politics, to avoid having their membership feel obligated to support their association's candidate:

Really, there's no need for that kind of participation. We already have our space, the Victims' Table. We haven't wanted to get involved in politics, in order to avoid conflicts additional to what our members have already experienced. (Victims' association leader, Tolú Viejo, control)

Conclusion 1: There is good voter turnout, regardless of interventions. The rates show that citizens in municipalities affected by the conflict think that the two most recent presidential elections were important – elections that have focused the debate on the end of the conflict. There is a high level of acceptance of formal democratic channels. There is an interesting anti-political dynamic among some associations, which is not wholly consistent with the way civil society can be a source to put forward candidates.

Transparency and accountability

One component of transparency is the degree to which citizens participate in oversight processes. MdM respondents were much more likely than the average CELI respondent to participate in *veedurías*, and survey respondents reported a slight increase over time in the percentage who participated at the level of decision-making. One victims' association in San Jacinto attempted to conduct citizen oversight, but found the process difficult. The local government did not provide the relevant information and did not respond to their rights of petition:


We have a veeduría called “Women taking stock” and that’s how we watch the municipality funds. Sometimes we submit a rights of petition and they don’t respond, they don’t answer at all. They don’t pay attention to us at all. (San Jacinto women’s association leader)

The Consolidation Index measures the percentage of public investment that is monitored by legally constituted oversight committees and gave the four MdM municipalities full marks in 2014. This contradicts with the low levels of *veeduría* reported in the survey (less than 2%) and qualitative research, and may reflect the more rural nature of the evaluation survey sample. However, it may also reflect problems with the Consolidation Index data, in that municipalities may report a high level of oversight activity that is inflated or superficial.

The survey instrument contained questions that were combined into an accountability index equal to 100 points. The survey asked to what degree the mayor kept citizens informed about public expenditures, the presence or absence of public spaces for citizen oversight, and the degree to which local government took citizens' opinions into account in decision-making. In Montes de María, the score fell by 1 point over 100, or 5%, while in control municipalities, scores fell by 3 points, for a positive impact in MdM of 2 points on the index. The decline in score in MdM was the lowest decline across the regional CELIs.

In MdM, respondents' perceptions of municipal government are mixed, with some improvements in trends since baseline, but no impact attributable to CELI. There is less perception in MdM of public service and institutional deficiencies and corruption, but less trust in promises made by the mayor or JAC president (see Figure 6.1). In control municipalities, there is greater perception of corruption than in CELI municipalities, and a greater sense that the municipality is not keeping citizens informed.

Figure 6.1. Trends in perceptions of serious problems with municipal administration



Perceptions of municipal government were negatively affected from baseline to midline. At the cluster level, negative impacts from 6pp to 15pp were found on whether the mayor’s office was run well, and only Cluster 13 said it was run better than two years ago (13pp impact). Cluster 14 had slight positive impacts when asked whether municipal authorities invited the community to express their opinion (3pp) or took community opinions into consideration in decision-making (6pp) but other clusters’ responses were either neutral or with negative impact. It should be noted that many surveys were collected in the run-up to the local elections, and as such, opinions about these offices may have been running particularly high. (Figure 6.2)

Figure 6.2. Impacts on perceptions of local government

	Cluster:	12	13	14	15
The mayor’s office is run well or very well		-0.0766**	0.0636*	-0.0635	-0.153***
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago		-0.0270	0.127***	-0.208***	-0.092**
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses		-0.00294	-0.0461**	-0.0388	-0.0193
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests		-0.0354**	0.00210	0.0341**	0.0121
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into account when making decisions		-0.00479	-0.00095	0.0631***	-0.0217
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project		-0.0315	0.0837**	-0.0364	-0.133***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project		-0.0528	-0.0662	0.0472	-0.287***

Qualitative interviews and focus groups show that experiences with CELI and national-level GOC support can be helpful for the legitimacy of efforts to increase transparency, as in this quote from a functionary in San Jacinto:


When Colombia Responde and Consolidación Territorial are present, there's this national contribution to the territorial entity. The community sees that management as part of the solution to their requests and complaints.

Another case comes from the secretary of government in El Carmen de Bolívar, in which CELI supported an accountability plan that was then presented to the mayor's office:

Legally, the Mayor has to be accountable and s/he's been doing it. Colombia Responde gave us a pamphlet on accountability and counseled us on a special scheme and a timeline, helped us choose what was to be presented, and on what the final product should be.

The lack of accountability and citizen participation in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of public policy is also reflected in the low ratings citizens give to government management, and these have largely worsened since baseline (Figure 6.3). Trust in the mayor's office and JAC leadership has also declined.

Figure 6.3. Trends in citizens' perceptions about public management




No impacts were found for these indicators at the regional level, because in general the control municipalities showed the same or similar trends. However, opinions of management have deteriorated in MdM municipalities for mayoral and departmental management.

Cluster responses showed that, in Clusters 12 and 15, perceptions of the management of the department dropped by 13pp and 17pp, respectively, and Clusters 14 and 15 said the department government was worse than two years ago. Cluster 12 showed a negative impact of 13pp on perceptions of the national government.

Consolidation Index data show an increase in the availability of mandated spaces for public participation in all four municipalities of the region. These include municipal councils on rural

development and social policy, both of which show an average of three or more meetings held per year.

The Consolidation Index reports on four indicators related to good government: capture of *regalías* project funding; the government’s own Open Government Index (IGA for its Spanish acronym); and the proportion of eligible people paying their taxes (property and industry/commerce). These four indicators are shown in Figure 6.4, below.



Source: Consolidation Index, authors’ calculations

The two tax indicators show modest increases over the four years of Index measurement. Royalties capture is the indicator with the greatest improvement, nearing full marks in comparison with like municipalities. The Open Government Index figure averages 70.4 at the end of the measurement period, but it is important to note that this is normed for similar municipalities. The actual average score on the GOC’s Open Government Index is 44 over 100 among the four MdM municipalities.

Conclusion 2: Accountability is still an emerging practice. Responses to the survey questions about accountability were low and the index declined from baseline to midline (though the decline in MdM of 1 point over 100 is the lowest decline among all CELI and PNCRT regions.) Lack of accountability has a negative effect on citizens’ participation and effective control. There are still examples of local governments not creating spaces for accountability and not inviting citizens.

Conclusion 3: Participatory mechanisms are not yet widely effective. CELI has intervened to ensure that communities’ stated needs are included in development plans at the municipal level, and to support accountability from the local government. It appears that the participation of CELI and the PNCRT can give citizens confidence that their petitions are being heard. Unsuccessful petitions erode citizens’ perceptions about government management and transparency, which in turn discourages participation, further weakening accountability. What the CELIs and PNCRT have done, then, is important for citizens’ confidence in government.

Conclusion 4: In CELI MdM municipalities, trends since baseline are mixed: less trust in the mayor’s office and departmental administration, and a low sense of government responsiveness to citizen needs. However, compared to other CELI and PNCRT regions, the declines in MdM are smaller.

Trust

The crisis of confidence in Colombian local institutions has worsened in recent years, though the MdM region showed more positive trends than other CELI or PNCRT regions. Respondents gave

slightly higher marks at midline to the *Defensoría del Pueblo*, the municipal council, the national police and the Armada. In the case of the mayor’s office, MdM respondents did not decline as happened in the control municipalities, so there was a positive impact attributable to the CELI interventions. Across all other institutions mentioned in the survey, MdM respondents reported having lost trust since baseline, as happened universally in control municipalities. This generalized negative trend crosses army, justice services, national government, departmental, government, the JACs; *personería*; and support bodies such as the national training institutes.

