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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

Regional Report, Central

December 2016

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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative

REGIONAL REPORT, CENTRAL

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CONTENTS

- Acronyms 1
- Abstract..... 3
- Executive Summary..... 5
 - Evaluation purpose 5
 - Project background 5
 - Evaluation questions, design, methods and limitations..... 6
- Findings and conclusions 7
 - Economic development..... 8
 - Institutional development..... 11
 - Social development 13
- Introduction 15
 - Background 15
 - How to read this report..... 19
 - Methodology and design 19
 - Quantitative methods 20
 - Qualitative methods 23
 - Limitations 23
- Regional Context 28
- CELI Interventions in the Central Region 41
 - Economic development..... 42
- Economic Development 43
 - Findings and conclusions 43
 - Direct beneficiaries 43
 - Global survey: Perceptions of economic conditions 44
 - Support for productive projects..... 49
 - Markets and marketing 50
 - Savings, credit, and financial services 53
 - Transportation and infrastructure..... 55
 - Land 57
 - Recommendations 59
- Institutional Development 61
 - Findings and conclusions 61
 - Participation 61
 - Transparency and accountability 63
 - Confidence 67

Provision of services	70
Recommendations	73
Social Development.....	75
Findings and conclusions	75
Social capital: Trust	75
Social capital: Participation in associations	76
Specific role of Community Action Councils (JACs in Spanish)	79
Support for producer associations.....	80
Women’s and victims’ associations	82
Cultural associations	83
Recommendations	83
Annex 1: Cluster-level results, List experiment	86
Central Region: Contact with armed groups	87
Central Region: Contact with illicit crops	88
Annex 2: Data tables, cluster	97
Cluster 16	98
Cluster 17	100
Cluster 18	102
Cluster 24	104
Cluster 25	106
Cluster 26	108
Cluster 27	110
Cluster 28	112
Annex 3: Calculation of indicator figures.....	114
Reporting on CELI indicators	114
Economic indicators.....	114
Institutional development.....	115
Social indicators	115

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions	6
Figure 1.2. CELI Central PMP indicator compliance	8
Figure 1.3. Impact on the economic situation of households.....	8
Figure 1.4. Trends in reasons for joining forces	9
Figure 1.5. Trends, road network (Good/very good).....	10
Figure 1.6. Trends in perceptions of problems with the municipality management	11
Figure 1.7. Trends in the culture of legality (agree/strongly agree).....	14
Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their CELI peers.....	16
Figure 2.2. Central Region, clusters and control municipalities	18
Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report	19
Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions	20
Figure 2.5. Central sample by ethnicity (self-identified).....	22
Figure 3.1. Index of the consolidation pillars and their components	28
Figure 3.2. Departments and Municipalities in CELI Central analyzed by the Consolidation Index	28
Figure 3.3. Secondary data: The General Consolidation Index score per department.....	29
Figure 3.4. Trends in the perception of security	31
Figure 3.5. Impacts on the perception of security.....	32
Figure 3.6. Trends in the perception of crimes	32
Figure 3.7. Impacts on the perception of crimes.....	33
Figure 3.8. Trends in the perception of state security services	33
Figure 3.9. Trends in the perceptions with respect to illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree)	35
Figure 3.10. Impacts on attitudes with respect to illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree).....	35
Figure 3.11. Trends in the inclination towards legality	36
Figure 3.12. Trends in the perception of the effects of the IAGs.....	37
Figure 3.13. Trends in human rights violations	37
Figure 3.14. Trends in the mechanisms for gaining access to justice	38
Figure 3.15. Trends in the legitimacy of the state (agree or very strongly agree)	39
Figure 3.16. Secondary data: Quarterly Data on assistance from authorities	39
Figure 4.1. CELI Performance: Fulfillment of the PMP benchmarks	42
Figure 4.2. CELI Performance: Commitments (in US\$M) by source and type of project (approx. \$211.5M)	42
Figure 5.1. Trends in the indicators on the economic situation	45
Figure 5.2. Impact on the economic situation of households.....	45
Figure 5.3. Impacts on the perception of the economic situation	45
Figure 5.4. Trends in the perception of food security	46
Figure 5.5. Impacts on the perception of and experiences with food security	46

Figure 5.6. Impacts on income	47
Figure 5.7. Impacts on expectations for the future	47
Figure 5.8. Secondary data: financial entities (left) and cultivated hectares (right)	48
Figure 5.9. Trends in reasons for joining associations.....	50
Figure 5.10. Trends in marketing channels for small-farm products.....	51
Figure 5.11. Trends in purchasing channels	51
Figure 5.12. Trends in problems with production and marketing their goods	52
Figure 5.13. Trends in production and sales problems compared to controls.....	52
Figure 5.14. Trends in the use of banks (banking) and access to credit.....	54
Figure 5.15. Impacts on the use of financial services and products.....	54
Figure 5.16. Trends in the perception of roads	55
Figure 5.17. Secondary data: Trends in the perception of roads.....	56
Figure 5.18. Trends in reasons for paying or being willing to pay property taxes.....	58
Figure 5.19. Trends in reasons for not paying taxes on property.....	58
Figure 6.1. Trends in reasons for voting	62
Figure 6.2. Trends in possible new leaders.....	62
Figure 6.3. Secondary data: Grants for financing projects	63
Figure 6.4. Secondary data: Average IGA results	64
Figure 6.5. Secondary data: Property compliance (left) and ICA tax (right).....	64
Figure 6.6. Trends in perceptions of problems associated with the municipality management.....	65
Figure 6.7. Impact on the perception of the local government	65
Figure 6.8. Impacts on confidence — considerable or a lot	67
Figure 6.9. Trends in the citizens’ perceptions of public management.....	68
Figure 6.10. Trends in perceptions of the management by the Governor's office and the national government	68
Figure 6.11. Trends in the registration of citizens for social services.....	70
Figure 6.12. Trends in access to and quality of public services.....	70
Figure 6.13. Impact on expectations for improvement in public services in the future	71
Figure 6.14. Secondary data: Availability of electricity (left) and cell phone (right)	72
Figure 7.1. Trends in confidence at the community level.....	75
Figure 7.2. Trends in the reported association mechanisms	77
Figure 7.3. Trends in active decision-making in the mechanisms of working together.....	77
Figure 7.4. Trends in active decision-making in the mechanisms of working together.....	78
Figure 7.5. Trends in the reported challenges of belonging to social organizations	79

ACRONYMS

ARD	Associates for Rural Development
BACRIM	Criminal bands, Bandas Criminales (in the service of the narcotics trade)
CAR	Regional Autonomous Corporations, Corporaciones Regionales Autónomas
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CELI	Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
CELI Central	CELI program in the Central region
CELI MdM	CELI program in the Montes de María region
CELI Norte/Sur	CELI program in the North and South regions
CERAC	Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos
CNC	National Consulting Center, Centro Nacional de Consultoría
CNC-DoD	Crime and Narcotics Center, U.S. Department of Defense
CSDI	Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DNP	National Planning Department, Departamento Nacional de Planeación
DO	Development objective
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DPS	Department for Social Prosperity, Departamento para la Prosperidad Social
ELN	National Liberation Army, Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EVIDINCE	Research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FHH	Female head of household
GLAC	Local savings and loans groups, grupos locales de ahorros y crédito
GOC	Government of Colombia
HH	Household
IAG	Illegal Armed Group
IC	Illicit crops
ICO	Index of Organizational Competencies, Índice de competencias organizacionales
IDI	Integral Performance Index, Índice de desempeño integral
INCODER	Colombian Institute of Rural Development, <u>Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural</u>
JAC	Community Action Council, Junta de Acción Comunal
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MADR	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural

MdM	Montes de María
MHH	Male head of household
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc.
PAR	Regional Action Plan, Plan de acción regional
PMP	Performance management plan
PNCRT	National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy, Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial
SENA	National Learning Service, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SGP	General Participation System, Sistema General de Participación
SIJIN	Judicial police, Seccional de Investigación Judicial
SIMCI	Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos
SISBEN	Identification and Classification system for potential social program Beneficiaries, Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de potenciales Beneficiarios para programas sociales
TA	Technical Assistance
UACT	Territorial Consolidation Administrative Unit, Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial
UARIV	Victims' Integral Attention and Reparation Unit, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas
UMATA	Municipal Agricultural Extension Units, Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
URT	Land Restitution Unit, Unidad de Restitución de Tierras
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEO	Verification of Organizational Status, Valorización del Estado Organizacional

ABSTRACT

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

The CELI Central midterm evaluation took place 13 municipalities: Chaparral, Rioblanco, Planadas and Ataco in the Department of Tolima; Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, San Juan de Arama, Uribe and La Macarena in the Department of Meta and La Montañita, and Cartagena del Chaira and San Vicente del Caguán in the Department of Caquetá.

Economic Development

The economic situation for the average family is getting worse, but the effects on CELI's direct participants are positive. Respondents perceive that the poverty families suffer from today is worse than it was at baseline. However, there also seems to be an increase in employment levels and profitability of productive work. CELI's productive projects provide more economic benefits than projects in which they did not intervene. Respondents state that thanks to the intervention the profitability of their productive projects and the quality of their products has improved, their production costs have declined, and they gained access to new markets. However, markets in these areas are still generally localized.

CELI Central's beneficiaries also report greater use of bank services and loans. Loans from rotating funds and the Local Savings and Loan Groups, GLACs, have been an important alternative to the informal mechanisms that are popular in these areas but have interest rates that are much higher than producers can accept.

Respondents' perceptions of the intra- and inter-municipal road network improved slightly compared to baseline, but is still perceived as generally of poor quality. CELI support for land ownership is important for communities but interventions are inadequate in comparison to the size of the problem.

Institutional Development

Respondents' participation in the political process increased between the baseline and midline despite the lack of compelling candidates. Respondents do not believe that ex-combatants should become political figures. The stigma against ex-combatants affects their legitimacy as potential community leaders. In light of the peace process and a post-conflict environment, there is no evidence that guerrilla groups have the credibility to participate in politics in this region.

Respondents shares the low confidence in public institutions seen across the country. There are no positive effects of CELI's efforts to improve transparency and accountability. Citizens still see deficiencies in availability and quality of public services.

Social Development

Trust between community members has deteriorated. However, citizen participation has seen significant growth. CELI succeeded in strengthening the formation of associations and empowering communities to make their own decisions. The Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs) are

the most frequently recurring mechanism for encouraging associations and reinforcing decision-making ability.

Homicides, kidnapping, and the presence of IAGs have declined in CELI municipalities. Respondents perceive that security conditions are poor (45%), but they believe policing has improved.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics International, has worked through the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, ARD Tetra Tech, implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (Mdm) project. This volume reports on achievements and impacts to date in the CELI Central region.

Evaluation purpose

In 2011 USAID/Colombia's evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., designed an impact evaluation of the CSDI interventions. The design included two more measurements: midline and final. EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), carried out the midline. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline design, additional qualitative fieldwork, in-depth interviews with the CELI teams, and program satisfaction questions. Key audiences for the evaluation are the USAID/Colombia Mission Program and Technical Offices, who will use the results to plan follow-on programming.

Three guiding principles were set for uses of the evaluation, as follows:

Measure the change in impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with target populations.

Inform decision-making processes with timely data, to identify components needing strengthening to achieve program goals.

Identify best practices and lessons learned to date to inform future USAID programming.

Project background

Based on the GOC's National Consolidation Plan and formalized in the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT in its Spanish acronym), the concept of "consolidation" refers to the expansion in the conflict zones of Colombia of the legitimate presence of the state. The policy, designed for implementation once minimal conditions for public safety were established, would create the necessary institutional mechanisms to provide basic human rights protections to the populations in those zones historically affected by conflict and illicit crops. The PNCRT was oriented to establishing the presence of state institutions capable of efficiently bringing the public goods needed for development.

The U.S. Embassy developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and at the reduction of illicit crops and the

presence of illegal armed groups in conflict zones. The basic premise of the CELIs, one component of CSDI, is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of the state, and their activities are oriented to bolstering state institutions, generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life.

Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: *Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated*, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation—strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS for 2014-2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

Obviously, the CELIs are no substitute for the state. They were called upon to provide support to the PNCRT. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice services in the consolidation zones is a sine qua non condition for enabling the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation.

Evaluation questions, design, methods and limitations

The midterm evaluation took place in 32 CELI municipalities as well as in 16 municipalities from three regions (Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle and Putumayo) in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities. The midline, structured around the baseline completed by DevTech, examined changes since the baseline was completed across the institutional, social and economic indicators related to the interventions.

Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target population in the areas of interventions?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting
Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities? ¹	IR 3.2
What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)	Sub-IR 3.2.1
What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?	IR 3.3
How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities?	Cross-cutting
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

¹ This is answered in Annex 6 of the main report with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.

EVAL, working with its strategic partner the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), used a mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of the CELI interventions. The design closely followed the baseline, with additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, opinions and experiences of the population. Full design considerations are found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Limitations to the study are various and important to consider fully. There are limitations based on the design, such as the difficult and imperfect process of matching municipalities in a country that has an important history of isolation and variation among regions. The original design has also been deeply affected by the loss of the whole-of-government intervention, in which impact goals and indicators were set at a very high level, but the implementation has been far more limited than promised. Exogenous factors (such as the drop in world oil prices) and variations in implementation also condition the interpretation of the data. Please see the Limitations section of this volume as well as the methodology annex (Annex 3) to the main report for full details.

Findings and conclusions


How to read the findings and conclusions

This summary and the report that follows give two key types of data: *trends* and *impacts*. The trends reveal the changes over time of each variable analyzed in the CELI municipalities, while the impacts compare the changes in the variables in the municipalities analyzed with those in the control municipalities.

Note that the trends and impacts at the cluster level are also given, i.e., individual municipalities or small groups of municipalities that are geographically and socio-economically similar. The results of a cluster analysis often differ from the regional results, which is why it is important to study them to get more targeted information.

CELI Central provided information on meeting the goals that were established in the Performance Management Plan (PMP). This includes indicators such as the number of organizations and governmental offices that have received support from the project, sales from the productive projects, and leveraged funds, etc. On the date of the analysis, CELI Central had reached or exceeded the majority of the goals established in the three pillars (economic, social, and institutional) though the social and economic goals were more fully accomplished. The economic pillar also contains the largest number of indicators that are CELI's direct responsibility. There are also indicators which have goals with a high probability of being attained before the program ends, although these goals have not been completely fulfilled. The following figure gives a summary of the levels at which the goals have been fulfilled for each type of indicator (an explanation of the calculations for the figure are found in Annex 3):

Figure 1.2. CELI Central PMP indicator compliance



Economic development


The economic situation for the average family is getting worse, but the effects on CELI’s direct participants are positive. According to the information obtained, those surveyed perceive that the poverty families suffer from today is worse than it was at baseline. However, when an analysis is done by cluster, as will be explained below, the result is different. From that point of view, even though conditions of extreme poverty seem to be worse, there also seems to be an increase in employment levels and profitability of productive work. Despite the decline in the perception of the economic situation in absolute terms, it was worse in the control zones. CELI Central had a positive impact of almost 14pp. (Figure 1.3)

Figure 1.3. Impact on the economic situation of households

Variable	Impact CELI vs. Control
The economic situation for the place where I am living is good or very good	0.137*
Unemployment or the lack of opportunities is a serious problem here	-0.0185
The productive work people do earns very little	-0.107
One of the few attractive, productive options is illegal activities	-0.00663

Support for productive projects. CELI is recognized in this evaluation for its ability to provide technical assistance and reinforce associations of producers as well as make them more sustainable. CELI’s productive projects provide more economic benefits than projects in which they did not intervene. Nevertheless, respondents expressed concerns about their food security in the short and medium term. In the regions analyzed, economic concerns are an increasingly important factor in forming associations. Producer families seek to solve their logistics problems (transportation for products, etc.) and develop economies of scale for purchasing supplies, strengthen their capacity for negotiating product sales, and gain access to financing and loans. The most important issue, however, is community training. Figure 1.4 notes the improved clarity that producers have today for why they should join associations compared to baseline.

Figure 1.4. Trends in reasons for joining forces




Markets and commerce. Technical assistance and support for merchandising are fundamental for offsetting problems related to low profitability. Those surveyed state that thanks to the intervention the profitability of their productive projects and the quality of their products has improved, their production costs have declined, and they gained access to new markets. However, markets in the Consolidation territories are still generally localized. When markets are small, poorly developed, and not specialized, the transaction costs are very high and communities remain trapped in a vicious cycle because there is little incentive for increased production. At the same time, the increased production and efficiency of other markets clashes with the rigidity of the local market and its lack of readiness to export to other regions. Therefore, it is necessary to reach markets with enough demand to achieve prices that are above production and transportation costs. Many productive projects in these regions have grown out of alternative development, but if the market is poor and there are not sufficient access roads (or the existing ones are bad) poverty may increase. If pressures from armed groups persist, there is an incentive for producers to return to growing illegal crops.

[The problem] isn't so much the supplies but that they pay us good prices. A load of coffee is worth more than the costs. Imagine that... and how much back-breaking work do you have to do to get the crop. The serious problem we small farmers have is the middlemen. The middleman is the one who gains by the sweat of our brows. So that is what the government has to control. (Beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima)

Financial services. CELI Central's beneficiaries report greater use of bank services and loans between baseline and midline. Furthermore, loans from rotating funds and the Local Savings and Loan Groups, GLACs, have been an important alternative to the informal mechanisms that are popular in these areas but have interest rates that are much higher than producers can accept.

Road infrastructure. Respondent' perceptions of the intra- and inter-municipal road network improved slightly compared to the baseline (Figure 1.5), but is still perceived as generally of poor quality.

Figure 1.5. Trends, road network (Good/very good)



As mentioned, production and access to markets are negatively affected by the lack of roads or by their poor condition (especially the tertiary roads). CELI Central has designed and implemented improvement and maintenance projects for some of these roads through contracts awarded by the local JACs.

Land. Informality of land ownership in the regions where CELI Central has intervened is a constant. For example, communities and families sometimes depend on letters of sale that do not legally support formal ownership, and therefore, do not serve as collateral for loans and the development of productive projects. It is important to note that land ownership is a public good and the express responsibility of the state. CELI support has been important for communities but is inadequate in comparison to the size of the problem.

One hears that they often would rather lose the land and ignore the problem than file a complaint. [They tell you that:] -no, look, the man over there says, - if I open my mouth, bla, bla, bla, or just that he has been there many years and he'll never turn it over to me, that he bought it from someone else. Do you understand? So until the Land Unit gets here... they are coming to Caquetá now like they did to Putumayo or Tolima...I don't think there is any guarantee that these people will begin to take the initiative. (Ombudsman's office, La Montañita, Caquetá)

To guarantee proper land use, the policy should be consistent with factors inherent to ownership and should consider the nature of the land, legal property registration, and the processes of issuing titles and restitution, which requires insight about the realities owners and landholders face. One factor to keep in mind is the owner's ability to pay taxes, which is not assured since they may not have the funds available if there is a poor harvest.

The evaluation recommends: (see report for details)

Take advantage of local opportunities to simultaneously improve production and marketing.

The work CELI has done to create alliances between the private sector and mutually benefiting associations should be duplicated. This cooperative effort should develop pilot projects to overcome deficiencies found in the production and marketing processes.

Support producer associations to develop economies of scale, reduce production and transportation costs, expand demand (in markets outside of the local market) and improve marketing channels, so that even while the middlemen are playing a difficult to replace role, their role in the chain is minimized and profitability remains in the hands of the producers.

Improve food security plans. Support traditional farms and other activities that generate resources over the short, medium, and long term, minimize dependence on a single crop, provide the producing families with liquid assets, and make it possible for them to consolidate production and marketing.

Coordinate with national initiatives (irrigation districts, drainage, collection points, refrigeration chains, financing and banking, technology parks and technological extension, etc.). Analyze the

Policy for Productive Development project that the National Planning Department (DNP in Spanish) is implementing.

Use community models to improve the tertiary roads. Reinforce the successful work with the JACs to build a community-based participatory model for managing the tertiary road network in Colombia, based on international experiences and taking into account both the national context and environmental factors in order to minimize direct and indirect environmental risks or to design environmental compensation models. In the case of previously constructed roads that need maintenance, a suitable environmental plan is also essential.

Land restoration processes require greater effectiveness to guarantee proper restitution and provision of legal titles to properties. New relationships with the entities responsible for administering this program at the national level must be prioritized, especially those who are responsible for the functions of the now defunct INCODER, i.e., the Agency for Rural Development and National Land Agency. The institutionalization work with the Land Restitution Unit must be continued.

Institutional development

Participation. Based on the survey results, people’s participation in the political process increased between the baseline and midline despite the lack of compelling candidates. According to those surveyed, the fact that a candidate belongs to a community association or organization is a boon for participating in politics because this increases his or her legitimacy and representativeness.

With the hope that someday someone will represent the community to see what... and this year there is a lady, in fact she is in the Caucho Alliance. She is seeking election to the Council with the desire that perhaps she will be lucky and do something for the community now that she is there. (Rubber Tappers’ Association, La Montaña, Caquetá)

Respondents do not believe that ex-combatants should become political figures. The stigma against ex-combatants affects their legitimacy as potential community leaders. In light of the peace process and a post-conflict environment, there is no evidence that guerrilla groups have the credibility to participate in politics in this region.

Transparency and accountability. Accountability processes are not well developed, which reduces confidence in government institutions. Despite CELI’s efforts to improve transparency, accountability, and social control, no positive effects have been seen so far. It is not possible to verify whether the community actively participates in planning processes, which further reduces community participation in accountability and oversight, even while respondents perceive that transparency and accountability is improving.

This region shares the low confidence in public institutions seen across the country. Confidence in institutions fell, according to respondents. This affects the state’s legitimacy as the guarantor and protector of rights, its leadership to intervene in the countryside (because failure to meet commitments along with other problems still persist), and recovery of the territory from the hands of the armed groups. (Figure 1.6)

Figure 1.6. Trends in perceptions of problems with the municipality management

CELI		Control
↑	Distrust of public entities	↓
↑	Municipal administrations do not pay attention to requests from the community	↑
↑	The administration is not able to solve the community's problems	↑

CELI		Control
↓	Deficiencies of public utilities for households	↓
↓	Lack of highways	→
↓	Corruption	↓
→	Lack of institutional services: hospitals, schools, courts, and kindergartens	↓
↑	Municipal administrations do not report on what they are doing	↑
↓	The municipal authorities invite the community to express their opinions about subjects that are of interest to the community	↓
↓	The municipal authorities take the opinions of the citizens into account when they make decisions	↓

Provision of services. Even if the availability of public utilities is high in the official data, with the exception of the sewer system, garbage management, and final disposal of garbage, the citizenry still sees deficiencies in availability and quality, especially in rural areas. This implies reinforcing the capacity of the local entities that are responsible for providing these public services.

Well yes, it has obviously been very important [CELI's support] because they are very concerned about development. They support different institutions, us, or rather us with projects, the court. They try to get all of us to work together. They have also supported the Ombudsman's office. (Sec. of Government, La Macarena, Meta)

The evaluation recommends: (see report for details)

Maintain credibility in the processes and mechanisms of political participation and empower the communities and their new leaders. CELI and other USAID programs should be instruments for applying the rules that guarantee this political exercise such as the principle of gender equality and representation in and access to electoral debates in order to generate and consolidate proposals that can mobilize the electorate to support democratic consolidation.

Two tasks must continue to be developed. One, strengthening political participation through social organizations and two, consolidation of expertise regarding the channels for political participation and influence on public administrations.

Coordinate CELI and strategies for transparency and accountability driven by the country and be supportive of the National Strategy for a Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Public Policy and for programs on the right to access public information. CELI (or USAID in future programs) requires organized, decisive, sustainable, and coordinated inter-institutional action that is consistent with PNCRT and with initiatives the country has defined in recent years.

Use new tools in the effort to improve the provision of services. CELI's challenge is to continue strengthening local governments in order to improve the provision of the municipalities' and departments' services. Decentralization is a national initiative, but, on the municipal level, capacity is low and finances are limited. To that effect, it becomes necessary to reinforce citizen participation and have information that is relevant from the demand point of view and, thus, manage the supply and emphasize pilot projects that significantly involve civil society and, at the same time, support local governments with permanent technical assistance. Tools such as "score charts" and other measures to get citizens to rate the changes in the provision of services are very useful for improving this.

Social development

Social capital. The results of the survey suggest that the Index of Confidence between members of the communities has deteriorated and that mutual assistance between the members and the ability to work together has declined. This affects the strengthening of association processes and, therefore, the success of CELI interventions.

However, in the regions that CELI Central covers, citizen participation has seen significant growth in quality and quantity as well as clear evidence of its benefits. CELI has succeeded especially in strengthening the formation of associations and decision-making. However, it is noteworthy that teamwork has stood out most as a weakness.

The JACs are the most frequently recurring mechanism for encouraging associations and reinforcing decision-making ability. These associations play an important role in resolving conflicts, at least in some *veredas*. The JACs have also worked very successfully with CELI Central on infrastructure projects regarding maintenance and sustainability of tertiary roads through community work.

Association and production. Economic rationale is undoubtedly one of the major incentives for starting to set up associations since they provide a way to gain access to cooperation resources and state resources. CELI's positive impacts are also seen in the establishment of public places for training, selling products, and marketing. The fact that women who are the heads of their households are the ones who have taken advantage of these places the most is interesting, especially for processing, selling, and transporting their products. CELI is recognized for its ability to provide technical assistance and to strengthen and make associations more sustainable.

The formation of associations is critical for all of CELI's components that should favor cooperation and not competition. CELI's efforts to foster associations by improving the JACs' efficacy, providing support in administrative areas, strengthening small producers' groups, and empowering women and young people to work together is recognized.


Security. The security policies are making a difference as data show that homicides, kidnapping, and the presence of IAGs have declined in the regions under review. However, the perception of those surveyed is that security conditions are not good (45%), but their view of the security services provided by the state through the police is better (increased from 26% to 34%). The rise in the number of households whose perception of the security services offered by the police and the armed forces is notable, with differences of 3pp and 11pp respectively.

