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EVALUATION

Post-implementation evaluation report:

Evaluation of the More Investment in Sustainable Alternative Development and Areas for Municipal Alternative Development programs

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This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared independently by the Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL) project, and its team members Management Systems International (MSI) and Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC). The report was written by Oscar Huertas Diaz, Director of the Evaluation, and Keri Culver, Lead Evaluation Specialist for EVAL.

FINAL REPORT:
POST-IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION

Post-implementation evaluation of the programs More Investment in Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS) and Areas for Municipal-Level Alternative Development (ADAM)

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Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL)

FINAL REPORT:
POST-IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAMS MORE INVESTMENT IN SUSTAINABLE ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT (MIDAS) AND AREAS FOR MUNICIPAL-LEVEL ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT (ADAM)

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ACRONYMS

ADAM	Areas for Municipal-level Alternative Development (ADAM for its Spanish initials)
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CONPES	Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social
CS	Case study – report method used to illustrate models, best practices, and lessons learned
DIAN	Dirección Nacional de Impuestos y Aduanas
DPS	Departamento para la Prosperidad Social (successor to Acción Social)
ECA	Escuelas de Capacitación para Agricultores (farmer training schools)
EVAL	Evaluation and Analysis for Learning
GE	Gente Estratégica
GOC	Government of Colombia
HA	Hectares
KT	Key Themes – ordering structure of the report's findings, conclusions and recommendations
MIDAS	More Investment in Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS for its Spanish initials)
PyMEs	Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (Small and Medium Enterprises)
SENA	Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOW	Statement of Work
TA	Technical assistance
TEP	Productive Ethnic Territories (TEP for its initials in Spanish)
UMATA	Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USG	U.S. Government

Note on the use of conventions: This report uses the standard convention of italicizing words in Spanish, (e.g., *veredas* or *campesinos*), with the exception of proper nouns (e.g., Banca de Oportunidades.) A second convention involves the capitalization of acronyms that have become words, such as the names of organizations, are spelled with only the initial letter capitalized (e.g., Asocati, Apropesca, etc.) and these are not included in the Acronyms list.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Purpose and Evaluation Questions

The purpose of the evaluation, coming as it does over three years post-implementation, is not to judge the success or difficulties of the programs under study. Rather, this review of lessons learned and detailed case examples are designed to inform post-conflict Mission programming. The evaluation questions examine best practices and lessons learned and extract useful methods, processes, capacities, alliances and activities undertaken in four key program components. The evaluation is designed to demonstrate degrees of success and sustainability, to support Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) implementation and to provide the 'why' and 'how' to program designers and activity managers.

Project Background

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) created two major programs in Colombia to improve conditions for rural citizens through productive projects, community participation, public policy development and strengthening municipal governments. Many Colombian organizations worked in partnership to extend the influence of programming, ensure relevance, and work toward sustainability. ADAM and MIDAS offered alternative development options in complex, multi-faceted programming designed to affect social and economic behaviors at local, municipal and national levels. They operated in environments where illicit crops, displacement, violence and environmental effects were always threats.

ADAM (US$189,000,000) focused on productive agricultural projects, public works, municipal strengthening and civil society collaboration. These tended to be deep interventions in a given community, with an integrated model, and were implemented in 75 municipalities. MIDAS (US$180,000,000) provided technical assistance and support to micro-, small- and medium-enterprises, productive forestry, conservation, and agribusiness, in more than 500 municipalities. Its policy component supported reforms for development at all levels of the country.

Evaluation Design, Methods and Limitations

The evaluation used a mixed methods design with triangulation of sources. Quantitative methods included infrastructure observations and a business owner survey. Qualitative methods began with a review of MIDAS and ADAM documents. The team conducted interviews and focus groups with USAID, implementers, agribusiness producers and associations, second-level organizations, small- and medium-sized enterprises, councils and community members, and parastatal and Government of Colombia (GOC) respondents. Fieldwork reached 249 people from thirteen departments and 57 municipalities. Field teams traced lessons, practices and cases to understand their implementation.

The evaluation was carried out over three years after programs' end. As such, the sample is limited to respondents with up-to-date contact data, or who could be found through a field contact or "snowball" sample (please see the Design chapter for further information on this method.) The findings, therefore, are not representative across the programs. However, the purpose was not representativeness or judgment of the program; rather, it was to extract lessons and practices to inform programs in light of the peace process. For this purpose, the methods were ideal.

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

The full set of findings, conclusions and recommendations can be found in Annex I in tabular form. In this summary, the evaluation presents its overarching conclusions and recommendations.

Sustainability. The evaluation found many sustained organizations, infrastructure works and productive activities, in all departments. Communities and projects were highly motivated, even in the face of adversity, to succeed and expand. Newer associations, especially with unfamiliar crops, needed more support, and rates of failure were higher. Recommendations include:

- Leverage positive experiences with current and past community-level projects, companies and public works by having them share their experiences in peer-to-peer learning.
- In exit strategies, link producers to networks – peers, as above, but also market actors, government and university technical assistance sources, and financial resources.

Associativity. ADAM and MIDAS realized great gains in building associativity among some of their productive and public works activities, helping communities begin to reconstruct social fabric damaged by conflict, illicit livelihoods, poverty and the absence of the state. The common goals, training, and support were essential, yet took time to build. Notably these successes were also replicated across communities – when projects involved some combination of *campesinos*, indigenous groups, and Afro-Colombians. Recommendations include:

- Use genuine participatory methods in bottom-up decision-making on productive and public works projects. Build in time for the process, particularly with new associations or groups.
- Diagnose local needs and priorities around associativity, in an inclusive, intergenerational process. This is often promised, but in the rush of implementation it can be compromised.
- Train and monitor implementing staff on inclusivity and respect for self-determination.

Culture of legality. Families and communities embraced licit opportunities to make a living and avoid the social disintegration, risks to life and livelihood, and shadow markets of illicit crops. The evaluation recommends:

- Focus on what beneficiaries need in order to think long-term: credit access, land tenure, education and capacity building options.
- Foster this culture with the same conditions that supported associativity.

Scaling up. Established enterprises and associations provided fertile ground for productive activities that change mentalities and scope from subsistence, household levels to efficiency, marketing and a regional economy. Given the ambition and global scope of the proposed peace process, working with the GOC at all levels will be essential. Recommendations include:

- Build with experienced associations and companies using the bottom-up, participatory approach to take best advantage of their proven interest and ability to produce.
- Scale projects sufficiently for production and livelihoods that are greater than subsistence level. This goal should supersede attaining output indicators.
- Ensure municipal participation. The peace process should empower municipalities, and their buy-in is a precondition for sustainability and state credibility.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). The output-level indicators by which ADAM and MIDAS are known – families supported, hectares planted, jobs created – were flawed both for telling the story of the programs and for monitoring their progress to improve implementation.

- Create modern M&E systems for complex environments - adaptive, shorter-cycle, context- and conflict-sensitive, and built around shared stakeholder goals. Avoid privileging output-level results that distort implementation by affecting implementer incentives.
- Work to instill an evaluation culture that permits experimentation in the Mission.
- Manage knowledge intelligently and enlist successful partners to share with others.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation Purpose

USAID/Colombia commissioned this external, post-implementation evaluation of aspects of its Programs entitled "MIDAS (Más Inversión para el Desarrollo Alternativo Sostenible)" and "ADAM (Áreas de Desarrollo Alternativo Municipal)" to inform pending program designs. This report will help the Mission better understand what worked, did not work, and what has been sustained, by documenting lessons and case studies from a set of ADAM and MIDAS activities.

In that it does not judge success or failure of the projects, this evaluation is atypical. More than three years post-implementation, the activities and their participants have been altered by external events, to the point that judgment would not be possible. Rather, the evaluation is designed to capture and disseminate lessons learned on key activities, sectors, and cross-cutting themes, by examining the activities that remain active today, or that can provide lessons learned since their termination about implementation and sustainability. The evaluation findings will be incorporated into program design in alignment with the new Mission CDCS. In this way, the evaluation will be used to support evidence-based activity design and implementation.

The results and findings of the assessment will be used by (i) USAID/Colombia Mission Front Office, Technical Offices, and Program Office and (ii) implementing partners. These results can also provide important inputs to the Government of Colombia (GOC) for replication, sustainability, and in implementing the peace process.

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation examined a set of activities within two guiding principles:

1. Identify best practices and lessons learned that can be taken from ADAM and MIDAS to inform USAID/Colombia's CDCS implementation, including new program development and new activity design.
2. Document and describe cases (e.g., success stories) where methodologies, processes, capacities, public-private partnerships and infrastructure set in motion by the projects have been successful and sustainable.

The activities under study in the evaluation are examined with respect to these two guiding principles. The activity sets are as follows: (full description of the areas of inquiry can be found in Annex XI in the Evaluation Statement of Work.)

1. Agricultural activities (ADAM outcome 2) and productive activities (MIDAS outcome 1)
2. Community participation (ADAM outcome 3)
3. Municipal strengthening (ADAM outcome 6)
4. Alliances (MIDAS outcome 3)

The evaluation team sought to unpack these activity sets with attention to key factors related to each thematic area. These key factors are listed in full in Annex IV Getting To Answers table.

The report continues with background on the ADAM and MIDAS programs, evaluation design and limitations, and the main body of the report – Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, which include "meta" conclusions and recommendations that unite findings from multiple key themes. An added section discusses these findings in light of a likely peace accord, and how to make best use of lessons learned in new programming plans. Readers are encouraged to review the evaluation case studies in Annex V as well as the full set of findings in Annex I.

A summary of these case studies is offered in Figure 1, below. The case studies offer insights into the opinions, perspectives and dynamics of the ADAM and MIDAS activities at "ground level." The cases generally show both positive effects and lessons for future programming. The cases demonstrate the underlying "why" and "how" of the various models used by implementers and operators to work toward their desired results.

Figure 1. Evaluation case studies

Beneficiary	Location	Sector	Description of the case
1. Aproaca - ADAM	Antioquia	Cacao	This association benefited new cacao production with commercialization, plant material, TA and support for project implementation. As a result of ADAM participation, Aproaca became providers of TA and transporters. They earned an Alianza Productiva project with the GOC. Casa Luker buys their production. The group has increased output and quality to meet buyers' needs. There is new citizen empowerment and oversight in the organization.
2. Aprocasur - ADAM	Sur de Bolívar	Cacao, coffee	Organized as a second-level association under ADAM, Aprocasur has grown to the lead National Cocoa Network with 15,000 families, 28,000 cacao hectares and 40 organizations in 17 departments. Aprocasur provides TA, institutional strengthening and microcredit to its members. They built the ADAM program through a bottom-up approach on which the organization insisted, with the intent of empowering small farmers. Successful marketing of much of the production.
3. Aprolim - ADAM	Nariño	Dairy	This study of an Indigenous group includes the story of one woman's empowerment. As the project began, the community found itself without a Legal Representative and with little much faith in associativity. The woman put herself forward for leadership, oversaw community training, and worked to convince municipal and departmental governments until they helped buy a chilling machine. Challenges remain, including some beneficiary unwillingness to change their milking practices to newer, more modern methods.
4. Apropesca - ADAM	Cauca	Fish	This 30-year-old association produces fish in Cauca, and involves Colombians from five different, and formerly competing, indigenous communities, plus a campesino group. With ADAM´s help, they created space for dialogue and conflict resolution over land issues, and increased income. Some negative environmental impacts resulted from a lack of technical assistance, and a local mayor is attempting to take the land on which a viscera processing plant is built, for lack of written title.
5. Asocati - MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Cacao	Asocati has become a national-level actor in the promotion of sustainable cacao as an alternative to illicit crops, particularly in conflict areas, and expanding the culture of legality. These changes occurred during their MIDAS activities. Asocati´s size and influence impact the degree of industrialization and the coverage of their association and its benefits. Their chief obstacle is infrastructure to expand coverage and opportunity. Knowledge exchange has a prime best practice that this case demonstrates well.
6. Asocoprolyda - ADAM	Nariño	Dairy	In this association campesino and indigenous dairy producers come together with strong evidence of gains in associativity. There are also ample challenges: disagreements and project desertion. Quality and efficiency gains, environmental improvements and certifications supported those who stayed. The community also challenged the wisdom of the TA provided, and had to face challenges with municipal participation, co-optation, and funding. The case provides useful lessons for overcoming differences through negotiation.
7. Asogpados - MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Palm	In this case a palm promoter became a MIDAS operator after once having received USAID funding as a beneficiary. With MIDAS, the association promoted producer relationships and provided alternatives for campesinos who formerly grew illicit crops. One strength was supporting smaller associations with administrative and management training, organizational development, TA and market links. They also supplied low-cost inputs through their own supply. They are working now to build a processing plant and roads.
8. Asopalmira – ADAM & MIDAS	Nariño	Cacao	This community was deeply damaged by a natural disaster in 2009. MIDAS arrived to support the community and worked with the municipality to support a rapid and comprehensive change to cacao production. Families created new life projects. An ADAM school construction was taking

			place at the same time, with significant community involvement. Respondents reported that the efforts had changed their mentality and made them more entrepreneurial, focusing on market-driven production and marketing.
9. Asopez – ADAM	Putumayo	Fish	This project was situated in an area with ongoing conflicts over illicit crops and an oil pipeline. ADAM strengthened an existing fish farm/processor with technology and TA, systematizing their administrative and management of the livestock. The program featured a strong focus on crossing generations - youth participation, studying with SENA, doing study tours. Infrastructure and other weaknesses affect successful marketing.
10. Aspalbe - MIDAS	Cesar	Palm	In an area that once suffered from some of the highest statistics for violence and victims of violence, MIDAS supported the oil palm company Palmariguani. The company guaranteed small producers' bank loans, purchased their production, and offered transportation. Beneficiaries praised the interactive, practical training and the childcare provided to facilitate mothers' attendance. This was a win-win for the processor as well, because it resulted in more hectares under production, higher yield and better quality. Associativity provided beneficiaries with some protection from armed groups as well.
11. Compañía de Empaques, S.A. - MIDAS	Antioquia, Nariño, Cauca	Fique	MIDAS supported this commercial firm to train producers in twelve associations across three departments. The company set up collection points, increased plantings and yield, and provided TA in processing, quality and transport. They removed intermediaries from the value chain, increasing value for themselves and for producers. The company asked SENA to train widely to meet excess demand with the currently unprocessed supply. The company noted the long process needed to bring small producers to the necessary levels of production and quality, and in basic business topics.
12. Condimentos Putumayo – ADAM & MIDAS	Putumayo	Spices	Production of peppers was, for many small producers in this project, their first work after voluntarily eradicating coca. It has also recuperated deforested areas. In the area, this project is nearly uniquely successful; many in the region have failed. Thought difficult to start, because the product was new, the growers have made progress and markets are slowly coming on line. Plantation size per family is not large enough to affect family economy. The physical plant is underused at about 5% of capacity. Respondents appreciate being back in the licit economy, including positive changes for families and communities.
13. Fedar - ADAM	Cauca	Youth	ADAM created a project with FEDAR which brought together youth from municipalities hit by conflict. They were trained in their territories and natural resources, thinking critically, service projects, and interpersonal and political communication. Participants reported greater ability to resist recruitment by armed groups, and social fabric across generations. Students submitted an education proposal to the local government; at the same time they built links with national and international groups. The method was shared with the National Coffee Growers' Federation, who used the same tools with young coffee growers.
14. Frepac - ADAM	Cauca	Dairy	In this project both the association and the crop were new for beneficiaries, bringing technical, administrative and interpersonal challenges. TA included neither an adequate soil study nor respect for local climate knowledge. Inferior seedlings resulted in the loss of an entire harvest. The second-level association appears to have done a poor job in TA and follow-up, particularly on credit. Some families are indebted to the present day. However, there were some positive elements in this challenging case. The association involved afro-Colombians and indigenous communities, a new collaboration for the participants. Respondents felt they learned a great deal about farming techniques from the training.
15. Gente Estrategica - MIDAS	Atlántico	SMEs	With MIDAS support Gente Estrategica, an outsourcing and human resources management firm, created more than 3,000 new jobs in 18 months, 2,700 in the lowest social strata. The company grew from 10 to 63 branches country-wide. Their work includes special attention to Afro-Colombians in vulnerable communities, and capacity building in basic work skills, self-esteem and other themes. The company now also implements for cooperation agencies and international foundations. A strong business vision and plan helped target new employees for industries in need, providing well-trained and adapted staff.

16. Greystar - MIDAS	Santander	Small-scale agri-culture	Mining company GreyStar worked through its foundation and MIDAS to conduct training in small-scale agricultural production with spouses of their employees, primarily women. The women learned about entrepreneurship, good practices on small farms, and marketing their produce. The project was welcome at the time but became more important after MIDAS left, when the region was given an environmentally protected status, and all mining stopped. Working with the municipality, the women now sell their surplus in a central market. Their produce provides dietary diversity and likelier food security.
17. Red Cantoyaco - ADAM	Putumayo	Radio	ADAM supported radio station network in Puerto Caicedo featuring community programs: shows made by and about women, indigenous communities, afro-Colombian groups, and youth. A popular radionovela was created with protagonists facing local problems, such as the dangers of illicit crops and resisting armed actors in the community. The municipality invited listener comments to their show. The station revived a local musical style, and now plays the music of several bands that were created for a biennial concert. ADAM supported this programming without imposing content, a choice that supported community rights.
18. Textiles Mónica Urquijo - MIDAS	Atlántico	Arts and crafts	This project was listed as a success story from MIDAS, but the evaluation found that its fortunes had changed since the end of the program. Afro-Colombian women were trained and supplied to create crafts for retail sale; the workers were women heads of households, some of them victims of forced displacement and violence. The company was designed to be profitable and to contribute materially to its participants' quality of life, but these have not been sustained for the long term. Cultural differences appeared to have played a part of the failure, as the majority Afro-Colombian producers left the project together.

PROJECT BACKGROUND

The U.S. Government (USG) made a substantial commitment through Plan Colombia (2000-2005) to reduce illicit crop production and promote a culture of legality. Despite these interventions and GOC efforts, Colombia continued to struggle with the production of illicit crops. The GOC and USG together designed a three-pronged strategy to meet the challenge: Interdiction, Eradication and Alternative Development (AD). The latter was intended to improve social and economic conditions in areas with illicit crop production, thereby empowering and enabling small producers to reject illicit crops. AD sought to stimulate licit and viable economies, expanding legitimate livelihoods and promoting sustainable economic development, particularly in rural areas vulnerable to illicit crops.

It was in this context that USAID introduced two large multifaceted AD programs to work in challenging environments where illicit activities, population displacement, violence and environmental challenges were potential, if not always active, threats. The projects tried to improve conditions for rural citizens through productive projects; community participation; social infrastructure development; forestry projects; support to agribusinesses, micro-enterprises, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); strengthening municipal governments; improving access to credit; and public policy development. The programs – designed to respond to a key lesson learned in the field: *people in isolated communities with little or no state presence and limited economic options are more likely to cultivate illicit crops*[1] -- were as follows:

- The Areas for Municipal-Level Alternative Development (ADAM) project sought to create a network of municipalities and communities committed to legality. Its goals were to strengthen the legitimacy of the state and to provide tangible incentives to local populations to participate in the development of their own communities. Anticipated results included a culture of zero illicit crops and improvements in the quality of life or marginalized populations in rural areas.
- The More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS) project worked with the private sector, agribusiness, forestry and SME participants, and regional-level operators to reduce the production of illicit crops and create sustainable economic activities through agribusiness, commercial forestry, SMEs and Policy.

ADAM (2005-2011) used a territorial approach, in which productive communities were targeted for agricultural interventions, citizen participation, municipal governance, social infrastructure works, social organization strengthening, and access to state programs in some 75 municipalities. ADAM targeted illicit activities through integrated economic, political and social approaches to agricultural production, social infrastructure, community participation and local governance.

The following figures – claimed by ADAM project records – provide a sense of scale: the agriculture component reports benefits to over 50,000 families, supporting 108,000 hectares, while generating 66,000 jobs and $51 million in sales. The social infrastructure component

[1] TetraTech ARD, 2011. *Areas de Desarrollo Alternativo Municipal (ADAM); Final Report (2005-2011).* Preface. All ADAM results citations in this introduction are from this work.

reports 182[2] projects, valued at $42 million, benefiting 38,000 families. The project cites 1,926 social organizations strengthened.

MIDAS (2006-2011) employed a demand-driven model to promote public and private alliances to provide income and employment in six geographical corridors. The goals were to eliminate illicit crop planting, promote competitiveness, improve social and economic policies and strengthen institutions. Many Colombian organizations worked in partnership with the programs to extend the influence of programming, ensure relevance, and work toward sustainability. Project records claim leveraging of $571 million from public and private sectors benefiting 280,000 families; 164,000 new hectares planted and 260,000 new jobs.[3] MIDAS also worked at the national level with significant contributions to policy and institutional reforms

[2] This figure differs from that (220 projects) provided by ARD, but both figures come from the implementer.
[3] TetraTech ARD, 2011. *Mas Inversion para el Desarrollo Alternativo Sostenible (MIDAS); Final Report.* All MIDAS results citations in this introduction are from this work.

EVALUATION DESIGN

Evaluation Methods

The evaluation team used both quantitative and qualitative data as primary sources, as well as secondary documentary sources. Full evaluation design specifications, including detail on methods, sample, fieldwork and analyses are included in Annex II. Quantitative methods included a telephone survey of small- and medium-enterprises, forestry and agribusiness participants in MIDAS. The team applied a quantitative checklist in observing infrastructure projects in the field, along with a short questionnaire.

Qualitative methods began with desk and document review, and early interviews with USAID, implementer staff who were still available in Bogota, and related GOC partners. Further interviews were conducted in Bogota during December and January to cover additional topics, including MIDAS policy interventions and microenterprise programming. Interviews and focus groups were used extensively in field research. ADAM and MIDAS were large programs ($369,000,000 between the two) with a variety of field approaches across the country and within a given region. As a result, field teams were trained to pursue different actors within given alliances and projects at different levels. Researchers probed thematic areas beyond those found in the instruments, in accordance with the variety of roles and relationships represented by the different levels of participants, at *vereda*, municipality, project, SME, popular-level association, second-level association and operator levels. On rare occasions, when sufficient numbers of beneficiaries or other respondent types were available, the field teams conducted focus groups.

Where certain cases showed particular best practices or lessons learned, especially in cases of public-private partnerships, the field teams attempted multiple interviews with subjects from various perspectives on the implementation. These were included in a set of 18 case studies produced for the evaluation, three per geographic team. Please see Annex V for the full studies.

Sampling

The team selected a purposive or convenience sample by geography, with the intention to cover Mission-prioritized activity sets. In Cauca, an advance team piloted the instruments. A summary of the sample is shown below in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Summary of the site visit evaluation sample

Departments	**13**	**Municipalities**	**57**
	Men	**Women**	**Total**
Interview informants	111	70	181
Focus group participants	46	22	68
Totals	**157**	**92**	**249**

Through the pre-fieldwork interviews in Bogota, the team assembled lists of likely candidates for site visits from both accessing databases and other resources (SMEs, infrastructure project list, success stories, project one-pagers) and from respondent recollection and recommendations. The fieldwork required extensive use of the snowball sample technique once in the field.[4] Most

[4] Snowball sampling (or chain-referral sampling) is a non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects support recruitment efforts for future subjects, from among their acquaintances, and in particular among known participants. (From Wikipedia's definition, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowball_sampling) The limited timeframe for the evaluation and the fact

contact information in implementer databases was no longer valid; capture rates ranged from 10-18 percent across the regions. As a result, the field teams pursued cases through project coordinators who were still in the field, through the few contacts that remained valid, or through going directly to communities that were recorded as having had a project, and asking for knowledgeable informants.