Looking at trust at the cluster level, similar patterns are found. (Figure 6.5)

Figure 6.5. Impacts on trust – quite a lot or very much

Cluster:	12	13	14	15
The departmental government	-0.0142	-0.00293	-0.00845	-0.125***
The national government	0.00506	0.0685	0.126**	-0.113*
Justice sector institutions	-0.0796	0.0543	-0.0473	-0.0922
Alternative justice institutions	0.0292	0.192***	-0.0372	-0.205***
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0.0787	0.0422	0.173***	-0.0320
Social organizations and NGOs	0.102*	0.0761	0.128**	-0.0918
Training centers	0.0369	0.116**	0.215***	-0.0118
The <i>Defensoría del Pueblo</i>	0.0718	0.0722	-0.0006	-0.162***
The municipal council	0.0125	-0.0235	0.00767	-0.099**
The national police	0.109*	-0.0906	-0.128**	-0.157***
The army	0.129**	0.00579	0.00628	-0.135**
The navy	0.104*	-0.0675	-0.124**	-0.212***
The municipal <i>personería</i>	0.0415	-0.100*	-0.0359	-0.150***
The mayor’s office	-0.0709	-0.0454	-0.163***	-0.179***
The JAC	-0.0256	-0.0638	-0.224***	-0.378***

Cluster 15 was most uniformly negative in its trust of government offices across the board, and for many of the government bodies mentioned, significant impact was found compared to changes in control municipalities. There was a positive impact on opinions of the agricultural sector in Cluster 14, but nowhere else. Opinions on the armed forces were split, with more positive responses in Cluster 12 than the other sites. Clusters 14 and 15 had particularly negative impacts on trust in the JACs, of 22pp and 38pp respectively.

Qualitative data show more promising results in terms of improved trust.²⁵ In one case in El Carmen de Bolívar, CELI worked closely with the municipality following the dissolution of government, to improve citizen trust through improving service provision:

The community had lost trust after the dissolution of the mayor’s office. I think one of the big successes of Colombia Responde was helping us in earning back that trust in the Municipal Mayorship. One of the strategies was to help the mayor’s office institutionally at certain points to strengthen it so the mayor’s office could once again reach the community. Colombia Responde arrived first, with some projects in far-removed veredas and corregimientos, then Consolidation.

²⁵ The contrast between quantitative estimates and the qualitative reports may be explained, at least in part, by the difference in samples: as a random exercise, the quantitative research shows the population average, while qualitative research reached out to active community members, who are not only easier to reach but also more likely to have experience with the interventions.

Institutionally they supported the Family Commissary, the Treasury, the general secretary of the Interior, and the victims' attention center. They helped us in many points where we were weak, so we could provide a better service. (Secretary of government, El Carmen de Bolívar)

However, some beneficiaries consulted in focus groups still express a lack of trust in local authorities, who they at times associate with corruption. A San Jacinto participant said:

The Mayor of San Jacinto called me when I formed the association and said "I've got a tool for you, a project, let's set up this kickback, you and I. Don't tell the association and we'll both get something out of it. I told him/her I don't work that way. It's the Mayor's job, but if the mayor is not a force majeure for us, for the associations, for the people nor for the corregimiento, we're back to square one, it's as if we have no mayor. (Beneficiary. San Jacinto)

Conclusion 5: Trust in institutions depends on their ability to meet citizen needs, and in general that has worsened. Cluster comparisons show particular problems in Cluster 15 with significant loss in trust, and only training centers showed positive impact in more than one cluster. In general, circumstances have worsened citizens' overall trust of government since baseline, creating an even worse environment than when the CELIs began.


Service delivery

The MdM municipalities are under-resourced for their provision of services, and the municipalities are impoverished, which continues the vicious cycle as there is no tax base. CELI work with the municipalities included assistance to improve management, in order to improve service delivery:

The municipality is poor. There are no businesses, so the municipality depends completely on what comes in from the nation, which barely covers operational expenses. The mayor has to work with the senators to get part of whatever projects he can. This is why we're so grateful to Colombia Responde, because they've supported our municipality. (Secretary of government, San Jacinto)

In terms of service delivery, the state's System for Potential Beneficiaries of Social Services (SISBEN) is the means by which the GOC works to guarantee the rights of the most vulnerable populations in the country. Registration in SISBEN is a key step for access to state presence and the provision of services; it requires the completion of an enrollment questionnaire and provides an identification document. As shown in Figure 6.6 below, the levels of registration are high, and improving over time.

Figure 6.6. Trends in citizen registration for social services




In addition, 93% of respondents in CELI MdM municipalities say they are registered to vote.

The evaluation survey included a set of questions on government capacity and service delivery from the citizens' perspectives, and created an index of these indicators for the CELI PMPs. The index is composed of four elements, totaling 100 points, and includes access to services, quality

of services, quality of public policy formulation and implementation, and perceptions of municipal actors' honesty. The results for CELI Mm municipalities coincide with control zones, and as such there is no impact by comparison. The CELI Mm score declined by 5% or from 39 to 37 points in absolute terms. Among the components, the score deteriorates most in respondents' rating of service access. (Figure 6.7)

Figure 6.7. CELI performance: Government capability index



In terms of particular services, there are no impacts and few changes in absolute terms among the various services queried in the survey. For the following public services, respondents were asked whether they had access to the service, and if so, to rate its quality, and to say whether or not it had improved over the last two years. The figure below shows the changes from baseline to midline. There were no impacts, as the trends were similar in all control areas as well.

Figure 6.8. Trends in public service access and quality

	Access at midline	Change in Access	Change in Quality	Has it improved in the last two years?
Health clinic			9%	-6%
Under – 5s with access to quality child care	41%	6%	21%	13%
5-11 year-olds with access to quality education	98%	1%	4%	-6%
12-18 year-olds with access to quality education	79%	3%	6%	-4%
Electricity	81%	1%	-8%	-3%
Propane gas	21%	2%	5%	15%
Water	44%	1%	3%	9%
Sewage	2%	0%	3%	22%
Trash collection	3%	1%	-6%	-17%
Cellular telephone	93%	3%	1%	1%

There were slight changes in access and a few quite positive changes in the ratings citizens gave – particularly for child care and the health clinic. One CELI activity in San Jacinto involved building a new school from durable materials to replace the palm used before:

The kids were practically like animals before, seated on the floor, a palm roof, bats, it was horrible. Colombia Responde helped us build the new school for the children. (Beneficiaries, San Jacinto)

The Consolidation Index shows MdM to have high levels of service delivery, nearly full marks, across the education indicators. This means their high rates of coverage, low rate of desertion, and low rate of teachers missing from their posts is equal to or better than the rates in like municipalities. Health care coverage is also given full marks, but a lower grade (66 points) is given on the indicator for health brigades visiting all the areas without clinics.

However, electricity and trash collection quality fell in MdM municipalities. Despite giving schools and clinics higher marks when asked to rate them on a scale of one to five, respondents were less likely to say these had improved in the last two years. Given the very strong trends of lower trust in government entities at all levels, this response may well reflect general attitudes toward service providers.

At the same time, the Consolidation Index gives Montes de María municipalities nearly full marks for electrical coverage, normed to that of their matching municipalities. Cellular coverage is closer to two-thirds, however, in population centers. The survey's citizen perception data actually show better cell coverage than the Consolidation Index, quite different from most of the indicators.