Other data in the survey are more troubling. They show an erosion of the support for a culture that supports legality and more justification for disobeying the law. (Figure 1.7)

I reiterate, the organizational topic, if we think as a group, because we are actually forgetting that this society is a mixture, that we all have a relationship and a shared relationship. No one is [alone] here. If we learn to get along with each other and not compete... We are not independent but rather we are interdependent in many ways. We are able to learn to get along. That is basic. (Beneficiary, La Montañita, Caquetá)

I am thankful because the truth is the resources that were allocated were not for purchasing supplies but for everything that had to do with managing the project. In other words, Colombia Responde funds were used to pay for one year of technical assistance. They paid for one person involved in the business-and-partnership area. (Association, La Macarena, Meta)

Figure 1.7. Trends in the culture of legality (agree/strongly agree)



The evaluation recommends: (see report for details)

Adapt programming to build confidence. Guaranteeing safety and fostering the birth of new leadership is essential to strengthen relationships between associations and communities.

Improve the effectiveness of associations by encouraging and consolidating confidence between communities and their members. There are clear benefits to working together that favor dialogue, the generation of knowledge, economies of scale, etc. to create community identity and to manage community projects. It is important to recognize and coordinate national efforts to encourage the participation of young people and women as the foundation of society, as they were the main victims of the armed conflict. Youth are not just the future, but also the country's present. Their sense of belonging is essential for the development of their community and the region.

Increase the work done with households headed by women. Female-led households take advantage of cooperation and state help. Their vulnerabilities may require different solutions, such as the provision of childcare or calling meetings during their free time. Those who already participate could serve as guides for other women and encourage their participation.

Continue to reinforce the JACs. Create multiple mechanisms for strengthening the role of the JACs, such as conflict resolution agents, managers of community radio stations, proponents of oversight and follow-up processes, etc. The main evaluation report recommends adapting the Organizational Competencies Index – Evaluation of the Organizational Status (ICO-VEO in Spanish) for the JACs and making the results public to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of their communities.

INTRODUCTION

Background

According to the National Consolidation Plan (PNC in Spanish), which became the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT in Spanish) in 2011, the concept of “Consolidation” refers to an expansion of the state’s legitimate presence into conflict regions within Colombia. The Colombian government will design policies once the minimum security conditions are established in order to generate the necessary institutional capacities to protect people’s fundamental rights in the territories that have historically been affected by armed conflict and illegal crops. It will be oriented towards establishing presence of state institutions that are capable of effectively providing the public services needed for development.

The policy conceives of social, economic and institutional consolidation and social reconstruction as the result of a process of mobilization and continual strengthening of three pillars: (1) the territorial institutionalization of state institutions focused on guaranteeing security and creating the necessary capacities to institutionally manage the area; (2) the strengthening of citizen participation; and (3) the fostering of regional integration.² The interaction of these three pillars on a base of territorial security, combined with coordinated collaboration with state entities, would be the path to guarantee the fundamental rights of the citizenry.

The U.S. Embassy, for its part, developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and at the reduction of illicit crops and the presence of illegal armed groups in conflict zones. It included significant investments in security, antinarcotics, access to justice, and eradication activities:

USAID is already coordinating closely with other Embassy entities, including the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), the Military Group, and the Department of Justice as well as the Political and Economic sections of the State Department to develop an integrated USG approach for the priority CSDI consolidation zones. Programs will include peace and security, illicit crop eradication, access to justice, justice sector reform and humanitarian and development interventions targeted at a wide range of populations.³

The multi-faceted nature of security and development problems required a coordinated response. The joint CSDI activities were designed to address the multiple challenges remaining across consolidation zones, including continued presence of armed groups and the illicit narcotics trade, enduring poverty, and the lack of rule of law. Working with the GOC and PNCRT, the goal of uniting USG agencies toward consolidation was:

²http://www consolidacion.gov.co/themes/danland/descargas/entidad/planeacion/POLITICA_NACIONAL_DE_CONSOLIDACION_Y_RECONSTRUCCION_TERRITORIAL_PNCRT.pdf

³ USAID Colombia Solicitud de Aplicaciones Número 514-09-000005, “Montes de María – Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative;” Septiembre 15 de 2009, p. 5.

To reach a “tipping point” where state presence and positive perception of the government is sufficiently well-established so that communities decide to align with their government rather than illegal armed groups and the coca industry.⁴

USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) as one of the CSDI components and as the backbone of the integrated plan to bolster the PNCRT by supporting efforts to consolidate the state’s institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in the production of illegal crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.

The basic premise of the CELIs is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of the state, and their activities are oriented to strengthening state institutions, generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life. The CELIs are no substitute for the state. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice services in the consolidation zones is a *sine qua non* condition for enabling the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation.

The CELIs, or *Colombia Responde* as the projects are known in the implementation zones, supported the GOC through three pillars that are similar (though not identical) to those of the PNCRT:

Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their CELI peers

	PNCRT pillar	CELI pillar	CELI pillars defined as:
1	Territorial institutionalization	Strengthening institutional development	Improving local government response; formalizing property rights; processing cases of victims’ property rights; implementing a rural development strategy
2	Citizen participation and good government	Strengthening social development	Strengthening civil society organizations (CSOs); promoting alliances between the community and the state
3	Regional integration	Catalyzing economic development	Implementation of rural development programs and improving competitiveness

With this shared mandate and the assumption of the GOC’s leadership role, the CELIs developed strategies for institutional, social and economic development in four of the seven corridors where the policy was implemented: 1) Montes de María, in the departments of Bolívar and Sucre; 2) the Southern Corridor in the municipality of Tumaco in the department of Nariño; 3) the Central Corridor in Meta, southern Tolima, and the Valle del Cauca as far as Buenaventura; and 4) the Northern Corridor in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia and southern Córdoba.

Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics International, implements the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, Tetra Tech ARD, implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca,

⁴ Ibid.

Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (Mdm) project.

Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: *Civilian government present in CSDI zones consolidated*, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation – strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS for 2014-2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, *Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*.

CELI investments target Intermediate Results supporting Development Objective 3 and have much in common with their original results framework in spite of the shift toward economic activities. The current framework, tied to the CELIs’ common Performance Management Plan (PMP), prioritizes the following:

IR 3.1 More equitable and secure land tenure Sub IR 3.1.1 Land restituted to displaced victims of conflict
IR 3.2 Increased private and public investment in the rural sector Sub IR 3.2.1 Strengthened local governments’ capacity to access and manage public funds for productive infrastructure Sub IR 3.2.2 Increase private sector investment in target rural communities
IR 3.3 More effective producer associations benefitting smallholder farmers Sub IR 3.3.1 Improve institutional capacity to producer associations

In 2011-2012 USAID/Colombia called upon its monitoring and evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., to design an impact evaluation of the set of CSDI interventions and collect the baseline survey data. DevTech worked with Econometría, S.A., to carry out this work.⁵ The design included two subsequent measurements: a midterm after two years of program implementation, and a final evaluation following completion of the program.

EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), has been charged with carrying out the midterm measurement and reporting on CELI impacts to date. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline evaluation design, program satisfaction questions for participants, additional qualitative fieldwork and in-depth interviews with the CELI teams. The evaluation design included the collection of data in seven corridors in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities.

The midline examined changes since baseline across institutional, social and economic indicators and established three guiding principles for their use:

Measure the change in impact indicators and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their goals with target populations.

Inform decision-making processes with timely data to identify components needing strengthening to achieve program goals.

⁵ DevTech Systems, Inc. and Econometría S.A. 2013. “Impact Evaluation Methodology of the USAID Strategy in CSDI Zones - Final Methodology Report.”

Identify best practices and lessons learned to date to inform future USAID programming.

The impact evaluation was originally linked to the full range of interventions within the CSDI framework. Unfortunately, funding for the other programming was curtailed, leaving the CELIs alone as only one component of the full strategy. Given this, it should not be expected that an impact evaluation designed for the larger initiative would detect results of aspects of the CSDI strategy that were never carried out.

This document reports on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for evaluating the CELI midline in the Central Region, executed in 13 municipalities with PNCRT and CELI Central interventions. Chaparral, Rioblanco, Planadas and Ataco in the Department of Tolima; Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, San Juan de Arama, Uribe and La Macarena in the Department of Meta and La Montañita, and Cartagena del Chaira and San Vicente del Caguán in the Department of Caquetá. These municipalities have common problems related to security, coca production, poverty, and displacement, which means significant challenges in institutional approaches and development.

Note that the results of this evaluation are also given for the cluster level, i.e., for individual municipalities or small groups of municipalities that are geographically or socio-economically similar and that the results of their analysis often differ from the results of the regional analysis. This is why studying them to get more focused information is important.

Each of the clusters in the Central region and their control municipalities are listed in the following figure. Throughout the document, the analysis of the variables will be done by cluster, and the clusters will be identified by cluster number.

Figure 2.2. Central Region, clusters and control municipalities

Cluster	Treated Municipalities	Control Municipality
16	Chaparral, Rioblanco (Tolima)	San Antonio (Tolima)
17	Planadas (Tolima)	Ortega (Tolima)
18	Ataco (Tolima)	Balboa (Cauca)
24	Vistahermosa (Meta)	Mapiripán (Meta)
25	Puerto Rico (Meta)	Orito (Putumayo)
26	Mesetas, San Juan de Arama (Meta)	San José del Fragua (Caquetá)
27	La Uribe, La Macarena (Meta)	Puerto Caicedo (Putumayo)
28	Montañita, Cartagena del Chaira, San Vicente del Caguan (Caquetá)	Lejanías (Meta)

How to read this report

An impact evaluation is a powerful tool but also includes important challenges and differences from other evaluation research.⁶ It is important to understand the different types of findings an evaluation like this generates and how they should be interpreted.

Four types of findings. The report has four types of findings, shown in figures and text in the report. Each figure starts with one of these words.

Impacts. These come from the survey and compare treated and control groups on key outcomes of interest. Impact is read as the percentage point (pp) difference between baseline and midline *that is attributable to the intervention*. Data tables show statistical significance with asterisks (*).

Trends. These come from the survey and show change over time, without comparison to controls. Trends are shown in graphics, not tables. In the text we use the percent sign (%) and absolute values.

CELI performance. These data come from the CELIs and they track CELI performance indicators.

Secondary data. These data come from other sources like government figures and indices, and they help to describe the context in which CELI interventions operate.

Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report

Table title:	
Impacts	PP
Trends	%
Secondary data	Se
CELI performance	C

Whole sample and four sub-samples. The whole sample survey is approx. 19,000 households, divided into four sub-samples. These are respondents from: CELI municipalities, their controls, PNCRT municipalities and their controls. Sometimes we refer to the “*full sample*,” when results are similar across all 19,000 households.

Direct and indirect beneficiaries. Due to design challenges (see the Limitations section, below), households that were supposed to be direct beneficiaries at baseline did not always receive CELI interventions. As a result, this evaluation report looks at all residents of *veredas* in treated municipalities as indirect beneficiaries. There is one exception, and that is in the economic development chapter, where we have been able to identify a population of direct CELI participants, and track their progress.

Methodology and design

EVAl, with the support of its strategic partner, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) used a mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each

⁶ Please see Design section at the end of the Executive Summary, Limitations there and in the main report, and Annex 3 for details.

CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development and civil society, government and institutionalization and security as a result of the CELI interventions. The design followed the baseline design from 2012-2013 very closely, with additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, experiences and opinions among treatment (CELI and PNCRT) and control groups. Full design considerations can be found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact.

Evaluation questions

The baseline identified the evaluation questions in 2011, and have been slightly adjusted (per USAID; please see Annex 2 of the main report for the SOW) and are presented below.

Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions

QUESTION	STRATEGIC LEVEL
What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target population in the areas of interventions?	IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the consolidation process?	Cross-cutting
Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities? ⁷	IR 3.2
What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)	Sub-IR 3.2.1
What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?	IR 3.3
How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities?	Cross-cutting
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?	Sub-IR 3.2.1
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?	IR 3.2 IR 3.3

These questions serve both impact (1, 4-8) and performance evaluation (2, 3) goals, and the evaluation reflects this blended purpose with a mixed methods design (please see section on Methodology and its detailed annex in the main report for full details.) The interdisciplinary team used data from the quantitative household survey (in a quasi-experimental pre-post design) and a range of qualitative instruments, secondary data research and multi-faceted analyses to answer the questions in this report. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation.

Quantitative methods

The impact evaluation design included a quantitative survey of households in Consolidation municipalities, both with and without CELI interventions, with these data collected between July 20 and November 30, 2015. Control municipalities were selected using an advanced matching

⁷ This is answered in Annex 6 to the main report with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.

protocol, described in detail in the annexes to the original baseline report.⁸ The original design included an oversample of 12% for each follow-on survey, to allow for attrition. In the field, the midline evaluation, following a panel design, revisited the same households in order to ensure comparability, and lost approximately 15% of the sample to attrition. Within CELI municipalities, not all *veredas* had CELI interventions, and this was reflected in the sample.

The baseline was done at different points over a two-year period. The time of the midline evaluation was planned to match the increase in data captured at baseline and to prepare a seasonal timeline for the final evaluation. In the same discussion, it was determined that the midline evaluation would be more useful if it were done closer to the decision-making moment for new programming. Therefore, gathering the data for the midline evaluation was done between July 20, 2015 and November 30, 2015. It is important to note that local elections (for mayors and governors) were held on October 25, 2015. It is possible that the politicized atmosphere and environment affected the opinions of the respondents in both the treatment and control zones.

The survey instrument (Annex 8 to the main report) includes modules on demographics, justice and security, licit and illicit economic opportunities and performance, government legitimacy, social capital and participation in grassroots organizations, electoral behavior, social and public services, land rights and ownership, victims' rights, roads, social programs, and opinions about the future and about peace. Several indices are created from the data, including indices of social capital, government performance, and government accountability. In general, the survey measures perceptions (as in the case of security) which are important, but more sensitive to news and recent events. The survey is less adept at capturing actual experiences, in part because most respondents will not have had direct contact with the changes in institutions or security, for example. In this regard, there is subjectivity in the indicators that were designed at the time of the baseline survey.


The evaluation added several new items for the midline on satisfaction with interventions and a short set on victimization from the LAPOP⁹ survey. The survey was administered in person in households, workplaces and, when issues of security prevented deployment to *veredas*, in municipal centers.

The assessment team carried out 4,647 household surveys in the Central Region of which 2,732 of the respondents were men and 1,915 were women. Those interviewed reported a literacy rate of 85%. Half of the respondents, 2,363, self-identified as mestizos and a third self-identified as white, as shown in Figure 2.5.

⁸ From the baseline report: "The survey interviews occurred in two phases, with the first phase providing interviews for 65 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control households between March 27 and July 5, 2012. The second phase, providing the remaining 35 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control interviews, plus 100 percent of the direct beneficiary interviews, occurred between November 7, 2012, and May 25, 2013, with a break for the Christmas and New Year holidays." *Impact Evaluation of USAID's Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report. Volume 1: Summary of findings*. June 30, 2013.

⁹ The Latin American Public Opinion Survey (<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/>), which has been implemented throughout Latin America by a team at Vanderbilt University for the past three decades.

Figure 2.5. Central sample by ethnicity (self-identified)



Around 86% of those surveyed in the Central Region live in scattered rural settlements, 10% in population centers that are not municipal capitals, and only 4% in municipal capitals. Approximately a third (34%) had heard of *Colombia Responde's* activities in their municipalities.

A slightly higher percentage of men (38%) than of women (29%) had heard of *Colombia Responde's* work. It should also be noted that the people surveyed were very optimistic about the future since a large majority said that they expected conditions to improve. Women were the most optimistic.

One notable characteristic of the sample is that the municipalities in Cauca were classified as PNCRT instead of CELI municipalities at baseline. However, once the program was implemented, CELI intervened in those municipalities. Nonetheless, for the evaluation, they continue to be categorized as PNCRT, i.e., part of the PNCRT sample. The result is that these municipalities have more positive results in general than those with political intervention but without CELI intervention. Of course, these results are closer to the CELI municipalities.

Other quantitative measures included the examination of key secondary data sources. These came from government sources and the EVIDINCE consortium,¹⁰ which collects quarterly municipality-level data on outcomes of interest, such as police and judicial staff presence, among many others. GOC sources also provided updated data on major crimes including homicides, acts of terrorism, and massacres. The CELI implementing partners also provided data on their achievements to date in their performance management plan (PMP), including such indicators as numbers of organizations and government offices treated, sales of productive project outputs, and leveraged funds.

¹⁰ EVIDINCE is a research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level.

Qualitative methods

The qualitative methods include in-depth interviews with key informants at the national, regional, and local levels in areas with CELI and PNCRT interventions, areas where PNCRT has implemented work without CELI interventions, and in control municipalities. The team carried out structured interviews with officials from municipalities and the Ombudsman's office in 21 sites chosen to capture variations between CELI and PNCRT interventions and their control zones. Vistahermosa, Lejanías and La Macarena in Meta; La Montañita in Caquetá; and Chaparral, Ortega and Coyaima in southern Tolima were visited in the Central Region. The data and reports on the case studies of southern Tolima and La Macarena were also consulted to develop this report.

Furthermore, leaders of civil society organizations (OSC in Spanish) and producer associations were interviewed and parallel subjects were covered through focus groups. Those participating in the focus groups were citizens from the CELI and PNCRT areas, some of whom participated in the interventions. The quantitative and qualitative data often have different results since the quantitative sample is representative of the “average population” while the qualitative respondents were selected due to their higher levels of community participation or participation in CELI.

Qualitative data were analyzed in Atlas.ti using thematic coding that mirrored the evaluation questions and allowed for emergent codes to cover issues not foreseen in the evaluation design. These codes were correlated to understand coincidence and patterns of importance to the evaluation's response to the research questions.

Limitations

The evaluation design followed in this study has certain limitations. These are grouped and discussed below, and a more detailed discussion can be found in Annex 3: Methodology.

Factors related to the evaluation design

The CELIs were to be evaluated as part of a much larger and more comprehensive effort that failed to materialize. The outcomes of interest are at a high level of generality in the Results Framework of USAID's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), relative to the investment, the interventions, and the duration of implementation to date. The evaluation was created to assess a set of programs, formerly called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), with broader funding and goals than the current set of interventions. CSDI included a whole-of-government approach from both the U.S. and Colombian governments – anti-narcotics, security and justice, regional and local institutions, economic development, regional integration and roads, and civil society interventions, across the same geographic intervention area. The Initiative as a whole dwindled to comprise only the Colombia Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative, run by USAID, with significant funding but without the wider approach initially envisioned. As a result, the impact evaluation design includes several indicator sets for which few or no targeted interventions were completed. No impacts can be detected for programs that no longer exist.

For CSDI to have produced detectable effects would have been an enormous feat; for the CELIs to do it without the other CSDI interventions, including the interventions promised by the GOC, was far too much to expect. As a result, impacts found by the evaluation as measured by rigorous statistical techniques are few and mostly at the local level with particular direct interventions with producer associations.

Selecting the panel of respondents at baseline was a challenge, resulting in discrepancies in the list of “direct beneficiaries” at midline. A further limitation in terms of determining and attributing impact involves the panel design of the baseline, followed closely at midline. Baseline data collection was carried out over 18 months, crossing various growing seasons and the three different starting dates of the CELIs. In order to respond to the baseline team’s request for lists of direct beneficiaries, CELI Central approached local leaders and called for meetings of potential local participants, who signed attendance lists. CELI N/S, which was already in progress, provided lists of those who were participating in their interventions at that time. These lists served as the sampling frames for the treatment sites, but they created a problem: attendees knew they would receive a program, thus violating the basic assumption of an impact evaluation baseline that *the intervention has not yet begun*. Knowing about the future benefit changes the population’s perceptions, perspectives, decisions and expectations. To some extent, the changes begin to appear from the time of the meeting invitation, and such changes can no longer be observed when the baseline information is collected, so we do not know how this knowledge may have changed their responses, but the relevant literature suggests a social desirability bias in which respondents who think they are to receive some benefit will respond more positively, in an attempt to be amenable to researchers – who they may presume to be involved with the intervention. This makes it very difficult to detect small effects on certain variables, since the baseline measurement has already incorporated, or lost, such effects.

The midline evaluation found that some baseline respondents originally identified as direct beneficiaries did not participate (or did not recall or report participating) in CELI interventions. There were significant discrepancies between people who were classified as direct beneficiaries at baseline and the people who eventually participated in CELI programming. The evaluation team therefore recognized three definitions of “direct beneficiaries”: (1) direct beneficiaries per the baseline evaluation design (4,426 households); (2) respondents who answered a survey question about receiving an intervention from *Colombia Responde*, as the program was known in the field (2,198 households); and (3) direct beneficiaries from the baseline who are on the CELIs’ own participant lists (2,015).

Random households in the municipalities were then selected as indirect beneficiaries, to complement the sample and to represent the wide-ranging set of indicators that the CSDI was to have impacted, such as economic integration through roads and markets, security and justice, and increasing and improving government presence.

None of the three “direct beneficiary” definitions provides a sufficiently reliable gauge of participation and, as a result, for analysis of the more diffusely applied components of CELI activities in governance, infrastructure support and social development, the indirect and direct beneficiaries of the baseline were combined into one group of beneficiaries. However, for certain activities, especially with respect to participation in producers’ associations and other economically focused interventions, analysis was conducted on a separate “direct beneficiaries” subgrouping based on the three definitions just specified. When taken together, with no double counting (that is, counting a household only once, for example, when a participant fulfills more than one of the definitions such as by appearing on the original list and by responding “yes” to the survey question on *Colombia Responde* participation), there are 5,445 unique respondents among the three definitions. The evaluation uses this larger group to examine economic impacts on

participants, which represents a more rigorous standard. Where impacts are found on this group, they are generally much more positive than the rest of the citizen population.

The qualitative team's experience in the field conducting focus groups helps to understand why so few of those identified as direct beneficiaries actually reported being participants. The first and key questions in the focus groups were regarding participation in *Colombia Responde* activities, and few focus group participants said they had participated. The reasons for the problems with the *Colombia Responde* name are not precisely known, but the evaluators speculate that the following could have contributed: i) at GOC request, USAID hid its participation under the *Colombia Responde* name so that the beneficiaries would attribute the effects of the program to the GOC; ii) subcontractors have other names, and beneficiaries may have been confused about the identity of the benefactor in the first instance; iii) the results may suffer from recall bias, since the baseline was established between 2012 and 2013, and certain benefits ended a long time ago; and iv) a combination of these and other factors that are unobservable.

The category of indirect beneficiaries is imprecise, and capturing impacts at that diffuse level will take more investment and more time. Several categories of CELI and PNCRT interventions – essential though they may be – are likely to be invisible to average respondents, and do not reach a minimum treatment threshold, for one of two main reasons. First, some public goods affect few residents of a given area, like the strengthening of justice services or work with municipalities or *personerías*, or some social or productive infrastructure projects. Internationally, only an average 6% of a given population ever accesses justice services in their lifetime, and only a fraction of that figure do so in a given year. Detecting perceptions of change among this “fraction of a fraction” is therefore very difficult. Second, as discussed above, the CELI programming had important goals and benchmarks across the pillars of social, economic and institutional development – such that the significant funding is fragmented across geographic sites and pillars. While a member of a treated productive association or civil society group knows well that they have benefited from an intervention, the “indirect” beneficiary is indeed very distant from the benefits. Their inclusion in the sample dilutes the impacts that can be detected by the evaluation design.

Had the robust set of CSDI and GOC whole-of-government interventions continued as planned, perhaps more impacts in these higher-order indicators would have been detected. As it stands, however, the “dose” of intervention is a fraction of what was planned, in far fewer sectors, and at great distance from the beneficiaries, particularly the indirect beneficiaries.

Factors outside the control of the interventions

Local contexts and the absence of public entities condition the effectiveness of the CELIs.

The intervention municipalities are historically economically isolated, with stagnant local markets, very limited road connectivity, armed illegal group activity, minimal (and sometimes corrupt) government institutions, and deep intergenerational poverty. The households in these zones have limited access to land – in terms of either size or low productivity – and a deficit of human capital (education, health, nutrition, as shown in baseline statistics on education coverage, perceptions of service quality, and food security challenges).¹¹ The main consequence is low productivity and income from land and work, which are rural families' two main factors of production. This

¹¹ See, for example, Impact Evaluation of USAID's Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report Volume 1: Summary of Findings – All PNCRT Zones pp 30 and 42-43; Volume 2 p. 47-50 and 69-70; plus the regional baseline reports.

constrains households in a logic of poverty perpetuation – the trap – in which poverty is reproduced as a consequence of low savings capacity, which prevents changing the initial amounts of capital, land and work. The cycles are reproduced in the short term, limiting the capacity to change the initial situation, and in the long term, limiting changes in the welfare of the next generation: young people cannot find opportunities and are pressured into migrating or joining illegal armed groups. In this context – and others related to unemployment and informality – violence, in its different forms, reinforces poverty traps.

The other face of this poverty trap context is communal: the municipalities lack access to roads, political representation and market formation. Weak political representation often dilutes attention by the central or departmental government, such that the investment in roads is insufficient to develop markets in which small farmers can sell their products above production and transportation costs. As such, poverty is not only individual: it is poverty at a municipal level that encompasses the collective. There is an evident absence of public goods that are essential for the development of communities and entire regions. The capacity of rural interventions to generate significant effects on economic and social development is closely linked to land tenancy and property rights. However, the State’s policy has had little success on this front, and the CELIs faced the same – or worse – institutional roadblocks.

Exogenous contextual factors cannot be excluded. Among exogenous factors,¹² it is important to mention the inflation caused by the global economic slowdown and the sharp drop in oil prices, resulting in recession in economic activities associated with extraction. These effects occurred at the moment that beneficiaries’ perceptions of the performance of the CELIs and the PNCRT were sought.

The CELIs’ relationship with the Consolidation Unit was not uniformly strong, based on political and other factors. The Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial (UACT) was a newly created government body as the CELIs began, which benefited from CELI support for opening regional offices and for staff capacity building. The Unit had the function of coordinating government agencies to deliver the state’s programs to the consolidation zones. One of the great difficulties it faced in realizing this task was its lower (or at best equal) status within the government hierarchy with respect to those entities responsible for those state programs, which presented challenges for the CELIs as well. The national level and regional level offices were also not always in sync according to some stakeholders, and one CELI COR reported better and more collaborative relationships at the regional than at the national level.