The summary of the quantitative survey samples is shown in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Summary of the quantitative survey sample

	Universe	Sample	Notes
SME, agribusiness and forestry projects survey with MIDAS beneficiaries	473	69	Low capture due to outdated telephone contact information
Observations of ADAM infrastructure works	220[5]	42	Selected within geographic sites to be visited
Beneficiaries in communities with ADAM infrastructure projects	N/A	44	Outdated contact information on project participants; convenience sample where contact information failed

Limitations and Gaps

As the evaluation was carried out over three years after the end of the programs, with longer gaps since some activities had ended, the sample is limited to those respondents for whom contact data were available and up to date, or those who could be contacted through a snowball sample. This affected access to all types of respondents: small and medium enterprises, agricultural and forestry producers and commercial operations, community associations, implementing staff members, and municipal and other government partners. The sample, then, is skewed toward those that have the same contact information. Such respondents are more likely to have remained in the same place (while missing displaced persons and those with other kinds of transience), to have maintained financial solvency (while missing those with financial challenges), to have continued in similar work (while missing those with labor condition transience), to have closer connections with other projects through whom the evaluation team could find them (while missing isolated cases), and so on. It is also worth noting that carrier competition and cell subscribers' preferences have resulted in frequent changes to both personal and business lines, for reasons neutral to the evaluation. In the case of municipal officials involved with ADAM projects, few were found to still be in office or accessible through previous contact information.

The issue of expired contact information also affected the telephone survey completion rate, which was approximately 15 percent of MIDAS' database of agribusinesses, small and medium enterprises, and forestry enterprises.

Because of these limitations on both the qualitative and quantitative samples, no results of the evaluation can be taken to be representative of the wider population involved.

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that the programs ended years ago, limited the access to informants. By implementing the snowball method we were able to consult informants in all regions and we covered the sector.

[5] This figure differs from that (182 projects) in ARD's final report, but both figures come from the implementer.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents a synthesis of the field research and analyses of the evaluation data. It is organized in sections based on the key themes from among the ADAM and MIDAS activity sets under study. These grounded data, analyses and recommendations answer the guiding questions of the evaluation. The final section is a user's guide for 'connecting the dots' between the evaluation results and upcoming programming, particularly in light of a possible peace process.

Because the fieldwork was extensive, covering several components of two substantial programs, the bulk of the findings – empirical data points – are shown in Annex I – Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, in tabular form. This Annex is useful for the reader looking to plumb a given subject in more depth, as it contains the full range of findings on each key theme. This table also shows the relationship between conclusions and the findings on which they are based, as well as the recommendations that then emerge.

At the same time, the main body of the report provides a targeted review for readers who want to understand key themes across the areas of inquiry of the evaluation, in a concise and accessible way. The User's Guide to the report, the final report chapter, orients the user in to how to apply the evaluation's results, in the context of Colombia's peace process and the Mission's CDCS process.

The Conclusions section of each Key Theme emphasizes the *how* and *why* of the findings and these elements are underlined in the text of the Conclusions. Recommendations for key themes are also cross-referenced by the array of key themes to which they are related, and arrayed in a table by key theme at the end of this section. Finally, case studies are referenced in the text to indicate the detail that can be found in Annex V with eighteen program case studies.

A final annex that can help readers understand these key themes is Annex IV, Getting to Answers. As the evaluation questions for this study were unusual in their format – a matrix of guiding principles and sectoral questions – the evaluation team designed the evaluation around the key themes, below, and how they answered both the guiding principles and the sector-based questions. The key themes emerged from a facilitated process in the evaluation team's extended team planning meetings.

1. Key Theme: Associativity

Findings

a. Associativity

In response to the evaluation fieldwork, a range of organizations and projects highlighted their experiences with associativity. In Bolivar, ADAM's Aproaca project helped the organization to form, strengthen production, create citizen oversight, and remake the social fabric of their community (Please see Case Study (CS) 1, Annex V). Indigenous community dairy project respondents realized the value of associativity through implementing an ADAM project in their organization. The leader of that association and other association representatives emphasized the lack of associativity prior to these projects, with individuals working in isolation and mistrust (CS 3).

A social worker in Cauca who worked with various ADAM projects called the associativity work "added-value," saying that the feeling of belonging to the community was a very important result of building sewers, schools, or other infrastructure projects jointly.

The infrastructure observation and survey results include one infrastructure project that failed after ADAM staff left. A failure in an ADAM productive project in Cauca occurred when a new association dissolved for lack of capacity to resolve conflicts over resources and leadership. Most infrastructure projects (34 of 42 that were observed), however, continued to be cared for by a community organization.

b. Community contributions

Responses to the infrastructure survey and the observations themselves indicate a correlation between community participation in design, construction, management or maintenance, and the current physical state of the project. A respondent who led an ADAM school cafeteria project noted the importance of linking the associations to the projects through their contributions: materials, labor and committee participation. *"That's the way they buy into the project,"* he noted, *"though the work was hard, excavating and leveling the ground for the cafeteria."* He said that associativity was particularly challenging – and important – for communities of displaced people like theirs.

c. Prior consultation and the consultative process

The ADAM design called for a consultative process with potential beneficiaries prior to all activities with communities and associations. For Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, this process has an official name, "prior consultation," reflecting its status in Colombian regulations. In a great many visits to communities and projects, this consultation process was reported to have been essential and very appreciated – including in communities and activities without Afro-Colombian or indigenous participants. A great number of positive experiences with this consultative process were encountered in the field, with a small but important number of negative ones that provide lessons learned.

The Aprocasur association debated with ADAM on which new crops and products to adopt. Local producers with generations of experience said they knew better than ADAM staff what they wanted to plant and what would work well (CS 2). They chose cacao, and ADAM supported that decision, empowering them and building ownership.

Small producers in Cauca challenged the technical assistance (TA) they received on avocado planting, noting that the plant material provided was already past its prime, and that soil and rainfall conditions were not appropriate for the plants they were being offered. Nevertheless, since avocado was new to the area, the TA's presumed expertise was followed. The planting failed and the producers were left indebted, having taken out loans to increase their planting and yield. TA and credit were provided by a second-level organization, described in the case study annex (CS 14).

Respondents appreciated a "bottom-up" approach to projects, in interview after interview. A participant in a coffee project in Huila appreciated that he and his family got to say what they needed, and see that reflected in the project that was ultimately agreed upon. He also noted: *"The [GOC] program Rural Opportunities offered less money but there was more of a chance to work directly with the technical assistance [than there was with MIDAS]."*

d. Participatory management and maintenance

Of 44 infrastructure survey respondents, 73 percent reported extensive community participation in managing project resources.[6] Thirty respondents (of 40 valid responses, or 75%) said that the community provided maintenance after the project ended. Two noted, however, that these maintenance services were insufficient to maintain the technological aspects of their sewer and aqueduct systems. Nearly four-fifths (79.5%) of responses indicated that the facilities were in good shape at present; paint was the most common characteristic reported to be in a poor state of repair. Nearly all (95%) of respondents said that the facility was still in use for its original purpose. Most (79%) reported that a community organization existed to maintain the work, and only one respondent reported that there had once been such an organization but that it had disbanded after the facility was finished. More than three-quarters (77%) said that the community was still satisfied with the result. Five respondents (11%) reported satisfaction but also problems for continued functioning.

A community in Nariño identified the project they wanted to undertake – a comfortable and well-supplied school for their children's welfare, development and learning – and then worked together to meet ADAM's requirements for their contribution. They carried out raffles and a bingo night in order to provide the school with a small library with new books and an LCD television. They now carry out ongoing maintenance of the school and its grounds and report that the school is the pride of their community, one which neighboring communities want to emulate.

Conclusions

- Developing associativity in ADAM and MIDAS projects was a major achievement for the programs. Though it was not successful in every activity visited, it was quite frequent and respondents cited it as a major change. It is especially noteworthy in conditions of displacement, poverty and the presence of armed actors. Reconstructing social fabric required the individuals and communities establish – or re-establish – their life projects, work collectively, and involve all generations. This contributed to a shared identity, shared enterprise, and to rooting the citizens again in their communities.
- When ADAM and MIDAS worked with established organizations, the learning period was shorter, producing stronger community appropriation and sustainability. Greater associativity in MIDAS projects was correlated with greater community agreement on processes of agricultural production and collective strategies to face market requirements.
- ADAM projects strengthened associations through the activities of the citizens' oversight and management committees, and through capacity building in accounting and organizational skillsets. Community contribution in these projects was key to feelings of ownership. Where there was greater participation from communities in terms of funds, land, labor and risk, there was also greater local commitment to sustainability.
- Deciding which project to undertake empowered participants and increased their commitment to the project and to the contributions they would have to make to it. Early consultation at decision-making levels allowed local knowledge of agricultural, economic, infrastructural or conflict-related contexts to be recognized and incorporated into projects.

[6] These data are not representative of all ADAM social infrastructure projects, as the sample was purposive rather than random. These findings cannot therefore be generalized, nor assumed to apply to all such projects. However, the data provide strong indications of strengths, lessons learned, and the implementation model utilized, including its associativity.

- Some implementing staff members had better results than others in prior consultation. This may have reflected the varying situations they were in as much as their individual capabilities – but the communities needed to perceive that implementation was sensitive to their differences and needs, in order to garner their trust.
- Involving communities in administering resources generated credibility and participants assumed responsibility. Where community members and their organizations were empowered to criticize plans, decision-making and participation were considered genuine. Where participation was weakest in terms of community planning and decision-making, communities experienced conflicts in their expectations and project processes.

Recommendations

1. Continue to build associativity into productive and infrastructure projects with bottom-up programming with genuine community participation. Build time for this challenging undertaking into timelines, particularly with returnee communities, with new or newer associations, and when working across multiple communities. Diagnose and support locally necessary TA to reach associativity goals and build relevant capacity. Include detailed TA and training content on the benefits of associativity tailored to communities, using real-world examples. Include participants across generations to encourage sustainability. Build capacity in conflict resolution, so participants can manage potentially contentious issues, such as around commercialization of production. (Key Themes (KT) 1, 3, 7, 11)[7]
2. Continue to require community contributions as part of productive and public goods activities. Continue TA and training for a range of types of community contributions, across generations, including citizen management of resources, project oversight, and organizational development. (KT 1, 3, 7, 11)
3. Work "bottom–up" to ensure relevance, diagnose local needs, and build community buy-in. This should not be compromised when time or resources are short. Ensure that all implementing staff undergo sensitivity training on vulnerability issues, and monitor their work to ensure that their methods are perceived locally as inclusive. Seek local counsel on approaching communities to participate, and respect community rights to self-determination. (KT 4, 6, 7, 13)
4. These recommendations apply equally to abstract notions of rights as well as to concrete decision-making about project design and implementation. While advance consultation is often a goal, in the rush of implementation it can be compromised. (KT 4, 6, 7)
5. Ensure space and TA for community decision-making and project oversight to maximize both empowerment and appropriation. (KT 4, 6, 7)

2. Key Theme: Targeting and planning for agricultural projects

Findings

a. Established and new crops

[7] Some recommendations apply to several key themes. These are abbreviated after the relevant recommendations.

Projects reinforcing the cultivation of traditional crops in Huila and Putumayo showed good results in short and medium term. There, and in Cauca, new crops faltered more frequently. In Cauca, the beneficiaries attributed this to inattentive TA that didn't consider the region's soil conditions or climactic variations. ADAM's regional coordinator noted that his team underestimated the time and effort to bring a new organization up to speed on an unfamiliar crop.

> *"Actually, we found that it takes less time to teach the participants to grow a new crop, than it does to structure and grow a new association."*
>
> - ADAM regional coordinator

The condiments project in Putumayo had similar challenges: respondents said they needed longer-term TA, though in that project the association has found support from other embassies and an oil company. A fish farm project, however, was more successful in advancing the technology and technical prowess of an experienced association that started from a higher level (CS 4).

Respondents in Putumayo, Huila and Cauca reported that, for new products like palm, palmitos, avocado or rubber, they needed greater support, training and TA, over more time, to be sustainable. They described situations that they did not know how to manage, and as their neighbors were also new to these crops, they knew no one to ask for assistance on technical and production matters. With these new crops, the respondents also said marketing the produce was completely new to them.

Families new to cacao in the Aprocasur project in Bolivar reported that 20 percent of participants had abandoned the crop and returned to coffee cultivation.

b. Studying soil and climate prior to intervention

Figure 4: New crops, such as the Hass avocado in Cauca, required advance soil and climate study.

In Nariño and in Cauca, respondents reported that inadequate studies were done on soil and climate conditions, affecting project outcomes. In Nariño, studies reportedly failed to consider the soil effects of a landslide, which later presented problems for small growers who were working with the resulting unfamiliar soil conditions.

A MIDAS project in Cesar appeared to have been poorly planned for palm. The region regularly has half the necessary rainwater level; nevertheless, a MIDAS project developed palm in this area. An adequate prior study could have avoided the failure of the crop that followed. Asopalmira respondents in Tumaco also lost cacao crops, when soil studies were done after new clones had been planted in inappropriate conditions (CS 8.) In part this was due to changed soil conditions after a natural disaster, and in part the rush of implementation, according to

participants. For the next growing season this was remedied.

Conclusions

- In the medium term, known crops have good results in most projects visited. Those projects that planted crops new to the communities required more TA, for a longer period of time, particularly in longer-term crops. As problems arose prior to maturation, the projects needed to have access to ongoing TA. Among the evaluation sample, crops that were new to producers were somewhat more likely to have failed.
- Crops that are new to participants are also more difficult for them to market. They may be unfamiliar with demand sources, quality and aggregation standards or post-harvest techniques. Several field visits revealed that beneficiaries planting new crops felt they had not been supported through the value chain.
- Where a community does not have a pre-existing association to implement a project, greater TA is also necessary for the nascent association itself (above and beyond the TA on the crop.) These new organizations may not have sufficient tools to resolve internal conflicts or external challenges to production and marketing.
- Department-level soil and climactic studies are not likely sufficient when there is great variation across a given department, and these studies are particularly required when the crop is new to the area or to participants.

Recommendations

6. Choose project crops that are known to the communities where the projects will be undertaken, unless additional time and resources can be expended to analyze viability and to bring producers and associations "up to speed" with new crops. (KT 2, 3, 6, 11)
7. If new crops are proposed, ensure TA through to maturity and marketing of the products: the entire value chain. This does not have to be implementer-based TA, but rather can be built through nationally and regionally available sources such as the Ministry of Agriculture and its institutes, as well as local and regional, public and private, TA providers. However, ensure that out-sourced providers have the requisite knowledge, ability and time to fill this role. Set standards (frequency, quality, and sectors), agree on these with the out-sourcing agency, and monitor their performance for compliance. (KT 2, 3, 4, 6, 11)
8. Particularly with new crops, conduct detailed studies at a local enough level to be useful in the microclimates within a region. (KT 2, 3, 6, 11)

Figure 5: Associations' ability to market products was critical in finding alternatives to coca.

3. Key Theme: Marketing, competitiveness and food security with vulnerable groups

Findings

a. Seeds to sales – the full value chain

The greatest difficulties across the value chain, for both ADAM and MIDAS productive projects, were related to getting the production successfully to market. Isolation in Huila and Putumayo; severe price fluctuations in Cauca, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Cesar; and unsustainable, risky contract terms with major chains affected associations' ability to get their products to market and earn a fair return. Despite this major challenge, several projects also managed to have important advances within their projects and in getting them successfully to market. ADAM's infrastructure projects at times met these needs, such as with a blackberry collection center, and with road construction.

In Nariño, timely technology and TA improved the quality of a well-established dairy, allowing for alliances with national chains to purchase the bulk of the association's production (CS 6). A similar strategy failed in Cauca, however, with both a new avocado project and a new *panela* processing plant. In agreements with chain stores (Éxito and Carrefour), the terms were unfavorable for producers, with payments at 60 days and unsold merchandise returned. Smaller, newer and more vulnerable producers faced these problems in Putumayo as well. They lacked the capital to purchase and aggregate the production of their members at first harvest. When this happened, many producers would return to intermediaries and sell at very low prices, just to get something for their production before it spoiled. Also limiting their success are the minimal and faulty roads connecting their area with their buyers.

In Huila the size of agricultural parcels affected the export of coffee. Families had divided farms, either for inheritances to several children or to meet immediate financial needs by selling. As a result, production failed to meet export requirements – for quantity, not for quality – and these were relegated to the domestic market. As that market is covered many times over by traditional large producers, the growers were hampered with low prices and wastage.

In Antioquia, Nariño and Cauca, cacao project respondents reported important benefits to the entire value chain – despite, in Cauca, severe price and climate volatility. An alliance with Casa Luker resulted in a contractual agreement for the association's entire production, and respondents attributed the organization's strengthening and that of the value chain to the ADAM intervention. Beneficiaries in a Nariño cacao project reported that MIDAS fostered production increases, while an ADAM project worked to position Tumaco's cacao as high quality, with floral aroma and rich flavor. That association, in alliance with Aprocasur in the south of Bolivar, is one of forty partner associations across the region. The benefits have accrued to the umbrella organization and partners, to such a degree that they are now working to industrialize production and marketing of cacao, in order to garner more stable prices, enforce quality standards, and add value.

MIDAS operator Interactuar analyzed various sectors, and led entrepreneurs to target markets in support of their commercial strategies. Interactuar made strategic alliances with the regional office of the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (National Directorate of Taxes and Customs, DIAN for its Spanish initials) and the Cartagena Chamber of Commerce. The DIAN in

Antioquia created a specialized window to support micro-enterprises to formalize. The Chamber of Commerce helped MIDAS projects to structure themselves to compete.

In Barranquilla, MIDAS supported SME Gente Estratégica (GE), a recruiter and temporary employment services firm (CS 15). GE's model includes 12 to 18 months to prepare their job candidates with extensive training, particularly when they come from vulnerable communities, to ensure they meet the standards of the firms to which they are sent. They created 3,000 new jobs in a year and a half with MIDAS, and expanded the company from 10 cities to 63 across Colombia. One key factor was GE's prior network and agreements with significant enterprises; these clients were already satisfied with GE, but MIDAS helped GE expand the relationships.

In some cases alliances between small-scale producers and companies were successful and sustained in time, but in other cases there were shortcomings. Nariño's small-scale dairy producer association alliances with large companies such as Alquería and Alpina continue; the private sector remains involved because the associations continue to meet quality and volume standards. This is also true with a dairy producer in Santander. In Cesar and Norte de Santander alliances between producers and big palm companies like Hacienda Las Flores, Palmariguani or Palmas de la Costa are still ongoing under a win-win approach. The commercial palm companies foster transport and other challenging issues for producers, while drawing in greater quality production for processing (hence, the Win-Win.) Examples of successful MIDAS cacao alliances included Asocati and Asopalmira (both are case studies in the report.) The success factors in these cases include precisely the expansion of the associations across smaller producer groups and thereby having greater market power.

The team observed failed alliances that were due to unstable market relationships. The conditions for small-scale producers were often equal to those that competitive commercial firms had, but were insufficient for small associations. Alliances with chains like Éxito or Carrefour exposed producers to 60-90 day payments, merchandise return to farmers when not sold and other difficulties. An alliance between FUNDESMAG and ECOPETROL in Santander failed due to changes in tendering processes from ECOPETROL that were disadvantageous for small associations. Additionally, many respondents from failed projects said the reason was the lack of attention to the market end of the value chain. As with other challenges, failure to attend to markets, negotiation, and other themes at that end of the value chain were particularly prejudicial for smaller and newer associations, those with crops maturing after the activity ended, and/or those planting new crops. These vulnerable producers needed support up until they would become competitive, but the program support ended prematurely.

b. Planning for food security with vulnerable populations

In two cases in Cesar, associations of small palm producers (in Becerril and El Copey) reported that their palm crop took four years to be productive (CS 10). Although MIDAS assigned maintenance resources, they said their food security was compromised by monoculture, which they felt the project had promoted. In Huila, Cauca, Putumayo, Bolivar, Nariño and Santander, participants dropped out when they could no longer wait to have something to sell. Participants themselves pointed to the examples of home gardens and multi-crop, self-sufficient farms *("so you can go and sell the products in the local market."*) But the evaluation found cases in half of the departments visited where TA to projects did not sufficiently prioritize food security.

Participants in the Productive Ethnic Territories program (TEP, for its Spanish initials) reported that the Traditional Farm method had helped them remain food secure even in cases (such as

with a cacao project in Cauca) where the cash crop was delayed or damaged by disease or weather. In a project in Santander, a mining company assisted miners' spouses to carry out small-scale agriculture. Even after this mining company has left the area with a very uncertain employment future, these families have greater dietary diversity and some small income from these family gardens (CS 16.)

c. Planning for contingencies – risk management

In agricultural projects across the sites visited, respondents coped with unforeseen situations: drops in market prices (e.g., cacao dropped by three-quarters, palm dropped by half), increasing prices for inputs, landslides, unexpected weather extremes. New associations, or those with unfamiliar crops, often faced these threats to production, quality and marketing without the proper tools and knowledge to mitigate them.

MIDAS staff in Antioquia described the effects of not having a contingency plan when these unforeseen circumstances and needs arose. This was said to be important in meeting MIDAS job indicator targets, when, for example, floods affected the achievement of the required number of work-days. They told the evaluation team that not having a plan in place meant that reaction to shocks was more expensive. During a drought in one site, emergency irrigation was costly and very hard to acquire but necessary to save the crop. An attack of the sigatóca negra (an insect that devours banana foliage) was another example in Urabá. In that case, MIDAS participant Uniban quickly bought pesticides for producers, avoiding losses but at a significant cost. While it is not possible to plan for all contingencies, having a plan for those that can be mitigated could have helped some project participants when fully foreseeable challenges arose.

Conclusions

- Producers and associations that are not competitive prior to intervention were less resilient to shocks – price volatility, cost increases, weather extremes, and other production and market uncertainties. (This conclusion, and additional findings related to it, is explored as well in the section on risk management, below.) This vulnerability puts them at greater risk of project failure, as producers will turn to, or return to, other crops or activities when the productive project stumbles or fails. In this sense, not having reached a level of competitiveness is its own vulnerability.
- The marketing link in the value chain at times lacked timely planning or lacked attention altogether, in assuring that buyers and demand existed. Failing to do so resulted in wasted production or selling at below-market prices when production was already complete. Linking small producer associations with chain buyers can be successful. But when producers are not yet competitive, they have little power to negotiate for favorable terms with such chains. This augments their risk and vulnerability.
- Marketing through associations and alliances is generally more profitable for the small producers. The associations can aggregate production and thus have greater negotiating power. However, in order to begin, newer or very small associations must have the seed money to purchase the first production from their members.
- Second-level associations and commercial alliances in the sites visited showed that self-interest (in increased production and in strict quality standards) was sufficient to encourage their active and successful participation.
- The Traditional Farm method was well received, with the benefit of reflecting customary methods and respecting the knowledge of communities and their elders. Most projects were

not found to have promoted mono-cultivation. However, cases in at least half of departments visited showed that insufficient attention was paid to how families would sustain themselves in longer-term projects (notably palm and cacao) and there was evidence of worsening food security as a result. Food security and crop diversity were not uniformly promoted by either ADAM or MIDAS projects, or were not successful in ensuring participants' ability to maintain food security.