Despite negative appraisals of current service delivery, survey respondents tended toward optimism, particularly in Clusters 14 and 15 in the MdM region. (Figure 6.9)

Figure 6.9. Impacts on expectations for service delivery in the future

Cluster:	12	13	14	15
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0.0501	-0.0553	0.0985***	0.163***
In the future, will access to education improve?	-0.0157	0.00797	0.0672*	0.112***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0.0438	-0.0349	0.126***	0.127***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	-0.0166	0.0751*	-0.00558	0.177***

As has been the pattern in expectations elsewhere in this report, Clusters 12 and 13 do not show strong impacts, while Clusters 14 and 15 are strongly positive in terms of optimism and expectations for the future. This is true despite generally deteriorating trust in government entities and regional low opinions of government actors.

Conclusion 6: There is no progress in government capacity, from citizen perspectives, except limited improvements shown in some clusters. The analysis shows that governmental capacity is a desirable characteristic but difficult to achieve and very subjective, as it responds to structural and historical factors that can escape the reach of CELI interventions. However, the stagnation of perceptions of government capacity should be taken into account as a sign of the failure of the policies being implemented to consolidate these regions.


Conclusion 7: Perceptions of social services are mostly stagnant, especially with respect to quality. These indicators had little to do with CELI interventions, but do show a fairly stagnant set of perceptions about social services. Combined with the deterioration in public perceptions evident in the government capacity index mentioned above, it is clear that conditions for basic social services are largely unchanged. These conditions contribute to the poverty trap discussed in previous chapters.

Victims' Rights

The percentage of MdM households where a family member has experienced a human rights violation rose from 3% at baseline to 4.5% at midline. The only variables that show impact on

victims' rights indicators are, first, a 3pp increase in the proportion reporting that the BACRIM were responsible for the human rights violations. The second impact is found in a 27pp decrease in the proportion reporting that they do not know who was responsible for the violations committed against them. In absolute terms, more respondents reported not doing anything about the violation against them (26% at baseline to 53% at midline). This is reflected in the reporting practices of those who say their rights were violated. (Figure 6.10)

Figure 6.10. Trends in respondents' actions when their human rights are violated



The Consolidation Index indicators on human rights show steady and thorough improvement, with no incidence of massacres, antipersonnel mines, forced displacement, kidnapping with extortion, or homicides of local authorities. All four municipalities in the region report having an active human rights committee in place.

Conclusion 8: Citizens were quite a bit more likely to say they knew who had committed the violation of their human rights, but also quite a bit less willing to make a claim regarding the violation to authorities. This tendency was also present in control municipalities, indicating that citizens trust less in the government to do something about that violation.

Recommendations

1. Limit the scope of evaluation to the factors under implementers' manageable interest (Low impact findings and contextual knowledge) The CELIs were proposed as part of a whole-of-government intervention with coordinated GoC support, but on its own it is a complementary intervention. The design of the impact evaluation poses far higher impact gains than can be expected in such a situation. This does not imply that the interventions have not helped to improve participation, governance and institutionalization in local contexts; however, there are historic structural failings in the territories that prevent any such intervention from constituting a true model of governance for institutionalization.

The evaluation team suggests that impact analysis be focused on the reasonable and specific results that the intervention can be expected to make. It is the GoC that must lead efforts for the institutionalization of the territory. Where this institutionalization does not exist, the CELIs can only add support in limited ways.

2. Continue to strengthen political participation through social organizations (conclusion 1) The CELIs should continue to support social and political processes for association to strengthen citizens' knowledge of the channels of political participation and influence in public administration. These specific strategies and actions would support these ends:

- Help women and youth acquire identity documents and register for elections.

- Promote women's organizations to encourage participation in all spheres of public life.
- Use schools as a site for training, socialization and promoting values, democratic practices and institutions for children and youth with special emphasis on the importance of elections.
- Strengthen political parties and ensure their transparency to avoid the concentration of power.

3. *Strengthen accountability (conclusion 2 and 5)* Strengthen the ongoing practice of accountability to improve public policy orientation, gain citizen trust and provide management oversight:

- Train communities and local governments in the practice of setting priorities, performance indicators, and results-based management for day-to-day operations.
- Generate appropriate spaces in internal, external, vertical and horizontal levels to assist communities to keep tabs on progress on indicators and management.
- Strengthen information processes and coordinate with control entities to ensure that communities and authorities can promptly investigate and apply sanctions when mismanagement or corruption is detected. Prosecution is important when funds go awry.
- Accompany increased social and legal sanctions with sustained education policies to stimulate a culture of discrediting corrupt practices.
- Simplify administrative processes.
- Develop participatory budgets.

4. *Strengthen citizen consultation and participation from supply and demand sides (conclusions 4 and 5)* The fact that citizens do not feel involved and that trust in institutions has diminished requires a renewed focus on consultation exercises and citizen participation. Train and strengthen the exercise of citizenship from one side, while on the other, intervene rigorously to strengthen local government institutions in the same capabilities the citizens are being trained to expect.

5. *Continue to work with municipalities to improve service delivery, and involve citizens in oversight activities (conclusions 5, 6 and 7)* USAID and its implementers have a daunting task in their work to strengthen municipalities' and departments' service provision. There is a national imperative to decentralize, combined with low capacity and funding at municipal levels. Focus on pilot-size activities with significant civil society involvement, and scaffold the local governments with consistent TA. Use scorecards or other measures to involve citizens in rating the service provision changes, and learn from failures as well as successes what practices work best in different sectors and circumstances.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation question: What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?

Findings and conclusions

Social capital: Trust


The index of social capital is composed of trust (60 points) and participation (40 points – see the next section of the report), for a total of 100 points. Trust was identified at different levels: family, neighbors, friends, the local Community Action Council (JAC), legal and state oversight bodies, development institutions, municipal and national government, and the police and military.

As is apparent, many of the factors affecting the index are beyond the remit of cooperation programs such as CELI and should be considered indicators of contextual conditions. Nevertheless, analysis of the subcomponents at program level provides an increased understanding of its strengths and weaknesses.

In general terms, the social capital index did not register any impact attributable to CELI interventions, but the trend is generally positive. Control municipalities fared about the same, so there is no attributable impact, but in MdM municipalities the index improved by 2 points over 100 – a 10% increase, which is the best performance increase from among the CELI regions. The increase was divided between the two sub-indices of trust, on the one hand, and participation, on the other. However, MdM municipalities but did not outpace the control municipalities, and so no impact was found.

The trust sub-index was constructed in part from three survey questions, shown in the following figure. MdM and control municipalities, alike, showed a decline in trust of neighbors or others in the community; both groups of municipalities also saw an increase in responses that the tradition of collective work on community projects is part of their community life.

Figure 7.1. Trends in perceptions of trust between peers



The trust index also included a battery of questions on how much trust respondents have in state institutions, from the national level to the local. Responses to these items were discussed in detail in the Institutional Development chapter of this volume. Summing up these results, there are

slightly better results in MdM (and in the control municipalities) than in the rest of the sample, but overall, citizens' trust in government is low and in decline. None of the results can be attributed to CELI or PNCRT interventions, and indeed, the general nature of the decline suggests issues that are far outside the reach of a given intervention.

Qualitative responses were more positive, as they were gathered from an active, participating sub-set in CELI municipalities. The qualitative team heard from displaced persons and families who had been warmly received in associations and communities, leaders who had been threatened but now were returning to the communities and participating actively again, and victims whose associations had helped them embark on productive projects and regain their dignity.

At the same time, respondents revealed very positive expectations for the future about their relationships with their communities. When asked how they felt those relationships would evolve in the future, the survey found 10pp or more positive impact on responses, in three of the four MdM clusters.

Conclusion 1: The survey data show a marked decline in the level of trust that citizens have in most government bodies. This effect is not attributed to CELI interventions, because it is common to the control sites as well. Among the more actively participating community members who were interviewed in qualitative data collection, there are reports of positive change and improved relationships between citizens and the state. However, the latter group of respondents is a select, positively biased group and much smaller.