The UACT faced great obstacles in successfully carrying out its role in the territories, including limited budgets for meeting needs in a complex geographic area with deep social, economic and institutional challenges. It was in the context of these conflicts and complexities that the CELIs had to coordinate their tasks with the national-level GOC (although, as noted, regional and local contacts were reportedly much more operational). The UACT was finally merged with the Social Prosperity Department (DPS, for its Spanish initials) in December of 2015 because of the termination of the National Policy of Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT for its

¹² The role of the control municipalities is to ensure that exogenous factors do not bias results. Under perfect conditions, exogenous factors apply to both types of municipalities, so in principle these factors would “cancel out.” However, no quasi-experimental design is never perfect, and as a result, the evaluation uses control co-variables and clusters in order to minimize possible biases.

Spanish acronym). Afterwards, the CELIs in essence lost their counterpart at this midpoint in their programming. Nevertheless, the CELIs continue working to articulate their efforts with responsible institutions.

Factors related to implementation

The selection process for *veredas* in which to work faced challenges that could affect the evaluation results. The selection of *veredas* is a crucial foundation for implementation and for evaluation. The selection of municipalities and *veredas* in which the work is ultimately performed has substantial effects on the results of the strategy – and, therefore, on the impacts measured. Implementing partners are guided in selection by USAID and GOC preferences, and the baseline team for this quasi-experimental design followed up by employing a municipality matching system. Such systems, while imperfect, allow for the modeling of a robust counterfactual – what would have happened in municipalities that did not receive the interventions.

At least at the outset of the programs, the selection of *veredas* depended on the “stoplight” methodology, which relied on Colombia’s military for impartial classification of the danger of each *vereda* where the CELIs might potentially intervene. Stakeholders in USAID and the CELIs eventually sought a way out of this requirement, as they found the system highly politicized and, at times, the stoplight decision unjustified. Over time, the CELIs’ contracts were amended to allow implementers to amplify their reach to *veredas* in which local dynamics suggested potential positive relations – such as a shared productive project. In this way the CELIs could serve communities that were divided administratively but shared common agricultural goals and could expand to *veredas* that they themselves had established as safe for project activities.

One hypothesis generated during the evaluation was that the *vereda* selection – guided by the “traffic light” methodology – tended toward the *veredas* closest to the municipal centers, with greater access, more resources, greater associativity, and greater social capital, etc., while the problems of illicit crops and armed groups were extended in more remote and dispersed geographic areas. In general, it can be asserted that the poorer the population, the greater the impacts of an intervention of this type. Thus, focusing on what was easiest operationally may have been counterproductive in terms of impact.

REGIONAL CONTEXT

The objective of the Consolidation was to establish and reinforce the state institutions in the territory, economically integrate the regions, and build social fabric in the zones affected by Colombia’s armed conflict on the foundation of positive security results that can be attributed to Colombia’s armed forces. The CELI interventions supported consolidation, but not the full initiative. Other elements designed to accomplish this objective turned out to be less than expected. Security improvements are important but not absolute. Regional economic integration is promising but incomplete – institutional presence and good governance are still limited, especially in rural areas. The set of conditions that fed the armed conflict and the illegal groups has improved, but the regional context indicators do not show an ideal environment within which CELI can meet its objectives.

Consolidation Index

The Consolidation Index is a tool designed to measure and monitor the municipalities’ progress in the Consolidation process. This index is built on the basis of a set of 37 indicators in three PNCRT pillars each of which has several components as shown in Figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1. Index of the consolidation pillars and their components

PNCRT Pillar	Components
1 Territorial institutionalization	Security, justice, property rights, and human rights
2 Citizens’ participation and good government	Good government, citizen participation, and social capital
3 Regional integration	Connectedness, social services, and economic growth

Each pillar constitutes a third of the final score on a scale of 0 to 100. Since 2011, data from the Consolidation Index have been compiled for each Consolidation municipality together with information from a set of comparison municipalities. The scores are broken down by pillar or by the indicators in each pillar: time, geography (municipality, department, and region), and type of service.


The thirteen Consolidation municipalities measured by the Index and subject to evaluation are the following:

Figure 3.2. Departments and Municipalities in CELI Central analyzed by the Consolidation Index

Caquetá	Meta	Tolima
Cartagena del Chairá	La Macarena	Ataco
La Montañita	Mesetas	Chaparral
San Vicente del Caguán	Puerto Rico	Planadas
	San Juan de Arama	Rioblanco
	Uribe	
	Vistahermosa	

The trend in the ratings for each one of these regions from 2011 to 2014 has generally been positive, i.e., their progress towards Consolidation is incremental even when none of them has yet reached the category of consolidated municipality (or region) as shown in Figure 3.3:

Figure 3.3. Secondary data: The General Consolidation Index score per department



When the departmental review of the Index is done by pillar, the three regions coincide in that Pillar 3 (Regional Integration) has the highest scores, significantly bolstering the Index’s rating. Meanwhile, the Territorial Institutionalization Pillar has the lowest score in Caquetá and Meta while, in Tolima, the Good Government Pillar is the weakest.

The Index of Consolidation is made up of indicators, each of which has strengths, weaknesses, and particular viewpoints that should be taken into account when making comparisons between the scores and the data obtained through the evaluation.

First, the indicators contained in the Index correspond, in general, to data related to government perspectives. In many cases, they are reported by government officials at the municipal, departmental, and national levels, and differ from the opinions offered by citizens on the same issues surveyed (security, institutional structure, etc.). None is more “correct” than the other, nor are they precisely comparable. The decisions made based on one or another of the cases affect the results: on the one hand, the index takes the data from the main population centers as the basis for many of its indicators. In many cases, these data have been reported by government officials and, in other cases, by citizens, such as transportation companies that report on road conditions. By contrast, the index uses data from the survey sample, which includes 90% of the dispersed rural population, 8% of the population in towns other than the municipal capital, and 2% of those in the municipal capital.

Second, the scores of many indicators are weighted in order to be compared to those of municipalities that have similar socioeconomic conditions. As a result, high scores are registered even when the absolute scores are among the worst in the country. For example, the Open Government indicator (figures from the GOC Open Government Index) shows that the Index score for Tolima in 2014 was 59.5. However, this figure is adjusted to 90.8 due to the effects of the comparison to similar municipalities. This is not a flaw in the Index. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the fact that the scores are modified this way before they are added.

Background

This region is made up of municipalities from three departments that have different economic contexts but common social situations: their territory is basically rural, they have suffered

considerable levels of poverty, they were initially settled by Amerindian communities and have been gradually populated by settlers in search of wealth and development, they are survivors of periods of violence and displacement, they were recognized as municipalities in the mid-20th century which means that their institutional development is recent, and they have worked with illicit crops and neglected the production of other crops. As a consequence, they have suffered from the presence of IAGs, especially the FARC. In isolated cases, paramilitary groups have also migrated there to defend the cultivation of illicit crops in the region. To summarize, everyone has suffered from the social-political conflict and problems with law and order.

The municipalities of Ataco, Chaparral, Planadas, and Rioblanco are located in the southern part of the Department of Tolima. The municipality of Chaparral includes a considerable percentage of the total citizens in the area of interest (41%) and is considered the southern capital as well as the number three city in Tolima in terms of population and economic activity. In general terms, the drug lords in this area built themselves up by buying and appropriating land that had been devalued by the presence of the guerrilla groups and ensured their productivity through their own armed forces. The contra-guerrilla self-defense groups grew in the poppy-growing areas, especially in Rioblanco and Planadas.

In response, various programs have been in operation since 1982 seeking to strengthen the state's presence through different mechanisms that give priority to participation linked to investment. As of 2014 in the area of economics, "the four municipalities in southern Tolima have a number of important organizations connected to coffee and supported by the CELI *Central-Colombia Responde* program: Ataco has 8, Chaparral has 3, Planadas has 3, and Rioblanco has 6." This agricultural activity is supplemented by plantain, yucca, corn, sugarcane, fruit trees, and other crops of limited production. Animal husbandry is another economically important item.

The municipalities of La Montañita, Cartagena del Chairá, and San Vicente del Caguán, in turn, are located in the north central part of the Department of Caquetá. The municipality of La Montañita is rich in water and fish. Nevertheless, its economy is based on semi-extensive animal husbandry in which they breed, raise, and fatten animals for two purposes: milk and meat. They also cultivate rubber and cacao. Corn, rice, sugarcane, plantain, yucca, coffee and fruit are cultivated for their own consumption.

The municipality of Cartagena del Chairá has an economy that is basically dependent on illicit crops, but also includes the rubber business and agricultural products – corn, yucca, plantain, rubber, cacao, and tropical fruit – as well as animal husbandry and leather-working. One recognized attraction is the Chairá lagoon where there is an abundance of orchids.

San Vicente del Caguán is one of the largest municipalities (28,300 sq. km. of which 10,703 sq. km. are in the area the departments of Meta and Guaviare are disputing over). The Amazonian Forest Reserve covers 25% of its territory. Its economy is concentrated in animal husbandry, aquaculture production, and exotic fruits such as arazá, cocona, copoazú, and maraco.

Last of all, the municipalities of Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, San Juan de Arama, Uribe, and La Macarena are located in the center of the Department of Meta. Like the rest of the departments, agriculture in these municipalities is concentrated in plantain, yucca, corn, fruit, sugarcane, and citrus crops, with variations of rubber, cacao, and hibiscus flowers. Cattle, pig, poultry, and fish farming are also typical. Petroleum has been a very important item for the region's

economy but, since it is an enclave economy, it does not generate better living conditions for the citizens. These municipalities were benefited by the Presidential program “La Macarena Comprehensive Consolidation Plan - PCIM” which sought to improve conditions in the Sierra de La Macarena’s area of influence.

Security

The security component on the Consolidation Index includes the following indicators: police operations that do not involve the military, implementation of a public security plan, terrorist and subversive acts, and density and changes in coca production.

In Tolima, subversive and terrorist acts have shown a declining trend over time. Data on police operations and coca cultivation are not presented.


The density of coca cultivation in Caquetá has recently experienced a significant rise. The department is implementing a plan for citizen security. However, with regard to security in the territory, subversive actions are on the rise.

The data do not show acts of terrorism in Meta but there are still subversive acts. Just as in the case of Caquetá, there is a public security plan, but it is not being implemented. The density of coca cultivation has increased.

It is likely that the data from 2015 (when completed and made official) will show a significant deterioration in these indicators and the rise in the production of coca will become clearer (it has already been published by various media outlets). Based on different sources, the amount of land dedicated to coca cultivation in Colombia has doubled since 2013.

According to the results obtained in CELI Central, the perception in the *veredas* or townships indicates that security has gotten worse with respect to the baseline (dropping from 57% to 55%) in spite of a little progress over the last two years (which went from 32% to 37%). No impact attributable to CELI can be seen. (Figure 3.4)

Figure 3.4. Trends in the perception of security



Source: CELI baseline and midline evaluations; authors’ calculations

Although impacts attributed to CELI cannot be found in these aspects from the regional point of view, the differences are evident when the analysis is done by cluster, as seen in the statistical results in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5. Impacts on the perception of security

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Security in the <i>vereda</i> / township has improved in the last two years.	-0.0363	-0.0351	0.0162	-0.0716	-0.0267	-0.105*	-0.0335	0.0763
You would advise a relative to return to the <i>vereda</i>	0.193.	-0.109**	-0.0024	-0.10**	-0.23***	-0.232***	-0.0492	0.0484

The respondents from Cluster 16 had a positive impact of 19pp in their readiness to invite a family member to return to the *vereda*, but four other clusters had a negative impact on the same indicator. No cluster reported a level of improvement in security that would reach the level of an impact, but in absolute terms, five clusters reported some progress between baseline and midline.

The things that are affecting security the most are those that can be attributed to delinquency, IAGs, landmines, and extortion. Nevertheless, there is a generalized trend of a declining perception of insecurity which is consistent with the data from the rest of the country (see main report for details). An increase in forced recruitment (going from 1% to 2%) as a cause of insecurity in the region is the only notable exception to the increased perception that there are no serious security problems in the *vereda*, which increased from 60% to 62%.

In terms of impact, the data show that CELI had a direct effect on the results with respect to reducing homicides (6pp) and placing landmines (7pp). The trends are shown in the following figure:

Figure 3.6. Trends in the perception of crimes

	CELI Baseline	CELI Midline
Homicides	12%	5%
Illegal armed groups	36%	10%
Landmines	17%	5%
Displacement	9%	5%
Kidnapping or forced disappearance	5%	3%
Extortion	14%	8%
Lack of public security (theft, muggings, etc.)	65%	26%
Forced recruitment	1%	2%
Sexual violence	2%	2%

To understand their views on security, the respondents were asked about a variety of crimes. In general, those surveyed in the Central region saw a lower frequency of crimes in absolute terms in comparison to the baseline. However, if the control regions are reviewed, some crimes appeared in the CELI regions more frequently, implying that there was some impact, as shown in Figure 3.7. It is important to note that in this table, a positive figure indicates an increase in the crime, while a negative figure indicates a decrease in the perception of that crime.


Figure 3.7. Impacts on the perception of crimes

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Homicides	0.104**	0.0794**	0.0498	-0.00386	0.000678	-0.0693**	-0.0970*	0.0795*
Illegal armed groups	0.0396	0.236***	0.0408	0.0267	0.239***	-0.0319	0.232***	-0.193***
Landmines	-0.0135	0.0689***	-0.0675***	0.186***	0.0973**	0.0255	0.0652	0.0510
Displacement	-0.00026	-0.0206	-0.0780*	-0.0113	0.0554	-0.0161	-0.0727	-0.101***
Kidnapping or forced disappearance	0.0110	-0.0417*	-0.00347	-0.00772	0.126***	0.0326	-0.0686**	0.0498*
Extortion	0.0373	-0.0275	-0.0140	0.224***	0.0323	0.0547	-0.0486	-0.0105
Lack of public security (theft, muggings)	-0.0937	0.00425	0.0146	0.0148	-0.264***	-0.0725	-0.580***	0.0428
Forced recruitment	-0.0186	-0.00238	0.0382**	0.00500	0.0168	0.0229	0.0292	-0.0116
Sexual violence	-0.00352	0.0557**	0.107***	-0.0168	0.0205	0.00110	-0.0495**	-0.0192

Each one of the clusters has a different pattern in their perception of crime and, in absolute terms, there are some crimes, such as extortion, that were seen as having increased according to perceptions in some clusters (see the descriptive statistics in Appendix 2 for more details). There were statistically significant increases in four categories of crimes in Cluster 17 and in three categories in Cluster 25. In Cluster 27, the perception of delinquency had the most statistically significant decline.

According to reports, progress on security at the regional level is in line with progress in the view of security services provided by the state through the police (increasing from 26% to 34%). However, there is a notable decline (from 81% to 51%) in how the armed forces' security services are seen compared to baseline, as well as a slight reduction in the quality of service. Nevertheless, this is offset by how the service offered in the last two years is perceived, increasing from 34% to 36%. The improvement in the perception of the security services offered by the police and the armed forces is notable with differences of 3pp and 11pp respectively.

Figure 3.8. Trends in the perception of state security services



The positive perception services provided by the police is related to the progress in attention given to calls made by the respondents, which went from 49% unanswered calls reported at baseline to 23% after the intervention, and service rated as "fast" went from 30% to 43%. This increase was substantial in the CELI municipalities, which went from 30% to 43%, compared to the control municipalities, which went from 29% to 25%.

In the information gathered by fieldwork, the communities stated that, in general, the police presence in the region has risen:

Right now security is super good ... everyone thinks that the war is entrenched here and that they kidnap us there and that there, well..., but no; so that's why more than 1,000 tourists have been visiting our municipality; I think that if security wasn't good no one would dare come here. ... there is military [presence] in almost all of the population centers. (Secretary of Government, La Macarena, Meta)

And they report a positive change in the security conditions:

I say that now we live sort of in peace ... We eat our yucca feeling rather content ... the change that has been seen ... there are a lot of police, more than there were previously, a lot more, there is a lot of security ... no one bothers you, everybody goes their own way and does what they have to do, and everyone is just what they are and that's all, and they leave people alone. (Beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima)

At the same time, the focus groups also show that trade is affected by issues related to market access, presence of IAGs, and quality of infrastructure:

We don't feel that the Government has done its job of giving the families of La Macarena a better life, because it doesn't exist. At the moment, there is no stable economy in the municipality. Animal husbandry is the only thing available ... It's not profitable. It only provides subsistence, and we have to transport them to Bogota and ... and sometimes they buy them, sometimes they don't. We have to pay taxes to the guerilla groups. We have to pay taxes to the whole world and, in the end, the one who earns the least is the small farmer. (Producer association, La Macarena, Meta)

Basically I would say that the problem lies in the distances, and that's their excuse to lower the price of milk; that the roads..., that something went wrong with the car, so it is more difficult. (Beneficiary, Vistahermosa, Meta)


Illegal Crops and the Culture of Legality

According to the survey results about the security/presence of illicit crops ratio, CELI Central did not report any changes in the perception (which remains at 7%) of households that reported the presence of illicit crops in their *vereda*.

Like all the municipalities evaluated, those that are part of this region have been characterized by the presence of illicit crops and have been under the influence of illegal armed groups. This has been the target of all interventions intended to establish state presence.

In general, the households surveyed did not perceive illicit crops as a variable that would represent damage to their family economy or social environment. As can be seen in figure 3.9, the question of whether coca negatively affects the families that cultivate it registered a drop of approximately 20%. No significant impact of CELI can be seen in these results. (Figure 3.9)

Figure 3.9. Trends in the perceptions with respect to illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree)



These figures that show the erosion of support for legality are unevenly distributed among the clusters in the Central region. Clusters 24, 27, and 28 showed a positive impact in these responses, meaning that respondents were more likely to agree or strongly agree with statements related to the culture of legality. Clusters 17, 25, and 26 revealed a negative impact. (Figure 3.10)


Figure 3.10. Impacts on attitudes with respect to illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree)

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Coca (poppy plants, marijuana) should not be grown because it is illegal	0.0460	-0.102**	-0.0326	0.0560	-0.117***	-0.183***	0.200***	0.368***
Coca production (poppy, marijuana) affects the families who are cultivating it and the community negatively	0.0766	-0.102**	-0.0577	0.0057	-0.176***	-0.228***	0.269***	0.326***
Cultivating coca is not the only way to guarantee a livelihood for a family that is raising that crop	0.198***	-0.144***	-0.12**	0.0314	-0.190***	-0.202***	0.186***	0.415***
My family and friends think that growing coca is bad	0.0461	-0.0520	0.0089	-0.0535	-0.176***	-0.113**	0.308***	0.267***

Likewise, Clusters 18 and 27 registered a positive impact (13pp and 19pp respectively) on the question of whether they agree that there were no serious security problems in their *veredas*.

Both the CELI and the control municipalities exhibit a lower tendency towards legality (Figure 3.11). On the one hand, the answer indicating that neither the respondent (from 93% to 67%) nor the community (from 75% to 57%) act in accordance with the law increased. On the other, based on the answers, there is a stronger opinion that there are reasons that justify disobeying the law. The respondents in control municipalities showed the same or very similar results.

Figure 3.11. Trends in the inclination towards legality



Based on what was reported in the qualitative information survey, the small farmers tied eradicating their illicit crops to receiving support for sustainable projects. However, the households stated that the producer associations help the small farmers replace illegal crops with legal ones:

[The small farmers] are not refusing to eradicate coca, but are saying: Be careful, government people, because if you don't offer us any sustainable productive projects that are sustainable over time, we can't devote ourselves to them and forget about coca. (Secretariat of Government, La Montaña, Caquetá)


[...] With all the support, not because it's Colombia Responde or the Consolidation Unit, all the rubber and cacao has greatly helped communities to also look at other ways of producing, more than coca, leaving behind that "famous delusion" that without coca we can't do anything and with coca we can make money. Actually, they have already realized that many times well-handled cacao, or well-handled rubber produces much more than coca itself. I have heard that a lot from small farmers. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montaña, Caquetá)

In a post-conflict scenario, it is essential that the state support productive projects, improvement in the use of public services required for development, and reintegration programs for the guerrillas that are eventually demobilized:

Achieving peace is what all Colombians dream of. But ... there is crime ... the state would have to start to strengthen its own programs, the ones it can offer these people, yes, because as long as, or rather it is that people have spent their lives on that, on the war itself, so they don't know what to do, how to get ahead in life, ... I would say, reinforce the projects or companies so that they can provide an entry or the possibility for these people to do something. Also educational reinforcement, because if there is nothing to offer them then we will end up generating general crimes ... not everyone will hire a person who has been demobilized. (Secretariat of Government, La Macarena, Meta)

On the other hand, the improvement in perception that the IAGs affect municipal government performance (going from 5% to 22%) is noteworthy, although 33% perceive the effect to be negative (compared to 43% at baseline). The reason, apparently, is that the presence of these groups forces their activities to be better controlled and the perception of this goes from 68% to 86%. However, the view that the presence of IAGs negatively affects the performance of local governments is mainly justified by the lack of effective access to public information (increasing from 49% to 64%). CELI does not have a significant effect on this phenomenon. (Figure 3.12)

Figure 3.12. Trends in the perception of the effects of the IAGs




Human rights, justice, and the legitimacy of the state

Regarding the violation of human rights, those surveyed indicated that there was a slight rise in the number of violations seen (5% to 8%), and guerrilla groups are seen to be the main party responsible (increasing from 36% to 39%), followed by the armed forces for which, in contrast, the perception has a downward trend (declining from 13% to 12%).

There is a rise in the perception that criminal gangs (Bacrim) are responsible for violations, going from no violation at baseline to 4% at midline. The figure on the lack of response to claims filed against these violations is of concern, despite the progress compared to what was reported at baseline (from 47% to 41%). There was a significant impact on the decline of reported cases of rights violations of up to 6pp. (Figure 3.13)

Figure 3.13. Trends in human rights violations



In the focus groups, citizens state that the challenges are very difficult. In the La Macarena region, the perception of security in relation to the presence of illegal armed groups has improved even though they are still present in the region:


There are still illegal crops... There are people who are still involved in that ... Security goes up and down. The UP, which was exterminated, was here, and there was marijuana. After the UP, the paramilitaries arrived. The guerrilla groups came after the paramilitaries and the demilitarized zone. The demilitarized zone was shut down, but the guerrilla groups and paramilitaries, army, police remained, and

now we have guerrilla groups, paramilitaries ... ordinary criminals extorting the producers, for example, the dairy farmers have been ruined. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)

Well, now there is more confidence because previously one could not even talk to a mayor, with someone, one had to ... What was hidden, the groups did not allow anyone, if one came to speak with the mayor then you were a snitch. But now one can go out. One who needs to can go out and talk to him ... They would not even let us vote. (Beneficiary, Vistahermosa, Meta)

Another factor that affects the security of the region is access to the formal justice system and other mechanisms the state has available. Those who stated that they had filed a complaint before the formal justice system at baseline dropped significantly at the midline assessment, declining from 71% to 37%. Likewise, the perception of formal justice service as good or very good went from 33% to 27%, which certainly gives leeway for groups outside the law to provide their own justice in these regions. (Figure 3.14)

Figure 3.14. Trends in the mechanisms for gaining access to justice




Despite efforts to improve access to the formal justice system, the communities say that although the armed conflict has declined, it has not disappeared. The number of victims continues to grow today:

When the demilitarized zone was emptied here, there was a terrible attack in which 8 or 9 people from the urban area were killed. They were located there. I was not here, but it was terrible because they chased them. They were located and they were killed right there, right in front of their children, their families, I mean in 2001 ... This has diminished. I have helped – what – let's say about 4 families, 5 families who are victims and come from the veredas ... Recently I received one that came from Caquetá. But no, it is not that exaggerated either... that every day, that 20 arrive every day, and there is no way to help them. (Government Secretariat, La Macarena, Meta)

Finally, compared to the baseline, the citizens surveyed perceived the state as less legitimate. This is explained by the difficulty in providing public services and exerting a presence in the region, which is still limited, though better than what it was a few years ago (Figure 3.15). This, of course, reduces the citizens' confidence in the institutions, as was explained in the chapters on institutional and social development.


Figure 3.15. Trends in the legitimacy of the state (agree or very strongly agree)



The justice system figures prominently in the survey, as well as in the Consolidation Index, and, in a third source of data cited in this survey – EVIDINCE’s quarterly municipal data. In the survey, trust in the courts of justice did not receive a good score. As shown in the previous figure, only 10% of those surveyed in this region feel that the courts guarantee a fair trial. The survey measures the perceptions of justice in Colombia while the Consolidation Index reports on the presence of the "judicial apparatus": formal, administrative judicial power, the Ombudsman’s office and the Public Defender’s Office and, where applicable, Amerindian jurisdiction. The resulting scores on the Consolidation Index averaged close to 79 points out of 100 in Caquetá, 86 in Meta, and 91 in Tolima.

The data from EVIDINCE's quarterly panel, which were collected by local people, measure the presence of judges and other officials at their places of work and how well they serve the citizens on a specific day. Figure 3.16 shows the data for all CELI municipalities (T1 in the table), and PNCRT (T2) and their controls (C1 and C2 respectively).

Figure 3.16. Secondary data: Quarterly Data on assistance from authorities



Nota: Índice creado sumando las variables de asistencia en el día de la encuesta de fiscal, juez, procurador y notario en el municipio.

Source: Data from EVIDINCE panel, authors’ calculations

The information on assistance to the public provided by authorities at their place of work shows considerable variation over the three years of data collection. The CELI municipalities showed a steadier growth trend, reaching on average 2.7 functionaries present, of the four functionaries whose activities were reviewed. PNCRT municipalities in the study (where CELI has no interventions) and their controls had more volatile data, and the control municipalities had consistently lower results regarding officials present and their service to the public.

Peace process

CELI implementation occurred during the same time period that the peace negotiations with the FARC were being held in Havana. CELI Central's intervention municipalities have been a FARC stronghold due to its presence and deep cultural roots. In some cases, such as in the municipalities of southern Tolima, this has been a result of their history as the cradle of the FARC. In the case of municipalities in Meta and Caquetá, it is because the demilitarized zone, where the FARC had absolute control, was established there during the government of President Pastrana.