- Productive projects are inherently risky because of the nature of agricultural markets and climate variation. This is truer for vulnerable populations in general, and in conflict-affected areas. Starting projects with delayed harvest crops, but failing to plan for ongoing accompaniment through the volatility of production and the uncertainty of marketing is insufficient and can be damaging for participants when one or more of their multiple vulnerabilities comes into play.

Recommendations

9. Identify and secure market buyers from the start of productive projects, especially when working with vulnerable communities. During project and activity design, explore and secure potential channels of distribution and marketing of products, to identify the needs of potential business partners and match production to those needs. (KT 2, 3, 4, 6, 11)
10. Promote alliances that mitigate the lack of a strong competitive edge among associations just entering the market or having tenuous links to it. Terms should take into consideration the short time horizons of associations and the vulnerable populations that comprise them. Include marketing, negotiation and contract terms as part of association training and ongoing TA. When working with small producers for specific markets (such as high-end coffee for export), assist them in meeting quantity standards as well as in meeting quality standards. Association support should take into consideration all the requirements of a given value chain. (KT 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 13)
11. Work with the GOC on incentive systems to encourage systematic private sector participation, on terms that allow producers to become competitive. Companies could offer, singly or in packages, terms such as:
    - Reduced quantity requirements
    - Shortened payment schedules
    - Training in quality standards and how to meet them
    - Credit arrangements/seed money to purchase first harvest
    - Not extending credit to the buyer (i.e., the 60-day terms)
    - Transportation services(KT 2, 3, 4, 6, 11)
12. Other terms or supports may be identified for a given activity or beneficiary type, such as giving preference to participating alliances and associations in public contracting. Implementers should be open to negotiating for what will support vulnerable producers to move toward competitiveness. Incentives for participating buyers might also include preferential treatment in public contracting, packaging that highlights the social responsibility aspect of the offering, or tax breaks. (KT 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 13)
13. Particularly with delayed yield crops, ensure food security through rigorous attention to diversified planting. Make wide use of the Traditional Farm method that was used successfully in ADAM productive projects. (KT 2, 3)
14. Work with participants, associations and alliances to develop risk management plans. These should consider potential obstacles such as market price volatility, unexpected changes in productivity levels, disease and environmental management, economic shocks

and labor availability, disagreements within associations, political and security instability, and climate variations. (KT 2, 3, 11)

4. Key Theme: From vulnerability to resilience: the tipping point out of subsistence

Findings

There were many examples of projects increasing production, improving quality, strengthening their value chain and learning to compete. Respondents reported a change in mentality – from thinking like farmers who produced for their own consumption, to thinking like businesspeople who planted continuously and earned a more stable income and, in some cases, established wealth through savings. The TA helped increase efficiency in, for example, Asopalmira in Tumaco, and improved post-production techniques and disease prevention (CS 8). In a forestry project, a respondent linked improved productivity to better environmental awareness: *"people have really realized how the forest doesn't just bring life, but also sustains our communities."*

Figure 6: Using test laboratories to train vulnerable women to fill specific jobs increased employability.

MIDAS business owner respondents were asked about developing economies of scale, as a result of their participation in MIDAS activities. Respondents cited that their business had improved in financial terms (88%), they had associated with other companies (81%), increased annual sales and number of clients (74-75%), increased their formal employees and number of suppliers (61%). Though the businesses sampled do not represent all MIDAS-sponsored businesses, the preponderance of qualitative and quantitative evidence indicates strong achievements in business outcomes.

A project to collect and market the *fique* fiber in three departments set up collection points, increased plantings and yield, and provided TA in value chain themes (CS 11.) In Nariño, an existing dairy production association improved in productivity – from 5 to 8 liters average daily production per beneficiary – and in quality – with best practices and ensuring that the beneficiaries understood the importance and market value of meeting quality standards. Productivity in a set of *panela* projects in Cauca improved through introducing ADAM-sponsored cane presses and small, sustainable production facilities with more defined quality standards and methods.

Tecnoají provided irrigation systems and the necessary infrastructure to access water resources in the area. Uniban provided its partner producers an equipment kit for their parcels, complemented by their training and sensitization for farm support staff. Project impacts included reduced informality of businesses, a more dynamic market, and increased flow of resources throughout the community.

A former MIDAS staff member noted the long history of alliances in Colombia between commercial enterprises and small producers, with good results, and that the MIDAS model for agribusiness worked by building on that foundation. Ensuring that these programs were as "Colombian" as possible, and avoiding reliance on USAID projects, was a priority. MIDAS relied instead on the Escuelas de Capacitación de Agricultores (farmer training schools, known as ECAs) model, in which training explicitly builds on knowledge the farmers already have.

MIDAS conducted a diagnostic on the status of their TA at approximately mid-term, in order to help develop public policy on such assistance. MIDAS also contracted TA to support extensionists in some of the main growers' federations, including Fedecafe. Other Colombian TA resources include the Instituto Colombiano de Agricultura (ICA), the Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria (UMATAs), and the CENI – Centro Nacional de Investigaciones, which include centers for coffee, palm, cacao, rubber, and a range of other crops.

In two Huila agricultural projects, respondents contrasted MIDAS programming with that of the Ministry of Agriculture's Rural Opportunities program. The latter, one focus group respondent said, *"taught us to look at business, at niche markets, at best practices in markets. We went to business fairs and conferences."*

A MIDAS operator in the Santanderes region reported that most potential beneficiaries did not have the "vocation" of entrepreneurship that would motivate them to work with projects, and show them how to overcome obstacles. For vulnerable populations in particular, according to these respondents, generating such skills takes time. They felt that the indicators of the MIDAS project might push implementers away from this challenge. The manager of Proempresas, an institution that promotes entrepreneurship, reported that a little over two thirds of MIDAS beneficiaries had an "entrepreneurial spirit." He reported that, "of these, almost all were successful. From the other 30 percent, nothing remains."

In a dairy production project in Nariño, market quality requirements were the incentive for beneficiaries to improve their work, resulting in a price increase from COP 500 to COP 800 per liter. Other family and community members increased their income through the collection center and transportation cooperatives. Further, the beneficiaries sought alternatives for increasing income, such as offering credit and expanding their product lines.

The fish project in Cauca lost its first harvest when a promised market was not established early on. However, over time they have increased production to a level that provides a more stable income over time for the 300 participating families. Participants say that learning to manage the economies of scale afforded by the project had brought them closer to having a dependable monthly income.

Respondents from the Putumayo pepper project noted that their producers' plantings were a third of what each family would need to have to cover their expenses (CS 12). However, with market demand in hand (through support from Canada, Germany and a petroleum company) their goals are to increase production to 1500 hectares per family, to reach a level of economic sustenance, as well as selling to 80-100 Colombian restaurants and eventually becoming exporters.

A successful case of marketing support was seen in an association of farmers of southern Huila that succeeded in establishing a partnership with the multinational Nestlé. Thanks to good agricultural practices, catalyzed by the program, the association became certified and was able to

demand a better price for their products. *"In our case, SENA's support was very important. When we told Nestlé we had [our own] chilling tanks, they became interested right away."* In this case, the technological and quality advances from the program helped them garner a contract with a major buyer.

Conclusions

- Raising efficiency, production and quality standards was a focus of many of the ADAM projects visited, and those that were successful in these areas tended to have more substantial and more sustained market benefits as a result. Where farmers were planting unfamiliar crops, TA appeared to have been insufficient.
- Successful productive projects whose participants were interviewed for the evaluation were growing. Their motivation and incentive were endogenous, as was their effort to surmount obstacles. The most common requests for support from these initial successes involved technology, efficiency and productivity improvements, and TA for marketing their produce.
- ADAM projects often had the effect of changing participants' mentalities from that of subsistence farmers to one of entrepreneurship, and of the economy beyond that of their own households. It appears such assistance can help households achieve a "tipping point" where resilience leads to investment and wealth creation.
- The evaluation evidence suggests that this change in mentality was strong in communities and associations with high levels of participation and motivation – suggesting that associativity has productive benefits as well as individual and social ones.
- Though the evaluation looked at the ways in which ADAM and MIDAS helped beneficiaries (both individual and association), the evidence also shows many instances in which respondents (again, both individual and associations) took the ADAM or MIDAS support and built upon it after the programs had ended. Even when an initial harvest was unsuccessful, or when inputs were insufficient on their own to bring respondents to a competitive level, they were motivated and capable to continue and expand upon the projects. Other community members joined projects once they saw success; associations set goals for production and market access and sought resources to meet them; operational committees saved funds in execution from one ADAM infrastructure project and used the savings on an additional project; communities sought further TA and formal education to expand their products.

Recommendations

15. For associations with experience in their sector, program to build on that experience using the bottom-up, participatory approach discussed in the section on community appropriation. These groups, with proven interest and ability to produce, are good targets for efficiency improvements, TA on negotiation and expanding their markets, and associativity with like organizations across their sector. (KT 2, 3, 4, 6 9)
16. Use the significant national TA resources to support those participants who are new to their sector. Alliances with Colombian TA resources (CENIs, SENA, UMATAs, university extension, and commercial enterprises) are in line with standing practice but could be systematically expanded to the projects that are most in need. Monitor that TA, however, to ensure that standards and methods are of the required caliber. (KT 3, 4, 6, 11)
17. Provide projects sufficient support to build that beyond-family plantation size or other metric, to the point where the project does sustain families' needs sufficiently. This goal

should supersede the attainment of cross-cutting indicators such as number of hectares planted and number of families supported. (KT 4, 12)

5. Key Theme: Coordination with municipalities and the state

Findings

One of ADAMs program directives was to engage local authorities in productive and public works projects. Where successful, this had positive effects on local governance outcomes, local buy-in, accountability and capacity development. Municipalities varied greatly, even within a given department, in their commitment to and co-financing of ADAM projects. For instance, in Cauca, the local government supported a project by helping formalize community title of the project site; in Nariño, departmental, municipal and traditional authorities supported an indigenous community's dairy project with funds for equipment. Other projects in the same departments had less favorable experiences, with promises to project organizers that were not realized.

> *They're telling us we've got 30 days to get out. Why didn't ADAM make a direct agreement between us and the municipality? They left us dealing with the legal battle, and we don't know if we should keep on investing in this project or not."*
>
> - Apropesca focus group respondent

The team visited 42 ADAM infrastructure projects. Of the 47 related respondents, 78 percent reported that the municipality or other governing body took part. Government bodies were reported to have provided funds, TA, or necessary approvals. Among the nine respondents who said the municipality had not participated, two said the municipality had promised support but had failed to follow through. In qualitative and quantitative data, the result was seen in many sites across the sample – a loss of credibility, particularly in the case of failed promises.

Municipal representatives were infrequently accessible in the evaluation fieldwork, as the team encountered none who were still in office or who were for other reasons unavailable. In two cases where ADAM's agreements with them were said to be informal, therefore, there was less guarantee of sustainability once ADAM and the municipal government were gone. In the Apropesca fish project, ADAM arranged with a nearby municipality to create a fish processing facility but, respondents reported, did not secure title in the name of the organization. Now, new municipal leaders have given the organization thirty days to vacate the site. A formal agreement would have given participants a legal document to make their case. In other ADAM projects visited, such formal agreements were said to have been accorded with local governments. The regional director for ADAM in that region said that co-financing was a particular challenge, that there were some mayors who kept the funds from the projects, or in other ways did not comply, thereby slowing or stopping projects in process.

Evidence in the departments visited suggest that, at least from beneficiary perspectives, MIDAS initiatives did not systematically reach out to local authorities to support or be part of productive projects and SMEs. For example, in the Santanderes projects visited, no respondents recalled any MIDAS efforts to represent beneficiaries before government bodies at any level. USAID staff related that MIDAS' efforts with local governments was indirect, "offering them a seat at the table" rather than a direct relationship. However, respondents in a range of projects noted the absence of a more formal MIDAS role to take advantage of particular opportunities. For example, in Catatumbo, respondents expressed that this sort of support would have been helpful

in order to secure technical assistance from the Unidad Municipal para Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria (UMATA, Municipal Agricultural TA Unit) in Tibú for the various agribusiness projects. Another example is found in Barrancabermeja, where the local partner, the Chamber of Commerce, lamented that MIDAS did not support projects to reach out to Ecopetrol. The Chamber hoped MIDAS would help them come to an agreement on contracting standards for local businesses to provide the majority-state-owned firm with goods and services. In another example, Coemprender respondents wished MIDAS had supported their efforts to access credit in institutions like the Banco Agrario or Finagro for their agribusiness projects.

At the regional level, MIDAS did include strategic alliances with Governors' offices in different departments, but respondents were unaware of those linkages. The Nariño Governor's Office offered institutional support from the Secretaries of Agriculture to prioritized MIDAS products such as wheat, potato, cauliflower and dairy, in addition to special coffee, palm, cacao and coconut. Also in Nariño, the departmental government signed an agreement in 2009 for property formalization, which positively affected an ADAM housing project in Tumaco. In Cesar, the departmental government invested $2.95 million pesos during 2009 in SMEs, property formalization and sanitary and phytosanitary standards.

Conclusions

- Co-financing with local, particularly municipal, counterparts was an ADAM project goal. Citizens were happy with participation and funding from local officials when it happened. However, when it did not, especially when it was promised but not delivered, municipal governments lost credibility. This compounded the problem of the "absent state" for citizens and for the state itself.
- Municipal leaders in power during ADAM's time were frequently unavailable at the time of the evaluation. Other state or parastatal entities that worked with ADAM projects were more regularly available for interviews (i.e., still in their posts). This political turnover affected citizens' ability to engage with municipalities, and to sustain gains made in programming.
- In those instances where municipalities failed to participate, there was less project sustainability. This is an important missed opportunity. The results do not lay blame for this on one actor or another, rather they show that low resource levels and competing priorities play a part, as does lack of interest, bad faith and even suggestions of corruption on the part of municipalities in some cases.
- Another missed opportunity was that when state bodies were involved with MIDAS projects, beneficiaries were not made aware, and so did not regard the state more highly as a result.

Recommendations

18. Determine which incentives will encourage more engaged participation from municipalities, and use them. For example there are political and economic incentives that can motivate local authorities to participate:
    a. promotion of their positive actions in front of electors and the community
    b. awards for good performance issued by USAID and/or GOC
    c. inclusion in a USAID best local practices catalogue
    d. a national fair with success stories
    e. budgetary bonuses or other forms of additional financing
    f. international experience exchange programs
    g. local performance rankings that are locally and nationally publicized. (KT 5, 11)

19. Ensure that project staff understand the importance of engaging municipal support to provide legitimacy to cooperation projects, support governance issues like certification of producer associations, and build government credibility. Make genuine municipal partnership a priority, and measure and publish the level of co-financing and local support (KT 5, 11)
20. Support successful productive projects to access national-level programs through the Agriculture and other Ministries.
21. Consider municipal resource matches as selection criteria for future projects. Verify this closely, through local development plans, budgets, and royalties revenue investment plans, as well as post-project. (This should be based on municipal categories to avoid excluding small municipalities). (KT 5, 11)
22. Build in exit strategies that specify and mandate institutional roles on project follow-up, sustained TA and support for each project. (KT 5, 11)

6. Key Theme: Capacity building

Findings

The evaluation found ample qualitative and quantitative evidence that participants applied what they learned from ADAM and MIDAS TA and training. In the telephone survey, with 69 SMEs, agribusinesses and forestry projects responding, the top benefits cited by respondents were training (65%) and technical assistance (61%). The great majority cited improved capacity in technical knowledge for sales and production (90%) and for managerial skills (84%). Though the businesses sampled do not represent all MIDAS-sponsored businesses, the preponderance of qualitative and quantitative evidence indicates strong achievements in capacity building.

Aproaca respondents said that ADAM's capacity building helped in several areas: improved agricultural practices and efficiency, maintaining food security, and effective project management. ADAM intervention also helped Aproaca get their certifications up to date, access microcredit, and develop accountability and inventory systems. It became certified with the Ministry of Agriculture to provide technical assistance and won a GOC Alianzas Productivas project. In Nariño, milk producers credited the training for their ability to improve efficiency, production and quality. They report greatly increased marketing of their production. In Santander and Norte de Santander, MIDAS strengthened a set of operators and associations. Two associations became operators and went on to run major projects themselves (CS 5 and 7.) MIDAS capacity building in a Rio Chagui forestry project was cited for important changes in community usage: *"Making better use of our local forest has served us, in conserving nature, understanding all the forest has to offer, how we manage the tools we have, and in marketing wood products in a good way. We always share this knowledge in our communities."*

Training format was also important, with interactive training and practical approaches reported by respondents. Women respondents in Cesar appreciated the attention to childcare, so that they were able to attend as well as the men in the community.

> *The MIDAS coaching was spectacular. They had a team that coached us through all levels of the process. MIDAS arrived when we needed their help. It was rigorous and organized. Since then we have participated in numerous calls for projects.*
> - CEO, Gente Estratégica

The negative reactions to training and TA were also several, but coalesced around two main concerns: quality and duration. In Nariño, palm producers were disheartened by the lack of TA

when their project ended, two years before their plants would come to fruition.

The Cauca project cultivating Haas avocados, which were new to the zone, required greater technical assistance and, according to the association president, the TA was of poor quality and dismissive of the local knowledge offered by participants. The avocado crops were only partially viable, and many participants are still paying off the debts they incurred.

In the south of Huila, a successful dairy and cattle project participant noted that his project required ongoing TA because its growth had stalled and they needed to be able to compete with larger, existing companies in the sector.

Implementer staff in Bogota cited knowledge sharing across projects, but no evaluation respondents reported having participated. Palm producers in neighboring departments Norte de Santander and Cesar reported no sharing among peer associations. When projects and sponsored capacity building had ended, many respondents reported they had nowhere to turn. This was particularly evident – nearly unanimous in some areas – in geographically remote sites, and with new producer associations and/or when cultivating unfamiliar, delayed-yield crops.

Conclusions

- *Content:* Training and TA designed to meet the participants where they are, as producers and as associations, was best received and put to use. Training and TA, therefore, need to be designed from a genuine and participatory diagnostic process. Participants had important local knowledge to contribute. They welcomed training and TA that began from an assumption of local knowledge that could be built upon.
- *Format:* Practical approaches ("learning by doing") were most successful, particularly with the agricultural productive projects and agribusinesses. Respondents benefited from dynamic, interactive training rather than lectures.
- *Attendance:* Training was costly for participants, resulting in lost days of work. Reimbursements for travel and time helped participants ensure their participation; similarly, offering childcare and weekend training helped ensure the whole family could participate.
- *Trainers and extensionists:* Committed local consultants with the appropriate learning were most apt for the TA and training. "Parachute" consultants – who appeared to have just dropped in – had fewer stakes in participants' outcomes.
- *Time horizons:* TA often did not support the entire value chain, or did not do so well, particularly when it came to marketing. This was most evident in projects working with new associations with low levels of infrastructure, as their level of competitiveness was low. Compounding the problem was the preponderance of crops that were to mature outside the projects' time horizons.
- *Knowledge management:* One-pagers and success stories are communication rather than knowledge tools. Knowledge sharing – such as fairs and study tours – were reported only very infrequently among evaluation respondents, and those all in Bogota. With unfamiliar crops, long time horizons, or both, producers lacked the knowledge to get their production to market.

Recommendations

23. *Content:* Ensure technical quality and relevance with trained, local TA and trainers to the extent possible. Carry out pre-intervention diagnostics at a sufficiently local level to be

helpful, and use participatory methods to gather information on what participants already know. Continue to use diagnosis on a regular schedule to ensure that learning is appropriate and relevant. Provide quality tools and materials for ongoing use. (KT 4, 6, 11)

24. *Format:* Design practical, dynamic and interactive training that is tailored for associations to whom it is delivered. Maximize cost-effectiveness with the use of peer-to-peer knowledge sharing such as communities of practice, internships-visits, knowledge fairs, or peer reviews. Systematically identify and share practices during implementation to reduce the learning curve, maximize "quick wins" and avoid repeating past mistakes. These measures are especially necessary when new crops are introduced with producers. (KT 4, 6, 11)
25. *Attendance:* It is necessary to subsidize attendees' transportation. Plan trainings in line with participants' schedules, and make childcare available to maximize parents', and in particular mothers', attendance. (KT 4, 6, 11)
26. *Time horizons:* To deepen the effects of TA and training, and to prolong its value, develop methods and tools – tool kits, checklists, visual aids, process charts, and the like – to leave with participants between sessions. Get their feedback about extension and other capacity building services and use those to improve over time. (KT 4, 6, 11)
27. *Knowledge management:* Genuine knowledge management – often through peer-to-peer methods – should be used to strengthen local capacities with timely assistance, inputs and tools. Corporate advisory support is another option for close-to-home knowledge sharing throughout the value chain, in response to community needs. Use a results-based management approach: diagnose needs continuously, and then link M&E with field knowledge to support learning just-in-time and based on identified needs. (KT 4, 6, 11)

7. Key Theme: Engaging the whole community

Findings

Projects that intervened across communities – involving entire families, municipal and traditional authorities, *campesinos* as well as indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups – provided useful lessons for the evaluation. In Putumayo the fish farm's capacity building involved multiple generations in a family. Participants reported high motivation among the association, and among participants' children, in studying the science behind raising fish. Some undertook technical study in the SENA while others visited similar plants in Neiva and Medellín to understand and be in contact with other producers to compare and contrast technologies and methods. In Bolivar, ADAM's project with Aproaca supported an inter-generational process of transferring knowledge and supporting the formation of young leaders who now support the productive activities and continue their training.

The social cohesion allowed unexpected results, such as territorial attachment, solidarity and conflict resolution. Association members cited the importance of attention of training to a range of dimensions of individual and community life. A social worker who supported many projects in Cauca said of this training: *"There was attention to the resolution of conflicts, the act of sitting down to discuss things, like one that had a court case active, over some land. We had to really take care of that so it didn't become an obstacle for the project. We helped facilitate these spaces*

because, at times, people are really timid. This was especially true in this case, because three very distinct communities were trying to work together."

Community projects and associations fostered a common identity around the community, articulation and long-term vision. Delayed-yield crops, such as palm and cacao, brought together different families around the same needs and goals. One unique ADAM project worked with youth to strengthen self-esteem and sense of community, in the hopes of staving off recruitment by armed actors (CS 13.) Teachers and municipal authorities became involved, and the groups created an alert network to support participants who were being threatened. Another project in Putumayo trained 120 youth to be community radio reporters, revived an old musical genre with programming and a festival, and taped a *radionovela* that explored fictionally the challenges of living with illicit crops, armed actors, and poverty (CS 17.) Listeners reportedly wanted to hear the entire series again. They also offered new programs with ADAM support, with local Afro-Colombians, indigenous communities, a women's organization, and the local municipality.

Conclusions

- Engagement across communities and including traditional and state authorities led to more positive outcomes through:
    - Buy-in and, in some cases, significant support from authorities
    - Greater credibility of state authorities
    - Intergenerational effects, promising to sustain the intervention over time
    - Attention to community needs across the spectrum, including rebuilding social fabric
- This was a major consequence of intervention, at times even more valuable to respondents (in terms of social fabric) than the infrastructure works or productive projects themselves. Intergenerational involvement was particularly important for the community efforts because involved youth took on community identity that had been lost. Involving youth also brought them into contact with management, led them to want to learn more, and allowed for the continuity of the effort.