Conclusion 2: The survey data also show a decline in trust levels between peers and neighbors. These figures provide a strong contrast with the experiences narrated by the participants during the qualitative work, who had higher levels of participation and much more positive opinions of the social fabric – but, again, these are active participants and so, by design, they are more likely to perceive and take part in the construction of social fabric.

Social capital: Participation in associations

CELI MdM supported and strengthened different forms of association. To this end a range of interventions has been made, focused on existing grass roots organizations such as the JACs, which are the prime instance of participation in public life in the municipalities. Productive associations have been created or strengthened. Another focus of intervention was the support provided to victims' associations and cultural associations present in the areas of intervention; these operate as a way of building trust, collective identity and belonging in the territories, rooted in the intangible heritage of the community.


In MdM the qualitative research team found a range of organizations, including those dedicated to women, to victims, to youth, to displaced persons, etc., indicating community interest in associating for social reasons:

There are plenty of organizations here, Asomujeres [for women victims], Women's Initiative, Amusi [from the San Isidro corregimiento], others for the displaced. We have a platform that pulls in the various projects from the organizations, like five initiatives for youth we have going right now. For example, one group is about new masculinities, a group of youth that have workshops about male-female relations. Another organization is working on school feeding with natural products, because kids eat too much junk food today. (Social organization leader, Carmen de Bolívar)

At a more general level, in the survey MdM respondents report being less involved with community organizations than they were at baseline, while the control groups' responses show slightly greater participation in some kinds of organizations. There was a negative impact of 10pp, for example, in MdM respondents' participation in producer associations. The exception in MdM is an impact of almost 2pp greater reported involvement in *veedurías*. However, parallel to the findings in the general analysis, there was an increase in decision-making, among those who did continue to participate, particularly in the JACs, producers' associations, victims' organizations, and parents' and cultural organizations. The trend was similar among control municipalities, and as a result, no impact is found.

Also among those who did participate, there were positive trends (mirrored in the control municipalities) in reported benefits from participation, as shown in Figure 7.2:

Figure 7.2. Trends in benefits reported from participation in organizations



Conclusion 3: In the MdM municipalities, participation in associations declined or was static, for the most part. However, those who participated were more active (that is, they participated more at the level of decision-making at midline). They also reported increased benefits of participation. This was also true in control municipalities, and so no impact was found.

The particular role of the Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs)

CELI MdM developed strong commitments to work with the JACs over the course of their activities, both in building capacity to function as more effective community organizations. CELI MdM trained individual community JACs and associations grouping multiple JACs. For example, CELI MdM held 31 sessions in 17 communities, providing orientation in management practices, transparency, and trust building. The JACs learned skills and procedures that they applied to implementing projects and negotiating advantageous agreements with providers.²⁶

Interviews and focus groups showed some of the challenges faced by the JACs as a result of the armed conflict. Their leaders faced threats, community projects were suspended, and many individuals and families had to leave the area.

²⁶ Colombia Responde Montes de María Quarterly Report July-September 2014. Bogotá, Colombia: Global Communities, p. 11.

We used to have a JAC, but everyone had to leave. Some were killed. Now they're coming back to take the SENA classes on how to run a JAC that are being offered. (Community leader, San Jacinto)

The survey data show that, on average, participation in JACs in the MDM municipalities declined from baseline to midline (47% to 36%), though decision-making rose (20% to 38%) among those who continued to participate in the JACs. The patterns are similar in control zones; as a result, no impact is seen.

Conclusion 4: Despite the fact that on occasions these entities are considered to have been co-opted by local political interests – in certain places a threat to their legitimacy – or negatively affected by violence, they continue to represent the gateway to state services and programs. Where security situation has allowed, and where the JACs have the confidence of the population, this kind of social organization is central to political life and to participation in the *veredas*. In these cases the JACs play a central role in providing access to, and enjoyment of, the services offered by the state in terms of political participation, infrastructural improvements and social control. In some regions the JACs are weaker, explaining why surveyed households report reduced levels of participation overall. However, JACs participants report more active participation at the level of decision-making.

Conclusion 5: In the *veredas* of geographically distant municipalities the JACs are the principal spaces in which disputes between neighbors are resolved, through direct negotiation. By having this local resource, minor social conflicts are resolved at the *vereda* level, without the need to take cases to municipal or national bodies. This is the case in regions where the security situation allows it. However, participation can be affected in cases where threats are issued against leaders.

Associations and productive projects


The priorities set for CELI changed from a focus on consolidation of the GOC's presence to what could be characterized as more traditional rural development objectives, with a focus on agricultural production and the strengthening of rural value chains. This is seen most clearly in the reassignment of the CELIs from their original focus on consolidation under DO 1, "Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated," to its present articulation as DO 3, "Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth." Throughout each project and especially since the revised Development Objective was released in June 2015, work with producers associations has been a principal means for the projects to achieve their goals.

In carrying out this work, the projects supported the producers associations in several ways: technical assistance and training; support work in developing marketing and commercialization (also often involving training); and assistance in financial services to support production and marketing. Considerable focus was placed on organizational training and capacity building, and TA on a range of crops, as described in the economic development chapter of this report. Training producers associations covered a broad range of topics, including improving agricultural production, introducing new crops, strengthening the functioning of their organizations, and training youth to encourage the transfer of knowledge and resources to the next generation.

Survey results suggest there is an economic rationality behind respondents' associativity, though the results are common across treated and control municipalities, and therefore show no impact.

CELI respondents said that the associations were useful to their productive projects for several fundamental reasons, as shown in Figure 7.3:

Figure 7.3. Trends in reasons for deciding to associate



Data at the national level strongly suggest that female-headed households (FHHs) make up much of the increase: it appears that women see this economic rationality very clearly and associate in order to take advantage of the opportunities that associating can confer. A focus group respondent from El Carmen de Bolívar said that associating was important

To have more weight, more strength. The association has gotten six or seven agricultural projects that are now in execution. One victims' association got tractors from the DPS. (Organization leader, El Carmen de Bolívar)

Conclusion 6: Among the most important incentives for forming associations are processing, transport, sales, and joint training. These results have been more significant in the CELI interventions and, above all, among FHHs. People who participated at baseline continue to take part in associations but are now also involved in decision-making at higher levels than in control municipalities.

Conclusion 7: At the same time, overall household participation in these associations has declined. This contradiction might strengthen the hypothesis that households seek out benefits and that once these have been achieved, participants lose interest in the organizations.

Women's and victims' associations

Implementation of Law 1448 for victims and land restitution brought substantial change in the region, in that victims were made visible and also made aware of their rights. CELI worked to support the implementation of the law, concretely in the strengthening of municipal *personerías* (see the Institutional Development chapter).

The law helped because victims have a space of their own. They used to be very inhibited when coming in here, worried that others were saying "Oh, here come the displaced ones to beg for something." We're not beggars, we have rights and we can demand them. (Social organization leader, Tolú Viejo, Control)

In some cases, producer associations are made up principally of women who are victims of the conflict and/or living in situations of displacement. As a regional secretary of government told us, "They might be women's leadership groups, or agricultural, but really, they all started as

victims' groups." These associations have enabled women to generate income, create solidarity with others and build roots in the territories that have received these people and families. A woman from Montes de María told us:

I'm an artisan and I belong to the Luz y Vida group... I make bags, I iron, I wash clothes and that lets me support my family. I'm not from here, and I thank God that this place has welcomed me and that things have gone really well. I have friends and we all meet and when there is some activity or a celebration we take part and we are all happy. We're fine, thank God, in spite of everything we've suffered. We keep struggling and everything turns out alright. (Bolívar, CELI)

The survey data also show that victims' associations are growing. In CELI MdM, the percentage of respondents who reported belonging to organizations of this kind rose from 13% to 18% (similar to the increase among control municipalities.) The quality of participation also improved, thanks to increased participation in decision-making (reported by 22% of MdM respondents at baseline, and 26% at midline). However, these changes are also present in the control municipalities, and were not, therefore, attributable to the interventions.