In the context of qualitative research, the respondents in Caguán affirm that they are involved in the peace process, in which the communities were not consulted. They think that they were not considered in the peace negotiations that were recently concluded:

Just as there are many who are convinced [of peace] ... we are not prepared, at all ... because of lack of information for the communities. It is hoped that what happened during the demilitarized zone does not happen again. They came and brought the Public Defender's Office to give a course on human rights and that was all ... They left the communities adrift. You know that at that time they removed the police and the army, the courts, the notary office, everything. There wasn't any Prosecutor's Office so they left the community in the guerrilla group's hands. They are afraid that concentration camps may be set up. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)

These municipalities have historically lived together with the guerrilla groups. Thus, they know that they will have to live with them in the future. They need information on the implementation of the post-conflict process:

Almost everyone has been involved with the guerrilla groups. Now they are complaining – that concentration camps, no – but what if they have a relative there, you understand me. We also have to play our part, but yes, it would be good if the National Government would come and have more direct contact with the community and institutions on the post-conflict subject and give us some preparation. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)

They emphasized the role that the component concerning truth telling must play to achieve true reconciliation:

We want to live in peace and, yes, we must forget the past. But we want them to tell us the truth, that I can know that this one beside me was the one who harmed me. That is what we want to know, so that I can have the ability that God gives one to forgive ... The truth, only the exact truth. (Victims' Association, Vistahermosa, Meta)


CELI INTERVENTIONS IN THE CENTRAL REGION

The CELI interventions included the following components to achieve the results proposed in the framework:

- Provide help for productive activities that concentrate on agricultural value chains (such as technical assistance and training in cultivation, processing, and marketing) and on supporting young people's entrepreneurial initiatives by developing their skills in business and trade.
- Support training in planning, budgets, taxes, royalties, formulating and managing projects, and accountability to strengthen local and regional governments.
- Provide assistance on issues of land ownership for communities and individuals, including formal land titles and private property rights, claims for restitution, regularization of the status of public lands, and dealing with the special rights reserved for ethnic groups.
- Support infrastructure, provide assistance for building social goods (schools, highways, health clinics, improvement in sanitation and electricity), and productive infrastructure (such as improvements in processing plants, stores, and shopping centers).
- Develop social capital and civil society by training and supporting JACs, producer associations, community councils in indigenous and Afro-Colombian areas.
- Provide support for developing credit and financial institutions and programs in the selected areas.

CELI Central has met a high percentage of its goals in the three pillars as of the information cutoff date for the PMP. The most important achievements in terms of goals are in the economic development pillar (which has the most indicators), which to date has met 81% of the commitments. The other two pillars have met two-thirds of their goals. In what is left for program implementation, it is estimated that the red portions will be accomplished. This means that the goals for economic development will be 87% fulfilled; the social issues, 83%; and the institutional pillar, 100%. (Figure 4.1: an explanation of the calculations for the figure are found in Annex 3)


Figure 4.1. CELI Performance: Fulfillment of the PMP benchmarks



Economic development

CELI Central’s financial commitments, as they appear in the USAID/Colombia MONITOR database, are broken down by the source of funds (figure on the left) and by the type of intervention (figure on the right). The management of leveraging resources, especially state resources that the program achieved should be noted. This work will generate greater empowerment and sustainability for the initiatives once CELI closes out the year. Furthermore, close to half of the resources have been focused on institution building, which fosters development of local technical capacity to improve the provision of public services.

Figure 4.2. CELI Performance: Commitments (in US\$M) by source and type of project (approx. \$211.5M)



Source: MONITOR database, May 1-9, 2016

The CELI interventions are described in the subsections below.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation question: To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and economic development?

Findings and conclusions

As mentioned above, the activities that propel the economy of the departments in the Central region differ due to geographical factors. The main economic category for southern Tolima is coffee in terms of acreage planted, employment generated, and contribution to exports. Special types of coffee, which still receive support from various programs, were positioned as the ones offering a possibility of added value and better income for the coffee farmer. The livestock sector is second in terms of strategic investment, with cattle production at close to 12% of the total in the entire department, in addition to the fishing sector. The agricultural sector, in turn, also includes the production of plantain, yucca, corn, sugarcane, and fruit trees.

In the municipalities of La Montañita, Cartagena del Chairá, and San Vicente del Caguán in the Department of Caquetá, the economy is characterized by specialization in semi-extensive breeding, raising, and fattening of livestock for both milk and meat and the cultivation of rubber and cacao. Corn, rice, sugarcane, plantain, yucca, and coffee are common as well; exotic fruit such as arazá, cocona, copoazú, and maraco are grown for self-consumption.

In the municipalities of Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, San Juan de Arama, La Uribe, and La Macarena in the Department of Meta, economic activity is concentrated in the cultivation of palm trees, plantain, yucca, corn, fruit trees, sugarcane, and citrus crops, with variations of rubber, cacao and hibiscus flowers. Cattle, pigs, poultry, and fish are also raised. In addition, starting in 2002, Meta's economy has developed a high degree of specialization in petroleum. This has stimulated GDP growth in the department and has also been an important factor in the changes that have been taking place in municipalities such as La Macarena and Uribe. However, because this is an enclave economy, it does not translate into a better quality of life for the citizens. Finally, in municipalities such as La Macarena, tourism related to Caño Cristales is being consolidated and is helping to overcome the stigma of insecurity that has affected the area.

The focus groups stated the following on this topic:

There are people that go to the different veredas just to go to Cristales. Before, nobody dared to go ... tourism is an indicator ... more than 1,000 tourists ... that means that we are already ok. It is also the perception that outsiders have, and it is very funny because I feel like the perception foreigners have is much better than that of people from other cities. (Government Secretariat, La Macarena, Meta)

Direct beneficiaries

Compared to the baseline, the direct beneficiaries in the Central region are about 7pp more likely than the general population to say that their economic situation is good or very good, and they are less likely to be victims of famine (7pp positive impact) or extreme poverty (9pp positive impact). According to the survey, fewer beneficiaries were left without food the week before due to lack of money (5.5pp positive impact), or were afraid they would be left without food for lack of money (8.5pp positive impact). They also had a higher income than their non-beneficiary

peers as measured by the income proxy of average monthly expenditure. The increase in average monthly income was approximately 60,000 COP or about \$21.50 USD, using an exchange rate of 2,800 COP per dollar.

At the same time, the direct beneficiaries of CELI Central had mixed opinions about their regions' economic challenges. While the perception of low income improved about 6.5pp from the baseline, 4.5pp more say that unemployment or the lack of opportunities are problems in their communities, and more than 3pp say that illegal crops are a more attractive option than at baseline.

The direct beneficiaries in the Central Region reported more sales to middlemen or wholesalers in comparison to the baseline as well as to their non-participating neighbors (from 6 to 10 pp positive impact since the beginning of the study). In general, the problems seen by the beneficiaries at baseline largely declined according to the intermediate measurement. Abuse by middlemen decreased by 6.5pp, receiving low prices for their products declined 8.4pp, the perception of high transportation costs fell 10.5pp, the perception of poor soil quality declined 10pp, the perceptions of a lack of water decreased 11.5pp, interference from armed groups declined 4 percentage points, and the lack of credit dropped 8pp.


The direct beneficiaries of CELI Central generally report very positive results with respect to associating with other producers on their productive projects with special appreciation for working together to sell their products (5.5pp positive impact) and receiving training (between 4 and 14pp positive impact). One inconsistency is that these beneficiaries do not refer to the benefits of joining associations in particular, although they say they are doing it more and more.

Global survey: Perceptions of economic conditions

When the data from the respondents were analyzed, 18% stated that the economic situation in the places where they live is good or very good, compared to 25% of respondents reporting the same situation at baseline. However, since there is a greater decline in the control groups, there was a positive impact of almost 14pp in the CELI municipalities.

In addition, the survey reported that there is significant progress in the perception of those households that claim that legal productive work is profitable. Only 5% believe that these activities do not lead to positive outcomes, compared to 85% at baseline. An improvement in household perception of access to work opportunities and the resulting increase in employment is reported. (Figure 5.1)

Figure 5.1. Trends in the indicators on the economic situation



CELI’s impact on these questions as well as on the perception of the productive projects’ profitability is positive, with an impact of 11pp. (Figure 5.2)

Figure 5.2. Impact on the economic situation of households

Variable	Impact CELI vs. Control
The economic situation for the place where I am living is good or very good	0.137*
Unemployment or the lack of opportunities is a serious problem here	-0.0185
People earn very little for the productive work they do	-0.107**
One of the few attractive, productive options is illegal activities	-0.00663

In cluster analysis, there are negative impacts on how those surveyed saw the economic situation. In Clusters 18, 24, 25, and 27, the negative impact fluctuates between 10 and 45pp. Only Cluster 28 shows a significant positive impact of 14pp as shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3. Impacts on the perception of the economic situation


Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
The economic situation for the place where I am living is good or very good	-0.0629	0.0463	-0.103**	-0.20***	-0.390***	-0.0483	-0.45***	0.141**
Unemployment or the lack of opportunities is a serious problem here	0.308***	-0.132**	-0.109**	0.111**	-0.0312	-0.14***	-0.115**	0.327***
People earn very little for the productive work they do	-0.08***	0.097***	0.239***	0.289***	-0.0143	0.129***	0.153***	-0.00633
One of the few attractive, productive options is illegal activities	-0.0111	-0.0147	-0.16***	-0.09***	-0.0322	-0.12***	-0.0233	0.172***

For the rest of the questions in the figure, the numbers for negative (and significant) impact show that the situation has improved. In the majority of the cases, there is a decrease in the percentage of those surveyed who thought that unemployment and lack of opportunities were serious problems, or that illegal activities were one of the few attractive productive options. Cluster 28 is

an exception in both cases. However, a negative impact was found in the responses that confirmed that productive activities produce little money in four of the eight clusters.

The results of the survey showed that the perception that their families “were suffering from hunger” had risen 18 points in spite of the fact that they simultaneously showed less concern about the urgent lack of food due to lack of money. There is a noticeable increase (23% to 64%) in the number of households who believe that their families are living in extreme poverty (Figure 5.4) and just like in the rest of the CELI and PNCRT regions and controls, views on food security have gotten worse. In that regard, and due to the fact that the responses in the control municipalities were worse, the conclusion can be drawn that CELI Central had a 15pp positive impact in that the conditions in their area of influence are less difficult than in the control municipalities. In other words, the households in these regions of influence would have suffered even more without CELI Central’s intervention.

Figure 5.4. Trends in the perception of food security



Per cluster, the results were concerning, since the reports from five clusters showed significant rises in the perception that families are suffering from hunger. Four report significant increases in extreme poverty, and three reported worried about not having food within the last week (Figure 5.5). Only Cluster 28 reports a difference in these trends and, in contrast, shows a 13pp improvement on the question of whether their families are suffering from hunger.

Figure 5.5. Impacts on the perception of and experiences with food security

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
The family is suffering from hunger	-0.0014	0.121**	0.112**	0.195***	0.140***	0.0911**	-0.0469	-0.13***
The living conditions are those of extreme poverty	0.302***	0.421***	0.170***	0.0616	0.0535	0.0619	0.104**	0.0604
Was worried that food would run out within the past week due to lack of money	0.453***	0.0570	-0.0368	0.00723	-0.0470	0.0521	0.00958	0.0610
At some point in the past week, food ran out due to lack of money	-0.0341	-0.0014	0.0150	-0,007	0.267***	0.132***	-0.0724	-0.0542

Income for those surveyed in the Central region measured by their estimated monthly expenditures rose 10% on average from COP 451,601 at baseline, to COP 498,240 at midline (USD\$161 to USD\$178). This finding cannot be attributed to CELI intervention since a greater increase in

income was registered in the control municipalities. The differences were significant and negative in Clusters 25 and 26. The impacts are shown below in Figure 5.6.

Figure 5.6. Impacts on income

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Income proxy (estimated household monthly expenditures)	-50.832	48.800	39.995	35.647	-113.399***	-175.010**	-74.625	51.362

In absolute terms, all of the clusters, except for 26, showed a 10% to 20% increase in income, but the control municipalities had equal or better increases in each case. Therefore, no impact was found in the rest of the clusters.

In order to understand respondents' expectations, the survey posed a series of questions about the future. The general trend reveals a rise in optimism throughout the sample. However, some control municipalities were even more positive, which gave the intervention a negative or null impact. In general, Clusters 16, 27, and 28 were much more positive than at baseline and more positive than their control municipalities yielding multiple positive impacts in these regions. (Figure 5.7)

Figure 5.7. Impacts on expectations for the future


Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Do you believe that your living conditions might possibly improve in the next few years?	0.120**	0.0555	0.0261	0.0341	0.0106	0.00248	0.0971**	0.0853*
Do you believe that the income your household receives from the legal activities you are going to carry out will improve?	0.141***	0.0708	0.157***	0.0444*	-0.0761	0.0694	0.0642	0.127***
In the next two years, do you expect the economic situation for the people in your <i>vereda</i> or township to improve?	0.146***	0.0694	-0.0151	-0.033*	-0.122***	-0.0083	0.0938**	0.184***
Will your housing conditions improve?	0.0983**	0.0723	0.0314	0.0311	-0.139***	0.0200	0.163***	0.0407
Are you thinking about making investments that will be key two years from now for the productive activity of your household's business?	0.120**	0.0555	0.0261	0.0341	0.0106	0.00248	0.0971**	0.0853*

Clusters 17 and 26 are notable for their lack of significant changes with respect to their control groups, and Cluster 25 is notable for the more negative impact on questions about expectations.

The Consolidation Index, in contrast, measures economic growth in the Consolidation regions by two indicators: presence of financial services and number of hectares cultivated. Regarding the first one, the department that lagged the most in the first measurement was Caquetá, but it showed a growth trend in the years following the baseline, although it did not reach Tolima's growth level, which saw an overall growth of 30%. Meta, in turn, showed a drop last year that went dipped to levels below the baseline measurement. Both low population density and vast distances affect Meta and Caquetá. Granada, the municipality in Meta where financial activity is concentrated, is not part of the intervention nor of the Consolidation policy. With respect to the number of hectares

with licit crops, Meta and Caquetá have shown a sustainable growth trend since the second year. In Tolima, which is more agricultural than the other departments, there were significant levels in the Year 1 measurement, but this declined in Year 3 and recovered, but not to the original level, in Year 4. (Figure 5.8)

Figure 5.8. Secondary data: financial entities (left) and cultivated hectares (right)



Source: Consolidation Index, authors' calculations

Results from the focus groups, the economic situation relative to the baseline, the fall in the price of coffee in foreign markets, and weather phenomena (El Niño in particular) all contribute to perceptions of the causes of the decline in the number of hectares planted in Tolima. The existence of an impact derived from CELI is not explicit:

There are no avocados, coffee in November maybe and if so ... they are also waiting for rain ... This is a hard time for people in the country ... The milk is also drying up, and the pastures ... even the sugarcane is drying up, so at this time all the crops are dying. On my farm, the water has dried up now, I can't grind because without water one can't do anything. (Direct beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima)

This situation, they say, arises because many of the crops are late-yielding ones such as those supported by *Colombia Responde*, with support based on providing sustainable productive projects with technical assistance. Even so, the people are optimistic:

I would say that [the economic situation] is just ok because what Colombia Responde has given us has not produced anything yet, they are long-term. So, we still have to work and save from what we have in order to sustain it ... As long as there is fruit, it still takes time, because we are now in the process of sustaining the crops ... That's the hope and, of course, improving employment there. That is where everything is. That's where people are on the move, money works, the workers, the merchant ... not having sustenance ... everyone is still, but we have hope. (Direct beneficiaries, La Montañita, Caquetá)

Conclusion I: The economic situation for the average family is getting worse, although the effects on CELI's direct participants are positive. These effects may vary by cluster. The perception of living in extreme poverty rose but this was offset by the perception of increased employment and that of the improvement in the profitability of productive activities. In the case of household income, there were many differences by cluster such as the case of Clusters 25 and 26.

Positive effects due to CELI were seen in the analysis thanks to the technical assistance for productive projects in which families sought to apply technology to labor in order to develop better productivity. Another goal of CELI's support is to foster associations to bring about financing of productive projects.

Support for productive projects


The priorities established for CELI workers changed from an approach towards strengthening the state's presence to reinforcing agricultural production, rural value chains, and mobilizing public services. This change in orientation is evident, as was mentioned at the beginning of this document, in the relocation of CELI workers from CDCS DO 1 "*Civil government presence in the consolidated CSDI areas*" to their current location in DO 3 "*Conditions for an improved, inclusive rural economic growth.*" In that regard, based on the new definition of the CDCS Development Objectives, it has been a priority to work with producer associations as a guide to help them reach those objectives.

Thus, at the beginning, CELI Central developed activities based on a traditional view of alternative development, in which they even provided supplies for the first associations with which they worked. With the change in strategy, CELI focuses on reinforcing the formation of associations and building alliances with national, regional and local state entities such as Autonomous Regional Corporations (CAR in Spanish), municipal governments and governor's offices, and with the private sector to improve the quality and price of products, strengthen producer associations' organizational capacities, and develop more robust infrastructure for specific projects (e.g., refrigeration chain for dairy products in Meta).

Training for producer associations encompassed a broad range of topics including improvement of agricultural production, which is done through technical assistance to reinforce the entire chain of production, the introduction of new crops, innovation in organizational management, marketing, and sales and training for young people so that knowledge and resources are passed on to younger generations. Specific cases of this work can be found in the coffee projects in southern Tolima, animal husbandry in Meta, and rubber in Meta and Caquetá.

As mentioned, one of CELI's most important objectives is to reinforce or increase the formation of associations. It has already been noted that those surveyed perceive that this work generates benefits for their families. According to the reported data, the reasons behind the formation of associations have to do with generating better conditions for purchasing supplies, generating economies of scale for transportation, gaining access to community training and to financing, and improving marketing. Compared to baseline, the reasons for joining fast-growing associations are training (increasing from 11% to 22%) and the search for financing (increasing from 9% to 19%). However, when the performance of these variables in the control groups is observed, this positive change cannot be attributed to CELI interventions. (Figure 5.9)

Figure 5.9. Trends in reasons for joining associations



The collection of qualitative data revealed that the direct beneficiaries appreciate the support received and feel empowered to face the future. In the case of late-yielding crops, they understand the financial difficulties related to supporting their families until harvest comes, but even so, they are willing to plant these crops:

[Rubber begins to yield] after 6 years, 7 years. At the moment, what people are doing is sowing the corn, interspersing rubber trees ... with that they support themselves and buy the supplies for the rubber crops the next year ... The project included the delivery of supplies for just one year. So for the second, the third, the fourth, the fifth, until the trees produce rubber, up to the sixth year, the producer must buy supplies using income from the corn crops or using his own resources.

With great pride, with a lot of gratitude, I've been able to highlight the work done by the Colombia Responde program. Actually, the program gave these two projects [rubber and animal husbandry] more than what the Ministry [of Agriculture] itself gave them. The resources that were allocated were perhaps not for purchasing supplies ... They were for everything that had to do with managing the project, that means, a year of technical assistance paid for by Colombia Responde resources. (Producer Association Leader, La Macarena, Meta)

Conclusion 2: CELI's productive projects show evidence of economic changes for families and households. The beneficiaries are grateful for the technical assistance provided by CELI, the National Learning Service (SENA in Spanish), and by other governmental institutions since this knowledge will result in more capital for them. However, those interviewed and surveyed have major concerns regarding food security in the short and medium term, in particular when it comes to late-yielding crops.


Markets and marketing

The work CELI Central has done to attract the private sector and incorporate it into the value chains is notable. With respect to rubber production in Caquetá and coffee in southern Tolima, important lessons have been learned in establishing win-win arrangements between producers and the market. In Caquetá, for example, the alliance between 1,100 rubber tappers from 16 municipal committees and an international buyer succeeded in getting the quality certification needed to export their product. The alliance established in the coffee chain linked nine productive associations with specialized services to profile their products. Training programs in coffee tasting were set up as well as models of organizational reinforcement for marketing with high standards and access to special niches in international markets. The experiences of these chains in the private

sector were extended to other products, regions, and markets to help producers to be partners in the process, add value, and earn higher incomes.


Based on survey responses, the most preferred channels for marketing products are direct sales at the municipal capitals (55%) and sales through middlemen (49%), which has fallen in preference with respect to other channels compared to the baseline. Even when the tendency to sell in the market plazas grew with respect to the baseline, their limited use compared to other channels is notable when they have historically been the centers for selling the typical food items in the great majority of the municipalities around the country. (Figure 5.10)

Figure 5.10. Trends in marketing channels for small-farm products



When asked about the places where the inhabitants go to buy their products, the municipal capital is still most preferred, followed by the nearest populated centers. This variable has increased in comparison to the baseline. In addition, the tendency to buy products in their own *vereda* or nearby *veredas* as well as in other municipalities has dropped. This may be related to issues of accessibility and road infrastructure. See the following figure.

Figure 5.11. Trends in purchasing channels




The results of the study, in relation to the information gathered in the focus groups, show that the issues related to high prices of supplies, low sale prices for harvests, the perception of abuse on the part of middlemen in fixing prices, and the high cost of transportation still persist. The lack of water, due to environmental phenomena, was a high incidence factor. A positive effect on gaining access to loans was evident:

[The problem] is not so much about the supplies, but rather that they buy at fair prices ... A load of coffee is worth more than the costs. Imagine that... and how much back-breaking work do you have to do to get

the crop. The serious problem we small farmers have is the middlemen. The middleman is the one who gains by the sweat of our brows. So that is what the government has to control. (Beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima)

An additional problem that those surveyed have identified is the presence of IAGs, which has increased compared to the baseline. In the control groups, this variable shows a slight decrease (from 7% to 6%). (Figure 5.12)

Figure 5.12. Trends in problems with production and marketing their goods



When the results for the CELI municipalities and the people in the control groups are compared, positive trends from the interventions are identified in product prices, cost of transportation, quality of the soil, and access to credit (Figure 5.13). There are persistent problems in the cost of supplies, abuse by middlemen, lack of water, and interference from IAGs. In the control municipalities, problems such as the high cost of transportation and the poor soil quality are noted.

Figure 5.13. Trends in production and sales problems compared to controls

CELI		Control
↑	Very high costs for supplies	↓
↑	Abuse by the middlemen	↑
↓	Very low prices for products	↓
↓	Very high transportation costs	↑
↓	Poor soil quality	↑
↑	Lack of water	↑
↑	Interference from illegal armed groups	↓
↓	Ban on coca	↓
↓	Lack of access to credit	↓

Conclusion 3: Technical assistance and support for merchandising help to counteract the problems related to the low profitability. Even if the productive projects receiving help from CELI have recovered their levels of profitability, they still need to open up new markets, reduce costs – especially transportation – and improve productivity to get sales prices that are above production costs. Productive projects counteract the incentives to cultivate illegal crops but, in the context of inadequate markets, pressure from armed groups, and the persistent lack of access roads, it is difficult for programs and policies to have the desired effects. The historical presence of these structural problems, which are ultimately the responsibility of the GOC and the state’s absence for

decades, make it very unlikely that programs like CELI or even PNCRT itself will produce sustainable effects.

Conclusion 4: Markets in the consolidation territories continue to be local and regional. As a share of the sales, markets in territories that are being consolidated continue to be local and regional. The export markets are still limited. Small producers are affected by the high costs of marketing that small, slightly developed, and non-specialized markets are characterized by. In this case, the transaction costs are very high and the communities remain trapped in a vicious cycle where there is little incentive to increase production and, at the same time, the rise in production generated by external markets clashes with the rigidity of the local market and lack of preparation to export to other regions.

Conclusion 5: Abuse by middlemen continues to be a critical issue in this region due to the inadequacy of the market, the producers' limited ability to negotiate, and poor marketing channels.


Savings, credit, and financial services

In order to strengthen access to financial services and loans for small farmers and producer associations, etc., Local Savings and Loan Groups (GLACs) were created which support the development of rotating funds to productive associations and offer technical assistance to expand capacity with information and financial tools. CELI Central has supported 14 productive associations in Tolima, Caquetá, Meta, and Cauca using more than USD\$600,000 to strengthen the management of the rotating funds, encourage the use of financial tools, and improve information management for accountability. CELI Central has made alliances with national financial institutions such as Bancolombia, Banco Agrario, Banca de Oportunidades, and Colpensiones to expand services like mobile banking, create more than 100 savings plans, and support and train 12 associations to handle loan applications for FINAGRO, among others. Regarding banking, CELI has helped almost 8,000 individuals to access financial products or services.

However, the survey findings show a decline in the number of households that report having a savings account, although the use of banks and non-bank correspondents (e.g., stores or retailers) for paying public utilities has risen.

Although the number of families that report having a current loan rose, the number of households reporting that they have requested one at some point has decreased. No significant impact derived from access to loans and banking services for the families' economic development has been reported. (Figure 5.14)

Figure 5.14. Trends in the use of banks (banking) and access to credit



At the cluster level, several of these measurements show an impact, as can be seen in Figure 5.15:

Figure 5.15. Impacts on the use of financial services and products

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
They have a savings account	0.160***	-0.23***	0.122**	0.0360	-0.0170	0.0962	-0.0947	0.0913
They have a checking account	-0.101**	-0.11***	-0.0437	-0.025**	0.0466*	0.0262	-0.0539*	-0.0275
They have paid for public utilities at banks or at non-bank correspondents	0.298***	-0.26***	-0.36***	0.0525**	-0.17***	0.228***	-0.0325	0.258***
They have asked a bank, financial institution, cooperative, or an NGO for a loan	0.0341	-0.0833	0.0208	-0.00681	0.0108	0.0813	0.0166	0.129**
They currently have a loan from a bank, cooperative, or NGO	-0.0156	0.195***	0.103	0.144***	-0.102	0.233**	-0.00697	-0.120
They have debts	-0.0288	-0.22***	-0.133**	-0.00912	-0.0706	0.150**	0.0353	-0.0683

If the analysis is run by cluster, there is a 16pp increase in Cluster 16 and 12pp increase in Cluster 18 in the indicator that measures whether the people have savings accounts. In Cluster 17, in contrast, the indicator declined by 17pp. Three clusters registered a decline in the number of checking accounts, which represents a small percentage of the respondents. The results were positive in four clusters regarding respondents using banking and non-banking entities to make utility payments, but the results were negative for three others. It is probable that banking services and payment options are not the same in all municipalities. Debt has fallen significantly in Clusters 17 and 18, and only Cluster 28 showed an increase in the number of loan applications.