Recommendations

28. Make intergenerational involvement an explicit goal of projects with communities, from planning to capacity building to execution. When diagnosing capacity at the outset of an activity, include questions about differential interests and capacity among potential youth participants, and include these in programming. (KT 7, 11)

8. Key Theme: Differentiated approaches for vulnerable groups

Findings

Respondents in Huila and Putumayo reported that some projects failed when they did not adequately take into consideration the cultural identities of the peoples with whom they worked. In Cauca, one group of Afro-descendent respondents reported that they didn't find ADAM's interventions to be particularly tailored to their needs. This generated difficulty in the relationship of these respondents with ADAM actors.

> *MIDAS support was very important for us. In fact, the project was designed in collaboration with MIDAS, while we told them what we needed. We weren't used to this, so they trained us. The ones who got the training are working on the same things even now. MIDAS understood well our 'particularities' and adapted to our reality.*
>
> - Confederación Indígena Tayrona participant, Sierra Nevada

However, there was another example in Cauca of an inter-ethnic project that strengthened communities and contributed to minimizing conflicts between ethnic communities. The project united two indigenous communities and a *campesino* group that had long been in conflict over land rights. This ADAM fish project opened spaces for dialogue and participation for the members of the different communities, finding common goals (from one indigenous participant: *"the path to integrate us was our common need to produce trout – in that we are the same"*) with projects that provided benefits for all parts. They get along better now and this process itself strengthened the association.

In another intervention, indigenous respondents reported that ADAM projects focused efforts in indigenous communities around those communities' own Life Plans, creating activities that were therefore more appropriate and more in line with the interests and needs identified by those communities. In Tumaco, one forestry project respondent said that ADAM *"helped us technically to put our Life Plan into action. People realized the need to conserve the forest, and we built an internal set of rules around that. ADAM financed the socialization of those rules in all our communities."*

In two Nariño dairy projects participants were reported to have opened opportunities for greater women's participation in the dairy associations to which they belonged. In both cases, however, there was desertion from the projects when some participants – often indigenous – found the quality standards for milking and other processes too different from traditional practices.

In a second project in Nariño, on the other hand, a MIDAS cacao project with Afro-Colombians strengthened the relationship between several Afro-Colombian communities while supporting their traditional crop – in this case, cacao. MIDAS brought instead information, and better techniques, so that they could continue with a crop with which they were familiar and comfortable. One respondent was pleased that*"…they didn't try to take us out of our cacao culture."*

In Afropatia in Cauca, respondents reported improved women's participation, though in other projects respondents did not present gender as an important aspect of the ADAM projects. Beneficiaries' and ADAM project stakeholders' own approaches and interests were said to influence the degree to which gender was included.

Evidence from the evaluation did not show particular attention to gender, and the program indicators (from the 2008 Performance Management Plans - PMPs) did not include measures about how credit, formalization, property rights, legal counsel, or technical assistance, for example, might be different for men and for women. One project specifically designed to help women become artisans and entrepreneurs lost most of its work force of 100 Afro-Colombian women over time; respondents cited conflicts over cultural differences and in some cases intrafamilial violence as the causes (CS 18.)

Conclusions

- The degree to which ethnic minorities perceived that ADAM and MIDAS projects were sensitive to their unique needs varied considerably across projects. The previous experiences of communities, their sensitivity to perceived slights, and the different competencies and approaches of individual implementer staff members have likely all contributed to this set of mixed results. Some of the negative experiences reported by respondents were linked to perceptions that a productive project devalued traditional production methods. Others felt

they had not been sufficiently consulted in the process, or that their recommendations and prior knowledge were ignored.

- In projects that united different communities in common goals, respondents reported surprising and positive outcomes with respect to getting along with neighboring communities – even when there were previous conflicts. Among sites visited in the evaluation, these multi-community efforts were generally very successful.
- Results in promoting women's active participation in productive projects were mixed. Respondents in general did not report a particular focus on including both sexes in projects, or in doing so using gender-differentiated models.
- Given that gender-specific constraints and inequalities do exist, especially in rural areas, in important themes related to development, the programs appeared to lack activities specific to gender on land tenure and credit access, technical assistance, entrepreneurship and agribusiness skills, among other themes that may have important repercussions for women in rural environments.

Recommendations

29. Projects in ethnic communities require detailed and genuine prior consultation processes to identify community needs and priorities. Use the opportunity as part of the necessary diagnosis of local capacity to take advantage of extant knowledge and to tailor programming to local needs. (KT 7, 8)
30. Actively seek to bridge communities – *campesino*, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian – while building associativity with one group, it is just as well to build it across groups and nurture the resolution of old conflicts. (KT 7, 8)
31. Involve local and traditional authorities in decision-making. Ensure that implementers respect communities' right of self-determination with concrete actions that allow for communities' participation in decision-making through the life of the project. (KT 7, 8)
32. Diagnose differential challenges faced by men and women in alternative development projects, particularly in rural areas, on issues of finance and credit, access to TA and services and business skill sets. Ensure that women have as much access to programming as men with measures such as child care during trainings, targeted assistance and counselors, and troubleshooting. Implementers need to make these opportunities apparent to participant families. (KT 7, 8)
33. Leverage the successful associative projects in ethnic communities to counsel and train those invited to join new programs, in a peer-to-peer model that empowers one peer in sharing experiences, and the other in learning from them. (KT 7, 8)

9. Key Theme: Access to financial services and formalization

Findings

a. Financial services

Increasing SME, farmer and association access to credit was an important building block in alternative crop and market viability. ADAM and MIDAS contributions to results included important policy influence. MIDAS contributed to decrees, resolutions, laws, policy recommendations through CONPES documents, and institutional reforms. The evaluation spoke with respondents who were able to take advantage of Banca de Oportunidades innovations in

regional financial services. On the ground, ADAM fostered access to credit for communities and associations. Respondents in Cauca reported important informal but sustaining relationships with the Juntas de Acción Comunal as part of ADAM's work with the Banco Agrario and other regional entities. They at times served as guarantors in cases of association credit. Commercial firms also served this purpose with several of the MIDAS respondents.

MIDAS' microfinance program was designed to create sustainable financial alternatives, to introduce new financial services and to extend the reach of financial institutions and populations in rural areas. For example, Interactuar granted micro-insurance and micro-capital, and created a credit tool for use when associations or individuals needed to purchase equipment. Through TA on the tool, they visited their partner micro-enterprises at the time of granting credit as well as after the credit was paid off. In those visits they also provided basic information on family businesses, and on other services they could provide to support the small or micro-enterprise. This close follow-up with each company allowed Interactuar to identify bottlenecks in credit use and payment. Interactuar also provided TA on the use of the funds obtained through credit, recommending investments in processes or actions that strengthened the business and improved its productivity and profitability.

In Catatumbo, MIDAS worked to increase access to credit, not only to move a project forward, but also to link beneficiaries with another counterpart with a stake in its success. Successful loans permitted project viability and organizational consolidation. The latter occurred with Asogpados, in which this second-level association used credit to create a rotating fund that guaranteed liquidity for the association to underwrite its own projects, with sales of small parcels for the purpose of palm production that benefited the fund. In another instance, a lending institution failed to approve credit applications and the MIDAS partner organization (Fundescat) assumed the costs of projects, stepping in where loan approval took so long that the goals of the project were compromised.

Creating associations in order to garner credit worked in Catatumbo when the organizations thus created were strengthened and sustained, and their members trained and empowered to manage the project. The activities linked financial institutions, expanded microcredit providers, diversified products, and expanded geographic coverage of microcredit. Respondents to the MIDAS SME telephone survey reported positive benefits around access to financial services. More than half (54%) said their access to credit had improved since participating in MIDAS, while one-third said their access to credit was the same as before they participated.

However, the evaluation also registered credit access shortcomings during the fieldwork. In some cases, the beneficiaries had no access to credit affecting their resources for production capacity and trade opportunities. For instance, in Huila and Putumayo some associations had no credit due to lack of collateral, and in some cases because of a lack of knowledge on credit that was available to them, and of the required procedures. In Nariño, the participants in a MIDAS project did not receive required financial training about their credit terms, relative to the delayed-yield time horizons of their crops. In two years their credit came due, while it was not until three years later that the harvest would come. This generated many late payments.

In Cauca, one association discussed the effects of a second-level institution, contracted by ADAM to supervise their avocado project, in which crop failures left them heavily indebted. This experience differed from those, reported by other associations, in which they received training and TA on credit. Several families remain indebted to the present day, and many

reported they were told that the second-level organization was to cover 50 percent of the debt. When that organization brought a check for the association president to endorse, they expected payment in the amount of some nine million pesos; but that payment had never arrived.

b. Certification and formalization

The MIDAS Policy component also implemented what was called the rural development model, which helped to reduce land informality, taking advantage of economies of scale generated by the massive application of administrative and judicial routes for formalization. MIDAS offered TA in the piloting and development of programs to formalize rural property in Boyacá, Cauca, Cesar, Guajira, Santander y Tolima. The basis for this work was an institutional cooperation model designed to mitigate challenges to formalization of land title and the burden of the requirements on land tenure seekers. The lessons learned with these pilots allowed the government to identify process areas for normative and procedural adjustments, which are now under analysis with the national government and other related entities (departmental and municipal governments, cadastral agencies, beneficiary representatives, and Incoder, among others.)

In Antioquia and Bolívar respondents reported that guaranteeing land tenure encouraged people to care for their land, think more long-term, and reduce their willingness to risk that title by planting illicit crops. Sustainability in rural environments, according to the beneficiaries (both individual and associations, as well as private companies), was said to require land title as a key condition. Titles bestow ownership, according to these respondents, promote a local dynamic, and allow for taxation. They felt that taxation, in turn, would promote state response in the form of investment in their communities. Implementer staff echoed these sentiments.

In Cauca, association, community and individual respondents said their degree of territorial ownership was crucial for sustainability. They said that sustainability did not simply result from the continuity of institutions and the infrastructure works themselves, but had to be combined with land rights as the household's central infrastructural asset.

Securing land tenure, as an individual or collective, is a challenging process even for those with legal experience. Respondents felt these difficulties were a barrier to even enter the process, despite their certainty that land tenure was the only way to stability. One respondent reported that the process was simpler at the local than the national level. Still, the national recognition of locally granted land rights was uncertain in that case.

In one department, ADAM made considerable progress in getting approval for departmental resources to be used to co-finance pilots. In that department, the team also secured permission for certificates of budget availability. With MIDAS in the same department, some state resources were put to use for legal aid, including help in assembling documents to formalize businesses.

Conclusions

- MIDAS developed strategic partnerships to provide credit guarantees, such as with Juntas de Acción Comunal, second-level ("umbrella") producers' associations or commercial processors. Credit access did improve, although at times without the necessary training to individuals and associations to understand the uses, responsibilities and limits of credit. This fault caused pressures on producers on several occasions, sometimes resulting in default.
- Empowered associations, particularly at the second-level, began to make use of credit internally to support their membership and to facilitate their own works.

- Though not all associations require certification from state authorities, for agricultural production (because of its relationship to land) it was seen as valuable and beneficial. It is a positive quality attribute to attract buyers, because of the degree of permanence it confers.
- As a requirement to establish productive projects, participants need access to, and use of, the land. Whenever title or tenure is weak, the projects were at risk of losing that land to municipal, commercial or armed actor encroachment.
- The differences in land title processes between national and local levels indicate that the national process is unworkable. There is a gap between what is expected of tenure seekers and what they can reasonably be expected to undertake, in terms of legal processes. Given that this problem will only be exacerbated by increased claims in a post-conflict environment, this is probably one of the central and most essential policies in need of reform.

Recommendations

34. Support second-level organizations that unite small associations, and serve as guarantors for credit. Access to credit should be promoted through rotational funds, bank due diligence, local guarantors, second-level organizations, and support from local, regional or national institutions. However, monitor these organizations closely for adherence to the same standards the implementers would themselves meet. (KT 1, 6, 9 11)
35. Ensure financial literacy training for beneficiaries in the product-specific themes they are likely to encounter. Credit terms should be very explicitly expressed. (KT 6, 9, 11)
36. These recommendations are particularly pertinent for returnees and ex-combatants returning to their communities following an eventual peace accord. They will need credit but will not likely have collateral – land or title – and these will be necessary for productive projects. (KT 6, 9, 11)
37. Promote and support associations to be certified for their quality standards and processes through local authorities, according to the particular needs of their value chains. (KT 6, 9, 11)
38. Work with the local and national government and with USAID programs in land restitution and tenure to facilitate formalization and remove obstacles to it. This should be part of all productive projects in consolidation zones. (KT 9, 10, 11)

10. Key Theme: Building a culture of legality

> *Sundays, it's nice to go to the plaza because you see the change in how people went back to the old way of running their farms. Before, people weren't planting food – just coca. Now in the plaza you find tomato, cucumber, cilantro, chicken, panela and fish.*
>
> - Asopez participant, Putumayo (CS 9)

Findings

Respondents reported a change in time horizons from when they cultivated illicit crops, resulting in thinking more about the future, and thinking of stability. They report that being recognized as legal producers improves their family and community relationships, as well as those with state institutions. Long-term planning, such as that required for delayed harvest crops, was a substantial change from the short time horizons of illicit crops. In each of the regions visited, respondents discussed longer-term plans, investment, savings, and having resources available. Participants report feeling ownership of the land and cease to be nomads, as the illicit crops tend to require.

Working in the licit economy, according to Huila respondents, carries benefits beyond the economic or business-related. They can plan and carry out a new life project, bring their families

back together in one place, send their children to school, and construct collaborative relationships with their neighbors as well as with local and national institutions.

One project in a particularly conflict-ridden area in Cauca brought youth together for a "school" in critical thought, community communication, territorial awareness, and other themes. In addition to showing students alternatives to recruitment into the armed groups, this project increased their ability to address community concerns as a group. When some of the project's leaders were threatened by the armed actors, the project made strong ties to national and even international human rights organizations, maintaining constant communication in an "alert network."

Respondents in Cauca noted that ADAM projects' attention to transparent resource management in the projects and to community participation resulted in keeping conflict actors out of the process, because everyone could see who participated in each purchase.

> *Licit crops have affected how we feel. Within the* veredas *they've given us a kind of brotherhood. We consider ourselves a 'rubber family', not like before. The coca grower said, 'I am here and you are there,' and if we had to shoot each other, well, we had to – that was the mentality. Now there is solidarity among neighbors.*
>
> - Member, Asocap, rubber growers' association, Putumayo

In Nariño, growing cacao has developed producers' ambitions around their life plans. Their traditional agricultural practices are respected, and there is increased income that is highly valued, in part because it is licit. Respondents report positive impact in individual and community esteem, and people are committed to their shared enterprise. They also reported that small growers responded well to the instruction to give up illicit crops, under threat of losing project support. Project participants say they reject the idea of illicit crops, and have support of their associations to enforce this, which in turn diminishes the armed groups' interest in the area.

In a focus group with MIDAS productive project participants in the Santanderes region, respondents were relieved to take the licit alternatives that MIDAS offered. They have adopted a longer-term mentality and contribute to creating a "culture of legality" in the Catatumbo area.

Conclusions

- The importance to beneficiaries of a "culture of legality" cannot be overstated. Shifting to licit productive activities lengthens participants' time horizons, encouraging them to think in terms of staying on their land with their families. Land tenure, credit, local associativity, intergenerational engagement and increased capacity (including formal education) are all factors that link citizens to their land and productivity, in ways with which illicit activity cannot compete.
- Specifically, the work of the programs has contributed greatly to increasing the culture of legality by (i) providing licit means of income and security; (ii) linking family and community needs and expectations around productive projects; (iii) empowering communities; (iv) providing a long term view instead of nomadic, subsistent behavior; (v) promoting attachment to the region; (vi) involving families rather than individuals; and (vi) boosting families' self-esteem.
- Transparent community resource management, as in the ADAM projects, also reinforced long-term and associative thinking.

- These factors also act as bulwarks against the prolonged engagement of armed actors. The increased associativity of this long-term, grounded and productive thinking increases populations' abilities to resist engagement with those armed and illegal actors as well.

Recommendation

39. Leverage an integrated vision of what projects are accomplishing – not just production, but the associativity, capacity building, land tenure, shared management of community resources, education opportunities, credit and long-term commitments that encourage the culture of legality across communities. (KT 10, 11)

11. Key Theme: Sustainability and replication

Findings

In the absence of dedicated, long-term projects in the region, the local partners and beneficiaries have learned to link together support sources in order to reach their longer-term goals. In Antioquia, Uniban leveraged other cooperation and national support on the basis of the positive experience with MIDAS. Respondents used their improved administrative and increased technical and managerial skills to garner support from the European Community, among others. Similarly, in Norte de Santander, local partners credited their MIDAS-supported capacity with helping them win financial and in-kind support from other sources. There were in fact many cases of this kind of participation in multiple projects, financed by the GOC (through the Departamento para Prosperidad Social, DPS, the institution that succeeded Acción Social) and/or by international cooperation projects. On average, the MIDAS SME survey respondents said they had participated with 1.8 USAID projects.

> *The projects aren't sustainable on their own. They become sustainable when communities assume joint responsibility. It's not enough for the farmer to take on the responsibility alone – and if the plants die, the project dies. I think in our case, the community really did buy in, and because of this the projects live on.*
>
> - Río Chaguí Community Council

Most of the MIDAS projects that the team sought to interview in the Santanderes region remained active, such as one in which displaced people were returning for cacao plantation in Barrancabermeja (implemented by Comfenalco), and the majority of Catatumbo palm projects. Another example was MIDAS' work with Pasteurizadora La Mejor in Norte de Santander that, with TA for dairy producers, moved the region significantly toward self-sufficiency in dairy. Many of these successful projects were built on previous success – association and small businesses with years of existence and experience. Newer examples reported more struggles just to stay in the market, and keep their associations from disbanding over disagreements.

One of the most important sustainability lessons learned with ADAM projects was the importance of stakeholder participation – community members and leaders, traditional and municipal authorities, and any local alliance partners. Including participants from design to implementation to maintenance required consensus building, from which respondents say they gained important experience.

In Cauca, various participants reported that ADAM's practice of involving participants in the construction and processes of the projects allowed participants to move past a "culture of assistentialism" toward one in which the beneficiaries are protagonists in community development. There was a correlation in the infrastructure survey responses between the current

state of repair of the works, and the degree to which respondents reported having been involved in construction and management of the process.

In both Huila and Putumayo, the majority of projects visited were able to sustain themselves over time. In one case where cacao trees achieved maturity this year, cacao productivity has continued to rise and new producers join with the ongoing planting initiative. Respondents said they were more likely to join and participate once they could see the production and marketing actually working in the market. Apired, an apiary project in Putumayo, benefited from a network they created with other bee associations in Risaralda, Quindío, Santander and Boyacá.

> *USAID must have an enormous database of participants. It'd be great to share that with us. Or provide follow-up themselves.*
> – Textiles Monica Urquijo
>
> *We Arhuak like to have follow-up over time. We didn't like how the project disappeared. We never got to work out how to export, and we've got no experience – we need a push. For me this was a failure of the project.*
> - Indigenous specialty coffee project, Sierra Nevada

Respondents in Cauca from various organizations noted that continuity was more likely when the association leadership did not change frequently. Rotation of leadership limited continuity. This was true as well with engaging municipal leadership in the projects. In the short term, however, this strategy helped organizations remain transparent, which served as a bulwark against armed actors. Organizations that created savings funds strengthened their ability to be sustainable, and more easily weathered market fluctuations, production failures, and climate variation.

A MIDAS-supported project to modernize strawberry production in Suratá, Santander ceased operations after MIDAS departed. According to some interviewees, when the support was gone the project partners came into dispute resulting from the absence of administrative capacities and understanding on how to manage an associative project.

Sustainability was tested by the lack of contingency strategies from the outset, so that project participants could deal with challenges that inevitably arise. There were many field examples of difficulties from weather, inputs, market price volatility, natural disasters, incursions from armed actors, and other contingencies that threatened continuity and success for various ADAM and MIDAS activities. Though natural disasters, for example, are difficult to predict, having a plan in place for climate variations can mitigate the high costs and potential losses of acting after the fact.

Conclusions

- Projects initiated by ADAM and MIDAS continued to exist, in some cases thriving. Many associations, companies and individuals were highly proactive, motivated and capable in their work, progressing the projects beyond where they were left by the USAID interventions. Deep community involvement and contributions were important success factors, as was strengthened organizational capacity, and viable links to the market end of the value chain.
- ADAM and MIDAS had important successes in building on existing organizations, rather than starting from scratch with new projects, new associations and unfamiliar crops. While this strategy is not likely sufficient on its own, particularly post-conflict with returnees and ex-combatants reintegrating into communities, there is value in capitalizing on existing strengths for substantial results at lower cost.

- The end of project TA was often a major challenge for participants. Some were more successful than others in leveraging their ADAM or MIDAS experience to seek additional support in a chain of projects.

Recommendations

Recommendations related to sustainability are found in nearly all the key themes, as this is an integral and cross-cutting theme.

12. Key Theme: Managing implementation with indicators

Findings

MIDAS and ADAM both exceeded most of their performance targets, particularly on a set of high-profile indicators. They had significant achievements from this perspective: for MIDAS, 164,716 new hectares were planted, corresponding to 96.5 percent of the goal; natural forest hectares reached 113 percent of the target; the number of families benefited was 190 percent of the goal; and the new jobs figure was 147 percent of the goal. ADAM results averaged more than 160 percent of the initial goals. For example, 84,636 families benefited, 143 percent of the programmed 59,369. Hectares free of illicit crops reached 131 percent of target, social organizations were strengthened at 223 percent of the target, and people benefited by national programs was at 209 percent of the goal.[8]

While these are impressive achievements, many respondents in the evaluation stressed that, in real terms, those indicators seemed to underrate other important aspects of development. The indicators have two important weaknesses: first, they are at the output level, which tells little about what happened after those hectares were planted and those new jobs were created – that is, what outcomes they may have brought about in the social evolution and intangible (but transformative) improvements in terms of quality of life and development.

> *"In the rush to comply with X number of hectares, many of the hectares of cacao were planted poorly, in terrain and conditions that were unfavorable to success."*
> - Manager, Asocati

Second, some of these indicators are vague enough to raise questions about what it is they actually measure. For example, the depth to which a family "benefited" may vary greatly, as in a case in Cauca where respondents said ADAM insisted on including 100 families, though the producers complained that each family only got two or three seedlings. The indicator was defined to include families participating in productive agriculture activities such as technical assistance or credit, families receiving food security kits, or families benefiting from infrastructure projects. Depending on how these are counted, they could include entire communities – whose connection to the project may be minimal at best.

Evaluation respondents also questioned the new jobs created indicator. The evaluation team heard that MIDAS counted day labor jobs into their calculations, for example, but also that these jobs were transitory, and so labeling them "jobs created" was misleading. Number of jobs measured by full-time equivalent job units does not measure the economic stability, access to

[88] Sources: ADAM and MIDAS final reports. Full citations in the Sources Annex.

employment or income generation, particularly in the rural environment were the day labor activities are not the same as formal jobs. As no baseline was included, there is no way to test whether any of the jobs created was "new" or a replacement activity for people who would have found some kind of work in the absence of MIDAS.