In contrast to the quantitative findings, which showed no CELI impact for belonging to or participating in victims' organizations, the qualitative responses indicated their importance. Organizations for displaced, returned or vulnerable people were said to have transformed into organizations of another kind that have expanded their identities and their sense of what they should seek to achieve, without losing sight of the reasons they were originally founded. Frequently, in order to generate income for their members and for the organizations, victims' associations established complementary productive projects.

Conclusion 8: The social capital that has been constructed as a result of the work of victims' associations has permitted the creation and strengthening of other kinds of organizations in a process that has encouraged an expansion of their reasons for existing and their aims, fomenting a sense of belonging and identifying new resources.

Conclusion 9: Participation in victims' associations and organizations of vulnerable groups increased in the MdM region, although similar changes have taken place in the control areas. Respondents can describe the qualitatively important function of their CELI participation for productive and other ends.

Cultural and other associations

The MdM region has a predominantly Afro-Colombian population base. CELI supported associations that had disappeared as a result of the armed conflict. Such associations, based in culture, reconstruct trust and identity relations within and between communities. Youth participation is especially important for the conservation of cultural legacies. A cultural leader from El Carmen de Bolívar explains:

We created a project called the Son de Negros. We focused on... the recruitment carried out by the illegal armed groups and we are going to include this in our Danza Negra. Danza Negra is African dance that we have been dancing since the time of the palenque²⁷ of María la Baja. There is a sense of connection with the mountains, with my grandparents; I remember that my

²⁷ Palenques are communities of free blacks created in resistance to slavery.

grandfather was black and was a drummer in the Danza Negra. (Bolívar, CELI)

Cultural associations are fundamental to the Afro-Colombian communities as a conduit for self-awareness and to feel pride in their history and their traditions. CELI projects worked with community elders to recuperate lost practices and customs and with youth to encourage saving the culture's importance among the next generation.

Conclusion 10: The CELIs have supported different cultural associations, enabling the reconstruction of community values damaged by the armed conflict. Returning to activities such as dance, music or traditional artisan production has permitted communities to create a cultural identity in which they are able to recognize themselves and feel pride in their traditions; it has also acted as a form of resistance against armed actors. In regions with a large Afro-Colombian population, such as Montes de María, cultural organizations have been strengthened, enabling the emergence of social ties in the regions where the interventions have taken place. The high levels of social capital that have been constructed in the regions have been added to the equation, as a result of the presence of victims' associations which establish the bases of trust on which the participation of social organizations is based.

Conclusion 11: The support provided to associations that preserve and reproduce the intangible cultural heritage of a community is enormously important because it produces transformations in the communities by assigning value to collective identity. Cultural associations have helped to inspire processes of symbolic renewal in communities of victims of the conflict.

Recommendations

1. Adapt programs to encourage trust (conclusion 2 and Trust section findings in Institutional Development chapter) The unprecedented overall decline in trust of the government cannot be resolved by development alone, but it is important to develop ways to strengthen community ties to mayors' offices and local government bodies. Despite international development interventions, the population feels less trust toward local government than they did two years ago, and less trust between neighbors. These indicators are highly sensitive to factors outside the control of any program, but interventions can and should develop tools to confront the problem.

2. Improve work with female heads of household using participatory models (conclusion 3) In terms of participation, the positive results obtained for MHHs need to be extended to FHHs. Efforts should be made to benefit this population that has traditionally been immersed in unfavorable socioeconomic conditions and has had less free time available to dedicate to associations. FHHs who already participate in victims', women's and other groups could serve as guides for other women to become involved and to increase their participation. Similarly, the community leaders of associations and other groups, whose commitment and participation represent higher levels of social embeddedness, could serve as a resource to advance this aim. The CELIs should continue investigating different ways of using this resource of association leadership and practice in the final months of the intervention, engaging in outreach activities with community members whose behaviors indicate increasing isolation.

3. Support the legitimacy of the JACs (conclusions 1, 4 and 5) In order to strengthen the JACs, the CELIs should continue training leaders in board election processes and community participation tools to counteract the risk of the organizations losing legitimacy. Support of the JACs to encourage wider participation in local affairs – including women's participation, that of victims, and other marginalized groups – should be a priority, so as to generate horizontal

communication between neighbors and vertical relations between communities and local authorities.

Programs should monitor the quality of community associations such as the JACs, in ways similar to how producers' organizations are monitored. The Index of Organizational Competencies (ICO) should be adapted to meet organizational and community expectations for these groups, and to ensure that programs involve the JACs, communities and local government. In cooperation with mayors' offices and officials responsible for community or administrative affairs (the *secretarios de gobierno*), work should continue to establish special programs focused on the JACs to improve their management capacities and their representativeness. Monitoring results should be made public to generate community incentives to play an active role in holding JACs to account.

The component competencies of the ICO should be evaluated to determine which aspects work well and which do not. Given the differences of opinion that exist concerning its usefulness, the Chatham House Rule²⁸ could be used for such a discussion, in which parties express their opinions openly and identify weaknesses or gaps in the measuring tools without fear that their views will become public.

4. Strengthen the role of the JACs in the resolution of conflicts (conclusion 5) The CELIs should support the strengthening of the tools currently available to the JACs in their conflict resolution role with training for leaders in the *veredas*. Other interventions, local and regional *personerías*, the police and the *Defensoría* or even groups such as the Chambers of Commerce could also be involved.

5. Make the organizations more transparent (conclusions 6 and 7) To improve the quality of the associations, use a refined ICO as a monitoring and ranking system for associations. Make results public and give greater access to programs and benefits to the highest ranking associations, with local authorities' involvement.

6. Loosen the requirement that beneficiaries must be grouped into associations (conclusions 6 and 7) In future programs, the possibilities that intervention might not rely strictly on the creation of associations should be examined. It is not always necessary to require that potential beneficiaries form an association. If an association is to be authentic, it should emerge from the initiative of individuals who decide whether they wish to take part or not and who wish to gain individual advantages (for example, improved sales for their products). This represents a contrast with the JACs, whose objectives are based on public goods and proposals (such as parks, bridges, child-care facilities, road improvements, etc.).

Similarly, programs such as CELI should support private initiatives. Small businesspersons improving their businesses may be a ripe target for support, as did happen in some cases under the CELIs. Cases also exist where the obligatory formation of new associations is not appropriate, for cultural, social or historical reasons.

7. Increase collaboration with associations whose objectives may or may not be at root

²⁸ When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule>.

productive (conclusions 8-11) Social organizations are also candidates for interventions like CELI because of their high levels of social capital, and they are increasing in number in the zones of intervention. Such organizations (that are not necessarily producer associations) should be supported to become autonomous and financially sustainable. Such activities could be developed in cooperation with the DPS, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA) and the municipal agricultural technical support units (UMATAs).

ANNEXES: REGIONS AND CLUSTERS


ANNEX I: CLUSTER-LEVEL RESULTS, LIST EXPERIMENT

List experiment results in this annex are presented first for the region of Montes de María, and then for the four clusters that make up the Montes de María sample. These clusters are:


Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
12	San Jacinto (Bolívar)	Tolu Viejo (Sucre)
13	Ovejas (Sucre)	Galeras (Sucre)
14	San Onofre (Sucre)	Los Palmitos (Sucre)
15	El Carmen de Bolívar (Bolívar)	Riohacha (Guajira)

Results are shown for the question on contact with illegal armed groups, and then for contact with illicit crops. For the region and then for each cluster, three graphs are presented. The first shows the results at baseline, the second at midline, and the third shows the impact, if any, using the differences in differences calculation. As will be seen across the graphs, there is an overall diminution of respondent reports that they have contact with either illegal armed groups or with illicit crops, in many cases approaching zero at midline. However, this trend crosses the treatment and control sites, and as such, the trend cannot be attributed to any intervention.