When the results from the focus groups were reviewed, the participants stated that associating is important to guarantee access to loans:

These are just regular loans. What happens is that one as an association ... one feels that the association is recommending that person ... If he does not pay well then you don't recommend him, you don't certify him. So out of 50, 60 partners, you can find 20 who are very diligent. Then with that certification, they do not need a cosigner ... everything is done through the Banco Agrario. (Community Leader, Vistahermosa, Meta)

However, indebtedness and payment of obligations is critical, according to some respondents:

I got five million and paid back two and a half million. But then they go back and do the paperwork again and then you have to pay the 5 million again. So, what is the benefit ... it is of no help, there is no benefit ... And they reduce it too. they do not give you 5 million, but instead, they give you 4 million, 7 hundred, so they take away 300 or 400. And the interest kicks in at that time when they approve the loan. They charge it at 10% or 11% and the paperwork is added with more interest on top. (Group of Beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima)

When asking about informal loans, it is striking that there were no statements about this like there are in other parts of the country.


Conclusion 6: The use of banking services and formal loans has fallen in both CELI zones and control municipalities. Loans from rotating funds and GLACs are also important alternatives to informal loans because of their significant links to associations and increased confidence.

Transportation and infrastructure

In general, the road conditions in rural areas around the country are very poor. According to the latest report on the tertiary roads in the Central region (July 2016), the conditions of 987 kilometers have improved and become passable, but there are still 125 kilometers to be improved in 2016.


The results of the survey show that the perception of the road network within and between municipalities has improved with respect to the baseline, although scores are still low (see the following figure).

Figure 5.16. Trends in the perception of roads



The Consolidation Index, in turn, measures the road situation in the Consolidation areas by means of two indicators in the connectedness component of the Regional Integration pillar. These results are provided in Figure 5.17.

Figure 5.17. Secondary data: Trends in the perception of roads



Source: Consolidation Index data, authors' calculations

The first indicator measured the percentage of the main population centers in the municipality that are connected (by road, river or sea) to the municipal capital throughout the whole year. The overall score is very high, 100% in Tolima and around 90% in the other two regions, but far from perceptions of respondents in rural areas. The second indicator makes it possible to know whether there are paved roads from the municipality to a main city. The indicator showed that there were more paved roads in the three departments in 2014, although Caquetá showed a significant decrease in 2013.

CELI Central has done important work for roads by means of targeted interventions to improve sections that are impassable at some periods of the year. CELI worked with the people and with the JACs to determine which parts of the roads should be prioritized for repairs and then hired the JACs to supply local labor. Since the project started, approximately USD\$5 million has been invested in road improvements.

Respondents recognize that interventions regarding roads improves the profitability of the products:

We did [have road improvement]. The opening of the road, that was a benefit for us ... [before] we barely got a single car through. There was no way to reach the market since the one who got there said: - I'll pay for the milk at 500 and if you want to sell it to me, fine, if not, fine too – because he was the only one ... right now they are paying us \$780. So look, there is a change because income rises. (Beneficiary, La Montañita, Caquetá)

The biggest impact ... has been the roads since here, the roads are damaged so badly by the rain. So they have made a good investment together with the municipal government in terms of roads. (Government Secretariat, La Montañita, Caquetá)

Just by arriving on my little motorcycle, just by being able to take my small bag of potatoes out, a small bag of plantains, well, just that paving they did is really a lot of help. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, Caquetá)

Conclusion 7: Road infrastructure is an unresolved issue. Access to markets is affected by the scarcity or poor condition of tertiary roads. This phenomenon affects the costs of production, the price of products and, therefore, the profitability of the productive projects. CELI has intervened in some of the roads the community has prioritized, and they, through the JACs, have provided support for improving them.

Land

One of CELI's lines of action is, along with other objectives, supporting small farmers and displaced families by implementing processes associated with land ownership in order to encourage a return to land that was abandoned during the armed conflict. The main obstacle in these areas has been the weakness of the government, especially INCODER. The challenges for restoring the land ownership rights or for compensating victims are enormous.

Regarding land restitution, CELI Central gave special support to reinforcing the institutional capacity of the Land Restitution Unit (URT in Spanish) through arbitration experts in 2014. With respect to giving titles to vacant lands, they supplied INCODER with technical assistance between 2012 and 2014 to improve the topographic survey and real estate appraisal processes. In spite of the fact that the Cauca municipalities are not part of the CELI sample, it should be noted that thanks to *Colombia Responde's* support, INCODER bought 107 plots of land (a total of 8,267 hectares) to resolve departmental land disputes and distributed them as follows:

- Cauca Amerindian Regional Council, 52 plots
- Amerindian Authorities of Colombia, 2 plots
- Norte del Cauca Association of Amerindian Cabildos, 1 plot
- Small farmers, 36 plots
- Afro-Colombians, 16 plots

Apart from institutional support, CELI has helped communities and organizations to certify land titles. They helped families build their legal cases to ask for restitution of their land. They helped civil society organizations (JACs, producer associations and women's associations) to understand the land registration process and get their land titled, and they held workshops on the restitution and titling process with producer associations in Norte del Cauca and Sur del Valle, where small farmers usually have informal ownership.


In both the baseline and midline surveys, results show that small farmers who have a plot of land to work mostly focus on agricultural output, although this decreased from 79% to 69% between the two measurement periods.

There is a decrease in the number of respondents who report that they work land without a title, which supports the evidence showing that more respondents overall report that they have property titles. Nevertheless, there are still challenges to receiving formal titles for half of the respondents.

When the results of the survey about the methods used to acquire land are reviewed, purchase-sale is still the most used method (in more than 70% of cases), followed by cases of inheritance (23%). There are no significant changes between what was reported at baseline and after the CELI intervention.


Despite the weak results in issuing formal titles, there is an upward trend in families who pay taxes and their willingness to pay because it is an obligation for citizens. These opinions are stable between the baseline and in this evaluation. (Figure 5.18)

Figure 5.18. Trends in reasons for paying or being willing to pay property taxes



With a 28% increase between baseline and midline, the reason why the few individuals who said they were not willing to pay property tax would not pay is that the productive agricultural projects were not profitable enough. (Figure 5.19)

Figure 5.19. Trends in reasons for not paying taxes on property



Moreover, the Consolidation Index reported results that allow us to conclude that there is variable performance in each region with regard to overcoming land issues, at least since the first data collection was completed in 2011. The zoning process has been very slow in the department of Meta over the last four years. However, Caquetá and Tolima made significant progress in this area, so much so that the latter already has two municipalities micro-targeted in preparation for land restitution.

The process of getting property titles is critical for respondents, according to information gathered from focus groups discussions. Although performance is perceived as better in urban areas, the greatest challenge is concentrated in the rural ones in terms of restitution, legal titles for property, and transference of titles from the municipality to the owners. This transfer, although feasible, requires special oversight. This process is affected by fear of threats, which means that people sometimes prefer to lose the land rather than start the registration process. Policies should be implemented by the agricultural sector as well as the state to ensure the citizens' safety. Serious security problems are still reported in these regions:

Many times people do not have any documents, as such, they are just settlers. So what you can do is help them to get a document, so that they can do what they call "the improvements" on that property. And they

can also have that document in hand so that they can make progress, or start the registration to get their own deed. (Ombudsman's Office, Vistahermosa, Meta)

This is an area where everyone came and grabbed their plot of land ... It is a fairly serious problem, and perhaps Colombia Responde tried to do its job, and it did it at the right time. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)

As far as I know, nothing has been done to issue legal titles to land here ... These are plots of property that people squatted on back then and they have not yet gotten legal title. Because, since the owners are asking for restitution of their land, whether or not they will get legal title to the lands is not exactly known until they negotiate... A project is being implemented to grant deeds to the people who live there because the land belongs to the municipality. (Government Secretariat, La Montañita, Caquetá)

One hears that they often would rather lose the land and ignore the problem than file a complaint. [They tell you that:] -no, look, the man over there says, - if I open my mouth, blah, blah, blah, or just that he has been there many years and he'll never turn it over to me, that he bought it from someone else. You understand me? So, until the Land Unit comes... they are coming to Caquetá now like they did to Putumayo or Tolima... I don't think there is any guarantee that these people will start to take the initiative. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, Caquetá)

Conclusion 8: The factors inherent in the ownership of land demand greater knowledge and intervention on the part of public policy with respect to land, giving title to, and restoring it.

The progress made in the proceedings that CELI reports continue to be limited with respect to the massive scale of the requests for registering titles and restitution. While CELI is able to support these processes, it is ultimately the state that must resolve the differences between citizens and the interests involved in the land issue.

The implementation of the restitution policy is being affected by threats, which, in some cases, have resulted in people preferring to lose the land rather than undertake the process of legalizing the titles. This also comes along with the incentive the settlers have to take formal ownership of the land, generating conflicts over ownership.

Recommendations

Make simultaneous improvements in production and trade (conclusions 2-3, 5-7, and 10)

Increased production must go hand-in-hand with market improvements. Low quality, intermittent and seasonal production is not attractive for a market that exports goods to the rest of the country. In contrast, good quality and regular production has better results when that production is directed at adequate markets. Transport to markets is never guaranteed. The GOC must endeavor to resolve market and infrastructure inadequacies and establish programs that improve relationships with commercial allies and middlemen. This is and must be one of the most important concerns for post-conflict policies in Colombia. While support from international funding sources is certainly important, it may be wise for the latter to lead small focused pilots that treat these interconnected structural failings holistically, or to support GOC efforts that do so, rather than dilute the effects by intervening across broad geographic areas with expansive mandates.

Support initiatives to open up new markets (conclusions 2, 3, and 4) in order to achieve equilibrium between supply and demand and a suitable price level that would generate profit for the producer. These types of programs include creating alliances between small producers and middlemen or merchants, improving product quality, implementing the quality and/or phytosanitary standards demanded by purchasers, gathering market intelligence, producing added-

value goods, etc. The advantage of these types of alliances is that the producer is not the direct exporter to foreign markets, but is rather a supplier with the ability to export, which strengthens the entire chain.

Place a greater emphasis on coordinating with national initiatives (conclusions 1-4) CELI's interventions to help production processes require better coordination, use of technology, and innovation using instruments that the country has designed to improve productivity. These instruments are related to the implementation of irrigation districts, drainage, collection points, refrigeration chains, access to financial services, technical assistance that is coordinated with technological facilities, and strategies for technological extension for those initiatives that show commitment and maturity, access to document registration, etc. An analysis of the draft policy for the production development that the DNP is working on is recommended, with respect to the existing instruments or those being designed to correct market failures and improve economic growth.

Make improvements to guarantee food security (conclusion 1) CELI and USAID should consolidate their efforts to ensure that productive projects guarantee food security for families, especially for those projects with late-yielding crops. Prepare for this situation – common for these types of USAID projects – and plan technical assistance for traditional farms or other activities to minimize dependency and provide some liquidity while the producing families consolidate their production and marketing.

Use community models to improve and maintain tertiary roads (conclusions 3, 4, and 7) Ensuring that the tertiary road infrastructure is in reasonable shape is fundamental for access to regional, national, and international markets. USAID has supported the design of the Tertiary Roads National Policy, but it has also fostered models of participative operations through CELI Central for the improvement and maintenance of tertiary roads by JACs. Reinforcing these community models by learning from the successful experiences in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Costa Rica in the framework of Colombian regulations is recommended. The environmental factors must be kept in mind to minimize the risk of direct or indirect environmental impacts.

Continue supporting processes for formal registration and restitution of land (conclusion 8) To do this, strengthening relationships with the new authorities responsible is recommended – the National Land Agency and Rural Development Agency – as well as making progress on collaboration with the Land Restitution Unit.

Various USAID interventions play an important role in encouraging protection of property rights to land through formal titles and developing productive activities and environmental services that, in addition to being profitable, should be compatible with the existing categories of environmental management.

Continue working to expand financial services (conclusion 6) Rotating funds have proven to be a useful instrument for meeting the loan needs of communities and families. Similarly, EVAL recommends reinforcing these funds with clear norms and rules on management and accountability, monitoring systems, exchanges of successful experiences, and performance incentives.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation questions:

To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and institutionalization of the territory?

What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)

Findings and conclusions

Participation, transparency, accountability, and confidence generally show neutral or negative results in the midline evaluation. This seems to be a trend that is exacerbated by factors that are beyond CELI's influence.

CELI Central worked closely with state entities on many fronts, including institutions in the agricultural sector and alliances with the private sector. CELI team members say that the institutional framework that should have come with the Consolidation was weak. *"We wanted to be the catalysts for the state's and the private sector's work. But we didn't have permanent partners. Once the alliance was made, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, for example, did not appear again."* The CELI team, which said they had worked well with the regional offices of the Territorial Consolidation Unit, was disappointed in the limited capacity of agricultural sector services (Epsagro and UMATA): "They have good intentions but little capacity. They are not able to extend." However, CELI was able to make long-term commitments with the Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA in Spanish) and SENA, and has also had positive experiences when turning to organizations trained in capacity building for new associations.


Participation

Participation was measured in the survey by an index that included variables such as participation in political parties, JACs, watchdog and oversight groups, view of participation in elections, voter registration, and voting in the last presidential election. The average score in CELI was 35 out of 100 points, one point above what was reported at baseline and with no impact when compared to the control sites.

Although the number of people willing to vote (going from 88% to 97%) and that exercised their right to vote in 2010 (80% to 89%) rose compared to the baseline, there is no evidence of a significant CELI impact on electoral practices since these variables also rose in control areas. Among the few who did not vote, the non-voting trend rose under the argument that they did not like the candidates (8% increase vis-à-vis the baseline).


In contrast, it is significant that those who voted did so because, first, their vote is valuable (this variable increased from 89% to 94%) and, second, it is their responsibility (this variable increased from 95% to 96%). There were no significant changes in the variable that measures any type of pressure, gift, or cash as a reason for voting. The trends in the control municipalities were very similar, so the conclusion is that CELI had no impact. (Figure 6.1)

Figure 6.1. Trends in reasons for voting



In addition, a large majority of respondents believe that women could be leaders in the community at both baseline and the midline measurement, increasing from 96% to 98%. Likewise, in spite of a slight decline from 88% to 83%, the respondents perceived young people as having a high degree of legitimacy as leaders. These results contrast with the perception of the possibility of an ex-combatant being a community leader, declining from 20% at baseline to 18% at midline. There is no evidence of CELI impact on the consolidation of new leadership. (Figure 6.2)

Figure 6.2. Trends in possible new leaders



According to focus groups, there has been an increase in electoral participation. Based on what was reported, having led or belonged to an association may improve a candidate’s chances of getting elected:

It was scary to go and vote. Many people abstained ... They were forbidden to vote. Now there is more police presence. There are more political parties. There is more freedom in all aspects of life, and that has generated a lot of participation in every area. I would say that is one of the main engines. (Victims’ Association, Vistahermosa, Meta)

It has changed a lot. Here, a mayor could be elected with maybe 600 votes. Now a mayor who does not get more than 2,500 votes will come out in front (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)

The hope that someday someone will represent the community to see what...And this year also there is a lady, in fact she is part of the Rubber Alliance. María Yineth Cardona, she is seeking election to the Council with the desire that perhaps she will be lucky and do something for the community now that she is there. (Rubber Tappers’ Association, La Montañita, Caquetá)

The change in the relationship between the community and the police has been immense, which is the first step in establishing an institutional framework. However, this depends on its permanence over time and coordination with other institutional stakeholders:

The police have earned a very important position. When they came, the population accommodated itself to the stakeholder present at the time. If there are guerrilla groups, then they adjust to the guerrilla groups. If there are paramilitaries, then they adjust themselves to the paramilitaries. If the army is there, then they work with the army. If there are police, they do the same. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)

Conclusion 1: Participation in political processes is increasing. The intention to vote and the real exercise of this right has increased. Some of the reasons for voting are associated with new leadership (young people and women), who represent the evolution of their communities and are offering innovative proposals. The democratic efforts that CELI carried out coincide with greater participation. However, there is still a high perception that the electoral process is difficult.


Conclusion 2: The stigma of being a former IAG combatant affects their legitimacy. Facing the peace process and a post-conflict environment, there is no evidence that the guerrilla groups can have credibility or provide representation in the communities where they have been operating.

Transparency and accountability

The Consolidation Index measures good governance through a set of indicators such as getting grants to finance projects, the GOC's Open Government Index (IGA in Spanish), and the number of eligible people who pay their taxes (property and industry/commerce ICA).

The indicator measuring the distribution of grants for financing projects around the region shows that the department of Caquetá dropped back to the same score it received in 2011 after having hit a significant peak in 2013, which was close to 100% of the resources allocated. Meanwhile, Tolima's loss of ground is visible even with a growth trend in the last four years. Meta had significant growth between 2012 and 2013, but it then declined (Figure 6.3). Generally speaking, none of the departments are able to obtain grants on a regular basis to finance their investment projects, interrupting the path for development and growth of the region.

Figure 6.3. Secondary data: Grants for financing projects



Source: Consolidation Index, authors' calculations


Likewise, the information gathered from ICA shows an interesting change in the scores, which went from an average of 74.6 to 96.6. Recall that scores are adjusted or normalized to scores of similar municipalities based on the explanation in the Consolidation Index section. (Figure 6.4)

Figure 6.4. Secondary data: Average IGA results

	2011		2014	
	Raw score	Standardized score	Raw score	Standardized score
Caquetá	48.2	72.2	64.9	99.0
Meta	48.0	72.0	70.0	100
Tolima	53.6	79.8	59.5	90.8

With respect to compliance in paying property taxes, the index reports a score of approximately 62% for Meta with a slight increase over the last year. This increase can be explained by better fiscal management. Caquetá reported a sharp drop in year 3 but a recovery in year 4, which suggests a possible difficulty in gathering data. Tolima is the department that is lagging behind the most. The three departments show a growth trend in industry and commerce taxes with the highest scores going to Caquetá with 90%, followed by Tolima with 77% and Meta with 68%.

Figure 6.5. Secondary data: Property compliance (left) and ICA tax (right)



Source: Consolidation Index, authors' calculations

Regarding the perception of problems associated with municipal administration in the Central region, the municipalities receiving interventions showed greater mistrust of the public entities than the control municipalities did, even though the citizens notice that in both cases, the administrations do not report on their activities. In contrast, the perception of corruption has declined and the provision of public services has improved in both the municipalities that received interventions and in control municipalities. There was no positive impact in either of the two cases (treatment or control) on the citizens' position regarding public issues nor their participation in decisions. (Figure 6.6)

Figure 6.6. Trends in perceptions of problems associated with the municipality management

CELI		Control
↑	Distrust of public entities	↓
↑	Municipal administrations do not pay attention to requests from the community	↑
↑	The administration is not able to solve the community's problems	↑
↓	Deficiencies of public utilities for households	↓
↓	Lack of highways	→
↓	Corruption	↓
→	Lack of institutional services: hospitals, schools, courts, and kindergartens	↓
↑	Municipal administration does not report on what it is doing	↑
↓	Municipal authorities invite the community to express their opinions about subjects that are of interest to the community	↓
↓	Municipal authorities take the opinions of the citizens into account when they make decisions	↓

Impacts on these trends emerge in the cluster analysis. Respondents' perceptions of municipal governments, with respect to these variables, show a downward trend although, in some cases, the impact was stronger in CELI municipalities than in control municipalities. This is a good sign, as data were collected during the electoral period.

For example, two clusters showed positive effects on the way the municipality is governed, and two clusters claimed that management was better two years ago, compared to the opinions of their controls.

Furthermore, the data revealed that the municipal governments in the CELI and control zones are not very inclined to listen to citizens' opinions or consider those opinions. Only one cluster stated that the municipal government regularly reported on expenditures and their perception was higher at midline and better than that of the control municipalities. Nonetheless, confidence that the municipal government is committed to carrying out a project rose significantly in three clusters. The same cannot be said with respect to confidence in the president of the JACs' commitment – three clusters see this situation as worse than at baseline. More negative responses are seen in the treatment areas than in the controls. (Figure 6.7)

Figure 6.7. Impact on the perception of the local government

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Rate municipal government's management as good or very good	0.0431	0.0589	0.0961**	0.00409	0.0551	-0.041	0.173***	-0.00554
Think that the municipal government's management has improved in comparison to two years ago	0.268***	-0.0337	0.128***	-0.069***	0.0283	-0.018	0.00407	0.0911
The city mayor regularly informs the community about what the funds have been spent on and how	-0.104**	0.0521	-0.0290	0.0388**	-0.0135	-0.07*	-0.0753*	-0.140***
The municipal authorities invite the community to express their opinions about subjects that are of interest to the community	0.0867***	-0.0070	0.0223	-0.0108	0.0286	0.0339	-0.0265	-0.0133
The municipal authorities take the opinions of the citizens into account when they make decisions	0.0362	-0.0220	0.0129	0.0111	0.0140	0.0291	0.00272	-0.00590

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Have quite a bit or a lot of confidence in the mayor of the municipality's commitment to managing a construction project	0.0874	-0.0618	0.104**	0.0648***	-0.0193	0.0222	0.115***	-0.0695
Have considerable / a lot of trust in the chairman of JAC's commitment to managing a construction project	-0.0540	0.0293	-0.0438	-0.0662**	0.0344	-0.13**	0,172***	-0.134**

The Consolidation Index indicates the percentage of the municipal funds that are subject to legally registered oversight mechanisms. Caquetá and Tolima report 69% and 75% respectively. No data are reported for Meta. The three departments achieved a 75% operating level for their institutional framework for citizen participation with the minimum number of regular meetings of the Municipal Council for Social Policy and the Municipal Council for Rural Development. In contrast, the respondents in the survey of scattered rural areas believe that they enjoy less participation.

One of the components of transparency is the degree to which citizens participate in oversight processes. The survey instrument contains questions that were combined into an accountability index with a total score of 100 points. The survey asked about the extent to which the mayor kept citizens informed about public spending, the presence or absence of public mechanisms for citizen oversight, and the degree to which the local government welcomes citizens' opinions for decision-making. In the Central Region, the index fell by three points (from 28 to 25), similar to what happened in the control zones, so there was no CELI impact. Nonetheless, this general decline shows that the issues associated with transparency and accountability, which are fundamental to fighting corruption, still pose major challenges in the consolidation areas.

In the Central region, participation in oversight committees had a slight increase compared to the baseline. It went from 1% to 3% of respondents and had a positive impact of 1.6pp compared to the control municipalities. According to the qualitative information collected in the focus groups, the diversity of political parties and the presence of the police have encouraged greater citizen participation in decision-making. The participation of associations is greater and has encouraged the creation of citizen oversight committees. These have focused on monitoring the use of public resources which, as a result, has led to increased trust in the institutions. The Consolidation Unit and CELI are recognized as leading these initiatives:

Before, there were no oversight committees. In other words, a project was done and ... well, they didn't know, no one took notice and then they came to criticize. Now they know, in fact, they create the oversight committee and follow up on what is being done in the project. So that has also strengthened the institutional framework greatly. (Leader, Women's Organization, Chaparral, Tolima)

In the projects, they name the oversight committee, depending on the project and on the municipality where it is. The people know the technical part ... When they are going to bring material, then the community is ready; It plays the part of the community's watchdog, but the technical part is done by the controller. (Beneficiaries, La Montañita, Caquetá)

In terms of accountability, the focus groups show progress in controlling the use of resources:

There is a lot of surveillance now. What the government has implemented is very good. The follow up that they really do to the resources that come from the municipality is very good. (Association, La Montaña, Caquetá)

Conclusion 3: The processes for accountability still require consolidation and are affecting confidence in institutional development. In spite of the efforts to implement practices that have been in development for a number of years and that have been managed by CELI, positive effects have not yet been achieved. There is no evidence of exercise in participatory planning, implementation, or follow-up. This is also affected by the gaps in community participation in control and oversight, even though better performance has been seen in these mechanisms. While the focus groups show greater participation, there are no specific data that prove this is permanent.

Confidence

Confidence in institutions and their exercise of power has generally fallen. According to the responses from those surveyed, the perception of confidence in institutions fell, with the exception of the national police. The decrease in this perception was similar in the treatment and control municipalities, so these changes cannot be attributed to a CELI impact. There is a decrease in confidence in the Public Defender, Ombudsman's office, municipal government, and the JACs at the local level which brings about a decline in confidence in national entities that depend on their management (for example, the Victims Unit depends on the management of the ombudsman's offices for Single Registry of Victims [RUV in Spanish]).

It is reasonable to assume that the publicity of the electoral period affected the responses to the extent that the current government's problems were public before the elections and highly controversial. The impacts on confidence at the cluster level vary. (Figure 6.8)

Figure 6.8. Impacts on confidence — considerable or a lot

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Governor's office	-0.0047	0.0439	0.121***	0.0799***	0.00421	-0.0839	0.0264	-0.0757
The national government	0.0715	0.107*	0.248***	0.149***	-0.120**	0.0560	-0.122**	-0.0987*
Formal justice institutions	0.00612	-0.0262	0.102**	0.0349	-0.0793	-0.0016	-0.14***	-0.0550
Alternative justice institutions	0.0262	0.00324	0.0935*	0.114***	-0.0018	0.147***	-0.0454	0.0688
Agricultural sector institutions	0.118**	-0.0389	-0.0177	0.0480**	0.0863	-0.0251	-0.17***	-0.115**
Social organizations and NGOs	-0.0997*	-0.0958	0.00730	0.112***	-0.101	0.0727	-0.0671	-0.0412
Training and educational centers	0.170**	-0.0807	-0.0896	-0.00861	-0.117*	0.129*	-0.35***	0.131*
Public Defender's office	0.0370	-0.0827	0.0505	0.0474*	-0.139**	0.0553	-0.0378	-0.0626
Municipal councils	-0.0265	-0.0196	0.0556	0.0670***	-0.0570	0.0528	-0.0266	-0.0634
The National Police	0.116**	0.116**	0.106**	0.0819***	-0.125**	0.00254	-0.0914*	-0.0641
The National Army	0.194***	-0.0161	0.120**	0.0777***	-0.0211	-0.0220	-0.23***	-0.112*
The National Navy	0.0118	-0.26***	-0.0124	-0.0103	-0.24***	0.0292	-0.22***	-0.0820
The municipal ombudsman's office	-0.0341	-0.145**	0.00888	0.0233	-0.124*	0.0380	-0.0577	-0.154**
Municipal government	0.0286	-0.0046	0.0452	0.0507**	-0.0588	0.0317	-0.0184	-0.0595
JAC	-0.0861	-0.0837	-0.0475	-0.0293	-0.0101	-0.153**	0.117*	0.0422

The changes in absolute values are better for those surveyed in the Central region than in other regions, warranting a review (Annex 2 of this report). The impact calculations given in the table above indicate more positive results in Clusters 18 and 20, while the other clusters varied in

comparison to the control municipalities. Among the rated institutions, the army and police have higher impacts, although Clusters 25, 27, and 28 do not share that trend.