With new hectares planted, there were two problems. First, because Acción Social restricted ADAM and MIDAS from work in any *veredas* with illicit crops, there is little reason to assume that these licit hectares could be construed as producers' substitution. As an output-level indicator, it also does not reveal whether the supported hectares are being harvested or are providing real means of income for producers. The second problem was the urgency with which the implementers ensured the meeting of targets: there was evidence in the field of several failed projects where these new hectares were planted ineffectively, or even creating harm. In one site, there was too little water to serve the crop, while in another the soil had been changed by a landslide and was no longer apt for the crop selected.

> *"We had to reach out to a group of businesspeople who could help us meet the goals. Meanwhile, for vulnerable populations, we had to skip important steps or turn them down."*
> - Manager, Fundescat

As in most sites, in Santander and Norte de Santander the MIDAS indicators on jobs and hectares were met or exceeded. Nevertheless respondents found these goals inflexible and unrelated to the regional context and other strategic objectives such as local capacity generation and substantial work with vulnerable populations. The emphasis on meeting the goals also prioritized targeting beneficiaries with previous experience in income generation projects, with a high probability of success. The downside of that, however, is that access by more vulnerable groups is less likely: they may require capacity building in the medium term and their likelihood of success is more variable. If they lack a productive vocation or require support and training, they may be less desirable to implementers.

Due to the vast size of the programs, the number of sectors included and the amount of resources implemented, it is perhaps understandable that the indicator matrix was structured around these overall performance indicators seeking a "bottom line." The programs worked to find the right balance between comprehensive yet comparable indicators and flexible metrics more suitable to the topics and intangible results. However, the strict focus on these indicators and their target figures distorted implementation – for example, in targeting previously successful organizations or distributing resources over groups too large to see real benefits from them. Perhaps the greater loss is in the systematic tracking of how program outputs led to real development outcomes – learning. Respondents in the evaluation cited changed mentalities, a growing culture of legality, the re-knitting of social fabric, increasing associativity, building capacity, internal program learning, and other overarching goals – which, in a conflict context and working with vulnerable communities, represent very important kinds of progress that should be understood and tracked.

Conclusions

- There were unintended consequences from the use of a set of comprehensive indicators – and the responsibility for meeting high targets. MIDAS and ADAM staff decision-making was distorted around reaching these targets on output-level indicators. Attention to higher-order results appears to have suffered as a result. Beneficiary individuals and associations, SMEs, operators and implementing partner staff felt the effects.
- The indicators with the highest profile (MIDAS' jobs created, families benefited, and new hectares supported, for example) did not capture everything that mattered about the project,

but they were so powerfully presented, and the targets so high, that they overshadowed other more nuanced data about the project's accomplishments. Moreover, they provided a perverse incentive to the implementer to distort the achievement of impact-level goals in favor of easier, quicker wins but at a lower-order level of results.

- In conflict- and poverty-affected environments, such as those in ADAM and MIDAS, more deft, frequent, alert, learning-oriented and attentive M&E are required, with review of measures when external shocks interrupt implementation, for example. There were activity dynamics, such as associativity and the culture of legality, that warranted much more high-profile attention than did the output level indicators listed above.

Recommendations

40. It is important that follow-on programs define key success factors at the output and outcome level, including intangible results, and include these data in a baseline to establish the initial status of the target groups.
41. Avoid overarching but low-level or weakly defined indicators (e.g., families supported or jobs created.) These indicators were cited numerous times in interviews (with MIDAS) as having had exaggerated importance relative to more important long-term, behavioral indicators. An M&E imperative such as indicators like these with very high targets can push operators toward particular implementation actions – such as targeting low-hanging fruit, acting precipitously without sufficient prior diagnosis and consultation, or writing indicator definitions that are overly inclusive.
42. Be prepared to change indicators in the field. Encourage open-ended approaches to learning that are somewhere "between M & E" – that is, not simply PMP indicators on outputs, nor the biggest picture goals, but at the outcome level. Train implementation staff to look beyond PMP numbers to bring back evidence frequently of unintended consequences, longer-term developments, and subjective but valuable learning about what works in a given environment.
43. Construct 21st century M&E systems for complex environments (please see Annex X for a bibliography on this topic) – agile, adaptive, shorter-cycle, context- and conflict-sensitive, built around goals shared with stakeholders, combining log frame-type indicators with outcome mapping, targeted qualitative research, measure perceptions among key stakeholders, internal process and formative evaluation, and genuine feedback loops. The feedback is essential to increase implementer accountability, improve decision making at all levels and provide a culture of performance measurement rather than simply complying with an administrative requisite with M&E units. Create space to fail and learn. Accept no less from implementers, and work to instill this kind of evaluation culture in your Mission and Agency.
44. Introduce community-based M&E. This may be particularly helpful where ethnic minorities value the project activities in ways that differ from donor viewpoints – such as with collective lands. Share results with other communities to encourage the development of grounded indicators.
45. Incorporate the measurement of intangible assets such as community participation, associativity, empowerment, self-esteem, the culture of legality, community solidarity, attachment to the region, social cohesion across generations, and community perceptions on program impacts and their satisfaction, as well as their and perceptions about illicit crops or the presence and influence of armed groups members.

46. The alignment between M&E and knowledge management needs to promote learning to the national and local levels in an integrated manner to foster informed, two-way decision-making.

13. Key Theme: Targeting beneficiaries with different needs

Findings

The regional coordinator for ADAM in Cauca described the process for selecting projects in a given municipality: *"We convoked a municipal-level meeting and called organizations from the whole municipality, the mayor's office. We presented ADAM, and listened to the groups' presentations. We took that information away, conducted our own analyses, and called a second meeting to announce the organization we were going to work with."*

> *To undertake changes in behavior and attitudes, you need at least a decade. We didn't have that amount of time, and we couldn't start from zero. So we sought organizations that were already on their way. As a test, we also worked with one new group, to see the difference, and it didn't work well at all, in fact.*
>
> - ADAM Regional Coordinator

The coordinator stated that the ADAM management team in Bogotá allowed each region to design how it would intervene and conduct project selection.[9] The rationale he and his team used was that existing organizations with projects and direction of their own would be their primary targets, to avoid starting from scratch in terms of organizational development.

All ADAM projects were prohibited from working in *veredas* with coca cultivation, per their collaboration with the GOC's Acción Social. This hard-and-fast rule was mentioned by many respondents, and it appeared that all beneficiary selection where the evaluation visited had followed the injunction to the letter. Among respondents, there was some dissent with this rule, in cases where potential participants eager to undertake an ADAM project were excluded from doing so.

In regions with many indigenous respondents, several respondents reported not wanting to work with ADAM initially, as they mistrusted cooperation projects and signing documents. Some were later convinced; others remained outside the project. In a project in Medellin, a project respondent worked to select beneficiaries through examining data on unmet basic needs and ADAM reports show that the program focused on 75 municipalities ranked as category 5 or 6 (the smallest and poorest in Colombia).

A youth project in Cauca selected projects by issuing an invitation across the four municipalities in which the project planned to work, formally through the mayor's office as well as through the

[9] The evaluation found that the decentralized management implemented by ADAM, where regional directors had the autonomy to make decisions was appropriate as it enabled this region to focus its targeted, bottom-up approach and take into account the various ethnic populations present in the region. The decentralized approach, according to this manager, matched the participatory emphasis of the program and allowed a more agile execution, reducing hierarchies and relying on the judgment of its key regional staff. However, as this was not an evaluation question per se, the evidence for the value of decentralization of these functions is limited. It is highlighted here in response to USAID comments on the draft report.

schools. There was no pressure to participate – youth who joined did so of their own accord; some were particularly recommended by teachers who felt they were at risk.

Poor infrastructure and lack of public goods and services (schools and health centers) continued to be obstacles to successful implementation of agribusiness projects equally across Catatumbo. Targeting in this region tended to exclude these difficult-to-reach areas. The majority of associations in the region (Asogpados, Asolpacat One, Asopromuca and Asocati, among others) have their headquarters in Tibu. They noted their inability to successfully reach municipalities, such as La Gabarra and Sardinata, which were the epicenter of the recent peasant strikes. Areas where the need is greatest, then, were excluded from participation by the very characteristics that describe their need. MIDAS projects in Atlántico and Cesar reported that they were targeted not through open sources, but through networks. This aligns with the respondent comments presented earlier, in which indicator compliance led implementers and operators to target known businesses, with successful track records, in order to meet oppressive targets. In the telephone survey, agribusinesses and SMEs had, on average, 19 years of operation when they participated.

Respondents tended to trust MIDAS as a transparent program but admitted not always understanding the criteria used to prioritize support. Many stakeholders in the region were not clear how projects were prioritized. The dissemination channels for project calls were sometimes discretional, which was perceived to depend on individual relationships.

Conclusions

- The targeting process differed for MIDAS and ADAM; MIDAS focused more on established organizations and ADAM on remote (often *vereda*-level) communities and associations.[10] Both approaches were relevant based on the objectives of the interventions: MIDAS' focus allowed for a wider geographic spread and greater economic impact, while ADAM provided some measure of sustained support away from municipalities.
- New associations and new businesses were less often invited to participate in productive projects, apparently as a result of targeting that privileged existing, successful enterprises. If a peace accord is signed, this may not be an option in the future. Returnees and reintegrating ex-combatants will not have the benefit of years of experience upon which to build, but including these entrants into communities and markets will require additional support.
- Best practices with these new associations included more time for productive project maturation, but still more attention to capacity building of the association itself – how to resolve conflicts, how to make decisions, how to monitor progress.
- Despite intention to target *veredas* away from the municipal seats in ADAM, USAID added a focus on displaced populations, who were most commonly located in municipal seats. There are needs among both populations, but the more remote communities in the evaluation tended to be more vulnerable in terms of both poverty and armed actor presence. A post-peace accord period may in fact require more outreach to those remote areas where infrastructure and other services are weaker.

[10] This focus was changed, according to some implementer staff, who said that at about mid-term, USAID requested significant attention and budget to be redirected to projects for displaced populations, who were generally in municipal capitals. This new focus from USAID diluted, to some extent, ADAM's earlier focus on communities outside regional population centers.

Recommendations

47. When target populations include vulnerable groups, diagnose and address requirements for entrepreneurial education. Ensure that project indicators do not distort targeting by encouraging implementers to privilege successful targets.
48. Ensure that timelines and programming decisions take into account the different needs of communities, associations and individuals who are new to production, market, and the social fabric itself. These are less likely to serve as "quick wins" but are necessary actors for a future peace.

Figure 7. Recommendations by key theme

Recommendations	1. Associativity	2. Planning for ag projects	3. Competitiveness /food security and vulnerable groups	4. Vulnerability to resilience	5. Municipal coordination	6. Capacity building	7. Engaging community	8. Differentiated approaches	9. Access to finance	10. Culture of legality	11. Sustainability/Replication	12. Managing with indicators	13. Targeting
1. Build associativity into productive and infrastructure projects with bottom-up programming with genuine community participation. .	x		x				x				x		
2. Continue to require community contributions as part of productive and public goods activities.	x		x			x	x				x		
3. Work "bottom–up" to ensure relevance, diagnose local needs, and build community buy-in. Foster staff sensitivity and monitor their work to ensure that their methods are perceived locally as inclusive.				x		x	x						x
4. Apply these principles equally to abstract notions of rights as well as to concrete decision-making about project design and implementation.				x		x	x						
5. Ensure space for community decision-making and project oversight to maximize both empowerment and appropriation.				x		x	x						
6. Choose project crops that are known to the communities, unless additional time and resources can be expended to analyze viability and support producers.		x	x			x					x		
7. If new crops are proposed, ensure TA through to maturity and marketing of the products: the entire value chain.		x	x	x		x					x		
8. Particularly with new crops, conduct detailed studies at a local enough level to be useful in the microclimates within a region		x	x			x					x		
9. Identify and secure market buyers from the start of productive projects.		x	x	x		x					x		
10. Promote alliances that mitigate the lack of a strong competitive edge among associations just entering the market or having tenuous links to it		x	x	x		x					x		x

Recommendations	1. Associativity	2. Planning for ag projects	3. Competitiveness /food security and vulnerable groups	4. Vulnerability to resilience	5. Municipal coordination	6. Capacity building	7. Engaging community	8. Differentiated approaches	9. Access to finance	10. Culture of legality	11. Sustainability/Replication	12. Managing with indicators	13. Targeting
11. Work with GOC on incentive systems to encourage systematic private sector participation, on terms that allow producers to become competitive.		x	x	x							x		
12. Incentives for buyers may include preferential treatment in public contracting, packaging that highlights social responsibility, or tax breaks.		x	x	x							x		x
13. Particularly with delayed yield crops, ensure food security through rigorous attention to diversified planting.		x	x										
14. Work with participants, associations and alliances to develop risk management plans.		x	x								x		
15. For experienced associations, TA needs may include negotiation, markets, work with second-level groups, and support for efficiency gains.		x	x	x		x			x				
16. Use national TA resources to support those participants who are new to their sector (CENIs, SENA, UMATAs, university extension, and commercial)			x	x		x					x		
17. Provide projects support to build projects to the point where the project does sustain families' needs sufficiently.				x								x	
18. Determine and apply incentives for participation from municipalities, from the array of types in the text or others that emerge.					x								
19. Make genuine municipal partnership a priority, and measure and publicize the level of co-financing and local support.					x						x		
20. Support successful productive projects to access these national-level programs through the Agriculture and other Ministries.					x						x		
21. Consider municipal resource matches as selection criteria for future projects					x						x		

Recommendations	1. Associativity	2. Planning for ag projects	3. Competitiveness /food security and vulnerable groups	4. Vulnerability to resilience	5. Municipal coordination	6. Capacity building	7. Engaging community	8. Differentiated approaches	9. Access to finance	10. Culture of legality	11. Sustainability/Replication	12. Managing with indicators	13. Targeting
22. Build in exit strategies that specify and mandate institutional roles on project follow-up, sustained TA and support for each project					x						x		
23. Ensure technical quality and relevance with trained, local TA and trainers to the extent possible.				x		x					x		
24. Design practical, dynamic and interactive training that is tailored for its variable audiences. Maximize cost-effectiveness with the use of peer-to-peer knowledge.				x		x					x		
25. Subsidize attendees' transportation. Plan trainings in line with participants' schedules, and make childcare available.				x		x					x		
26. To deepen the effects of TA and training, and to prolong its value, develop methods and tools to leave with participants between sessions.				x		x					x		
27. Knowledge management: Genuine knowledge management should be used to strengthen local capacities with timely assistance, inputs and tools.				x		x					x		
28. Make intergenerational involvement an explicit goal of projects with communities, from planning to capacity building to execution.							x				x		
29. Projects in ethnic communities require detailed and genuine prior consultation processes to identify community needs and priorities.							x	x					
30. Actively seek to bridge communities – campesino, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian.							x	x					
31. Involve local and traditional authorities in decision-making.							x	x					
32. Diagnose differential challenges faced by men and women in alternative development projects.							x	x					

Recommendations	1. Associativity	2. Planning for ag projects	3. Competitiveness /food security and vulnerable groups	4. Vulnerability to resilience	5. Municipal coordination	6. Capacity building	7. Engaging community	8. Differentiated approaches	9. Access to finance	10. Culture of legality	11. Sustainability/Replication	12. Managing with indicators	13. Targeting
33. Leverage successful projects in ethnic communities to counsel and train those invited to join new programs, in an empowering peer-to-peer model.							x	x					
34. Support second-level organizations that unite associations, and serve as credit guarantors, but ensure their work meets quality standards.	x					x			x		x		
35. Ensure financial literacy training in the product-specific themes participants will encounter. Credit terms should be explicitly expressed.						x			x		x		
36. These recommendations are pertinent for ex-combatants and returnees coming home following an eventual peace accord.						x			x		x		
37. Promote and support association certification for quality standards through local authorities, according to the needs of their value chains.						x			x		x		
38. Work with local and national government and USAID in land restitution and tenure to facilitate formalization and remove obstacles to it.									x	x	x		
39. Include intangibles among project accomplishments -- associativity, capacity building, management of resources, land tenure, education opportunities, credit and long-term commitment to a culture of legality.										x	x		
40. Follow-on programs should have indicators at the output and outcome level, including intangible results, and include these data in a baseline.												x	
41. Avoid overarching but low-level or weakly defined indicators (e.g., families supported or jobs created.)												x	
42. Be prepared to change indicators in the field, and to use more frequent quantitative and qualitative monitoring through implementer staff reports.												x	
43. Construct 21st century M&E systems, with agile, adaptive, conflict- and complexity-aware monitoring for formative feedback.												x	

Recommendations	1. Associativity	2. Planning for ag projects	3. Competitiveness /food security and vulnerable groups	4. Vulnerability to resilience	5. Municipal coordination	6. Capacity building	7. Engaging community	8. Differentiated approaches	9. Access to finance	10. Culture of legality	11. Sustainability/Replication	12. Managing with indicators	13. Targeting
44. Introduce community-based M&E, a particularly helpful tool with ethnic communities for whom traditional indicators are problematic.												x	
45. Incorporate measurement of intangible assets such as solidarity, intergenerationality, and perceptions on illicit crops and armed groups.												x	
46. Use M&E and knowledge management together to promote learning between national and local levels to foster informed, decision-making.												x	
47. When target populations include vulnerable groups, diagnose and address requirements for entrepreneurial education.													x
48. Ensure that timelines and programming take into account the different needs of communities, associations and individuals new to production, market, and the social fabric itself.													x

USERS' GUIDE: LINKING ADAM/MIDAS LESSONS TO POST-CONFLICT PROGRAMMING

Beginning to connect the dots to the CDCS and the peace process

This User's Guide is intended to help readers understand how to most effectively apply analysis contained in the report on the post-implementation performance evaluation of the ADAM and MIDAS projects. That report presents conclusions and recommendations to inform USAID post-conflict programming, pursuant to the Mission's draft Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS; chiefly applicable to DO1: Effective presence of democratic institutions and processes in targeted areas; DO2: Reconciliation advanced among victims, ex-combatants and other citizens; and, especially DO3: Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth).

The CDCS is largely intended to support GOC efforts to implement a peace process, based on successful negotiations in Havana (the CDCS draft Mission Goal is a "Colombia more capable of successfully implementing a sustainable and inclusive peace). Figure 8 presents how specific issues addressed in the evaluation report also apply to specific Negotiation Points in Havana:

Figure 8: Evaluation themes relevant to specific points in the Colombian peace negotiations

ADAM/MIDAS themes addressed in this report	Sub-Themes of Peace Negotiation Point 1: Integrated Rural Reform (RRI; negotiations completed)
Coordination with municipalities and the state	1.1 Land Use (unproductive land; formalizing land holdings; agricultural frontier and protected areas)
Geographically targeted rural development; scaling-up	1.2 Territorial development programs
Infrastructure; community contribution	1.3 Infrastructure and adaptation of under-utilized land
Associativity: Community participation, empowerment, and appropriation; Targeting and planning in agricultural projects; Marketing, competitiveness and food security with vulnerable populations; Scaling up; Capacity building; Access to formal and financial services	1.5 Stimulate agricultural production (economic solidarity and cooperatives; technical assistance; subsidies; credit; income generation; formalization of labor
Food security	1.6 Food security
	Sub-Theme of Peace Negotiation Point 3: Ending the Conflict (negotiations ongoing)
Many of the items listed for ADAM/MIDAS for Negotiation Point 1.5, targeted to ex-combatants	3.2.2 Social, economic, social, and political reintegration
	Sub-Theme of Peace Negotiation Point 4: Solving the Illicit Drug Problem (negotiations ongoing)
Culture of Legality; many of the items listed for ADAM/MIDAS for Negotiation Point 1.5, targeted to crop substitution	4.1 Illicit crop substitution programs (integrated development with community participation; execution and evaluation of the substitution programs; environmental recuperation)

The GOC's recently-disseminated "Informe Conjunto del la Mesa de Conversaciones" (January 2014), regarding the points on which there is agreement between the GOC and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (1 and 2), indicates that peace process implementation is likely to track closely the negotiation points. Significant detail is provided on Point 1, which charts a path in which ADAM/MIDAS lessons will be very applicable.

Figure 9. Implementation of the peace process is likely to follow closely the negotiation points discussed in Havana. ***(Photo: Reuters, Enrique de la Osa)***

A challenge for the reader, however, might be to understand how to apply ADAM/MIDAS experience to designing activities for the CDCS and peace process, because, in many cases, one must link more than one area of the evaluation report's analysis to construct a way forward. Presented below are some applications of the learning to themes likely to be useful for both USAID's CDCS and GOC post-conflict programming. They are merely examples of how one might reference the information in this report to inform decision making, to move beyond common wisdom, to think slightly out of the box to maximize the likelihood of the lasting peace that has eluded Colombia for half a century.

The evaluation team hopes that by modeling how to "connect the dots" in this way will inspire those engaged in USAID in fleshing out the CDCS, and in the GOC to operationalize the peace process, for a range of other themes that might be important to them.

Examples to guide further analysis

Working with Producer Associations: a two-for-one proposition

The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations section of the report recommends actions on a range of issues – the need to have communities lead the process,[11] the time and investment required for success,[12] the importance of community contributions,[13] among others – that implementers should take into account to accompany producers as they develop effective associations. It also concludes that effective associational development organized around critical household needs (growing cash crops in a context of scarcity, for example) can enable positive collaboration among ethnically diverse, formerly conflictive groups.[14] Accompanying this

[11] See *Associativity*, p. 9, and *Differentiated approaches for minority and vulnerable groups*, p. 27
[12] See *Targeting and planning for agricultural projects*, and *Marketing, competitiveness and food security for vulnerable groups*, pp. 12-18
[13] See pp. 10 and 26
[14] See *Differential approaches for minority and vulnerable groups*, p. 27, and *Engaging the whole community*, p. 26

process with the appropriate patience can also unite the broader community,[15] foster inter-generational learning and cooperation,[16] and provide barriers to intrusion by conflict actors.[17]

Thus, in addition to providing practical guidance in *how* to successfully support producer associations, clues are also provided as to *why* USAID and the GOC should focus strenuously on associations. *Not only are associations effective in increasing agricultural productivity,[18] household income[19] and food security,[20] they also provide the kind of societal glue essential to hold diverse communities together, engage youth, and provide a relatively safe and productive environment to accept returnees and ex-combatants*. Thus, supporters of the peace process should actively support associations for both reasons. While doing so, they should plan for the reality that it will not be a "quick win", as processes to sustainably develop such associations, while healing the social fabric, requires time,[21] particularly if it is a new association[22] working with a vulnerable population.[23] It is likely to require even more patience when significant numbers of returnees and ex-combatants enter the mix. Such investments would support directly USAID DO2 and DO3 and Item 1.5 of the peace process as well as 3.2.2.

Figure 10. Successful Association work begins with understanding where producers are and accompanies them through processing, until the product is well-marketed.