Montes de María; Contact with Illegal Armed Groups






Montes de María: Contact with Illicit Crops






Montes de María, Cluster 12

Contact with Illegal Armed Groups






Contact with Illicit Crops






Montes de María, Cluster 13

Contact with Illegal Armed Groups






Contact with Illicit Crops






Montes de María, Cluster 14

Contact with Illegal Armed Groups






Contact with Illicit Crops






Montes de María, Cluster 15

Contact with Illegal Armed Groups



Contact with Illicit Crops



ANNEX 2: DATA TABLES, CLUSTER

This annex presents data tables for the clusters that make up the Montes de María sample. These clusters are:

Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
12	San Jacinto (Bolívar)	Tolu Viejo (Sucre)
13	Ovejas (Sucre)	Galeras (Sucre)
14	San Onofre (Sucre)	Los Palmitos (Sucre)
15	El Carmen de Bolívar (Bolívar)	Riohacha (Guajira)

Cluster 12

CELI: San Jacinto, Bolívar

Control: Tolú Viejo, Sucre

Variable	Cluster 12				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,395	0,302	0,160	0,163	-0.0620
The family is experiencing hunger	0,325	0,237	0,313	0,362	-0.132**
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,479	0,500	0,852	0,700	0.165***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,950	0,813	0,737	0,812	-0.204***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,792	0,783	0,025	0,013	0.0231
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,013	0,053	0,045	0,036	0.0600**
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,918	0,765	0,864	0,884	-0.165***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,634	0,541	0,535	0,694	-0.216***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	367465	350329	444996	484566	-52,311
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0,473	0,273	0,337	0,331	-0.155***
Have a checking account	0,008	0,007	0,037	0,018	0.0229
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,391	0,092	0,354	0,347	-0.254***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,362	0,248	0,395	0,436	-0.128**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,602	0,261	0,646	0,621	-0.221**
Currently have debt	0,761	0,490	0,502	0,510	-0.254***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	

The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,174	0,087	0,104	0,109	-0.0766**
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,157	0,125	0,083	0,075	-0.0270
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,033	0,038	0,029	0,031	-0.00294
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,029	0,016	0,000	0,025	-0.0354**
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,033	0,013	0,012	0,020	-0.00479
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,155	0,105	0,076	0,061	-0.0315
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,447	0,406	0,319	0,339	-0.0528
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,291	0,181	0,215	0,268	-0.134**
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,183	0,163	0,100	0,161	-0.0366
The national government runs well or very well	0,576	0,479	0,382	0,416	-0.130**
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,227	0,303	0,163	0,211	-0.00672
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,162	0,142	0,173	0,195	-0.0142
The national government	0,339	0,419	0,253	0,322	0.00506
Justice sector institutions	0,247	0,254	0,185	0,265	-0.0796
Alternative justice institutions	0,187	0,261	0,170	0,219	0.0292
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,190	0,234	0,219	0,176	0.0787
Social organizations and NGOs	0,182	0,278	0,243	0,250	0.102*
Training centers	0,538	0,554	0,573	0,577	0.0369
The <i>Defensoría del Pueblo</i>	0,255	0,359	0,308	0,367	0.0718
The municipal council	0,157	0,123	0,137	0,120	0.0125
The national police	0,347	0,432	0,402	0,369	0.109*
The army	0,467	0,622	0,479	0,509	0.129**
The navy	0,430	0,617	0,447	0,528	0.104*
The municipal <i>personería</i>	0,241	0,272	0,219	0,241	0.0415
The mayor's office	0,266	0,130	0,105	0,081	-0.0709
The JAC	0,403	0,393	0,293	0,312	-0.0256
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,424	0,459	0,305	0,390	-0.0680
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,893	0,935	0,864	0,911	-0.00137
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,028	0,025	0,037	0,002	0.0353*
Illegal armed groups	0,056	0,014	0,070	0,018	0.00459

Antipersonnel mines	0,000	0,021	0,004	0,025	0.00540
Displacement	0,035	0,018	0,045	0,036	-0.0171
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,004	0,012	0,004	0.0102
Extortion	0,000	0,014	0,029	0,034	0.00460
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,650	0,369	0,366	0,383	-0.322***
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,000	0,004	0,000	0.00624
Sexual violence	0,000	0,024	0,021	0,013	0.0279
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,584	0,747	0,646	0,586	0.244***
There is police presence	0,864	0,483	0,321	0,204	-0.236***
The police here are good or very good	0,384	0,413	0,487	0,725	-0.226**
The police have improved in the last two years	0,320	0,365	0,385	0,444	0.0218
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,004	0,007	0,008	0,014	0.00294
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,063	0,011	0,058	0,016	-0.00833
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,967	0,890	0,788	0,953	-0.215***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,950	0,935	0,847	0,959	-0.120***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,975	0,910	0,708	0,955	-0.293***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,983	0,945	0,890	0,966	-0.117***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
EXPECTATIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,782	0,945	0,809	0,939	0.0374
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,877	0,919	0,905	0,951	0.00115
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,774	0,877	0,885	0,926	0.0581
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,840	0,917	0,918	0,962	0.0451
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,819	0,937	0,909	0,975	0.0673**
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,790	0,859	0,942	0,957	0.0501
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,831	0,843	0,926	0,951	-0.0157
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,720	0,790	0,938	0,951	0.0438
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,770	0,819	0,926	0,978	-0.0166
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,741	0,848	0,868	0,944	0.0382
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,745	0,785	0,897	0,953	-0.00787

Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,881	0,909	0,922	0,904	0.0278
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Cluster 13

CELI: Ovejas, Sucre

Control: Galeras, Sucre

Variable	Cluster 13				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,305	0,290	0,059	0,120	-0.0888**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,203	0,130	0,377	0,430	-0.139***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,686	0,372	0,845	0,762	-0.245***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,941	0,910	0,678	0,597	0.0588
Productive activities earn very little money	0,797	0,841	0,004	0,007	0.0468
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,008	0,009	0,021	0,016	-0.000243
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,770	0,898	0,908	0,922	0.118***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,510	0,514	0,628	0,746	-0.140**
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	359837	409309	460799	964693	-454,887
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0,343	0,546	0,360	0,465	0.106*
Have a checking account	0,033	0,007	0,021	0,031	-0.0387**
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,259	0,165	0,264	0,163	0.0283
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,368	0,305	0,347	0,336	-0.0289
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,443	0,438	0,735	0,642	0.107
Currently have debt	0,724	0,648	0,510	0,577	-0.125**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,096	0,100	0,142	0,104	0.0636*
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,100	0,182	0,112	0,093	0.127***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,063	0,020	0,033	0,040	-0.0461**
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,008	0,016	0,013	0,016	0.00210
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,017	0,022	0,008	0,018	-0.000947
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,109	0,150	0,134	0,099	0.0837**
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,410	0,498	0,211	0,354	-0.0662
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,135	0,158	0,162	0,215	0.00355
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,105	0,158	0,076	0,102	0.0359
The national government runs well or very well	0,323	0,527	0,338	0,471	0.0898