The survey delved into the management of the JACs, municipal governments, governor's office, and national government in more detail. In that regard, perceptions fell in both the control and treatment municipalities. See the following figure:

Figure 6.9. Trends in the citizens' perceptions of public management

CELI		Control
↓	The municipal government's management is described as good or very good	↓
↓	The administration of the Governor's office is described as good or very good	↓
↓	The national government's management is described as good or very good	↓
↓	Have considerable / a lot of trust in municipal government's commitment to managing a construction project	↓
↓	Have considerable / a lot of trust in the chairman of JAC's management of a construction project	↓

No impact was found for these indicators as is reported in Figure 6.10:

Figure 6.10. Trends in perceptions of the management by the Governor's office and the national government

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
The administration of the Governor's office is described as good or very good	0.0718	0.0223	0.0771	0.0340	-0.0454	-0.34***	0.101	0.0919
Think that the management by the Governor's office has improved in comparison to two years ago	0.0551	-0.0189	0.00365	-0.0300	-0.107*	-0.19***	0.217***	0.0684
The national government's management is described as good or very good	0.190***	0.0365	0.358***	0.167***	-0.0765	0.0272	-0.123*	-0.0464
Think that the management by the national government has improved in comparison to two years ago	0.181***	-0.102**	0.0951*	0.0865***	-0.17***	-0.0557	0.0172	-0.0356

When those surveyed were asked about their perception of governmental management at the departmental and national levels, the trends registered were consistently negative. Nevertheless, there were positive points in some clusters, mainly regarding their views on the national government. This perception declined in absolute terms, but not as much as it did in the controls. As a result, for Clusters 16, 18, and 24, the opinions on the national government showed a significant positive impact among the CELI municipalities. The opinions about the management of the departmental government were closer to the baseline, and thus, the impact was lower. There is one notable exception, Cluster 26, where the opinions about the departmental government fell dramatically.

Coordinated services offered to help victims are provided by different state agencies at the national, regional and municipal levels (UARIV, DPS, ombudsman's offices, and municipal government) and

have been important vehicles for implementing the individual and collective reparation models established in the Victims' Law. While progress has been made in preventing the forced recruitment of minors, there are still large challenges regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the process, as well as delays in humanitarian aid delivery. There is a shortage of communication channels with victims and, in general, the victim registration census process must be improved.

The focus groups said that recovering trust is a gradual process:

They [the population] have already realized that the state has finally succeeded in reaching out to the forgotten rural areas. Well, it became active against different outlaw groups ... already their perspective and their concept ... has improved more than 80%. They know that there are other organizations that have a very specific interest in starting as collaborators, but that is done in coordination with different institutions [...] they are working precisely with Consolidation and Colombia Responde so that they can gain access to these veredas and recover the state's credibility and strengthen those companies, those associations, and those Juntas de Acción Comunal.. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)

There is more confidence because before one couldn't go to speak with a mayor, with someone, one had to ... What was hidden, the groups did not allow you to, if you came to speak with the mayor then you were a snitch. Now you can go, anyone who needs can go and talk to him. (Beneficiaries, Vistahermosa, Meta)

The shortage of permanent UARIV offices in the municipalities and of financial mechanisms for payment of indemnities makes it difficult to serve and provide reparations to the victims:

The Victims Unit and also the Secretariat of Victims had offices here until last week. The attention given is quite slow in coming. Aid is delayed. The notifications that the law supposedly says must be given in less than sixty days never arrive. If the Ombudsman's office does not send a petition of rights, they are delayed. They have been delayed for up to six months. (Ombudsman's Office, La Macarena, Meta)

We had a payment point at the Agrarian Bank here for victims which... Starting that year, the news came from the Victims Unit, "we made an agreement with Davivienda now." It turns out that the municipality does not have a Davivienda here. The Victims Unit established a payment office in San Vicente del Caguán. That meant that the victims in the municipality of La Macarena who get humanitarian aid had to go to San Vicente del Caguán...It is a dirt road; you can easily find yourself at a guerilla group checkpoint. (Ombudsman's Office, La Macarena, Meta)

In the southern region of Tolima, registering and taking a census of victims has been difficult due to the lack of coordination between UARIV and the local governments:

The victims were handled by the Secretariat of Government, the Ombudsman's office before the censuses. Today the victims' database is handled by the Victims Unit at the national or regional level. There is no Victims' Unit in Chaparral. What you find in Chaparral and in municipalities like Chaparral and others around the country are "victims' liaisons," which are the ones placed to link the victims and the Victims' Unit. If not, it turns into an errand-handler with a link as such. In Chaparral, there are about 7 thousand [victims] but this is obviously something unofficial that is for the same Victims' Unit, but that makes it possible for there to be no description here. We tried as a municipality to do it, but it is very complex to develop an internal description of the census because the victims are not interested in that. It's that simple. They are not interested and that way it is very complicated to be able to give better support for the programs. (Government Secretariat, Chaparral, Tolima)

Conclusion 4: Confidence in institutions and their exercise of power has dropped, which has a direct impact on the state's legitimacy as the guarantor and protector of rights. This affects the leadership that is needed to implement the interventions that the state is responsible for, and the

recovery of territory from the hands of armed groups. It also negatively affects the peace process. A failure to honor commitments persists.


Provision of services

CELI has supported the work of local entities to provide services to the community, in particular, in relation to building local technical capabilities and coordinated work:

Well yes, it has obviously been very important [CELI's support] because they are very concerned about development. They support different institutions, us, or rather us with the projects, the court. They try to get all of us to work together. They have also supported the Ombudsman's office. (Government Secretariat, La Macarena, Meta)

Access to state services for the most vulnerable people implies having completed the procedures for obtaining an ID and having been a subject of the survey for (and later registration into) the Identification and Classification System for potential social program Beneficiaries (SISBEN in Spanish), which is the way the GOC seeks to guarantee that the rights of the most vulnerable people in the country are safeguarded. As shown in Figure 6.11 below, the perception that people have an ID is nearly 100%, in addition to 90% responding that vulnerable people who have been given the SISBEN survey. This survey will improve the state's ability to reach the most vulnerable populations.

Figure 6.11. Trends in the registration of citizens for social services



There are no significant changes nor impact attributable to CELI on provision of public services. For the public services below (Figure 6.12), people were asked about access to services, quality, and progress made in the last two years.

Figure 6.12. Trends in access to and quality of public services

	Access (2015)	Change in access	Change in quality	Has it improved in the last two years?
Health outpost			-2%	No
Children under 5 years of age with access to health care services	19%	7%	26%	No
Children between 5 and 11 years of age that attend school	95%	1%	-7%	No
People between 12 and 18 years of age that attend school	77%	9%	-12%	No
Electricity	72%	3%	-1%	No
Propane gas	54%	3%	1%	Yes
Water	45%	-4%	14%	Yes

	Access (2015)	Change in access	Change in quality	Has it improved in the last two years?
Sewer system	21%	1%	11%	Yes
Garbage collection	24%	0%	3%	Yes
Cell phone service	96%	0%	-2%	No

The widespread attitude towards service providers reflects the lack of confidence in governmental entities at all levels. Despite the low scores provision of services received, those surveyed were optimistic. The trend data (Annex 2) show that the people have high expectations for the future, perhaps due to their hopes for the signing of a possible peace agreement. This translates into a positive impact, especially in Clusters 16, 17, and 26. (Figure 6.13)

Figure 6.13. Impact on expectations for improvement in public services in the future

Cluster:	16	17	18	24	25	26	27	28
Will access to health services improve?	0.106**	0.152***	-0.0690	-0.252***	-0.0742	0.232***	0.0115	-0.0205
Will access to education improve?	0.114**	0.0812	-0.0181	-0.238***	-0.0677	0.153***	0.0532	0.0763
Will access to public utilities improve?	0.118**	0.122**	-0.0295	-0.206***	-0.110**	0.184***	0.0319	0.0603
Will the roads to the leading municipality improve?	0.237***	0.134***	0.0289	-0.202***	-0.16***	0.0680	0.215***	0.0390

The pattern for Clusters 18 and 28 has been one of little optimism or high impacts. Clusters 24 and 25 (to a lesser extent) are characterized by their negative impacts.

The Consolidation Index numbers for the public utilities component tend to be lower regarding electricity coverage and more positive in cell phone service. The indicators for social services, in turn, vary depending on the region.

The indicators for education in Caquetá show a slight decline in availability of elementary education (99% to 92%) and high school (84% to 77%), and register a higher rate of dropouts than in 2011. This was largely derived from data from San Vicente del Caguán. Health coverage from the subsidized system went from 89% to 75% and the availability of the mobile health centers in areas without clinics also declined, with Cartagena del Chairá being the worst affected.

The trend for the education numbers in Meta is positive for availability of services, dropout rates, and teacher positions filled, although the increases are relatively small. On average, and with the data adjusted for municipalities, 76% of respondents have access to elementary education, and 65% have access to high school education. Health coverage has declined 22pp since 2011.

Tolima's educational coverage is high, but with a slight drop in primary school access since 2011. Teacher coverage and dropout rates receive a high rating (100%). Health coverage is 96%, and for areas where there are no clinics, coverage declines from 87% to 64%.


Based on the results from the focus groups, the issue of access to quality higher education persists, due not only to problems related to infrastructure and provision of services but also to high costs. Participants also argue that it is difficult to enter the labor market even after obtaining technical or professional degrees:

Colombia Responde established its presence here only 3 years ago, almost 4 years ago. Because Chaparral has been deteriorating for 15, 20 years because there were 6 mayors ... They do not have defined programs. So far [the young people] are thinking like well... - I'll return to the country after I get an education - They still do not have it clear. Yes, there are no opportunities here. There are only very few universities, just 2 or 3.

Yes, because the problem is that you have to study, but one goes around town and it turns out that there are thousands of people studying and the complaint is that they can't get anything, because there is no one to help them find a job. At least I have a girl who graduated from high school. She had finished high school and can't find anything to do because she has to have a university degree or she's toast. There is nothing you can do there, so we are being left alone in the country. That's why, moving forward, struggling to see if they can get ahead, but it turns out that there are many requirements for a job. (Beneficiaries, La Montañita, Caquetá)

The Consolidation Index also measures the availability of electricity services and cell phone reception. The data show a decline in electrical service and a growing coverage of cell phone reception, although service in Caquetá reached only 44% at its highest point (2014). Tolima is the lowest in availability of electricity, declining from 44% to 41% over the four years of data collection.

Figure 6.14. Secondary data: Availability of electricity (left) and cell phone (right)



Source: Consolidation Index, authors' calculations

Conclusion 5: The provision of public services remains low – at levels that do not guarantee the full enjoyment of rights. Although it is true that the availability of public services reported in the official data is high (with the exception of the sewer system, handling of garbage, and final waste disposal), according to those surveyed, there have been negative changes in access to and quality of the services provided. Improving the capability of the local institutional structure should continue to be a priority, as well as guaranteeing budgetary efficiency and suitable municipal planning processes.

Victims' rights

The percentage of households in the Central region where a member of the family has experienced a human rights violation went from 5% at baseline to 7.6% at midline. The only variable that shows the impact of citizens' perceptions of state entities responsible for violations is a 17pp decline in the indicator. Those surveyed in the Central region, however, are more inclined to do nothing when their rights are violated (17pp) or not tell anyone. In absolute terms, they are more likely to start an action for fundamental rights protection, but with respect to the baseline, less inclined to take their case to the courts.

From the point of view of the Consolidation Index, and in terms of human rights and victimization, only one municipality in Caquetá has a human rights committee. Four municipalities in Tolima have committees, as do six municipalities in Meta, where five of them are still partially functioning. These data show that there were no massacres and political homicides in the three departments in 2014.

Displacement is trending downward in the three departments, even though close to 3,200 people were displaced in Tolima, 4,500 in Caquetá, and 1,300 in Meta in 2014. Incidents with landmines were still a critical issue in 2014 in Mesetas, Uribe and Vistahermosa (Meta); La Montañita (Caquetá); and Chaparral and Planadas (Tolima). There was a case of kidnaping for ransom in Vistahermosa, Meta, one in San Vicente del Caguán in Caquetá and one in Chaparral, Tolima.

Recommendations

Maintain the credibility of political participation's processes and mechanisms and empower communities and their new leaders (conclusions 1 and 2)

In support of the implementation of Statutory Act 1475/2011, CELI must encourage the application of those norms oriented towards reinforcing gender equality for participation in political activities, representation, and access to electoral debates. Interventions should foster participation and political activity to bring about consolidation and generate proposals that mobilize the electorate towards strengthening democracy.

This includes strengthening political participation through social organizations and improving expertise on the best channels for political participation and influence on public administration, as was done on the ADAM project. These strategies would help to provide support for the following:

Help young people and women in the rural areas to get their ID documents and get registered on the electoral rolls.

Promote women's organizations to further their participation in all of the spheres of public life.

Use schools as sites for training, discussing, and fostering values, practices, and democratic institutions among children and young people in general, with a special emphasis on the importance of the elections.

Support reinforcing transparency laws for political parties to prevent the undue concentration of power.

Coordinate CELI with the country's strategies for transparency and accountability

(conclusions 3, 4, 5, and 6) Support the National Strategy for a Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Public Policy and the right to have access to public information. CELI (or other future USAID

programs) requires action that is organized, decisive, sustainable, and coordinated with the government's inter-institutional activity.

Use new tools in the effort to improve the provision of services (conclusions 3, 4, and 5)
CELI's challenge is to continue strengthening local governments in order to improve the provision of the municipal and departmental services. Decentralization is a national, constitutional initiative, but, at the municipal level, capacity is low and finances are limited. Therefore, it is necessary to reinforce citizen participation and have information that is relevant from the demand point of view. Pilot projects should be emphasized that involve civil society and supporting local governments with permanent technical assistance. Tools such as "score charts" and other measures to get citizens to rate the changes in the provision of services are very useful for improvement.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation question: What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?

Findings and conclusions

Social capital: Trust


The index of social capital is composed of trust (60 points) and participation (40 points – see the next section under the Social Capital heading), for a total of 100 points. Trust was identified at different levels: family, neighbors, friends, the JAC, legal and state oversight bodies, development institutions, municipal and national government, and the police and military.

For the measurement, it should be mentioned that several of the factors that affect the index are being handled by cooperation programs, including CELI, and should be considered indicators of contextual conditions. Nevertheless, an analysis of the CELI subcomponents makes it possible to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the social capital index.

In the CELI Central municipalities the index rose with respect to the baseline, while the trend is stable in the control municipalities. This resulted in a 1.6pp impact attributable to CELI. The subcomponent of participation in CELI municipalities went from 6 to 8 points (over 40) while the score for confidence fell slightly, going from 17.7 to 16.3, (over 60). This was less than in the control zones.

When the results of the survey are reviewed, they report a decline in confidence compared to the baseline. The greatest difference is in the commitment value of help from neighbors in the face of possible difficulties (declining from 26% to 20%). The tradition of working as a group to do community projects was reported by 52% of the households and decreased 5% vis-à-vis the baseline. When this tradition is reviewed in control groups, it declined from 59% to 48%. This shows no evidence of CELI impact. (Figure 7.1)

Figure 7.1. Trends in confidence at the community level



Those surveyed are optimistic about the future of their relationships and their feelings of trust in their communities. However, some control municipalities were even more positive. Looking at the cluster results, this resulted in some negative and some positive impacts. When asked about their feelings regarding the evolution of their relationships in the future, those in Clusters 18 and 24 saw these relationships as worsening at the significant levels of 15pp and 18pp respectively. Only Clusters 16 and 26 saw these relationships as better with a positive impact of 15pp. The other four clusters had no significant impact compared to their controls.

The stigmatization, as reported in the focus groups, is notable due to its association with confidence in the communities:

Unfortunately, the settlers in the municipality of La Macarena never asked the national government to declare this municipality a demilitarized zone ... We are left with that stigma, that the settlers are the municipality of La Macarena. What there is there is guerrilla ... Here there are small farmers. There are families of victims here. Here also the scourge of war has touched them. Even so, the national government, through, like... that entity [Incofer] that continues stigmatizing the people, continues stigmatizing the small farmers and preventing them from generating productive projects or developing the land. (Government Secretariat, La Macarena, Meta)

Nevertheless, progress in security conditions in the municipality has made it possible to participate in community initiatives and feel pride in and ties to their region:

I like all the parts, let's say the pretty parts in Vistahermosa. You know, we have Caño Cristales which is among the seven wonders of the world. The tourist spots that Vistahermosa has, that we can take a lot of advantage of and preserve them, I like that, and the peace that we have now. (Beneficiaries, Vistahermosa, Meta)

The contribution of the association projects as promoters of coexistence and tolerance among neighbors, families, and community is highlighted:

I reiterate, the organizational topic, if we think as a group, because we are actually forgetting that this society is a mixture, that we all have a relationship and a shared relationship. Nobody here is [alone], if we learn to live together, rather than to compete ... We are not independent but rather we are interdependent in many ways. We are able to learn to get along. That is basic. (Beneficiary, La Montañita, Caquetá)

Conclusion 1: Community confidence has dropped. The confidence levels among members of communities have decreased, which reduces mutual support among members and their ability to work together. This phenomenon affects association activities. One of the causes that is indicated is stigmatization. In the case study of La Macarena, for example, settlers in some municipalities were stigmatized as "guerrillos" and the settlers in other municipalities as "paracos".

Social capital: Participation in associations


CELI Central supported and reinforced different types of associations. A series of interventions were carried out that focused on existing grassroots organizations, such as the JACs, which are the main forum in the municipalities for participation in public life and, in addition, created or strengthened productive associations. Another objective was to support victims' and cultural associations in the intervention areas, which function as a way of building confidence, collective identity, and belonging in the territories, rooted in the community's intangible heritage.

CELI measures organizational development through the Index of Organizational Capacity (ICO in Spanish), a tool that is designed and adapted to register changes in a few key organizational elements. Between 2011 and 2014, CELI showed a growth of more than 20 points (out of 100), which generated a 40 to 60-point improvement on average. Nevertheless, CELI implementers still encounter restrictions: "when we put aside this tool," said a team member, "we will finally have the freedom we need to work more on what these organizations need." Another team member described ICO as a USAID requirement that made gathering information difficult and was more focused on the internal workings of the organization than the external. This is necessary to generate income, which is what CELI recommends in practice. In that regard, CELI's appropriation of that

tool is limited. At the same time, CELI reported that they were able to focus on important aspects, such as how to make the producer associations be partners in businesses and managers of their companies rather than just producers of a product.


As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the index of participation in community associations shows a slight rise from the baseline, going from 6 to 8 points (over 40). The JACs remained the mechanism with the highest profile in spite of the decline reported in household participation with respect to the baseline (from 88% to 78%). Likewise, the increase in associations of fathers with families or voluntary groups who are also gaining ground as mechanisms for community relationships is notable. CELI's positive effect is shown in engaging the participation of those surveyed in associations. This participation generally shows a rising trend with respect to what was reported at baseline. (Figure 7.2)

Figure 7.2. Trends in the reported association mechanisms



When the results are compared to the decision-making process, consistent progress is seen for all of the participation mechanisms with respect to what was reported at baseline. The groups that, to a larger extent, succeeded in getting their members to actively participate in decision-making are the victims' organizations (increasing from 4% to 25%), and the producer or marketing associations (increasing from 22% to 47%). (Figure 7.3)

Figure 7.3. Trends in active decision-making in the mechanisms of working together




In addition, according to the data reported, a general trend is seen for household participation in the decisions of their associations to improve, which is demonstrated by the rise in this type of participation compared to the baseline (from 9% and 30%).

The Consolidation Index shows a significant decline in organization activity in Caquetá, with its report that the percentage of organizations that renewed their certificate of incorporation at the Chamber of Commerce went from 82% to 61% and the indicator for active JACs improved, going from 40 to 68 points. Meta did not show data for 2014, but in 2013, 90% of the organizations were active and in 2014, 100% of JACs were active. Tolima reported only 22% of the organizations as active in 2014, which is lower than the 73% the previous year. About 82% of the JACs in Tolima were reported as active.

Another positive finding is the perceived use of these mechanisms for households where there is a generalized trend – much more than there was on the baseline – that participating in some social organization is good for obtaining various benefits. These trends appear in both the CELI and control municipalities and show the value that these organizational processes have in building social fabric.

Figure 7.4. Trends in active decision-making in the mechanisms of working together




A key issue is the perception of CELI's assistance facing associations related to economic development, which has implications for the economic rationale of families and communities. However, there are still goals to achieve in this regard:

Another aspect is that the projects for these organizations have been deeply cut. Why? Because they always ask that the projects they get be association projects. Our society, our community in Vistahermosa, we don't have the education to work collectively yet. So I've always said, well, send them to us as associated, but here we will divide them up. If they give us 100 hens and if there are 100 people and they donate 100 hens to us, each person is going to be responsible for that hen and in this we've really had a tremendous failure. (Social Organization Leader, Vistahermosa, Meta)

Nevertheless, the positive benefits must be contrasted with the poor teamwork results, perceived as the biggest problem with joining associations (56%, slightly worse than at baseline). The authorities are likewise warned that they are required to facilitate the organizational processes, an issue that showed an increase of 2% compared to what was reported at baseline. Other challenges in the organizational processes dropped in importance from the baseline to the midline evaluations (see the following figure).

Figure 7.5. Trends in the reported challenges of belonging to social organizations



A factor that affects the practice of associating and effective participation has to do with customs and the effect of the conflict:

The people who have grown up with the conflict and subversion have great difficulty getting away from them, away from that ideology, that there is another possibility with filing complaints, that it's necessary to complain, it's necessary to say no more. Actually, the municipality of La Montañita still has lots of roots, lots of roots from those former parents, so subversion still really influences the community, considerably in spite of the law. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, Caquetá)

Conclusion 2: The region saw an increase in the quality and quantity of participation, although the increase in the latter was slight with many data supporting the value of participating and its benefits for the community. CELI has succeeded in increasing the participation of families in the formation of associations that result in perceived benefits for the families. In general, participation in decision-making through these participatory mechanisms has been strengthened. It is notable that teamwork has been the feature that is most commonly considered a weakness.

Specific role of Community Action Councils (JACs in Spanish)

CELI Central developed a deep commitment to work with JACs in generating technical capacity to improve their effectiveness. CELI trained individual JACs from the community and the associations that combine multiple JACs. For example, in southern Tolima, CELI Central worked to strengthen the management of 633 JACs by training them in project development, empowerment, hiring, and access to public services. The training was transformative for the JAC participants in Tolima, where the head of the JACs got the opportunity to test their new skills in meetings with the local and national governments to pressure them to implement projects prioritized in the Development Plans.

CELI Central turned to the JACs as implementers for improvement and maintenance of the tertiary roads, especially in Meta and Caquetá. CELI has raised approximately USD \$879,000 for labor, food and housing for the workforce, and these funds have also been used to leverage additional funds from the communities themselves. The JACs have taken on the responsibility for managing

and fulfilling the terms of the contracts, which is providing them with experience in community management and infrastructure maintenance.

Participation in JACs in the municipalities has declined between the baseline and the midline (from 88% to 78%), even though their participation in decision-making increased (from 31% to 43%). The patterns are similar in control zones. As a result, no impact is seen.

The participants recognize the importance of the JACs as a first step in resolving conflicts among neighbors. In addition, they are responsible for creating an environment of coexistence in the community:

[In the JAC] we have a Conciliation Committee. First, is tolerance, brother. If you don't tolerate your neighbor, then you end up in a bad situation. There the process is [first] the Community Action Council, the Association Committee when you can no longer put up with your neighbor, maybe there is Committee... because there will be a fine or something ... Usually, most cases are solved there, between neighbors. (Beneficiaries, La Montañita, Caquetá)

CELI's support for the JACs has enabled greater empowerment and communication and has made the community interested in participating in community processes:

There has been more support ... The community is more awake ... They are now informed. They have already figured out that: listen, that international cooperation – look at what they gave us. And that is something else, it's another thing since it was only for some veredas. Then they started to say: Come on, and why did they leave me out? I need to be there too. What should I do? (Women's Organization, Chaparral, Tolima)

Conclusion 3: Despite the decline in the number of associations registered in the Chamber of Commerce, the JACs are still the mechanism most respondents looked to for stimulating the formation of associations. Where the security situation allows, and where the JACs have the people's confidence, this type of organization is the nucleus of political life and participation in the *veredas*. In these cases, the JACs play a central role in giving access to what is available in terms of political participation, building infrastructure, and social control.

Support for producer associations

The support CELI Central gave the producer associations was delivered on different fronts: technical assistance and training, support for marketing and relationships with the public and private sectors, and financial services to support production and marketing. According to what a member of the CELI team said: “the approach has increasingly been to empower and mobilize associations of small producers and increase private sector investment in rural communities in order to create economic opportunities for stakeholders in the community within the context of legal markets and the rule of law.”

CELI Central worked with 21 producer associations on AgroColombia activities with respect to administrative and accounting topics, according to CELI's COR. This included support for rules and norms for managing rotating funds, a culture of teamwork and leadership, financial education, and 1,114 financial products provided by the associations' rotating funds. Young people were also invited to the training sessions to create the conditions for sustainability, and the CELI facilitated the opening of a bank branch where there had been no financial services before.

In order to plan the interventions, it is interesting to review the reasons why families join associations. After the interventions, the results of the survey reveal a similarity between the treatment and the control groups, whose perceptions are focused on the need to be trained within the community, have representation as a group, seek financing, and transport and sell their products, thereby creating economies of scale. Although the results are equivalent, this is attributed to the positive impact of CELI on encouraging common training frameworks. This variable had the highest growth (from 11% to 22%), and the sale of products and the presentation of projects to obtain financing grew 6% and 10% respectively (see Figure 5.9).