[15] See *Associativity* at p. 9 and *Differential approaches* at p. 27
[16] See p. 26
[17] See p. 32 on the *Culture of legality*
[18] See *Capacity building* at p. 24 and *Sustainability and replication* at p. 34
[19] See *From vulnerability to resistance*, p. 19
[20] See *Marketing, competitiveness and food security with vulnerable groups*, p.15
[21] See sections at pp. 15 and 27
[22] See p. 9
[23] See p. 27

Transitioning from a life based on coca to a culture of legality

The report describes successful strategies to provide livelihood alternatives to profitable coca production.[24] Merely presenting alternatives does not ensure that they will be adopted. In addition to well-documented preconditions (such as ability to operate freely, basic transportation infrastructure; suitable crops; a sense of security), the report notes a deep desire among some coca-producers to "go licit." It is not *all* about the money. After years of virtually nomadic pursuit of coca-based jobs and profits, residents have seen families torn apart, communities segmented, illegality take over their communities, and threat of crop destruction and loss of land use – with little in the way of long-term security.[25] Many seem to want a way out of lawlessness.

Many have accepted reduced annual incomes, in favor of a longer-term future integrated into a once-familiar rural economy and a return to the Colombian mainstream.[26] They want the security that everyone else wants: through legal land ownership, access to credit, and – critically – an education and a healthy and safe future for their children. When necessary, families will shift to viable alternatives, even when they have virtually no prior experience in mainstream agriculture.

Relating these separate evaluation insights indicates that eradication must not only be accompanied with presentation of agricultural alternatives (which are unlikely, in any event, to produce significantly higher immediate economic returns), but also with access to land, credit (all relevant to DO3) and the range of social services demanded by citizens (DO1) to realize a sort of "Colombian Dream." This corresponds primarily to Negotiation Point 4.1, and all of Point 1, but importantly also to Point 1.4.

Kick-starting Integrated Rural Reform through Peace Pollinators

Most readers will be struck by the large number of inspiring individuals and organizations that have persevered to feed their families and develop their communities. Given the high number of new and expanded activities expected in implementing peace, and the risk associated with such efforts,[27] USAID and the GOC should link veteran ADAM/MIDAS individuals and associations with new initiatives to share technology, community and association development experiences, and wisdom on how to deal with local government, GOC and donors. This large, untapped national resource would greatly reduce risk and accelerate success. This is related to DO3 and Negotiation Point 1.

[24] See sections on *Associativity* at p. 9, *Targeting and planning* at p. 12, *Resilience tipping points* at p. 19, and *State coordination* at 22, among others
[25] See p. 32
[26] See p. 32
[27] See *Resilience and risk management* at p. 17

Scaling up alliances as part of RRI

Examination of preliminary GOC approaches to Integrated Rural Reform (RRI) reveal an ambitious agenda with multifaceted approaches to reaching large numbers of people throughout large areas of the country. ADAM/MIDAS made extensive use of alliances, yielding impressive results in a range of improvements, capable of transforming household economies from vulnerability to resilience[28] – critical to any peace process. The report notes a number of factors that appear to lead to more effective alliances.[29] It also hints at some features that might help extend their reach, effectiveness and utility in a post conflict scenario: such as linking to national training institutions,[30] providing tax incentives or preferential contracting to overcome the risk of engagement in conflict-prone areas, and altering the credit balance between producers and large buyers. Another ideas might include certifying "Peace Products", where the GOC would certify as Peace Products, goods produced through substantial producer support via alliances (such as assuming risk by entering post-conflict areas, providing training, eliminating 60-day payment periods, subsidizing inputs, offering transport services) in order to raise demand from consumers eager to support the peace process in shopping aisles.

Figure 11. Cacao production has helped foster a culture of legality in Tumaco.

A fuller analysis could better define the model, assess scalability, and develop a plan for coming to scale. A resource in this process could be the upcoming Public-Private Partnership study to be completed by EVAL in 2014. This is related to DO1 and Negotiation Point 1.

Linking productive projects to local government

While the report notes that the projects had varied success in substantively linking productive projects to local government,[31] it does note significant benefits where municipalities participated in training, provided product certification, encouraged local procurement, supported land formalization or provided local resources. Such collaboration appears to have the potential of a multiplier effect for producer associations, alliances, and promoting peace. Given the prominent role contemplated for local government in the peace process, and decentralization initiatives afoot, this would seem a ripe area for analysis. Successful linkage would not only provide economic and social benefits, it would also create a positive cycle reinforcing government

[28] See p. 19
[29] See sections on *Marketing and competitiveness*, p. 15, the *Tipping point out of subsistence*, p. 19, *Access to financial services and formalization*, p. 29, and *Sustainability and replication*, p. 34.
[30] See *Capacity building* at p. 24 and the *Tipping point* section at p. 19, and *Coordination with municipalities and the state*, p. 22
[31] See *Coordination with municipalities and the state*, p. 22

credibility.[32] Mission investments in consolidation subsequent to ADAM/MIDAS have likely developed a body of knowledge – if explored – that could provide a good starting point for such analysis. This is related to DO1 and DO3 and Negotiation Point 1.

Further applications of ADAM/MIDAS learning

The above examples are illustrative of ways in which readers can mine the information presented in this report to help inform future interventions. One might review the same conclusions and recommendations presented above and design a slightly different path forward – perhaps based on additional wisdom brought to the table. A huge advantage of having reviewed these two massive projects after their completion is that we can see what worked, what has stood the test of time, and what unexpected gems have emerged. Also, being somewhat removed from the actual implementation cycle, we can perhaps examine the data in a more detached way and see what of that experience is useful to tomorrow's challenges.

[32] See recommendations for this section at p. 23-24

ANNEXES

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Annex I: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations Table

Table 1. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Associativity: Community participation, empowerment and appropriation		
Associativity In a dairy project in an indigenous community, one participant described the community's reaction to associativity: *"No one here believed in associativity because there had been administrative problems before and people saw the organization as a scam. I didn't know much about the majority of organizations, but I did know that ours [Colacteos] was not participatory."* The mistrust and low credibility of the organization jeopardized their participation in an ADAM project, so this respondent decided to run for the office of legal representative when it opened. In Nariño, ADAM supported Asocoprolyda, an existing organization, whose leader noted that the difficult economy in his area had lead to some people growing poppy. In addition, he said, There was no training, and the people didn't understand the concept of associativity: *"We didn't use to have a vision of working in a group: for all of us, work was independent and 'defend yourself however you can.*" He also reported that, when the mayor's office tried to put projects in place, but didn't follow through, the community lost faith in the municipal government. When successful, the ADAM project changed this mindset and improved participation. This project involved both	The construction of associativity in ADAM and MIDAS projects, where successful, was a major achievement for the programs (though it was not seen in all projects.) In conditions of displacement, poverty, violence and the presence of armed actors, the achievement is especially notable. ADAM projects tended to strengthen associations through the creation and activities of the citizens' oversight and project management committees, and through capacity building in accounting and organizational skillsets in committee processes. Working with established organizations reduced the learning curve and produced stronger results in terms of community appropriation	Continue to build associativity into productive and consolidation projects with bottom-up programming with genuine community participation. Build time for this challenging undertaking into timelines, particularly with returnee communities, with new or newer associations, and with multi-cultural associations (among and between communities, including different ethnic communities) which may need additional TA and support to reach associativity goals. In training and TA for associations, include detailed content on the benefits of associativity and how to attain it using real-world examples, including how to overcome internal conflicts and external challenges

campesinos and indigenous groups in the same dairy production project, which meant that both traditional and state authorities were invited to participate. In Nariño, two dairy projects reported both an increase in cohesion in their associations, and defections from the association for those participants who tended not to agree with the association's direction. Those who stayed with the associations increased production through efficiency gains and improved quality through new, better milking practices. With all production from one of these associations being purchased by a commercial firm, and significant marketing success in the second association, respondents within the associations were happy with the degree they had been able to access markets for their produce. In Bolivar, ADAM's project with Aproaca helped the organization to form, strengthen production, create citizen oversight, and remake the social fabric of their community. *"There was no social fabric here. The families were completely destroyed!, (…) Now I can say that the families in the association are much better." (Legal representative, Coragrosurb)* A social worker in Cauca who worked with various ADAM projects called the associativity work "added-value", saying that the feeling of belonging to the community again was a very important, if unexpected, result of building sewers, schools, or other infrastructure projects. The infrastructure observation and survey results reflect cases in which associativity was exclusive (such as respondents who said that there was no community management of the infrastructure works – because the parents' association managed them) or when an infrastructure project fell apart after ADAM staff left, due to internal conflict in the associations. A similar failure in an ADAM productive project in Cauca occurred when a new association dissolved for lack of the capacity to resolve conflicts over resources and leadership.	of the project and sustainability. Greater associativity in a given project was correlated with greater community agreement on processes of agricultural production and collective strategies to face market requirements. In the context of armed conflict, poverty and insecurity, reconstructing social fabric was seen to require that individuals and communities establish – or re-establish – their life projects, work collectively, and bring in all generations in the work. These overlapping concepts contributed to greater associativity and identity, and to rooting the citizens again in their communities and in shared enterprises that they themselves managed.	where opinions differ. Include participants across generations to encourage sustainability of the associativity that is built. Pursue associativity with these same recommendations in productive projects as well as infrastructure or other public goods activities, to build agreement and processes for getting to agreement, (conflict resolution TA) on productive processes and potentially contentious issues around commercialization.

Community contributions A respondent who led an ADAM project to construct a school cafeteria noted the importance of linking the associations closely to the projects through their contribution – labor, materials, participation in committees and oversight. *"That's the way they buy into the project,"* he noted, *"even though the work was hard, excavating and leveling the ground for the cafeteria."* He noted that associativity was particularly challenging – and important – for displaced communities like the one with which he worked to build the cafeteria. Responses to the infrastructure survey and observations indicate a correlation between community participation in design, construction, management or maintenance, and the current physical state of the project. In all of the infrastructure works visited, where a respondent involved with the project answered the evaluation questionnaire, participants said that the infrastructure project had improved quality of life for the community. Since in most cases this was done with community management and oversight, as well as labor and contributions of materials in most cases, the communities can be said to have contributed to their own quality-of-life improvements. The community contribution to the infrastructure works was a powerful and very appreciated component of these activities: *"Yes, [it has improved our quality of life], because it has improved the connection between the municipality and the rest of us. That's why we value the road and believe it's important to keep it in good condition."* *"The residents are really happy with the completion of the bridge and they're proud of having been able to do it in such a short time."*	Community contribution was key to participants' and associations' ownership of the project. Where there was greater participation from communities in terms of funds, land, labor and risk, there was also greater local commitment to sustainability.	Continue to require community contributions as part of productive and public goods/public works activities in consolidation zones. Continue TA and training for a range of types of community contributions, across generations, including citizen management of resources, project oversight, and organizational development.
Prior consultation In the APROCASUR association in the South of Bolivar department,	Deciding which project to undertake	Work "bottom–up" to ensure

one key process was agreeing with the community what the new crops and products should be. The local association, as local producers for generations, said they knew better than ADAM staff what they wanted to plant and what would work well. They chose cacao, and ADAM supported that decision, empowering them and building ownership. Small producers in Cauca challenged the TA they received on avocado planting, noting that the plant material provided was already past its prime, and that soil and rainfall conditions were not appropriate for the plants they were being offered. Nevertheless, since avocado was new to the area, the TA's presumed expertise was followed. The planting failed and the producers were left indebted, having taken out loans to increase their planting and yield. A community in Nariño identified the project they wanted to undertake – a comfortable and well-supplied school for their children's welfare, development and learning – and then worked together to meet ADAM's requirements for their contribution. They carried out raffles and a bingo night in order to provide the school with a small library with new books and an LCD television. They now carry out ongoing maintenance of the school and its grounds and report that the school is the pride of their community, one which neighboring communities want to emulate. A respondent in Cauca working on a sewer project told evaluators *"the idea for the project has to come from the group. That helps in their taking ownership."* An accountant hired by the ADAM team to support varied projects in the field said, *"they call [the process] a diagnostic, and it can take a long time, but it's essential that the people who're going to have to do the labor are the ones who participate in that process."* In a housing project in the Sur de Bolivar, participants noted that though the project site has the advantage of being out of reach of the	empowered participants and increased their commitment to the project as a whole and to the contributions they would have to make to it. Early consultation allows for the local knowledge of agricultural, economic, infrastructural or conflict-related contexts to be recognized and incorporated into projects. It can also help avoid investing in potentially problematic activities or tasks. Imposing a project was not welcome but using a bottom-up approach with a community to develop a local priority project or projects garnered better results. Some implementing staff members had better results than others in prior consultation. This may have reflected the varying situations they were in as much as their individual capabilities – but the communities needed to perceive that implementation was sensitive to their differences and needs, in order to garner their trust.	relevance, diagnose local needs, and build community buy-in and sustainability. This should not be compromised when time or resources are short. Build in time for these processes in all cases, with additional time allotted where potential participants are returnees, victims, or belong to ethnic minorities. Diagnose local capacity during prior consultation in order to take advantage of extant knowledge. Insist that all implementing staff undergo sensitivity training on these issues, and monitor their work to ensure that their methods are perceived locally as inclusive. Seek local counsel on approaching communities to participate, and respect community rights to self-determination. Hire locally for these roles where this would improve outcomes. These recommendations apply equally to abstract notions of community rights as well as to concrete decision-making about project design and implementation. While prior consultation is an oft-stated goal, in the rush of

local river (which at times overflows its banks), it would have been preferable to have the housing nearer the municipal seat, or provisions could have been made for transporting inhabitants to the city. Early consultation would have improved this situation. Because there was no existing transport to the area where the housing project was built, transportation companies have been able to charge users double to get them to the city, as they are charged in that same city. In addition, the small size of the housing units is insufficient for the family size of the target population. In Huila and Putumayo projects had stronger, more durable results when MIDAS supported established organizations in the communities. This allowed for greater ownership of the project, while providing a better understanding of the local context, which was reported to be indispensable for making decisions on the project and its management. Established organizations were more legitimate with local actors and non-participants, as well as with local and traditional authorities. In Huila, the Southern Tolima Farmers' Association replicated their program of good agricultural practices with other farmers in the region who initially did not participate in the program. Respondents appreciated a "bottom-up" approach to developing the projects, in interview after interview. A participant in a coffee project in Huila appreciated that he and his family got to say what they needed, and see that reflected in the project that was ultimate agreed upon. He also noted: *"The program Rural Opportunities [from the GOC] offered smaller amounts of money but there was more opportunity [than with MIDAS] in working directly with the technical assistance. MIDAS gave much more money, but I felt the benefits were greater with Rural Opportunities."* In Norte de Santander, local MIDAS partners reported that they were selected because they had significant operational experience and		implementation it can be compromised.

capacity, and some institutional support. As reported by project participants such as FUNDESCAT and associations of Catatumbo (ASOCATI, ASOGPADOS, and ESTAM), MIDAS allowed them technical and operational autonomy, which made it easier to incorporate their vision of the regions in their projects. Of the 48 infrastructure project observation survey respondents, 98% (46 of 47 valid responses) said the project was much-needed in their communities. Some 88% reported that the community took part in construction, indicating the value placed on the work.		
Participatory management and maintenance Of 44 infrastructure project observation survey respondents, 73% reported that there was community participation in the management of the project resources. Thirty respondents (of 40 valid responses, or 75%) said that the community provided maintenance services after the project was complete. Two noted that these maintenance services were insufficient to maintain the technological aspects (of sewer and aqueduct systems) functioning properly. Nearly four-fifths (79.5%) of responses indicated that the facilities continued to be in good shape at the present time; paint was the most common characteristic reported to be in a poor state of repair. Nearly all (95%) of respondents said that the facility was still in use for its original purpose. 79% reported that there was a community organization around the infrastructure's maintenance and use, and only one respondent reported that there had once been such an organization but that it had disbanded after the facility was finished. More than three-quarters (77%) said that the community remained satisfied with the result. Five respondents, or 11%, reported some satisfaction but also problems in its continued functioning. In an aqueduct project visited by the Antioquia/Bolivar team, participants emphasized their satisfaction with this ADAM activity,	Involving communities in the administration of resources generated credibility for the projects, and the populations' attention to sustainability. Empowering and training the communities to manage and maintain the infrastructure projects resulted in their taking responsibility for the ongoing and appropriate functioning of the work and its components. Where community members and their organizations were genuinely empowered to criticize plans, decision-making and participation were considered genuine. This was in turn correlated with working with existing organizations where critique and participation were valued. Where participation was weakest in	Continue to support community decision-making and oversight of projects, along with community inputs, to maximize both empowerment and appropriation. Provide sufficient capacity building tailored to communities' needs, across a range of skill sets required for successful productive and public goods projects. Continue to support communities and associations in these efforts, as conflicts and challenges arise throughout implementation.

allowing their community to have potable water 24/7. The ducts through which the water is taken to each house are maintained by community members who were involved in its creation. By working with their local organization, ADAM allowed more critical and inclusive involvement in day-to-day decision-making, reported respondents in a project in Cauca. This was felt to be more "real" involvement on their part, rather than just representative participation in which everyone raises their hands or sits through a meeting. Several respondents noted that community management of resources had led to savings, in which the funds allotted were not expended even by project completion. Additional small projects were created to use the remaining funds, through the community deliberation process. In Cauca, ADAM hired a social worker to serve a set of projects, and respondents indicated their satisfaction with this ongoing support.	terms of community planning and decision-making, communities experienced conflicts in their expectations and project processes.	

Targeting and planning for agricultural projects

Established and new crops

Projects reinforcing the cultivation of traditional crops in Huila and Putumayo showed good results in short and medium term. There and in in Cauca, new crops suffered more frequently. In Cauca, the beneficiaries attributed this in part to inattentive TA that didn't take soil condition or climactic variations common in the region. The regional coordinator for ADAM, however, said that the ADAM team underestimated the time and effort needed to bring a new organization up to speed on a new type of crop to which they were not accustomed. *"Actually, we found that it takes less time to teach the participants to grow a new crop, than it does to structure and grow that new association."*

The condiments project in Putumayo had similar challenges: longer-term technical assistance was reportedly lacking, though in that project the association has been able to find support from other embassies and an oil company. A fish farm support project, however, was much more successful in advancing the technology and technical prowess of an association that had long been involved in the farming of fish, and as such were starting at a higher level.

Producers in Cauca planting avocado, a new crop for them, said that despite the failure of the crop and its marketing, their association learned the benefits of diversifying their planting. Rather than simply plant coffee, they reported that they now felt it was important to look at alternatives for reasons of both food security and selling to wider markets.

Respondents in Putumayo, Huila and Cauca reported that, for new products like palm or rubber, they needed greater support, training and technical assistance, over time, to grow to a point where their

In the medium term, known crops have good results in most projects visited. Those projects that planted crops new to the communities required more TA, for a longer period of time, particularly in longer term crops. As problems arise prior to maturation, the projects needed to have access to ongoing TA. Among the evaluation sample, crops that were new to producers were somewhat more likely to fail.

Crops that are new to participants are also more difficult for them to market. They may be unfamiliar with demand sources, quality standards, aggregation standards, post-harvest techniques, and other related themes.

Where a community does not have a pre-existing association to implement a project, greater TA is also necessary for the nascent association itself (apart from the TA on the crop.) These new organizations may not have

Choose project crops that are known to the communities where the projects will be undertaken, unless additional time and resources can be expended to bring individuals and associations "up to speed" with new crops.

If new crops are to be proposed, ensure TA through to maturity and marketing of the products, throughout the entire value chain. This does not have to be implementer-based TA, but rather can be built through nationally and regionally available sources such as the Ministry of Agriculture and its institutes, as well as TA providers at local and regional levels. However, such implementation must include ensuring that these out-sourced providers have the requisite knowledge and ability to cover the areas intervened by the project.

productive projects were sustainable. They described situations that they did not know how to manage, and as their neighbors were also new to these crops, they knew no one to ask for assistance on technical and production matters. Relatedly, with these new crops, the respondents said marketing the produce was completely new to them. In a case of cultivation of palmitos, in Putumayo, the Agroamazonia processing company was created, with a huge investment in machinery and infrastructure. When the plants began to be harvested, a plague affected the bud, and the producers didn't know how to deal with the problem. They later learned that technical assistance would have allowed them to solve the problem quickly, but in the event, they lost the harvest. For this reason many previously motivated producers abandoned the crop. The potential connection between new crops and food security challenges is explored below, in a separate section on food security in productive projects with vulnerable populations.	sufficient tools to resolve internal conflicts (such as those over leadership or resources) or external challenges to production and marketing.	
Studying soil and climate prior to intervention In Nariño and in Cauca, respondents reported that inadequate studies were undertaken on soil and climate conditions, and that these affected the production outcomes of those projects – in the case of Cauca, with crops that were new to the producers as well. In Nariño, soil studies didn't take into consideration a natural disaster that had led to MIDAS intervention, and presented problems for small growers who were working in conditions different from what they were accustomed to (for reasons of the same disaster – a landslide – that affected soil quality.) Some MIDAS projects were developed without adequate prior studies and this generated negative consequences in terms of	Department-level soil and climactic studies are not likely sufficient when there is great variation across a given department, and these studies are particularly required when the crop is new to the area or to participants.	Particularly with new crops, conduct detailed studies at a local enough level to be useful in the microclimates within a region.

productivity levels. For example, palm requires 150 mm of water per month and Cesar has half that amount; nevertheless, a MIDAS project developed palm in this area. An adequate prior study would have avoided the failure of the crop that followed. In Asopalmira, despite excellent training outcomes in production, participants noted problems at the outset of programming with the soil studies. *"They didn't do soil studies where we were going to plant, or they did them but at the wrong time, so we ended up planting in a place that was ill-suited for the cacao and we couldn't correct it. So there was loss, there were people who really suffered from this failure."*		
Marketing, competitiveness and food security with vulnerable populations		
Seeds to sales: the full value chain By far the greatest difficulties across the value chain were those related to marketing the production from the projects, and getting them to market. Isolation in Huila and Putumayo; severe price fluctuations in Cauca, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Cesar; and unsustainable, risky contract terms with major chains affected associations' ability to get their products to market and earn a fair return. Despite this major challenge, several visited projects also managed to have important advances within their projects and in getting them successfully to market. Many associations and agribusinesses were eager and motivated and had made progress on their own. In the ADAM infrastructure observations, three respondents mentioned specifically the importance of the infrastructure projects for purposes of commerce: *"It improved the community's quality of life: comfort, cleanliness,*	Producers and associations that are not competitive prior to intervention were less resilient to shocks – price volatility, cost increases, weather extremes, and other production and market uncertainties. (This conclusion, and additional findings related to it, are explored as well in the section on risk management, on page 16 below.) This vulnerability puts them at greater risk of project failure, as producers will turn to, or return to, other crops or activities when the productive project stumbles or fails. In this sense, not having reached a level of	Identify and secure market buyers from the start of productive projects. During project and activity design, explore potential channels of distribution and marketing of products, to identify the needs of potential business partners. Promote alliances that mitigate the lack of a strong competitive edge among associations just entering the market or having tenuous links to it. Terms should take into consideration the short time horizons of associations and the vulnerable populations that comprise them. Include marketing, negotiation and

and health. The population increased and commerce improved."

"We now have a collection center for the blackberry producers in our area, which is one of the principal productive activities here."

"The ability to move merchandise more quickly and efficiently makes a big difference in the process of getting our goods to market."

In Nariño, the increased quality in dairy products (with timely technology and TA) had the effect of increasing alliances with national chains (Alquería, Alpina, Parmalat) to purchase the bulk of the association's production.