The national government runs better than two years ago	0,198	0,294	0,142	0,234	0.0130
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,123	0,134	0,082	0,117	-0.00293
The national government	0,280	0,387	0,244	0,317	0.0685
Justice sector institutions	0,216	0,329	0,154	0,254	0.0543
Alternative justice institutions	0,117	0,386	0,150	0,249	0.192***
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,118	0,218	0,117	0,186	0.0422
Social organizations and NGOs	0,099	0,346	0,150	0,336	0.0761
Training centers	0,359	0,684	0,418	0,668	0.116**
The <i>Defensoría del Pueblo</i>	0,189	0,453	0,206	0,408	0.0722
The municipal council	0,112	0,122	0,126	0,178	-0.0235
The national police	0,416	0,439	0,366	0,487	-0.0906
The army	0,445	0,554	0,425	0,540	0.00579
The navy	0,481	0,533	0,387	0,525	-0.0675
The municipal personería	0,278	0,371	0,164	0,347	-0.100*
The mayor's office	0,199	0,149	0,118	0,118	-0.0454
The JAC	0,403	0,489	0,207	0,377	-0.0638
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,282	0,461	0,366	0,469	0.0767
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,921	0,909	0,782	0,889	-0.130***
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,000	0,003	0,004	0,009	-0.00417
Illegal armed groups	0,000	0,003	0,000	0,016	-0.0116
Antipersonnel mines	0,000	0,014	0,000	0,007	0.00783
Displacement	0,000	0,034	0,008	0,013	0.0357*
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,010	0,004	0,000	0.0178*
Extortion	0,022	0,024	0,017	0,009	0.00955
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,380	0,223	0,226	0,158	-0.0803
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,009	0,000	0,002	0.00838
Sexual violence	0,000	0,014	0,004	0,022	-0.00210
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,812	0,818	0,753	0,822	-0.0728
There is police presence	0,540	0,717	0,347	0,477	0.0216
The police here are good or very good	0,397	0,548	0,366	0,584	-0.0375
The police have improved in the last two years	0,294	0,378	0,232	0,421	-0.0878

ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,004	0,011	0,009	0,019	-0.00261
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,000	0,011	0,009	0,037	-0.00598
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,903	0,863	0,897	0,955	-0.0941***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,863	0,896	0,895	0,966	-0.0308
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,919	0,890	0,824	0,968	-0.173***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,946	0,923	0,906	0,979	-0.0985***
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,906	0,937	0,763	0,905	-0.123***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,879	0,862	0,895	0,933	-0.0472
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,866	0,844	0,874	0,918	-0.0599
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,808	0,878	0,895	0,958	0.0152
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,854	0,915	0,916	0,969	0.00763
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,782	0,768	0,900	0,953	-0.0553
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,778	0,833	0,912	0,960	0.00797
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,715	0,713	0,904	0,935	-0.0349
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,695	0,793	0,916	0,944	0.0751*
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,703	0,853	0,921	0,969	0.0974***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,749	0,715	0,908	0,958	-0.0798*
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,943	0,911	0,962	0,935	-0.0146

Cluster 14

CELI: San Onofre, Sucre

Control: Los Palmitos, Sucre

Variable	Cluster 14				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,490	0,410	0,095	0,091	-0.0444
The family is experiencing hunger	0,283	0,359	0,485	0,395	0.157***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,485	0,524	0,826	0,871	-0.0225
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,941	0,925	0,606	0,581	-0.00331
Productive activities earn very little money	0,629	0,613	0,012	0,038	-0.0781*
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,025	0,032	0,004	0,002	0.0180
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,963	0,888	0,954	0,877	0.00702
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,498	0,588	0,763	0,740	0.114**
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	404029	392293	492842	618387	-122,998
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,577	0,524	0,448	0,433	-0.0105
Have a checking account	0,079	0,047	0,021	0,034	-0.0600**
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,407	0,178	0,398	0,239	-0.0913*
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,307	0,294	0,332	0,328	-0.00639
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,568	0,590	0,738	0,671	0.0546
Currently have debt	0,714	0,609	0,477	0,400	-0.0441
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,262	0,136	0,121	0,066	-0.0635
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,309	0,088	0,063	0,051	-0.208***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,104	0,047	0,021	0,013	-0.0388
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,025	0,036	0,025	0,000	0.0341**
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,017	0,049	0,021	0,002	0.0631***
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,232	0,146	0,126	0,063	-0.0364
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,580	0,419	0,392	0,180	0.0472
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,271	0,183	0,169	0,109	-0.0215
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,305	0,115	0,069	0,051	-0.154***

The national government runs well or very well	0,622	0,497	0,433	0,387	-0.0179
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,313	0,277	0,175	0,099	0.0521
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,201	0,171	0,100	0,091	-0.00845
The national government	0,393	0,434	0,281	0,199	0.126**
Justice sector institutions	0,327	0,277	0,144	0,155	-0.0473
Alternative justice institutions	0,355	0,249	0,170	0,119	-0.0372
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,176	0,273	0,157	0,120	0.173***
Social organizations and NGOs	0,207	0,232	0,196	0,122	0.128**
Training centers	0,561	0,543	0,626	0,385	0.215***
The <i>Defensoría del Pueblo</i>	0,361	0,279	0,278	0,216	-0.000594
The municipal council	0,176	0,157	0,125	0,112	0.00767
The national police	0,489	0,305	0,312	0,241	-0.128**
The army	0,532	0,477	0,377	0,296	0.00628
The navy	0,537	0,420	0,335	0,333	-0.124**
The municipal <i>personería</i>	0,366	0,246	0,247	0,165	-0.0359
The mayor's office	0,326	0,138	0,113	0,104	-0.163***
The JAC	0,738	0,372	0,329	0,174	-0.224***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,292	0,442	0,303	0,249	0.254***
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,888	0,892	0,722	0,795	-0.0368
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,020	0,086	0,025	0,116	0.0167
Illegal armed groups	0,010	0,092	0,012	0,184	-0.0891**
Antipersonnel mines	0,000	0,009	0,000	0,004	0.00542
Displacement	0,010	0,086	0,029	0,161	-0.0293
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,017	0,008	0,025	0.0118
Extortion	0,000	0,075	0,033	0,070	0.0448
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,690	0,401	0,266	0,357	-0.396***
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,004	0,004	0,000	0.00987
Sexual violence	0,000	0,040	0,021	0,015	0.0548**
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,701	0,583	0,718	0,431	0.156***
There is police presence	0,880	0,812	0,357	0,342	-0.0302
The police here are good or very good	0,391	0,385	0,291	0,241	0.0348
The police have improved in the last two years	0,317	0,298	0,186	0,204	0.0162

ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,000	0,024	0,013	0,024	0.0239
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,000	0,005	0,008	0,007	0.00621
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,962	0,921	0,895	0,672	0.181***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,979	0,942	0,863	0,678	0.145***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,970	0,940	0,680	0,662	-0.00633
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,983	0,961	0,909	0,697	0.197***
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,874	0,839	0,801	0,881	-0.109**
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,759	0,907	0,880	0,977	0.0690**
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,730	0,901	0,859	0,975	0.0575
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,718	0,899	0,896	0,983	0.0894**
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,751	0,915	0,917	0,983	0.0937***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,639	0,833	0,913	0,989	0.0985***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,705	0,860	0,921	0,983	0.0672*
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,606	0,795	0,929	0,979	0.126***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,672	0,767	0,913	0,989	-0.00558
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,647	0,852	0,905	0,977	0.124***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,639	0,784	0,929	0,981	0.0875**
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,875	0,938	0,937	0,928	0.0709**