In the focus groups, participants believe that it is essential to join an association in order to get financing. This partially coincides with the quantitative information:

The state and the government give us aid, but we have to be associated or, if not, there is nothing. So it is something that we should be aware of that today, for a long time now, the thing is to join an association in order to receive the aid that the government is giving. (Beneficiaries Focus Group, Vistahermosa, Meta)

The government's support models foster creating associations in order to get access to resources, according to the beneficiaries:

Year after year there were more and more associations and today there are like 72, 76, something like that ... Every time they come from the Ministry or from any governmental entity to give us training, they always emphasize that if we don't join an association, then we won't get resources. So that's why people are so tremendously into associations. There are associations of 10, 18, 20 people. (Beneficiaries, Vistahermosa, Meta)

I belong to an association that, as my friend said, we are organizing. Two years ago we started to found it. There are 49 people. But so we have not yet seen any help at all because we are starting. We are beginning to see how... because since many entities have told us that you can no longer receive any help or anything, if you don't belong to an association, So, we have found ourselves forced to participate in an association. (Group of Beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima)

However, the benefits of association models are recognized. CELI's resources have served to reinforce the associations from an administrative and technical point of view:

I am thankful because the resources allocated were actually not used for purchasing supplies but for everything that had to do with managing the project. In other words, Colombia Responde funds were used to pay for one year of technical assistance. They paid for one person involved in the business-and-partnership area. (Association, La Macarena, Meta)

The exchanges of experiences with other productive associations are recognized positively and remembered with gratitude, not only because of the increase in economic capacities, but also the sharing of social reinforcement experiences:

They gave us a trip to Cartagena de Indias ... to exchange ideas with people that had already begun working much longer ago. We went to Montes de Maria, which is very advanced there, and very good, I love it ... In Córdoba, we were also in La Libertad. There are some huge schools. Those kids are very well prepared. Another thing that I liked very much there was the attention given to old people. Here we, the old people, are abandoned. There no, there the old people are the ones who dance, sing, the ones who laugh, everything. There it is like that, they give them a lot of participation, but not here. (Cacao Farmers' Association, La Montañita, Caquetá)

Conclusion 4: The economic rationale is an incentive for associating. The economic rationale

is an incentive to join associations and face the logistical challenges of transportation and sale of products. CELI has had a positive impact on creating a common framework for training, sales of products, and seeking financing for projects. CELI is recognized for its ability to provide technical assistance and make associations more sustainable.

Conclusion 5: The formation of associations is critical for all of CELI's components that should favor cooperation and not competition. CELI has encouraged associations by enhancing the effectiveness of the JACs as advocates for coexistence and as partners in administrative issues and technical assistance. They also exchange experiences with other productive associations, reinforce associations of small producers, empower women and young people, and make resources available for association to present their projects.

Women's and victims' associations

The participation of women declined, according to the quantitative data. Household participation in women's groups went from 8% to 4%. In addition, the survey reflects the low participation rate of women in politics, with only 1% of mayors being women. However, in terms of their leadership in the JACs, there is an increase from 19% to 24%.

The participants in focus groups believe that the women's role is critical:

In the municipality, because of the leadership that I have ... I gather them, some gentlemen also, because men also have their rights violated, but it has been very productive. All the training that [CELI] gives us through other people, has served me even to educate my children because sometimes one, with so much conflict, sometimes those who carry the dead, as the saying goes, are our children so in that sense my organization has changed a lot. (Victims' Association, Vistahermosa, Meta)

Female participation in the electoral process has also improved:

We have 32 women running for the Council ... from different associations and from different political parties. Someone said we were the filling, but if they said so ... But, look, that quota law was turned against them because we see all 32 women in politics and selling the idea. And one sees that the women are very confident that they will be supported and will be elected ... They have proposals and they already have it clear. In other words, these women clearly understand already that it is necessary to be part of the Council and that we have to participate. A woman from Calarma was also strengthened by Colombia Responde and ran for the Council ... She was trained in politics. She came to a training class given by "More Women, More Democracy," I think that was the name of the program, and there she began to feel empowered. (Leader, Women's Organization, Chaparral, Tolima)

One of the axes of the training supported by CELI Central was the gender and youth topic, which generates empowerment for these two social groups in the community:

There was a program where these two axes worked together: one was boys, girls, adolescents, and young people, and the other was women. In other words, they worked on the same project ... We worked with a diagnosis for this community which will serve the municipality for public policies on women and young people. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, Caquetá)

Conclusion 6: Women can be critical and influential stakeholders in conflict resolution and the peace process, and the qualitative results show significant efforts in this respect. However, their participation in political leadership and families' participation in women's groups dropped in quantitative terms. The women have not succeeded in getting positions in spite of the importance of their roles in their communities. An increase in leadership of JACs is the only thing observed.

Cultural associations

The areas of culture, sports, and other group activities for social development are gaining terrain as a result of associations. When the results of family participation in these activities is reviewed, an increase compared to the baseline can be seen (from 41% to 49%), thus a better position compared to other mechanisms was gained. The members are increasingly active in the decision-making process. A review of the control municipalities revealed that CELI had an impact on the increase in cultural activities but not in the sense of decision-making scenarios. In the qualitative analysis, CELI support for cultural activities was not evident although the participants referred to the importance of these activities:

La Macarena holds two annual events. One is called Fiesta del Campesino and the other is called Fiesta de la Velloussea. It is the municipality's native flower. It is a party ... where the llanero folklore, the joropodromo, is strengthened a lot. Troubadours come, everything that has to do with the plains region. (Productive Association, La Macarena, Meta)

They felt important. That's what we need. Because here there is classical dance, bambuco, guabina, and so on. And there is a school for that. There is a school for theater plays, but it needs to get more support for that. Now, it is necessary and here there is a lot of talent, a lot. I don't know if it is because of natural character. Yes, in Chaparral we are deeply into this, we like it. But here you see girls with extraordinary voices, boys with talent ... But no, there is so much talent wasted, yes, so much. It would be great if it were done like that here and that area were strengthened. (Women's Organization, Chaparral, Tolima)

Conclusion 7: The development of sports and cultural activities is a mechanism for generating resilience. Communities and other groups recognize that these activities encourage coexistence, respect, and solidarity. Nevertheless, neither institutional backing nor sustainable support are evident for formation processes, use of free time, work preparation, or generation of productive and social projects. Regional cultural traditions strengthen these activities.

Recommendations

Adapt programming to build confidence (conclusions 1 and 5 and the related section in the chapter on Institutional Development) The decline in the indicators of trust in the government, in neighbors, and in the community cannot be solved exclusively by cooperative projects. It is essential to continue efforts to find mechanisms to link communities to each other and to the government with the support of coordinated interventions from international agencies. Taking advantage of the good relationships and credibility that USAID program implementation partners have with the associations and communities is key to generating trust in institutions.

There are demonstrable benefits to association models that favor dialogue and duplicate communities' implicit knowledge, including anchoring their identity and improving project management. Any initiative, strategy, intention, and action that CELI or another cooperation program devises to increase collaboration is key to the consolidation of the democratic state and the sustainable construction of peace. CELI must recognize and coordinate national efforts that have been defined for the participation of young people and generation of opportunities as defined in CONPES 173/2014 and the participation of women as defined by CONPES 3784/2013, which gives guidelines for risk prevention, protection, and guaranteeing the rights of women who are victims of the armed conflict.

Associations should foster cooperation and not competition. Therefore, it is important to review models that were historically used to encourage cooperation beyond the North American model. The incentive to access government resources encourages the creation of social organizations that may not necessarily meet their stated objectives and may not be sustainable. The design and implementation of monitoring systems should be a task that will guarantee, first, the sustainability of the organizations and, second, the adaptation of new productive models.

Increase collaboration with households headed by women by using participatory models (conclusions 2, 4, 5, and 6) With respect to participation, the positive results seen in male headed households should be extended to female headed households. Male heads of household take advantage of what is offered by both cooperative agencies and the state, and this can be duplicated to mobilize female heads of household. Their vulnerability may require different empowerment strategies, such as the provision of childcare when there are meetings or offering to have meetings when they have free time.

Furthermore, those that already participate in organizations for victims, for women or other groups can serve as guides for other women thinking about joining these organizations. Likewise, the leaders of community associations and other groups whose commitment and participation already represent high levels of social stability serve as a resource for accomplishing this objective. CELI should continue to investigate different ways of using this association leadership resource in the final months of their interventions and conduct outreach activities with community members whose behavior indicates a growing isolation.

Continue to reinforce the JACs to bring about their development and consolidation (conclusion 3) The current norm allows for the creation of multiple mechanisms for reinforcing the role of the JACs as conflict resolution agents. That is how the JACs have been expected to encourage reconciliation and develop peace. The work the JACs do to implement infrastructure projects (tertiary roads with a participatory component, for example), manage community radio stations, and perform oversight and monitoring of public policies could be effective for strengthening the social fabric. The main report on the evaluation specifically recommends adapting the ICO-VEO instrument for the JACs and, along with other steps, making the results public to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of their communities.

Reinforce cultural and sports initiatives to encourage peaceful communities (conclusion 7) Culture and sports bring people and communities together. The dynamics of the conflict have affected the communities across multiple dimensions, including the destruction of social bonds, trust, integration, and respect for others. CELI's intervention should be aligned with the programs offered through the communication, culture, and innovation strategy that the Ministry of Culture has been implementing since June 2016 regarding issues of cultural diversity, access to information, communication skills, participatory citizenship, and education and innovation in communication and culture.

In the sports sector, USAID programming should be coordinated with Coldeportes' Program for Coexistence and Peace, which seeks to provide children and young people with sports activities in order to improve coexistence, prevent violence, encourage respect for human rights, and build peace to enhance participation through proper emotional control and conflict resolution.


ANNEX I: CLUSTER-LEVEL RESULTS, LIST EXPERIMENT

List experiment results in this annex are presented by cluster, which are:


Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
16	Chaparral, Rioblanco (Tolima)	San Antonio (Tolima)
17	Planadas (Tolima)	Ortega (Tolima)
18	Ataco (Tolima)	Balboa (Cauca)
24	Vistahermosa (Meta)	Mapiripán (Meta)
25	Puerto Rico (Meta)	Orito (Putumayo)
26	Mesetas, San Juan de Arama (Meta)	San José del Fragua (Caquetá)
27	La Uribe, La Macarena (Meta)	Puerto Caicedo (Putumayo)
28	Montañita, Cartagena del Chaira, San Vicente del Caguan (Caquetá)	Lejanías (Meta)

Results are shown for the question on contact with illegal armed groups, and then for contact with illicit crops. For the region and then for each cluster, three graphs are presented. The first shows the results at baseline, the second at midline, and the third shows the impact, if any, using the differences in differences calculation. As will be seen across the graphs, there is an overall diminution of respondent reports that they have contact with either illegal armed groups or with illicit crops, in many cases approaching zero at midline. However, this trend crosses the treatment (CELI) and control sites, and as such, the trend cannot be attributed to any intervention.

Central Region: Contact with armed groups




Central Region: Contact with illicit crops




Central Region, Cluster 16

Contact with armed groups






Contact with illicit crops






Central Region, Cluster 17

Contact with armed groups




Contact with illicit crops




Central Region, Cluster 18

Contact with armed groups






Contact with illicit crops






Central Region, Cluster 24


Contact with armed groups




Contact with illicit crops



Central Region, Cluster 25 Contact with armed groups




Contact with illicit crops




Central Region, Cluster 26

Contact with armed groups




Contact with illicit crops




Central Region, Cluster 27

Contact with armed groups




Contact with illicit crops




Central Region, Cluster 28

Contact with armed groups



Contact with illicit crops



ANNEX 2: DATA TABLES, CLUSTER

This annex presents data tables for the clusters that make up the Central region sample. These clusters are:

Cluster	Treatment municipality(s)	Control municipality(s)
16	Chaparral, Rioblanco (Tolima)	San Antonio (Tolima)
17	Planadas (Tolima)	Ortega (Tolima)
18	Ataco (Tolima)	Balboa (Cauca)
24	Vistahermosa (Meta)	Mapiripán (Meta)
25	Puerto Rico (Meta)	Orito (Putumayo)
26	Mesetas, San Juan de Arama (Meta)	San José del Fragua (Caquetá)
27	La Uribe, La Macarena (Meta)	Puerto Caicedo (Putumayo)
28	Montañita, Cartagena del Chaira, San Vicente del Caguan (Caquetá)	Lejanías (Meta)

Cluster 16

CELI: Chaparral, Rioblanco (Tolima)

Control: San Antonio (Tolima)

Variable	Cluster 16				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,268	0,275	0,082	0,170	-0.0629
The family is experiencing hunger	0,150	0,085	0,381	0,293	-0.00137
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,316	0,238	0,907	0,517	0.302***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,772	0,816	0,881	0,654	0.308***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,969	0,940	0,021	0,071	-0.0806***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,010	0,021	0,000	0,025	-0.0111
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,696	0,728	0,701	0,272	0.453***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,144	0,137	0,160	0,160	-0.0341
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	401773	409384	413144	491679	-50,832
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,562	0,522	0,351	0,140	0.160***
Have a checking account	0,036	0,076	0,067	0,221	-0.101**
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,289	0,476	0,392	0,331	0.298***
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,613	0,631	0,515	0,527	0.0341
Currently have debt	0,748	0,815	0,770	0,845	-0.0156
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,197	0,353	0,353	0,455	0.0431
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,186	0,329	0,274	0,128	0.268***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,057	0,142	0,057	0,254	-0.104**
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,031	0,104	0,062	0,043	0.0867***
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,021	0,043	0,062	0,046	0.0362
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,159	0,306	0,236	0,284	0.0874
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,547	0,603	0,392	0,508	-0.0540
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,262	0,361	0,258	0,264	0.0718
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,201	0,223	0,077	0,037	0.0551
The national government runs well or very well	0,416	0,466	0,420	0,282	0.190***
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,221	0,283	0,176	0,040	0.181***
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
TRUST (a lot or very much)					
The departmental government	0,136	0,154	0,173	0,193	-0.00467
The national government	0,192	0,246	0,242	0,212	0.0715
Justice sector institutions	0,116	0,161	0,160	0,168	0.00612
Alternative justice institutions	0,218	0,274	0,180	0,187	0.0262
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,255	0,254	0,349	0,223	0.118**
Social organizations and NGOs	0,213	0,146	0,119	0,144	-0.0997*
Training centers	0,434	0,542	0,542	0,491	0.170**
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,165	0,259	0,154	0,179	0.0370
The municipal council	0,160	0,189	0,140	0,190	-0.0265
The national police	0,204	0,206	0,377	0,267	0.116**
The army	0,264	0,367	0,419	0,349	0.194***
The navy	0,263	0,245	0,217	0,200	0.0118
The municipal personería	0,205	0,249	0,124	0,205	-0.0341
The mayor's office	0,167	0,326	0,234	0,346	0.0286
The JAC	0,518	0,553	0,335	0,454	-0.0861

SECURITY	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,301	0,279	0,273	0,267	-0.0363
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,912	0,888	0,907	0,695	0.193***
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,057	0,125	0,077	0,025	0.104**
Illegal armed groups	0,245	0,318	0,015	0,041	0.0396
Antipersonnel mines	0,113	0,102	0,010	0,013	-0.0135
Displacement	0,094	0,102	0,015	0,015	-0.000264
Forced disappearances	0,038	0,011	0,062	0,018	0.0110
Extortion	0,075	0,068	0,057	0,018	0.0373
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,774	0,591	0,216	0,094	-0.0937
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,000	0,005	0,015	-0.0186
Sexual violence	0,000	0,011	0,005	0,015	-0.00352
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,727	0,776	0,722	0,835	-0.0478
There is police presence	0,263	0,331	0,052	0,081	0.0565
The police here are good or very good	0,114	0,222	0,200	0,313	0.0162
The police have improved in the last two years	0,023	0,087	0,100	0,094	0.0796
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,005	0,029	0,005	0,005	0.0210
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,005	0,040	0,005	0,029	0.0116
<i>(Agree or strongly agree)</i>					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,979	0,939	0,689	0,620	0.0460
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,979	0,959	0,693	0,610	0.0766
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,990	0,954	0,699	0,500	0.198***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,979	0,956	0,690	0,639	0.0461
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,926	0,886	0,698	0,855	-0.177***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,655	0,753	0,933	0,924	0.120**
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,639	0,725	0,928	0,888	0.141***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,598	0,723	0,938	0,926	0.146***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,649	0,761	0,954	0,962	0.0983**
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,500	0,580	0,964	0,934	0.106**
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,485	0,588	0,969	0,949	0.114**
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,464	0,560	0,969	0,952	0.118**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,464	0,669	0,974	0,941	0.237***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,443	0,598	0,959	0,934	0.153***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,500	0,560	0,969	0,936	0.0837*
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,940	0,908	0,944	0,858	0.0595

Cluster 17

CELI: Planadas (Tolima)

Control:Ortega (Tolima)

Variable	Cluster 17				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,251	0,289	0,192	0,183	0.0463
The family is experiencing hunger	0,153	0,041	0,463	0,226	0.121**
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,312	0,215	0,975	0,459	0.421***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,921	0,769	0,719	0,698	-0.132**
Productive activities earn very little money	0,861	0,964	0,015	0,038	0.0966***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,005	0,013	0,010	0,033	-0.0147
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,793	0,589	0,803	0,515	0.0570
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,241	0,127	0,286	0,173	-0.00143
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	311857	521138	333448	503355	48,800
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,424	0,617	0,187	0,604	-0.227***
Have a checking account	0,020	0,076	0,020	0,183	-0.105***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,424	0,437	0,424	0,693	-0.257***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,458	0,769	0,345	0,764	-0.0833
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,538	0,855	0,814	0,894	0.195***
Currently have debt	0,670	0,881	0,379	0,825	-0.224***
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,130	0,224	0,061	0,116	0.0589
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,195	0,216	0,020	0,090	-0.0337
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,030	0,117	0,074	0,107	0.0521
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,069	0,086	0,020	0,030	-0.00703
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,039	0,033	0,010	0,028	-0.0220
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,133	0,133	0,055	0,119	-0.0618
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,436	0,574	0,363	0,499	0.0293
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,361	0,430	0,250	0,326	0.0223
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,193	0,256	0,057	0,130	-0.0189
The national government runs well or very well	0,420	0,433	0,335	0,316	0.0365
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,232	0,234	0,058	0,153	-0.102**
TRUST (a lot or very much)					
The departmental government	0,183	0,178	0,197	0,158	0.0439
The national government	0,246	0,235	0,270	0,195	0.107*
Justice sector institutions	0,208	0,142	0,182	0,158	-0.0262
Alternative justice institutions	0,242	0,262	0,150	0,193	0.00324
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,276	0,338	0,231	0,380	-0.0389
Social organizations and NGOs	0,261	0,198	0,207	0,247	-0.0958
Training centers	0,560	0,506	0,550	0,592	-0.0807
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,201	0,209	0,194	0,290	-0.0827
The municipal council	0,167	0,136	0,154	0,145	-0.0196
The national police	0,232	0,151	0,383	0,195	0.116**
The army	0,452	0,269	0,488	0,327	-0.0161
The navy	0,456	0,239	0,219	0,255	-0.259***
The municipal personería	0,255	0,195	0,144	0,225	-0.145**
The mayor's office	0,199	0,182	0,165	0,154	-0.00462
The JAC	0,477	0,523	0,348	0,507	-0.0837

SECURITY	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,215	0,339	0,202	0,384	-0.0351
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,862	0,820	0,842	0,904	-0.109**
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,028	0,098	0,030	0,023	0.0794**
Illegal armed groups	0,111	0,348	0,020	0,043	0.236***
Antipersonnel mines	0,000	0,098	0,000	0,015	0.0689***
Displacement	0,069	0,065	0,020	0,028	-0.0206
Forced disappearances	0,042	0,022	0,000	0,018	-0.0417*
Extortion	0,069	0,098	0,025	0,063	-0.0275
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,806	0,652	0,355	0,152	0.00425
Forced recruitment	0,014	0,022	0,000	0,008	-0.00238
Sexual violence	0,000	0,043	0,020	0,008	0.0557**
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,645	0,766	0,621	0,784	0.00577
There is police presence	0,291	0,305	0,163	0,102	0.0654
The police here are good or very good	0,291	0,148	0,242	0,342	-0.196
The police have improved in the last two years	0,091	0,017	0,121	0,154	-0.0621
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,015	0,000	0,005	0,021	-0.0338**
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda	0,035	0,005	0,000	0,008	-0.0302**
<i>(Agree or strongly agree)</i>					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,975	0,969	0,668	0,763	-0.102**
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,980	0,961	0,688	0,769	-0.102**
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,975	0,974	0,620	0,762	-0.144***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,964	0,966	0,731	0,799	-0.0520
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,948	0,960	0,800	0,879	-0.0772*
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,739	0,777	0,906	0,871	0.0555
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,719	0,754	0,916	0,865	0.0708
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,719	0,766	0,941	0,911	0.0694
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,768	0,764	0,980	0,891	0.0723
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,591	0,619	0,975	0,822	0.152***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,670	0,650	0,975	0,865	0.0812
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,616	0,629	0,961	0,820	0.122**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,606	0,668	0,961	0,878	0.134***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,670	0,635	0,956	0,863	0.0462
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,635	0,563	0,926	0,868	-0.0264
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,874	0,941	0,921	0,946	0.0554*

Cluster 18

CELI: Ataco (Tolima)

Control: Balboa (Cauca)

Variable	Cluster 18				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,359	0,268	0,117	0,142	-0.103**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,063	0,141	0,330	0,294	0.112**
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,393	0,309	0,883	0,641	0.170***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,951	0,826	0,772	0,757	-0.109**
Productive activities earn very little money	0,835	0,936	0,136	0,013	0.239***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,136	0,010	0,000	0,035	-0.158***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,908	0,739	0,782	0,658	-0.0368
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,214	0,190	0,325	0,311	0.0150
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	181748	398176	274345	469722	39,995
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,447	0,501	0,495	0,420	0.122**
Have a checking account	0,005	0,053	0,049	0,134	-0.0437
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,325	0,362	0,257	0,620	-0.361***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,403	0,648	0,510	0,714	0.0208
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,675	0,777	0,781	0,773	0.103
Currently have debt	0,626	0,759	0,476	0,719	-0.133**
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,163	0,221	0,112	0,075	0.0961**
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,137	0,188	0,122	0,036	0.128***
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,150	0,096	0,087	0,063	-0.0290
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,078	0,041	0,092	0,020	0.0223
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,049	0,025	0,063	0,025	0.0129
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,173	0,191	0,143	0,054	0.104**
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,517	0,402	0,379	0,314	-0.0438
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,182	0,350	0,197	0,261	0.0771
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,142	0,201	0,086	0,126	0.00365
The national government runs well or very well	0,321	0,501	0,433	0,256	0.358***
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,289	0,244	0,232	0,096	0.0951*
TRUST (a lot or very much)					
The departmental government	0,034	0,166	0,085	0,087	0.121***
The national government	0,133	0,306	0,240	0,156	0.248***
Justice sector institutions	0,038	0,199	0,113	0,178	0.102**
Alternative justice institutions	0,057	0,243	0,090	0,177	0.0935*
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,217	0,310	0,254	0,354	-0.0177
Social organizations and NGOs	0,083	0,244	0,106	0,264	0.00730
Training centers	0,382	0,500	0,408	0,580	-0.0896
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,201	0,287	0,210	0,231	0.0505
The municipal council	0,125	0,163	0,123	0,100	0.0556
The national police	0,110	0,253	0,177	0,215	0.106**
The army	0,240	0,436	0,342	0,403	0.120**
The navy	0,205	0,375	0,167	0,329	-0.0124
The municipal personería	0,188	0,233	0,185	0,214	0.00888
The mayor's office	0,216	0,214	0,126	0,083	0.0452
The JAC	0,583	0,405	0,466	0,302	-0.0475

SECURITY	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,239	0,305	0,293	0,350	0.0162
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,917	0,858	0,932	0,871	-0.00238
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,058	0,035	0,087	0,018	0.0498
Illegal armed groups	0,330	0,244	0,180	0,046	0.0408
Antipersonnel mines	0,097	0,012	0,015	0,003	-0.0675***
Displacement	0,175	0,035	0,092	0,030	-0.0780*
Forced disappearances	0,010	0,012	0,010	0,013	-0.00347
Extortion	0,068	0,105	0,019	0,051	-0.0140
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,806	0,756	0,267	0,180	0.0146
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,023	0,015	0,003	0.0382**
Sexual violence	0,000	0,105	0,015	0,010	0.107***
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,500	0,782	0,602	0,752	0.132**
There is police presence	0,704	0,423	0,117	0,228	-0.395***
The police here are good or very good	0,148	0,256	0,333	0,471	-0.0557
The police have improved in the last two years	0,093	0,141	0,083	0,169	-0.0179
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,378	0,005	0,448	0,019	0.0645*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda (Agree or strongly agree)	0,005	0,083	0,015	0,069	0.0263
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,798	0,952	0,530	0,730	-0.0326
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,777	0,967	0,510	0,763	-0.0577
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,878	0,972	0,517	0,729	-0.120**
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,731	0,951	0,550	0,769	0.00893
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,809	0,935	0,718	0,814	0.00744
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,748	0,815	0,874	0,896	0.0261
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,612	0,742	0,850	0,803	0.157***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,767	0,775	0,898	0,911	-0.0151
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,689	0,732	0,908	0,914	0.0314
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,592	0,527	0,883	0,878	-0.0690
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,631	0,618	0,913	0,909	-0.0181
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,612	0,582	0,913	0,899	-0.0295
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,646	0,681	0,922	0,916	0.0289
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,699	0,557	0,913	0,906	-0.154***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,660	0,519	0,922	0,914	-0.143***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,921	0,969	0,942	0,966	0.0159

Cluster 24

CELI: Vistahermosa (Meta)

Control: Mapiripán (Meta)