In both Antioquia and Cauca, cacao project respondents reported important benefits to the entire value chain (despite, in the case of Cauca, severe price fluctuation and climate issues) that resulted in association-strengthening and applications for Alianza Productiva projects with the GOC. In both cases, the organizations were granted these high-standard GOC projects. In the Antioquia project, Casa Luker agreed to buy the association's entire production, and association informants attributed the organization's strengthening along with that of the value chain to the ADAM intervention.

In Barranquilla, Atlántico, MIDAS supported SME Gente Estratégica, a recruiter/temporary services firm. Gente Estratégica's model includes 12 to 18 months to prepare their job candidates with extensive training, particularly when they come from vulnerable communities, to ensure they meet the standards of the firms to which they are sent. As a result of their participation in MIDAS, they created 3,000 new jobs in a year and a half, and expanded the company from 10 cities to 63 across Colombia. One key factor was Gente Estratégica's network and agreements with several significant enterprises; these existing clients were satisfied

competitiveness is its own vulnerability.

The marketing link in the value chain at times lacked timely planning or lacked attention altogether, in assuring that buyers and demand existed. Failing to do so resulted in wasted production or selling at below-market prices when production was already complete. There were many examples of producers abandoning projects for these reasons.

Linking small producer associations with chain buyers can be successful but when the producers are not yet competitive, they have little power to negotiate for favorable terms with such chains. This augments their risk and vulnerability.

Marketing through associations is generally more profitable for the small producers. The associations can aggregate production and thus have greater negotiating power. However, in order to begin, newer or very small associations must have the seed money to purchase the first production from their members.

Second-level associations and

contract terms as part of association training and ongoing TA.

When working with small producers for specific markets (such as high-end coffee for export), assist them in meeting quantity standards as well as in meeting quality standards. Association support should take into consideration all the requirements of a given value chain.

Work with the GOC on incentive systems to encourage buyer participation, particularly on terms that allow producers to become competitive. Companies could offer, singly or in packages, terms such as:

- Reduced quantity requirements
- Shortened payment schedules
- Favorable credit terms, such as not extending credit to the buyer (60 day payment terms)
- Training in quality standards and how to meet them
- Transportation services
- Seed money to purchase first harvest

Other terms or supports may be identified for a given activity, like preference for participation alliances and associations in public contracting. Implementers should be open to negotiating for what will support vulnerable producers to move toward

with Gente Estratégica before MIDAS, but and wanted to expand the relationship. MIDAS helped Gente Estratégica do so. In the MIDAS SME projects visited in Bolivar, one component of the project focused on identifying markets and consolidating an efficient, profitable and sustainable value chain. The company Cocoliso was supported to identify market demand and to work on achieving the quality standards, volumes and requirements of that market. With ADAM's agricultural project in Rio Chagui forest, the community council noted that, *"They always talked about marketing, including with other cooperation funds or other sources, but eventually the talk was always abandoned. It was a failure that they never really followed up on this. It's only just recently that we've made some contacts with Casa Luker. And we're producing really good cacao, special cacao with a great aroma."* With regard to how to market, the same community council noted, *"We need to know more about the artisanal process, because we sell our wood just in raw material form, and like that, it's really not all that profitable. At times, the sales actually drop below a point of sustainability, because there's a lot of competition from clandestine sales sources, who don't have to comply with the laws so it's cheaper for them to produce."* During 2007 MIDAS operator Interactuar undertook a detailed analysis of various sectors and opportunities, and lead these small entrepreneurs to their target markets in support of their commercial strategies. Interactuar carried this out in part through strategic alliances with the regional office of the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (National Directorate of Taxes and Customs, called DIAN for its Spanish initials), Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria (Municipal Agricultural TA	commercial partners in the sites visited showed that self-interest (in increased production and in strict quality standards) was sufficient to encourage their active and successful participation.	competitiveness. Incentives for participating businesses might include packaging that highlights the social responsibility aspect of the offering, tax breaks, preferential treatment in public contracting, or other incentives. Returnees and ex-combatants are also likely to fall into the category of non-competitive as their communities move toward peace.

Units, or UMATAs for their initials in Spanish), and the Cartagena Chamber of Commerce. The DIAN in Antioquia created a specialized window to support micro-enterprises in their formalization processes. The Cartagena Chamber of Commerce helped MIDAS projects to structure themselves organizationally and competitively. UMATAs provided technical assistance to rural participants in the program in the department. In Nariño, MIDAS focused efforts on the production of cacao, when it became clear that there was significant production potential. Beneficiaries reported that the program MIDAS fostered production increases, while also working to position Tumaco's cacao as high quality, with floral aroma and rich flavor. To do so, the support from MIDAS included a variety of clones that allowed the growth in production. The Aprocasur activity in the south of Bolivar has strengthened that institution – and its forty partners across the region – to such a degree that the organization is now working to industrialize its production and marketing of cacao, in order to garner more stable prices, enforce quality standards, and add value. Their legal representative said that it was his responsibility to do so, for the sake of the producers in his organization, in order to respond to the price fluctuations and the unreliable national price in the cacao market for raw cacao. In Huila the size of agricultural parcels affected the export of coffee. Families had divided farms, either for inheritances to several children or to meet immediate financial needs by selling. As a result, production failed to meet export requirements – for quantity, not for quality – and these were relegated to the domestic market. As that market is covered many times over by traditional large producers, the growers were hampered with low prices and even wastage.		

In Tumaco, a forestry project that included cacao production reports: *"One thing that failed was the theme of marketing. They didn't figure out ahead of time who we were going to sell this cacao to. They focused on producing the raw material but didn't think about how and to whom it would be sold. Of course we appreciate the help in planting but they should guarantee somehow that it's going to be sold and consumed."* Similarly, the Rio Chagui community council reported, *"In these last few years we have dedicated ourselves to marketing, because USAID didn't take that into consideration. Nevertheless, what we did with them gave us a start and we've created our own collection centers and a business association. But getting it marketed has been difficult, and we still haven't managed to do it."* In the avocado project in Cauca the project created a marketing cooperative but with unstable market prices, and the lack of seed capital to purchase the first harvest, the organization failed. When they did make agreements with chain stores like Éxito and Carrefour, the conditions were very unfavorable for producers, with payments at 60 days, causing participants to return to intermediaries for their sales. This problem with delayed payments and returned produce was reported in connection with smaller, newer and generally more vulnerable producers. New associations reported that they lacked the capital to purchase and aggregate the production of their members at first harvest. When this happened, respondents reported, many producers would return to intermediaries and sell at very low prices, just to get something for their production before it spoiled. This compromised the associations' ability to maintain associativity in the abstract, and in concrete terms, to aggregate production into quantities necessary for regional-level buyers. Similarly, marketing of the production from a Putumayo fish farm		

fell through with Éxito when the ADAM-supported association couldn't compete on price. There were price fluctuations, and the chain took 60 days to pay. Producers could not wait so long for payment, and their association couldn't support them in the meantime. Also limiting their success are the minimal and faulty roads connecting their area with their buyers. In some cases alliances between small-scale producers and companies were successful and sustained in time, but in other cases there were shortcomings. Nariño's small-scale dairy producer association alliances with large companies such as Alquería and Alpina continue; the private sector remains involved because the associations continue to meet quality and volume standards. This is also true with a dairy producer in Santander. In Cesar and Norte de Santander alliances between producers and big palm companies like Hacienda Las Flores, Palmariguani or Palmas de la Costa are still ongoing under a win-win approach. The commercial palm companies foster transport and other challenging issues for producers, while drawing in greater quality production for processing (hence, the Win-Win.) Examples of successful MIDAS cacao alliances included Asocati and Asopalmira (both are case studies in the report.) The success factors in these cases include precisely the expansion of the associations across smaller producer groups and thereby having greater market power. The team observed failed alliances that were due to unstable market relationships. The conditions for small-scale producers were often equal to those that competitive commercial firms had, but were insufficient for small associations. Alliances with chains like Éxito or Carrefour exposed producers to 60-90 day payments, merchandise return to farmers when not sold and other difficulties. An alliance between FUNDESMAG and ECOPETROL in Santander failed due to changes in tendering processes from ECOPETROL that were disadvantageous for small associations.		

Additionally, many respondents from failed projects said the reason was the lack of attention to the market end of the value chain. As with other challenges, failure to attend to markets, negotiation, and other themes at that end of the value chain were particularly prejudicial for smaller and newer associations, those with crops maturing after the activity ended, and/or those planting new crops. These vulnerable producers needed support up until they would become competitive, but the program support ended prematurely.		
Planning for food security for vulnerable groups In two cases in Cesar, associations of small palm producers (Aspalbe in Becerril and Asococ in El Copey) reported that their palm crop took four years to be productive. Although MIDAS assigned maintenance resources, their food security was compromised by the monoculture. Respondents from the Coragrosurb project in Bolivar told the evaluation team: *"A lot of people have thrown in the towel, because they don't have anything to eat. What we planted [with the program] takes a very long time to mature, and people don't have what they need for their day-to-day."* In Huila and Santander, participants planting delayed yield crops pointed out the need for further training and resources for alternative food sources. In the years before the plants mature (cacao and palm, respectively, in these examples), subsistence needs must be met, and some participants dropped out when they could no longer wait to have something to sell. The participants themselves pointed to the examples of home gardens and multi-crop, self-sufficient farms (*"so you can go and sell the products in the local market."*) But there were cases where that had not been prioritized in the technical assistance they received, and food security suffered.	Food security is absolutely key. The Traditional Farm method was very well received, with the benefit of reflecting customary methods and respecting the knowledge of communities and their elders. Most projects were not found to have promoted mono-cultivation; however, in some cases (in at least half of the departments visited in the evaluation), insufficient attention was paid to how families would sustain themselves in longer term projects (palm, cacao, avocado) and in some of these there was evidence of worsening food security as a result. Food security and crop diversity was not uniformly promoted by either ADAM or MIDAS projects, or not successfully to ensure participants'	When working with vulnerable populations, ensure demand until associations become competitive and have a resilience or risk management plan in place. (See also the recommendation below on risk management and planning.) These strategies should be built around guaranteeing food security. Particularly with delayed yield crops, ensure food security through rigorous attention to diversified planting. Make wide use of the Traditional Farm method that was used successfully in ADAM productive projects.

For cacao in Asopalmira, Tumaco, one respondent noted: *"For each MIDAS project they should do a real diagnostic, of what to plant and how to provide TA over time. For example if it's cacao that takes three years, they should plan to supervise us for three years. And if it's delayed yield like that, they've got to give the farmer the tools to plant some shorter cycle crops too: corn, yuca, banana, rice, the ones that the farmer can use for his day-to-day living in the meantime. So I would recommend that these projects always have a food security component, an integrated farm within the package of the intervention."* Participants in the Productive Ethnic Territories program (TEP, for its Spanish initials) reported that the Traditional Farm method had helped them remain food secure even in cases (such as with a cacao project in Cauca) where the cash crop was delayed or damaged by disease or weather.	adherence to these principles. Associations of small producers, particularly in vulnerable areas with primarily subsistence farming, require stronger support for negotiation with potential buyers. This was especially true for those associations that were new, or working with crops that were new to them.	
Planning for contingencies – risk management In the majority of agricultural projects, in all sites visited, respondents had to cope with unforeseen situations. These included drops in market prices (e.g., cacao dropped by three-quarters, palm dropped by half, increasing prices for inputs, unexpected extremes in weather. New associations, or those with unfamiliar crops, faced these threats to production, quality and marketing without the proper tools and knowledge to mitigate them. In a small number of cases visited, as in a palm project in Copey, they also did not have a multi-crop plan for their own food security. MIDAS staff in Antioquia described the effects of not having a contingency plan when these unforeseen circumstances and needs arose, particularly during flood periods. This was particularly important in meeting MIDAS job indicator targets, because floods did affect dramatically the achievement of the required number of	Productive projects are inherently risky because of the nature of agricultural markets. This is more true for vulnerable populations in general, and in conflict-affected areas. Starting projects, particularly with delayed harvest crops, is insufficient and can be damaging for participants when one or more of their multiple vulnerabilities comes into play.	Work with participants and associations to develop risk management plans. These should consider potential obstacles such as: • market price volatility; • unexpected changes in productivity levels; • disease and environmental management; • economic effects on labor availability; • disagreements within associations; • political and security instability; and

work-days. They told the evaluation team that not having a plan in place meant that their reaction to shocks was more expensive. There were up-front costs to this preparation, they noted, which they would have had to pay themselves. They also felt that families' subsistence costs until the first harvest were one set of costs that needed to be considered in contingency planning. Other costs that they faced were those generated by external variables, such as insecurity and natural disasters. Floods in Uraba, caused by the winter wave, was one such disaster. During a drought in this site, emergency irrigation was required, and quite costly to attain, because of the urgency of the situation. An attack of the sigatóca negra (an insect that devours banana foliage) was another example in Uraba. In that case, MIDAS participant Uniban had to buy pesticides and create a contingency plan for producers in a short time, to avoid a drop in production and concurrent losses.		• climate variations.

From vulnerability to resilience: the tipping point out of subsistence

Improving productivity and learning to compete

In Nariño, an existing dairy production association improved in productivity – from 5 to 8 liters average daily production per beneficiary – and in quality – with best practices and ensuring that the beneficiaries understand the importance of meet quality standards.

A former MIDAS staff member noted the long history of alliances in Colombia between commercial enterprises and small producers, with good results, and that the MIDAS model for agribusiness worked from that foundation. He felt it was vital to ensure the program was as "Colombian" as possible, to avoid people thinking that USAID would always come in with a new program. Instead, he promoted the Escuelas de Capacitacion de Agricultores model (ECAs) which some respondents reported having seen. He also supported extensionists in the national federations (*gremios*) and suggested the Centros Nacionales de Investigacion, that work on coffee, cacao, rubber, palm and other key national crops for the latest data to be used in quality TA. He said that when he started with MIDAS, they undertook a diagnostic on TA specifically, as his role was to improve the quality of TA in the MIDAS projects in the field. He said the diagnostic was used to support public policy

In Asopalmira, San Juan Rio Mira (Tumaco), cacao production went up significantly: *"Before the technical training people complained that they only got 30% yield, the rest was bad; today, after the training, after the ECAs classes, that's absolutely reversed: 70% and more is good, and just 30% lost, because they taught farmers about the post-harvest. And when they all do the right post-harvest techniques, what it does is it prevents the*

Raising efficiency, production and quality standards was a focus of many of the ADAM projects visited, and those that were successful in these areas tended to have more substantial and more sustained market benefits as a result.

Successful productive projects whose participants were interviewed for the evaluation were growing. Their motivation and incentive were endogenous, as was their effort to surmount obstacles. The most common requests for support from these initial successes involved technology, efficiency and productivity improvements, and TA for marketing their produce.

ADAM projects often had the effect of changing participants' mentalities from that of subsistence farmers to one of entrepreneurship, and of the economy beyond that of their own households.

The evaluation evidence suggests

For associations with experience in their sector, program to build on that experience using the bottom-up, participatory approach discussed in the section on community appropriation. These groups, with proven interest and ability to produce, are good targets for efficiency improvements, TA on negotiation and expanding their markets, and associativity with like organizations across their sector.

Create relationships with the significant national TA resources to support participants, especially those new to their sector, even after programs end. Alliances with Colombian TA resources (CENIs, SENA, UMATAs, university extension, commercial and confederation) is in line with standing Colombian practice but should be systematically expanded to the projects that are most in need. Monitor that TA to ensure that standards, content and methods are of the required caliber.

Provide projects sufficient support to build that beyond-family plantation size or other metric, to the point where the

illnesses for future harvests. The clones that MIDAS gave us are high yield and they [MIDAS] and the municipal government are helping us keep that strain going. Because it's high quality cacao: flavor and aroma, that floral aroma that puts our cacao at an international quality level. And what are we going for with that? It's that, with the same cloning process, we want to improve regional quality. We can see now what trees here are better quality, we can identify the good ones that are more productive and that make that great cacao. The farmer here, now, has that ability to classify and and select those plants that really make the difference on his farm."

In an indigenous community with a forestry project in Tumaco, a community respondent noted the importance of the productivity combined with environmental consciousness: *"The most important benefit is that people have really realized how the forest doesn't just bring life but also sustains our communities. Our project was done hand in hand with the strengthening of our community council and the cultivation of cacao, in which people are now getting about double the yield as before – from 400 kilos per hectare to 700 or 800. So there has been an economic boost for the families. We haven't been able to market it yet, we're doing our best now with a collection center with cooperation resources and Accion Social."*

MIDAS SME respondents were asked about developing economies of scale, as a result of their participation in MIDAS, and 81% said they had associated with other companies to lower costs and achieved access to new markets that helped reach those economies of scale. 75% of respondents to the SME phone survey said that participation in MIDAS had led to increased annual sales for their businesses. Nearly two-thirds (61%) of respondents had more employees now than they did prior to their MIDAS participation; and a strong majority said that their trading levels had increased: that this change in mentality was strong in communities and associations with high levels of participation and motivation – suggesting that associativity has productive benefits as well as individual and social ones.

Though the evaluation looked at the ways in which ADAM and MIDAS helped beneficiaries (both individual and association), the evidence also shows many instances in which respondents (again, both individual and associations) took the ADAM or MIDAS support and built upon it after the programs had ended. Even when an initial harvest was unsuccessful, or when inputs were insufficient on their own to bring respondents to a competitive level, they were motivated and capable to continue and expand upon the projects. Other community members joined projects once they saw success; associations set goals for production and market access and sought resources to meet them; operational committees saved funds in execution from one ADAM infrastructure project and used the savings on an additional project; communities sought further TA and

project does sustain families' needs sufficiently. This goal should supersede the attainment of cross-cutting indicators such as number of hectares planted and number of families supported.

61% now has increased the number of suppliers and 74% increased the number of clients since the MIDAS program began. A great majority (88%) stated that their current business situation has improved since the MIDAS program took place. Productivity in panela projects in Cauca improved through increased efficiency, which was achieved through introducing presses that were slightly more technologically advanced than their predecessors. Through ADAM assistance, the projects also improved processing by constructing small plants with more defined quality standards and methods. As a result the projects visited were generally more competitive than prior to ADAM interventions. Tecnoají provided irrigation systems and the necessary infrastructure to access water resources in the area. UNIBAN provided its partner producers an equipment kit for their parcels, that was complemented by their training and sensitization for farm support staff. In Norte de Santander, 60-year-old Silvestre Mejía reported a greatly improved quality of life from his participation in the ASOGPADOS palm project. He reports that today his 20-hectare plot produces a net return of 3 to 4 million pesos per month, which has allowed him to make improvements to his plot and send two of his daughters through professional education. In Antioquia, MIDAS worked with UNIBAN with producer technical assistance in best agricultural practices. Project impacts included reduced informality of businesses, a more dynamic market, and increased flow of resources throughout the community. Local MIDAS partners in the Santanderes region reported that most potential beneficiaries did not have the “vocation” of entrepreneurship that would motivate them to work with projects,	formal education to expand their products.	

and show them how to overcome obstacles. For vulnerable populations in particular, according to these respondents, generating such skills takes time. They felt that the indicators of the MIDAS project might push implementers away from this challenge. In this regard, the manager of Proempresas, an institution that promotes entrepreneurship projects, reported that a little over two thirds of MIDAS beneficiaries had an "entrepreneurial spirit." He reported that, "of these, almost all were successful. From the other 30%, nothing remains." Beneficiaries in Huila, Putumayo and Cauca reported a change in mentality, from thinking like farmers who produced for their own consumption, to thinking like businesspeople who planted continuously and earned a more stable income and, in some cases, the ability to save. In a cacao project in Nariño, the farmers were increasingly motivated to develop life plans around the cultivation of cacao. Similarly, in a dairy production project in the same department, beneficiaries' incentives for improving product quality was market-related, in which the per-liter price increased (with increased quality) from COP 500 to COP 800 per liter. Other family and community members increased their income through the collection center and transportation cooperatives. Further, the beneficiaries sought alternatives for increasing income, such as offering credit and expanding their product lines. The ADAM project with second-level organization Aprocasur in the South of Bolivar and South of Cesar supported more than 1800 families, planting some 3300 hectares of cacao, in areas that as recently as two years previously had cultivated illicit crops. One of the organization's many ADAM-related growth areas was in providing microcredit to producers. The association has continued to grow and expand since ADAM ended.		

The fish project in Cauca lost its first harvest when a promised market was not established early on. However, over time they have increased production to 20-25 tons per month, which respondents report is a change from short-term income to a more stable income over time. Participants say that learning to manage the economies of scale afforded by the project has just about led them to have a dependable monthly income. It also helps that they now sell directly rather than through intermediaries, and are soon to open another direct outlet in Cali. Respondents from one Putumayo project with some measure of social and economic success, however, noted that the plantings they had been able to maintain with their producers were insufficient to change family economies significantly. However, with market demand in hand (having been supported by Canada, Germany, the U.S. and a petroleum company) they have the direction they need to get to that increased level of production (currently estimated at around three to four times what each family currently produces.) The medium term goals include 1500 ha per family, to reach that level of economic sustenance, as well as selling to 80-100 Colombian restaurants and eventually becoming exporters. In Huila agricultural project participants more often encountered difficulties at the product marketing stage. They pointed out the need for training and support in marketing, identification of business niches, participation in "business roundups", and other methods of meeting market needs. *"You have to guarantee the marketing of the good or service, because if not, the project is useless." (South Huila Breeders' Association)* *"With the Ministry of Agriculture Rural Opportunities Program they taught us to look at the business, at niche markets that existed,*		

at best practices in marketing. We went to business fairs and conferences." (Coomultiunión Huila) A successful case of marketing support was seen in an association of farmers of southern Huila that succeeded in establishing a partnership with the multinational Nestlé. Thanks to good agricultural practices, catalyzed by the program, the association became certified and was able to demand a better price for their products. *"In our case, SENA's support was very important. When we told Nestlé we had chilling tanks, they became interested right away."* In this case, the technological and quality advances from the program helped them garner a contract with a major buyer.		