Cluster 15

CELI: El Carmen de Bolívar, Bolívar

Control: Riohacha, La Guajira

Variable	Cluster 15				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,367	0,247	0,129	0,158	-0.131***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,236	0,218	0,525	0,256	0.254***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,425	0,370	0,854	0,738	0.0413
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,854	0,779	0,658	0,781	-0.205***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,571	0,802	0,025	0,015	0.237***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,000	0,011	0,046	0,009	0.0362***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,867	0,824	0,883	0,866	-0.0302
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,238	0,462	0,713	0,447	0.513***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	417996	430651	841967	498299	331,077***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
FINANCIAL SERVICES	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Have a savings account	0,421	0,451	0,383	0,421	-0.0247
Have a checking account	0,025	0,033	0,046	0,032	0.0173
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,246	0,169	0,392	0,293	0.0187
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,354	0,321	0,383	0,484	-0.154***
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,447	0,538	0,630	0,674	0.0300
Currently have debt	0,617	0,531	0,513	0,586	-0.148**
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,225	0,084	0,122	0,141	-0.153***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,190	0,172	0,118	0,198	-0.0922**
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,104	0,039	0,075	0,039	-0.0193
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,000	0,024	0,025	0,035	0.0121
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,013	0,017	0,004	0,028	-0.0217
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,206	0,094	0,102	0,115	-0.133***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,508	0,469	0,239	0,470	-0.287***
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,268	0,180	0,231	0,324	-0.170***
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,216	0,208	0,109	0,201	-0.0926*
The national government runs well or very well	0,606	0,552	0,453	0,493	-0.0746

The national government runs better than two years ago	0,230	0,339	0,242	0,303	0.0750
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
TRUST (a lot or very much)	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
The departmental government	0,145	0,130	0,107	0,200	-0.125***
The national government	0,434	0,449	0,252	0,395	-0.113*
Justice sector institutions	0,302	0,289	0,204	0,293	-0.0922
Alternative justice institutions	0,362	0,222	0,153	0,235	-0.205***
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,266	0,220	0,195	0,198	-0.0320
Social organizations and NGOs	0,302	0,261	0,226	0,303	-0.0918
Training centers	0,598	0,621	0,603	0,653	-0.0118
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,421	0,342	0,284	0,381	-0.162***
The municipal council	0,184	0,086	0,163	0,183	-0.0991**
The national police	0,411	0,402	0,316	0,472	-0.157***
The army	0,568	0,596	0,422	0,597	-0.135**
The navy	0,500	0,548	0,286	0,542	-0.212***
The municipal personería	0,274	0,276	0,171	0,320	-0.150***
The mayor's office	0,177	0,057	0,110	0,156	-0.179***
The JAC	0,543	0,427	0,228	0,457	-0.378***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
SECURITY	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,269	0,581	0,298	0,527	0.101*
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,938	0,941	0,838	0,911	-0.0659**
Serious security problems in the vereda:					
Homicides	0,024	0,015	0,058	0,015	0.0353
Illegal armed groups	0,059	0,023	0,021	0,035	-0.0605**
Antipersonnel mines	0,000	0,020	0,008	0,009	0.0133
Displacement	0,118	0,010	0,117	0,011	-0.0246
Forced disappearances	0,024	0,003	0,025	0,004	-0.00772
Extortion	0,059	0,023	0,021	0,033	-0.0470*
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,388	0,298	0,263	0,453	-0.299***
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,000	0,008	0,009	0.00184
Sexual violence	0,030	0,016	0,046	0,019	0.0336
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,813	0,717	0,675	0,521	0.104**
There is police presence	0,942	0,644	0,483	0,443	-0.245***
The police here are good or very good	0,466	0,460	0,431	0,569	-0.0835
The police have improved in the last two years	0,241	0,350	0,351	0,578	-0.0430

ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,035	0,025	0,013	0,029	-0.0227
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,016	0,004	0,013	0,008	0.00249
(Agree or strongly agree)					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,906	0,900	0,810	0,929	-0.139***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,919	0,943	0,817	0,968	-0.133***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,949	0,917	0,777	0,940	-0.209***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,953	0,945	0,868	0,925	-0.0750**
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,860	0,941	0,803	0,961	-0.0868**
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,763	0,904	0,967	0,965	0.127***
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,700	0,853	0,896	0,948	0.0669*
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,700	0,891	0,967	0,972	0.160***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,796	0,907	0,975	0,976	0.0964***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,658	0,816	0,958	0,959	0.163***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,738	0,859	0,958	0,961	0.112***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,638	0,777	0,946	0,957	0.127***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,654	0,837	0,967	0,965	0.177***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,671	0,829	0,913	0,944	0.119***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,629	0,748	0,938	0,946	0.0770*
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,893	0,938	0,906	0,927	0.0334

ANNEX 3: CALCULATION OF INDICATOR FIGURES

Reporting on CELI Indicators

Below are tables specifying how indicators were grouped into the three categories of economic, institutional, and social for presentation in the CELI Midline Evaluation general and regional reports. The present grouping is admittedly arbitrary but represents the best judgment of the evaluators, recognizing that other arrangements are possible. In discussions with the implementers, the present grouping was acknowledged and confirmed.

Economic Indicators

These are the sixteen indicators that were used to calculate the Economic Indicators pie chart. Indicators in yellow are reported by the implementers and those in green are taken from the midline survey data. While certain indicators provided by government sources were not included due to the irregular pace of reporting, indicators DO3-041 and DO3-040 had reliable numbers, compiled by government sources and reported by the implementers - since in all cases targets were met. DO3-038 was not included because of a lack of confidence in the numbers reported.

1	DO3-005 Avg monthly household income of USAID's beneficiaries
2	DO3-041 # of restitution cases supported in CELI municipios
3	DO3-040 # of formalized properties supported by CELI municipalities
4	DO3-036. Total value of CELI projects approved
5	DO3-037. Total value of CELI projects completed
	DO3-038. Total public investment in consolidation zones
6	DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones att to USG interventions
7	DO3-030 # of strategic rural and economic development programs with territorial approach implemented in CELI municipios
8	DO3-031 # & % of people benefitted by strategic rural and econ development programs with territorial approach, implemented in CELI municipios
9	DO3-034 # of rural households benefiting directly from USG interventions
10	DO3-032a Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG interventions
11	DO3-032b Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG interventions (for-profit, crops, social enterprises)
12	DO3-033a # of private-public alliances formed
13	DO3-033b # of private-public alliances formed

14	DO3-035 # of people with financial product includes mobile wallet, leasing, etc.
15	DO3-042 Community funds leveraged in CELI Zones attrib to USG Interventions
16	DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones

Institutional Development

These are the six indicators included under institutional development:

1	DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones attributed to USG interventions
2	DO3-010 # of strategic national social programs implemented in CELI zones
3	DO3-011 # & % of people benefitted by national social programs impl in CELI municipios
4	DO3-012 # of beneficiaries receiving improved infrastructure services
5	DO3-013 Governance capacity index
6	DO3-028 Level of accountability in CELI municipios

Two indicators that would be included in this category but which were to be provided by the GOC were not updated and have been deleted and are not reported or counted:

DO3-004 – Public Social Services Municipal Index

DO3-009 – Amount and Average Percent of annual change in municipal own-source income

Social Indicators

Six indicators included in the calculation of the Social Indicators pie chart:

1	DO3-008 # of rapid impact projects implemented by USG implementers
2	DO3-024 Social Capital Index
3	DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones
4	DO3-025 # of CSO members supported by USG assistance
5	DO3-026 (a) Change in Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG assistance
6	DO3-026 (b) Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG assistance

DO3-026(a) and DO3-026(b) are closely related. Information was partially available for both, and targets were met. For 26(a) this was listed as “not reported” for Montes de María and Central, but “exceeded” for CELI Norte/Sur. For 26(b), this was reported as exceeded for all three CELIs.

U.S. Agency for International Development
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20523