Variable	Cluster 24				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,495	0,327	0,136	0,172	-0.203***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,082	0,103	0,348	0,167	0.195***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,308	0,263	0,778	0,661	0.0616
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,862	0,928	0,697	0,661	0.111**
Productive activities earn very little money	0,677	0,890	0,106	0,024	0.289***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,215	0,083	0,045	0,010	-0.089***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,737	0,712	0,672	0,639	0.00723
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,263	0,235	0,232	0,213	-0.00697
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	444242	436078	518636	468644	35,647
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,399	0,475	0,338	0,448	-0.0170
Have a checking account	0,015	0,017	0,101	0,063	0.0466*
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,222	0,271	0,141	0,390	-0.171***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,414	0,424	0,424	0,414	0.0108
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,585	0,651	0,524	0,713	-0.102
Currently have debt	0,657	0,649	0,455	0,518	-0.0706
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,208	0,320	0,104	0,164	0.0551
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,214	0,351	0,041	0,152	0.0283
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,056	0,085	0,061	0,107	-0.0135
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,005	0,044	0,025	0,036	0.0286
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,015	0,034	0,020	0,024	0.0140
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,251	0,226	0,081	0,071	-0.0193
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,503	0,562	0,340	0,346	0.0344
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,386	0,366	0,287	0,349	-0.0454
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,340	0,297	0,108	0,180	-0.107*
The national government runs well or very well	0,438	0,362	0,318	0,313	-0.0765
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,335	0,228	0,106	0,172	-0.170***
TRUST (a lot or very much)					
The departmental government	0,253	0,242	0,164	0,158	0.00421
The national government	0,352	0,210	0,168	0,153	-0.120**
Justice sector institutions	0,220	0,169	0,139	0,173	-0.0793
Alternative justice institutions	0,270	0,250	0,170	0,158	-0.00181
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,205	0,197	0,214	0,139	0.0863
Social organizations and NGOs	0,312	0,242	0,151	0,186	-0.101
Training centers	0,698	0,497	0,628	0,542	-0.117*
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,425	0,328	0,313	0,360	-0.139**
The municipal council	0,246	0,168	0,156	0,137	-0.0570
The national police	0,298	0,142	0,236	0,198	-0.125**
The army	0,458	0,334	0,480	0,370	-0.0211
The navy	0,474	0,206	0,293	0,257	-0.236***
The municipal personería	0,391	0,311	0,283	0,325	-0.124*
The mayor's office	0,309	0,259	0,153	0,158	-0.0588
The JAC	0,500	0,570	0,388	0,454	-0.0101

	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
SECURITY					
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,297	0,362	0,355	0,480	-0.0716
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,747	0,772	0,753	0,877	-0.102**
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,086	0,073	0,066	0,058	-0.00386
Illegal armed groups	0,679	0,615	0,242	0,148	0.0267
Antipersonnel mines	0,049	0,312	0,020	0,102	0.186***
Displacement	0,062	0,073	0,030	0,073	-0.0113
Forced disappearances	0,012	0,015	0,005	0,019	-0.00772
Extortion	0,062	0,322	0,091	0,128	0.224***
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,296	0,551	0,106	0,346	0.0148
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,010	0,010	0,019	0.00500
Sexual violence	0,000	0,015	0,000	0,034	-0.0168
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,591	0,504	0,636	0,470	0.0637
There is police presence	0,136	0,174	0,172	0,194	0.0233
The police here are good or very good	0,320	0,324	0,441	0,342	0.0735
The police have improved in the last two years	0,200	0,118	0,265	0,275	-0.0897
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES					
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,494	0,157	0,302	0,134	-0.162***
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,000	0,033	0,006	0,022	0.0243
<i>(Agree or strongly agree)</i>					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,809	0,867	0,691	0,680	0.0560
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,828	0,897	0,642	0,706	0.00570
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,835	0,895	0,646	0,671	0.0314
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,842	0,833	0,672	0,728	-0.0535
EXPECTATIONS					
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,881	0,859	0,860	0,873	-0.0461
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,843	0,818	0,924	0,889	0.0106
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,818	0,738	0,864	0,847	-0.0761
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,793	0,709	0,944	0,966	-0.122***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,813	0,709	0,899	0,947	-0.139***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,768	0,579	0,859	0,918	-0.252***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,828	0,642	0,899	0,952	-0.238***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,707	0,588	0,838	0,927	-0.206***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,803	0,671	0,899	0,954	-0.202***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,727	0,584	0,899	0,935	-0.176***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,793	0,630	0,884	0,927	-0.228***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,835	0,925	0,870	0,916	0.0292

Cluster 25

CELI: Puerto Rico (Meta)

Control: Orito (Putumayo)

Variable	Cluster 25				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,556	0,258	0,048	0,146	-0.390***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,027	0,063	0,310	0,196	0.140***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,349	0,169	0,877	0,630	0.0535
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,973	0,894	0,759	0,732	-0.0312
Productive activities earn very little money	0,849	0,865	0,043	0,074	-0.0143
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,065	0,066	0,000	0,027	-0.0322
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,856	0,700	0,733	0,583	-0.0470
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,209	0,310	0,337	0,132	0.267***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	291070	411558	312257	534328	-113,399***
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,519	0,452	0,428	0,315	0.0962
Have a checking account	0,000	0,050	0,037	0,067	0.0262
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,251	0,171	0,524	0,216	0.228***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,316	0,342	0,412	0,362	0.0813
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,525	0,609	0,740	0,596	0.233**
Currently have debt	0,487	0,576	0,465	0,407	0.150**
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,220	0,202	0,077	0,082	-0.0414
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,220	0,155	0,105	0,066	-0.0179
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,203	0,124	0,091	0,089	-0.0707*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,070	0,067	0,043	0,010	0.0339
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,037	0,050	0,021	0,007	0.0291
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,217	0,226	0,109	0,073	0.0222
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,516	0,452	0,276	0,341	-0.131**
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,377	0,342	0,096	0,392	-0.341***
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,333	0,199	0,102	0,173	-0.194***
The national government runs well or very well	0,302	0,390	0,305	0,360	0.0272
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,349	0,264	0,155	0,126	-0.0557
TRUST (a lot or very much)					
The departmental government	0,180	0,249	0,067	0,215	-0.0839
The national government	0,181	0,289	0,148	0,208	0.0560
Justice sector institutions	0,087	0,251	0,043	0,218	-0.00159
Alternative justice institutions	0,065	0,314	0,040	0,159	0.147***
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,133	0,255	0,046	0,218	-0.0251
Social organizations and NGOs	0,055	0,288	0,066	0,229	0.0727
Training centers	0,440	0,644	0,506	0,579	0.129*
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,209	0,408	0,109	0,256	0.0553
The municipal council	0,138	0,221	0,079	0,110	0.0528
The national police	0,128	0,244	0,109	0,230	0.00254
The army	0,268	0,503	0,198	0,477	-0.0220
The navy	0,177	0,457	0,113	0,383	0.0292
The municipal personería	0,185	0,368	0,109	0,256	0.0380
The mayor's office	0,191	0,248	0,071	0,090	0.0317
The JAC	0,508	0,421	0,296	0,363	-0.153**

SECURITY	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,235	0,451	0,250	0,509	-0.0267
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,893	0,831	0,706	0,891	-0.229***
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,174	0,103	0,107	0,022	0.000678
Illegal armed groups	0,293	0,538	0,096	0,089	0.239***
Antipersonnel mines	0,065	0,197	0,053	0,050	0.0973***
Displacement	0,228	0,205	0,139	0,042	0.0554
Forced disappearances	0,000	0,154	0,011	0,032	0.126***
Extortion	0,022	0,145	0,032	0,107	0.0323
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,728	0,333	0,294	0,156	-0.264***
Forced recruitment	0,011	0,034	0,016	0,015	0.0168
Sexual violence	0,000	0,017	0,016	0,010	0.0205
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,508	0,710	0,529	0,697	0.0444
There is police presence	0,578	0,471	0,235	0,184	-0.0426
The police here are good or very good	0,171	0,342	0,300	0,473	0.0387
The police have improved in the last two years	0,134	0,241	0,159	0,459	-0.205*
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,286	0,095	0,202	0,103	-0.0753*
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,044	0,003	0,011	0,003	-0.0362***
<i>(Agree or strongly agree)</i>					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,844	0,940	0,650	0,865	-0.117***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,839	0,912	0,660	0,902	-0.176***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,919	0,942	0,675	0,884	-0.190***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,795	0,866	0,652	0,892	-0.176***
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,921	0,890	0,800	0,810	-0.00788
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,845	0,854	0,898	0,913	0.00248
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,759	0,829	0,898	0,898	0.0694
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,775	0,821	0,898	0,953	-0.00827
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,733	0,784	0,909	0,950	0.0200
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,717	0,663	0,845	0,881	-0.0742
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,765	0,727	0,866	0,918	-0.0677
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,695	0,630	0,856	0,896	-0.110**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,850	0,730	0,904	0,943	-0.159***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,674	0,663	0,963	0,908	0.0437
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,797	0,710	0,882	0,935	-0.136***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,887	0,884	0,914	0,905	-0.0112

Cluster 26

CELI: Mesetas, San Juan de Arama (Meta)

Control: San José del Fragua (Caquetá)

Variable	Cluster 26				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,212	0,256	0,116	0,185	-0.0483
The family is experiencing hunger	0,026	0,043	0,212	0,120	0.0911**
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,158	0,223	0,682	0,688	0.0619
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,781	0,863	0,616	0,824	-0.138***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,760	0,813	0,081	0,007	0.129***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,148	0,056	0,000	0,017	-0.119***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,586	0,637	0,591	0,576	0.0521
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,187	0,215	0,283	0,163	0.132***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	510177	455956	391111	531951	-175,010**
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,601	0,488	0,419	0,427	-0.0947
Have a checking account	0,040	0,044	0,030	0,083	-0.0539*
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,207	0,463	0,348	0,637	-0.0325
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,414	0,563	0,414	0,544	0.0166
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,756	0,649	0,854	0,735	-0.00697
Currently have debt	0,727	0,710	0,596	0,546	0.0353
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,144	0,261	0,171	0,115	0.173***
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,160	0,177	0,037	0,060	0.00407
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,187	0,078	0,207	0,176	-0.0753*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,040	0,032	0,005	0,027	-0.0265
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,030	0,037	0,005	0,010	0.00272
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,144	0,195	0,113	0,047	0.115***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,549	0,608	0,451	0,343	0.172***
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,172	0,447	0,121	0,293	0.101
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,108	0,343	0,038	0,074	0.217***
The national government runs well or very well	0,432	0,423	0,238	0,361	-0.123*
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,211	0,277	0,054	0,090	0.0172
TRUST (a lot or very much)					
The departmental government	0,169	0,267	0,074	0,144	0.0264
The national government	0,301	0,293	0,103	0,211	-0.122**
Justice sector institutions	0,222	0,215	0,068	0,216	-0.143***
Alternative justice institutions	0,223	0,327	0,047	0,198	-0.0454
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,305	0,370	0,081	0,321	-0.174***
Social organizations and NGOs	0,198	0,300	0,084	0,257	-0.0671
Training centers	0,711	0,649	0,399	0,671	-0.345***
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,297	0,418	0,126	0,293	-0.0378
The municipal council	0,162	0,217	0,063	0,145	-0.0266
The national police	0,215	0,238	0,137	0,242	-0.0914*
The army	0,411	0,428	0,245	0,479	-0.230***
The navy	0,393	0,292	0,138	0,269	-0.221***
The municipal personería	0,250	0,342	0,099	0,260	-0.0577
The mayor's office	0,250	0,245	0,119	0,135	-0.0184
The JAC	0,515	0,598	0,457	0,419	0.117*

SECURITY	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,141	0,360	0,116	0,435	-0.105*
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,823	0,815	0,707	0,939	-0.232***
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,167	0,040	0,061	0,015	-0.0693**
Illegal armed groups	0,489	0,327	0,136	0,044	-0.0319
Antipersonnel mines	0,167	0,193	0,056	0,039	0.0255
Displacement	0,089	0,058	0,045	0,029	-0.0161
Forced disappearances	0,011	0,045	0,020	0,032	0.0326
Extortion	0,100	0,175	0,056	0,078	0.0547
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,633	0,650	0,182	0,280	-0.0725
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,009	0,025	0,010	0.0229
Sexual violence	0,011	0,018	0,005	0,012	0.00110
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,545	0,456	0,697	0,629	-0.0285
There is police presence	0,313	0,263	0,101	0,122	-0.0600
The police here are good or very good	0,379	0,448	0,053	0,571	-0.463***
The police have improved in the last two years	0,207	0,281	0,000	0,388	-0.316**
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,388	0,053	0,257	0,035	-0.144***
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,005	0,012	0,000	0,010	0.000223
<i>(Agree or strongly agree)</i>					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,789	0,931	0,525	0,867	-0.183***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,851	0,926	0,582	0,886	-0.228***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,853	0,953	0,587	0,896	-0.202***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,764	0,945	0,565	0,873	-0.113**
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,750	0,858	0,690	0,857	-0.0543
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,707	0,780	0,884	0,878	0.0971**
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,636	0,712	0,843	0,859	0.0642
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,576	0,759	0,879	0,966	0.0938**
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,581	0,734	0,929	0,927	0.163***
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,399	0,629	0,894	0,890	0.232***
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,530	0,695	0,914	0,929	0.153***
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,439	0,654	0,904	0,927	0.184***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,611	0,737	0,899	0,959	0.0680
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,465	0,627	0,919	0,934	0.148***
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,475	0,641	0,924	0,956	0.145***
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,890	0,926	0,927	0,928	0.0353

Cluster 27

CELI: La Uribe, La Macarena (Meta)

Control: Puerto Caicedo (Putumayo)

Variable	Cluster 27				
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,497	0,198	0,036	0,158	-0.445***
The family is experiencing hunger	0,031	0,040	0,287	0,355	-0.0469
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,210	0,153	0,882	0,720	0.104**
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,954	0,758	0,723	0,693	-0.115**
Productive activities earn very little money	0,764	0,844	0,133	0,078	0.153***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,077	0,051	0,005	0,008	-0.0233
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,749	0,528	0,795	0,575	0.00958
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,328	0,175	0,374	0,270	-0.0724
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	339975	481448	394103	597225	-74,625
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,462	0,513	0,390	0,343	0.0913
Have a checking account	0,010	0,053	0,026	0,093	-0.0275
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,149	0,258	0,441	0,275	0.258***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,333	0,575	0,369	0,505	0.129**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,723	0,730	0,625	0,728	-0.120
Currently have debt	0,554	0,730	0,410	0,663	-0.0683
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,401	0,271	0,382	0,207	-0.00554
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,374	0,321	0,382	0,235	0.0911
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,185	0,123	0,149	0,203	-0.140***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,118	0,058	0,103	0,065	-0.0133
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,087	0,043	0,092	0,058	-0.00590
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,342	0,254	0,243	0,217	-0.0695
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,500	0,571	0,345	0,553	-0.134**
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,296	0,427	0,317	0,332	0.0919
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,268	0,377	0,200	0,225	0.0684
The national government runs well or very well	0,384	0,387	0,355	0,399	-0.0464
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,279	0,335	0,148	0,242	-0.0356
TRUST (a lot or very much)					
The departmental government	0,214	0,251	0,102	0,178	-0.0757
The national government	0,279	0,243	0,141	0,190	-0.0987*
Justice sector institutions	0,122	0,174	0,053	0,150	-0.0550
Alternative justice institutions	0,142	0,281	0,061	0,133	0.0688
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,201	0,248	0,089	0,228	-0.115**
Social organizations and NGOs	0,132	0,235	0,091	0,216	-0.0412
Training centers	0,596	0,672	0,570	0,511	0.131*
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,230	0,355	0,150	0,346	-0.0626
The municipal council	0,182	0,196	0,103	0,170	-0.0634
The national police	0,147	0,194	0,097	0,200	-0.0641
The army	0,273	0,381	0,153	0,347	-0.112*
The navy	0,248	0,294	0,108	0,236	-0.0820
The municipal personería	0,252	0,373	0,082	0,316	-0.154**
The mayor's office	0,273	0,295	0,206	0,239	-0.0595
The JAC	0,455	0,673	0,354	0,540	0.0422

SECURITY	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> has improved	0,200	0,393	0,263	0,480	-0.0335
I would recommend that a family member return to the <i>vereda</i>	0,877	0,870	0,841	0,875	-0.0492
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,152	0,110	0,072	0,090	-0.0970*
Illegal armed groups	0,182	0,543	0,051	0,198	0.232***
Antipersonnel mines	0,015	0,250	0,021	0,155	0.0652
Displacement	0,121	0,098	0,062	0,085	-0.0727
Forced disappearances	0,045	0,012	0,015	0,038	-0.0686**
Extortion	0,061	0,128	0,015	0,135	-0.0486
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,864	0,476	0,164	0,285	-0.580***
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,030	0,015	0,015	0.0292
Sexual violence	0,030	0,018	0,010	0,023	-0.0495**
There are no serious security issues in the <i>vereda</i>	0,662	0,590	0,749	0,513	0.199***
There is police presence	0,492	0,455	0,092	0,203	-0.182***
The police here are good or very good	0,202	0,274	0,118	0,259	-0.284*
The police have improved in the last two years	0,079	0,189	0,056	0,296	-0.190
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the <i>vereda</i>	0,348	0,142	0,301	0,170	-0.0602
There is currently illegal mining in the <i>vereda</i>	0,079	0,003	0,109	0,008	0.0132
<i>(Agree or strongly agree)</i>					
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,731	0,866	0,734	0,673	0.200***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,644	0,904	0,667	0,696	0.269***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living	0,682	0,946	0,658	0,732	0.186***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,641	0,899	0,724	0,690	0.308***
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,735	0,845	0,667	0,798	-0.0320
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,605	0,858	0,795	0,960	0.0853*
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,554	0,808	0,785	0,928	0.127***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your <i>vereda</i> or <i>corregimiento</i> improve?	0,472	0,835	0,795	0,970	0.184***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,492	0,745	0,759	0,955	0.0407
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,344	0,588	0,723	0,933	0.0115
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,436	0,713	0,738	0,933	0.0532
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,395	0,615	0,738	0,908	0.0319
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,441	0,835	0,744	0,930	0.215***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,441	0,630	0,759	0,905	0.0513
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,467	0,660	0,749	0,923	0.0138
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,885	0,908	0,922	0,950	-0.00487

Cluster 28

CELI: Montañita, Cartagena del Chaira, San Vicente del Caguan (Caquetá)

Control: Lejanías (Meta)

Variable	Cluster 28				Dif-Dif (Impact)
	Baseline		Midline		
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT					
The economic situation is good or very good	0,178	0,262	0,203	0,145	0.141**
The family is experiencing hunger	0,023	0,012	0,153	0,277	-0.133***
The family's conditions are of extreme poverty	0,178	0,239	0,668	0,652	0.0604
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems	0,787	0,893	0,827	0,617	0.327***
Productive activities earn very little money	0,770	0,819	0,025	0,070	-0.00633
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity	0,034	0,177	0,030	0,008	0.172***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money	0,609	0,688	0,649	0,664	0.0610
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money	0,213	0,246	0,173	0,316	-0.0542
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses)	391193	588996	477891	577891	51,362
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
FINANCIAL SERVICES					
Have a savings account	0,490	0,457	0,337	0,438	-0.150**
Have a checking account	0,030	0,043	0,074	0,090	-0.0267
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities	0,698	0,203	0,599	0,352	-0.297***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,609	0,406	0,594	0,402	-0.0798
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO	0,732	0,760	0,758	0,738	0.0885
Currently have debt	0,673	0,742	0,604	0,680	-0.0681
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS					
The mayor's office is run well or very well	0,301	0,257	0,213	0,227	-0.0505
The mayor's office is run better than two years ago	0,179	0,341	0,102	0,260	-0.00727
The mayor's office reports regularly on its expenses	0,054	0,168	0,168	0,184	0.0748
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to express their opinions on community interests	0,064	0,047	0,020	0,023	-0.0235
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens' opinions into account when making decisions	0,045	0,023	0,020	0,012	-0.00997
I trust a commitment from the mayor's office to run a project	0,280	0,219	0,105	0,165	-0.105*
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project	0,569	0,561	0,388	0,617	-0.213***
The departmental government runs well or very well	0,478	0,188	0,485	0,144	0.0621
The departmental government runs better than two years ago	0,261	0,193	0,138	0,067	0.0123
The national government runs well or very well	0,479	0,402	0,359	0,228	0.0681
The national government runs better than two years ago	0,251	0,402	0,072	0,126	0.0819
	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
TRUST (a lot or very much)					
The departmental government	0,323	0,154	0,237	0,077	-0.0190
The national government	0,295	0,237	0,226	0,127	0.0326
Justice sector institutions	0,265	0,157	0,213	0,093	0.00147
Alternative justice institutions	0,381	0,203	0,152	0,093	-0.120**
The institutions of the agricultural sector	0,333	0,252	0,282	0,181	0.0195
Social organizations and NGOs	0,208	0,258	0,225	0,202	0.0811
Training centers	0,714	0,623	0,690	0,554	0.0237
The Defensoría del Pueblo	0,377	0,358	0,343	0,242	0.0766
The municipal council	0,249	0,177	0,209	0,141	-0.0108
The national police	0,337	0,125	0,385	0,104	0.0349
The army	0,500	0,236	0,563	0,216	0.0621
The navy	0,380	0,265	0,458	0,175	0.153**
The municipal personería	0,383	0,261	0,238	0,228	-0.131*
The mayor's office	0,301	0,248	0,193	0,193	-0.0400
The JAC	0,580	0,614	0,440	0,539	-0.0838

SECURITY	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved	0,386	0,290	0,510	0,323	0.0763
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda	0,896	0,859	0,911	0,844	0.0484
<i>Serious security problems in the vereda:</i>					
Homicides	0,063	0,207	0,015	0,066	0.0795*
Illegal armed groups	0,365	0,300	0,050	0,156	-0.193***
Antipersonnel mines	0,073	0,221	0,015	0,086	0.0510
Displacement	0,042	0,036	0,005	0,090	-0.101***
Forced disappearances	0,010	0,036	0,050	0,012	0.0498*
Extortion	0,063	0,107	0,054	0,098	-0.0105
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.)	0,719	0,786	0,257	0,273	0.0428
Forced recruitment	0,000	0,000	0,005	0,016	-0.0116
Sexual violence	0,000	0,021	0,000	0,027	-0.0192
There are no serious security issues in the vereda	0,525	0,453	0,698	0,563	0.0777
There is police presence	0,317	0,699	0,153	0,133	0.438***
The police here are good or very good	0,667	0,149	0,586	0,091	-0.0446
The police have improved in the last two years	0,367	0,097	0,333	0,206	-0.185
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
There is currently coca in the vereda	0,026	0,450	0,020	0,386	0.0448
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda (Agree or strongly agree)	0,005	0,004	0,000	0,004	-0.00352
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal	0,949	0,846	0,965	0,506	0.368***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities negatively	0,965	0,854	0,990	0,560	0.326***
Growing coca is <i>not</i> the only way a family can make a living	0,985	0,953	0,960	0,510	0.415***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad	0,938	0,857	0,935	0,581	0.267***
EXPECTATIONS	Baseline		Midline		Dif-Dif (Impact)
	CELI	Control	CELI	Control	
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years?	0,801	0,897	0,801	0,791	0.0562
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve?	0,723	0,754	0,856	0,910	-0.0840
In the next two years, will your licit income increase?	0,653	0,680	0,822	0,816	-0.00224
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or corregimiento improve?	0,589	0,727	0,916	0,941	0.0572
In the future, will your housing conditions improve?	0,644	0,699	0,911	0,953	-0.0494
In the future, will access to health services improve?	0,540	0,578	0,916	0,941	-0.0205
In the future, will access to education improve?	0,614	0,715	0,936	0,938	0.0763
In the future, will access to public services improve?	0,520	0,598	0,911	0,918	0.0603
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve?	0,629	0,723	0,946	0,965	0.0390
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve	0,540	0,645	0,921	0,926	0.0630
In the future, will municipal government improve?	0,589	0,641	0,941	0,945	-0.000697
Do you think you'll stay in your current residence for the next two years?	0,912	0,921	0,905	0,953	-0.0390

ANNEX 3: CALCULATION OF INDICATOR FIGURES

Reporting on CELI indicators

Below are tables specifying how indicators were grouped into the three categories of economic, institutional, and social for presentation in the CELI Midline Evaluation general and regional reports. The present grouping is admittedly arbitrary but represents the best judgment of the evaluators, recognizing that other arrangements are possible. In discussions with the implementers, the present grouping was acknowledged and confirmed.

Economic indicators

These are the sixteen indicators that were used to calculate the Economic Indicators pie chart. Indicators in yellow are reported by the implementers and those in green are taken from the midline survey data. While certain indicators provided by government sources were not included due to the irregular pace of reporting, indicators DO3-041 and DO3-040 had reliable numbers, compiled by government sources and reported by the implementers - since in all cases targets were met. DO3-038 was not included because of a lack of confidence in the numbers reported.

1	DO3-005 Avg monthly household income of USAID's beneficiaries
2	DO3-041 # of restitution cases supported in CELI municipios
3	DO3-040 # of formalized properties supported by CELI municipalities
4	DO3-036. Total value of CELI projects approved
5	DO3-037. Total value of CELI projects completed
	DO3-038. Total public investment in consolidation zones
6	DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones att to USG interventions
7	DO3-030 # of strategic rural and economic development programs with territorial approach implemented in CELI municipios
8	DO3-031 # & % of people benefitted by strategic rural and econ development programs with territorial approach, implemented in CELI municipios
9	DO3-034 # of rural households benefiting directly from USG interventions
10	DO3-032a Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG interventions
11	DO3-032b Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG interventions (for-profit, crops, social enterprises)
12	DO3-033a # of private-public alliances formed
13	DO3-033b # of private-public alliances formed

14	DO3-035 # of people with financial product includes mobile wallet, leasing, etc.
15	DO3-042 Community funds leveraged in CELI Zones attrib to USG Interventions
16	DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones

Institutional development

These are the six indicators included under institutional development:

1	DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones attributed to USG interventions
2	DO3-010 # of strategic national social programs implemented in CELI zones
3	DO3-011 # & % of people benefitted by national social programs impl in CELI municipios
4	DO3-012 # of beneficiaries receiving improved infrastructure services
5	DO3-013 Governance capacity index
6	DO3-028 Level of accountability in CELI municipios

Two indicators that would be included in this category but which were to be provided by the GOC were not updated and have been deleted and are not reported or counted:

DO3-004 – Public Social Services Municipal Index

DO3-009 – Amount and Average Percent of annual change in municipal own-source income

Social indicators

Six indicators included in the calculation of the Social Indicators pie chart:

1	DO3-008 # of rapid impact projects implemented by USG implementers
2	DO3-024 Social Capital Index
3	DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones
4	DO3-025 # of CSO members supported by USG assistance
5	DO3-026 (a) Change in Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG assistance
6	DO3-026 (b) Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG assistance

DO3-026(a) and DO3-026(b) are closely related. Information was partially available for both, and targets were met. For 26(a) this was listed as “not reported” for Montes de María and Central, but “exceeded” for CELI Norte/Sur. For 26(b), this was reported as exceeded for all three CELIs.

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