Capacity building

MIDAS SME phone survey respondents cited training (65% of the 69 respondents), technical assistance (61%) and access to production inputs (22%) as the top benefits they received from participating with the MIDAS program. Among these 61 respondents, 77% said that MIDAS increased their capacity to manage resources and projects. Among the 69 companies included un the study, 90% said that their technical knowledge for production and sales had improved, and 84% said they had managerial skills (accounting, logistics, administrative) that they didn't have before MIDAS. More than three-quarters (77%) say they gained access to information technology, facilities and equipment improvements, through participating in MIDAS. Aproaca respondents said that ADAM's capacity building helped in several areas: improved agricultural practices including production efficiency, maintaining food security, and how to manage a project. ADAM also helped Aproaca get their certifications up to date, access microcredit, and develop accountability and inventory systems. As a result, these respondents report, Aproaca has gone on (post-ADAM) to become certified in providing technical assistance with the Ministry of Agriculture, and has won a project with the Alianzas Productivas. A MIDAS project in Rio Chagui appreciated the conservation lessons learned in capacity building, and said they shared them with other communities: *"Making better use of our forest has served us, in conserving nature, in understanding all the forest has to offer, in how we manage the tools we have, and in the part of marketing the wood products in a good way. We select from that which is mature, in a limited area, and with a limit to how much we cut, and we market just that bit. And when we keep to the phytosanitary standards, there's less pollution, we give life to the forest and ourselves have more at the end*	Capacity building worked best when it was 1) demand-driven and tailored to local needs; 2) presented in interactive, pragmatic and dynamic sessions; 3) designed to involve the entire family; 4) presented with quality materials and tools for further learning and use; and 5) part of a continuous process of a duration that marched participants' needs and crops. *Content* Training and TA designed to meet the participants where they are as producers and as an association was best received and put to use. Training and TA therefore need to be designed from a genuine and participatory diagnostic. Participants had important local knowledge to contribute. They welcomed training and TA that began from an assumption of local knowledge that could be built upon. Where tools and materials were present, respondents made use of them over time. *Format* Practical approaches ("learning by doing") were most successful, particularly with the agricultural productive projects.	*Content* Ensure technical quality and relevance with trained, local TA and trainers to the extent possible. Carry out pre-intervention diagnostics at a sufficiently local level to be helpful, and use participatory methods to gather information on what participants already know. Continue to use diagnosis on a regular schedule to ensure appropriate learning and relevance. *Format* Design practical, dynamic and interactive training that is tailored for associations to whom it is delivered. Maximize cost-effectiveness with the use of peer-to-peer knowledge sharing such as communities of practice, internships-visits, knowledge fairs, or peer reviews. Systematically identify and share practices during implementation to reduce the learning curve, maximize "quick wins" and avoid repeating past mistakes. These measures are especially necessary when new crops are introduced with producers.

of the day. We always share this knowledge in the communities." In an ADAM project with a second-level organization, training and TA were passed formally through project partner Aprocasur to as many as 40 cacao-growing organizations across the region. Respondents at Aprocasur said that these associations in turn became sub-regional leaders. In Nariño, milk producers credited the training for their ability to improve milk production and quality. They report that this allowed for greatly increased marketing of their production. However it was not an easy process. The process of uniting indigenous and campesino dairy producers together under higher quality standards was contentious, particularly over traditional versus "new" milking methods. In addition, the ADAM project's TA insisted that a different type of pasture be planted, which participants rejected, saying they actually knew better what would grow in the area. In Santander and Norte de Santander, MIDAS strengthened a set of operators and associations. Two associations became operators and went on to run major projects themselves. Operator Comfenalco grew through MIDAS to run bigger projects, having strengthened their capacity for attention to vulnerable populations. From 33 families supported under MIDAS, they are now supporting 1900 families. Another example was the Association of Asogpados, which at the beginning was a recipient of palm projects implemented in Catatumbo. Today they are an operator, or sub-contractor, for government agencies and cooperation projects. A MIDAS project in Nariño supported farmers in skills to enrich their cacao cultivation. The TA included important knowledge about plant material (cacao seeds) and about pruning and grafting. With the latter, the participant farmers learned to prevent diseases, generate more quality in aroma and flavor, and produce greater quantities more	Respondents benefited from dynamic, interactive training rather than lectures. *Attendance* Training was costly for participants, resulting in lost days of work. Reimbursements for travel and time helped participants ensure their participation; similarly, offering child care and weekend training helped ensure the whole family could participate. *Trainers and extensionists* Committed local consultants with the appropriate learning were most apt for the TA and training. "Parachute" consultants – who just drop in – had less stake in participants' outcomes. *Time horizons* TA often did not support the entire value chain, or did not do so well, particularly when it came to marketing. This was most evident in projects working with the most vulnerable, as their competitiveness was weak or non-existent. Compounding the problem was the preponderance of crops that were to mature outside the project time horizon. *Knowledge management* The level of integration between peer associations or beneficiaries communities does is	*Attendance* Subsidize attendees' transportation. Plan trainings in line with their schedules, and make childcare available to maximize parents', and in particular mothers', attendance. *Trainers and extension officers* Partner early on – not only in exit planning – with national TA systems (ICA, national labs, university extension) and commercial firms that can provide more localized and ongoing TA than can a temporary cooperation pilot. Monitor their performance throughout the program life and, where possible, link payment to goals agreed by the participants, to ensure accountability. *Time horizons* To deepen the effects of TA and training, and to prolong its value, develop methods and tools – tool kits, checklists, visual aids, process charts, and the like – to leave with the participants between sessions. Get their feedback about extension and other capacity building services and use those to improve over time. Use synergies developed with national and regional extension of varying sources to ensure follow-on

efficiently.

A fish project in Cauca trained the participating association in use of hatchlings, construction of tanks, and harvesting, knowledge which participants report is still very much in use. Similarly the administrative function and organization were improved through capacity building.

A MIDAS cacao project in Nariño reached a community hit by an avalanche that had wiped out their earlier attempts to grow palm. Training was their most important gain from this program, according to the leader of their organization. Male and female heads of households learned about seeds, planting and cloning, allowing for increased quality and production and control of diseases among the trees. Taste and floral aroma have led to increased income for the families. The leader of the association said that, previously, "the people complained that we had about 70% bad production and 30% that we could sell; *today, after the trainings, that is reversed – 70% yield and 30% waste, in part because we learned post-harvest techniques."* However, participants were disheartened by the lack of TA when the project ended, two years before their plants would come to fruition. "*…they abandoned us, they didn't do any real kind of diagnostic on what to plant nor did they follow through with us. For example if the time to grow cacao is three years, they should plan and supervise us for those three years."*

A project in Cauca cultivating Haas avocados, which were new to the zone, required greater technical assistance and, according to the association president, the TA was of poor quality and dismissive of the local knowledge offered by participants:

"There were problems with the plant material. We made observations to the technical assistance people, but they didn't listen to us. The plant material they brought us was already old; it had roots. And they didn't take into account the soil in which they were going to be planting. The producers in the association trusted in the TA, and they didn't really

minimal, and not thinking through what a knowledge model could be was a missed opportunity. (See also Indicators section below.) There was no effective system to identify and evaluate good and bad practices, disseminate lessons learned and make better-informed decisions, that the evaluation could capture, or that participants who were interviewed could speak to.

The programs lacked strategic edge by not sufficiently mapping knowledge to identify and meet the supply and demand for development knowledge in the regions – of which ADAM and MIDAS generated important and useful amounts, not just at the program level but among beneficiaries.

One pagers and success stories are communication rather than knowledge tools. Knowledge sharing tools – such as fairs and study tours – were reported only very infrequently among evaluation respondents, even when crops chosen for the projects were new to producers, time horizons were long, and market challenges were evident.

support after programs end.

Knowledge management Develop a system for knowledge management that reaches the participants while being a learning hub for implementers. The synergies and differentiation between regions, local operators, communities and associations could translate into better accountability processes, enhanced results, higher dissemination and sustainability, targeted TA, and more effective fund allocation from the Government.

There needs to be understanding and a profound discussion of the role of KM on strengthening local capacities by means of providing timely knowledge management tools, and advisory support that is closer to where it is needed on the ground so that services are responsive to communities' needs. This, following a results-based management corporate approach, means linking Monitoring and Evaluation with knowledge being used to prompt action that generates learning and change.

know better because avocado was new for us. With time the consequences set in, and the associations didn't have the necessary knowledge. The TA was no longer visiting." In the case of banana company Uniban, they decided to hire their own consultants and created their own methodology to provide technical assistance to producers, which resulted in very positive results for beneficiaries. On the other hand, in the case of Alianza Cartagena, Bolivar, a consultant was hired directly by MIDAS, and deliverables were very weak. The consultant produced outdated diagnoses of market and demand that were out of context, apparently downloaded from the Internet. In Antioquia agricultural respondents reported the highly positive results from their training in good practices, in generating solutions and production strategies, and in post-harvest and transportation requirements**.** They reported that they increased productivity, profitability and efficiency, and added value to the product for better market price for their higher-quality products. In the case of Tecnoají they worked to concentrate the crops geographically to reduce transport and logistics costs, by uniting their collection centers. Similarly, in the case of Uniban, they incorporated the training content into their production and processes to increase efficiency in transportation and logistics. In the south of Huila a successful dairy and cattle project participant noted that his project required ongoing TA because their growth had stalled and they needed to be able to compete with larger, existing companies in the sector. *"Why not keep working with us, based on the good start we have made, and keep pushing so that we reach a higher level, both in production and in standard of living? We could create an area here that is first in the production of milk. For example we lack milking equipment, the chilling tank is right at the feet of the cows, we need to systematize our*		

information, we could even serve as an economical information center for the entire zone. And with projects like ours that are already functioning, we have the ability to say, 'we'll cover half and you all, the other half.'" One group of beneficiaries in Antioquia stated that the TA lacked critical social themes for vulnerable populations. Tecnoají, a MIDAS-supported firm that makes aji, this type of support would have helped curb the high level of displacement among vulnerable groups who serve as labor for the firm. One respondent said that employers in the region seek utility, sustainability and profitability – but that transitory populations such as those with high levels of vulnerability make those goals harder to reach. Interactuar improved working conditions and helped micro-entrepreneurs formalize their operations. They provided TA in legal and labor themes for micro-enterprises, of which they helped to formalize 640. ADAM staff in the capital reported knowledge sharing activities, but these were not reported by the respondents we visited. Moreover, respondents requested this type of sharing and support. Palm producers in neighboring Norte de Santander and Cesar reported no sharing among their peer associations through MIDAS: From a focus group with Coemprender and Fundesmag participants who spoke on this topic in Barrancabermeja: *"In terms of experiences, yes, there were opportunities for exchanging experiences between Fundesmag and Coemprender, but financed by the European Union and its Development and Peace program.*" *"I feel that, when it comes to sharing experiences, this was really short [in MIDAS]. They didn't facilitate space for organizations to review what they were doing and how they did it. This should be shared – there's an opportunity there."*		

When projects and sponsored capacity building had ended, many respondents reported they had nowhere to turn. This was particularly evident – nearly unanimous in some areas – in geographically remote sites, and with new producer associations and/or when cultivating unfamiliar, delayed-yield crops. A particular type of knowledge sharing was cited by one operator respondent: *"The exchange of experiences should also be done at the national level, in fact, to define how to write public policy on how to use resources at the local level, to support organizations.* *"You see families and beneficiaries that are receiving benefits from different programs, while other families are completely left out. At times the organizations themselves are benefiting from multiple programs while others have nothing. People are on really left their own.* *"The MIDAS and FUPAD programs have databases, but they're not checking them effectively, crossing them to see who is involved where. We could do more with less if they shared this information wisely – because now, we're benefiting families that are benefiting elsewhere."*		
Engaging the whole community		
In Putumayo a fish farm's capacity building involved multiple generations in a family. Participants reported high motivation among the association, and among participants' children, in studying the science behind raising fish. Some undertook technical study in the SENA while others visited similar plants in Neiva and Medellín to understand and be in contact with other producers with similar experiences.	Engagement across communities and including traditional and national authorities led to greater positive outcomes: • Buy-in and, potentially, support	Support programming with plans for community-wide engagement, across generations and including those who are not part of official or elected bodies. Make intergenerational

A community radio network was trained in Putumayo with ADAM resources, and they established a processes and procedures manual as a result. The radio staff now also uses a personnel manual. *"We didn't have anything like this anywhere in Putumayo before, and it has permitted us to be organized, have a portfolio of services, and improve our own level so that we can write our own proposals"* The training of youth and others to report on community issues was also cited as an important outcome of the program. *"The "Stick to the Microphone" student now supports the radio and supports the community, because he's a reporter who shows us what's happening in his community and his territory. This was a great benefit."* *"The learning they acquired at the "Stick to the microphone" course wasn't just important for Puerto Caicedo, but for all the municipalities, because there weren't trained people for community radio. Training 120 people has impact, and they're still working for their radio stations."* One unplanned outcome emerged from community communication projects, in which participants recounted their own community's history. This can also be seen in the ADAM-sponsored support to community radio in Putumayo. The program included a radionovela that brought families' experiences with illicit crops, armed actors, and a culture of illegality from the private to the public sphere. Other programming included a women's issues show, another related to actions of the municipal government, and others on indigenous and afro-Colombian issues. The station also renewed a traditional music festival and regular radio programming featuring the music of earlier times. *"The 'música de cuerda' festival was great, because this music had disappeared. Now we do the program each week with six musical*	from authorities • Greater credibility of the state • Intergenerational effects, promising to sustain the intervention over time • Attention to community needs across the spectrum, including rebuilding social fabric This cohesion generated with multiple users and training themes to meet a range of community needs resulted in cohesion across generations. This was a major consequence of intervention, at times even more valuable to respondents (in terms of social fabric) than infrastructure works or productive projects. Intergenerational involvement was particularly important for the sustainability of community efforts because involved youth took on community identity that had been lost. Involving youth also brought them into management, lead them to want to learn more, and allowed for the continuity of the effort.	involvement an explicit goal of projects with communities, from planning to capacity building to execution. When diagnosing capacity at the outset of an activity, include questions about differential interests and capacity among potential youth participants, and include these in programming.

groups that were created there, and the festival itself is repeated every two years in La Hormiga." Participants in Cauca demonstrated greater capacity building success in municipalities where the territorial authorities were part of the TA process. Association members cited the attention of training to a range of dimensions of individual and community life: *"There was attention to the resolution of conflicts, the act of sitting down to discuss things, like we had a court case active, over some land. We had to really take care of that so it didn't become an obstacle for the project. We helped facilitate these spaces because, at times, people are really shy. This was especially true because this was three very distinct communities working together."* One result with the Aproaca project, according to respondents, was that community leaders were strengthened to such a point that they now hold upper-level posts in the territorial government. A PPP project in Santander between MIDAS and GreyStar mining company's non-profit foundation ended post-MIDAS when the zone was declared a protected area by the GOC, and the mining company left. Nevertheless, skills taught to the miners' wives – in small-scale farming and associativity – remain today, where respondents report that the ongoing planting feeds their families and results in additional production that they sell in the town. Respondents also give credit to the current mayor's office for opening a market in which they can sell their produce. In Bolivar, ADAM's Aproaca project also supported an inter-generational process of transferring knowledge and supporting the formation of young leaders who now support the productive activities and continue their training. One project in a particularly conflict-ridden area in Cauca brought youth together for a "school" in critical thought, community		

communication, territorial awareness, and other themes. In addition to showing students alternatives to recruitment into the armed groups, this project increased their ability to address community concerns as a group. When some of the project's leaders were threatened by the armed actors, the project made strong ties to national and even international human rights organizations, maintaining constant communication in an "alert network." And, though the teachers were unconvinced of the utility of the project at first, by the end the schools and mayor's offices were more and more involved. This resulted from students' own activities and their reactions to the class materials.		

Access to formal and financial services

Financial services

Respondents to the MIDAS SME telephone survey reported positive benefits around access to financial services. More than half (54%) said their access to credit had improved since participating in MIDAS. One-third said their access to credit was the same as before they participated.

In Cauca, one association made extensive reference to a secondary institution, contracted by ADAM to supervise their avocado project, in which crop failures left them heavily indebted. This experience differed from those, reported by other associations, in which they received training and TA on credit. However, several families remain indebted to the present day, and many understood that the secondary organization was to cover 50% of the debt. When that organization brought a check for the president to sign over, they expected payment in the amount of some nine million pesos; that payment never arrived.

In a visit to the Rio Chagui forest, the community council told the evaluators that *"we received credit from the Banco Agrario from 2008 to 2013. With ADAM we got credit so we could continue on, on our own, and this was great. We were able to pay off the credit and that was its own success. For example, I myself got my parcel that sustains me, and we have done the same with 712 parcels for a total of 6,000 hectares with other programs. It was a real necessity, the fruit of what we learned with ADAM."*

Respondents in other sites reported important informal relationships with the Juntas de Acción Comunal as part of ADAM's work with the Banco Agrario and other regional entities. They also served as guarantors in cases of association credit. Commercial firms also served this purpose.

The evaluation found several instances in MIDAS of partnerships designed to provide credit guarantees, such as with *Juntas de Acción Comunal*, second-level ("umbrella") producers' associations or commercial-size processors.

Credit access did improve, although at times without the necessary training to individuals and associations to understand the uses, responsibilities and limits of credit. There were lines of credit extended for terms that ended before maturation of the first harvest of delayed yield crops. This puts pressure on producers and is likely to result in default.

Empowered associations, particularly at the second-level, began to make use of credit internally to support their membership and to facilitate their own works.

As a requirement to establish productive projects, participants need access to and use of the land. Whenever land title is weak, the

Support second-level organizations that unite small associations, and serve as guarantors for credit. Access to credit should be promoted through rotating funds, bank due diligence, first harvest support, local guarantors, second-level organizations and support from local, regional or national institutions. However, monitor these organizations closely for adherence to the same standards the implementer would themselves meet.

Ensure financial literacy training for beneficiaries in the themes they are likely to encounter with the terms very explicitly expressed.

Promote credit access to strengthen and formalize associations.

These recommendations are particularly important for returnees and ex-combatants returning to communities, as their need for credit will not likely be matched with collateral to guarantee loans. They are unlikely to have land or

In Nariño, dairy product beneficiaries reported not having made use of access to credit that was made available to them through the program. In Nariño, the participants in a MIDAS project did not receive the financial training with regard to the delay in harvest, versus the credit terms. In two years their credit came due, while it was not until three years later that the harvest would come. This generated many late payments. They reported that they were not counseled on this difference in time, nor offered other credit options. In Catatumbo, MIDAS worked to increase access to credit, not only to move a project forward, but also to link beneficiaries with another counterpart with a stake in their success. When loans were successfully granted, there were positive benefits that permitted organizational consolidation and project viability. This was the case with Asogpados, in which credit was used to create a rotating fund that allowed the association to underwrite its own projects. In another instance, a lending institution failed to approve the credit and the MIDAS partner organization (Fundescat) assumed the costs of projects, particularly where loan approval took so long that the goals of the project were compromised. Creating associations in order to garner credit worked in Catatumbo, when the organizations thus created were strengthened and sustained, and their members empowered to manage the productive project. One such case was the Asogpados rotating fund. This guaranteed liquidity for the association's own projects by selling a parcel of the association's land for palm production that benefited the fund. The long-term crops projects MIDAS undertook in Catatumbo allowed associations to plan for the future. They focused first on supporting their membership in their enterprises, and in the longer term, to develop investments to grow and generate useful services for their participants. In the case of Asopalcat Uno, created during MIDAS, this planning has led to a warehouse for agricultural inputs for members, and the	projects were at risk of losing that land to municipal, commercial or armed actor encroachment.	title and will need this support for productive projects.

construction of an association headquarters. Interactuar granted micro-insurance and micro-capital, and created a tool for the purchase of equipment. In this way they visited their partner micro-enterprises at the time of granting credit as well as after the credit was paid off. In the same visits they provided basic information on family businesses, and on other services they could provide to support the small or micro-enterprise. The tool allowed for follow-up with each small company, allowing Interactuar to identify bottlenecks in credit use and payment. Interactuar also provided TA on the use of the funds obtained through credit, recommending investments in processes or actions that strengthened the business and improved its productivity and profitability.		
Formalization and certifications The MIDAS Policy component also implemented what was called the rural development model, which helped to reduce land informality, taking advantage of economies of scale generated by the massive application of administrative and judicial routes for formalization. MIDAS offered TA in the piloting and development of programs to formalize rural property in Boyacá, Cauca, Cesar, Guajira, Santander y Tolima. The basis for this work was an institutional cooperation model designed to mitigate challenges to formalization of land title and the burden of the requirements on land tenure seekers. The lessons learned with these pilots allowed the government to identify process areas for normative and procedural adjustments, which are now under analysis with the national government and other related entities (departmental and municipal governments, cadastral agencies, beneficiary representatives, and Incoder, among others.) In one case, the Mayor's office issued a certificate attesting to the association's good standing. This played a fundamental role in the	Though not all associations require certification from state authorities, for agricultural production (because of its relationship to land) it was often discussed as necessary and beneficial. It is a positive quality attribute to attract buyers, because of the permanence it presumes. As a requirement to establish productive projects, participants need access to the land, and this relationship should be formalized. Whenever title or tenure is tenuous, the projects are at risk of losing that land to municipal, commercial or armed actor encroachment.	Where useful, promote and support associations to become certified for their quality standards and processes through local authorities. Work with the local and national government and with USAID programs in land restitution and tenure to facilitate formalization and remove obstacles to it. This should be part of all productive projects in consolidation zones. Work with local and national governments and with USAID programming in land restitution and tenure to facilitate formalization and remove obstacles

association's accreditation and ability to gain financing. In Cauca a panela project that was supported to add value to the cane they had produced was successful. Their president reported that, after ADAM departed, the association worked to get their certification by the state, in order to facilitate wider marketing. The state inspector came to inspect the plant, wrote a report requesting various changes, and departed. The association made those changes but has been trying for over a year to get the inspector back for the final certification. The respondent noted the importance of certification for marketing beyond the nearby city and wished that ADAM had facilitated this process, because of the pressure international cooperants can bring to bear on the state. In Antioquia and Bolívar respondents reported that guaranteeing land tenure had an important effect on the population's care for their land, the degree to which they looked to the future, and their decreasing willingness to risk that title by planting illicit crops. Sustainability in rural environments, according to the beneficiaries (both individual and associations, as well as private companies), requires land title as a key condition. Titles bestow ownership, they said, promotes a local dynamic, and allows for taxation. They felt that taxation in turn would promote state response in the form of investment in their communities. These sentiments were echoed by implementer staff as well, as part of program goals. In Cauca, respondents noted the importance of their degree of territorial ownership for sustainability. They said that sustainability did not simply result from the continuity of institutions and the infrastructure works themselves, but had to be combined with land rights. In one case in Cauca and one in Putumayo, municipal authorities threatened to take away land being used for ADAM and MIDAS productive projects.	The differences in land title processes between national and local levels indicate that the national process is unworkable. There is a gap between what is expected of tenure seekers and what they can reasonably be expected to undertake. Given that this problem will only be exacerbated by increased claims in a post-conflict environment, this is probably one of the central and most essential policies in need of reform.	to it. This should be part of all productive projects in areas of consolidation.

The land formalization process took many forms, in different zones where the evaluation spoke with participants on this topic. There were different processes at the local or municipal level than those that come from the national level. Citizens and their local governments, at times, showed flexibility in these arrangements, while still providing forms of title and usufruct that guaranteed their land access use. In one case, however, national recognition of tenure granted locally was at issue. What all respondents who spoke about land tenure were sure to mention was the challenges in getting tenure, the bureaucratic processes which were uncertain to lead to a reasonable end. These were barriers to their entering the process. Still, they felt it was the only route to stability. In one department, ADAM made considerable progress in getting approval for departmental resources to be used to co-finance agricultural pilots. The team also secured permission for certificates of budget availability, which guaranteed resources. With MIDAS in the same department, some state resources were used to provide legal iad, including help in assembling documents to formalize businesses. As a result of these advances, an inventory was taken of learned lessons, obstacles and difficulties, particularly on the process of sanitation of the false tradition in small properties. A preliminary group of recommendations was elaborated to the corresponding authorities.		

Differentiated approaches for vulnerable groups: ethnic minorities, conflict-affected populations, and women

Respondents in Huila and Putumayo reported that some projects failed when they did not adequately take into consideration the cultural identities of the peoples with whom they worked.

In Cauca, some afrodescendent respondents reported that they didn't find ADAM's interventions to be particularly tailored to their needs. This generated difficulty in the relationship of these respondents with ADAM actors.

However, there was another example in Cauca of an inter-ethnic project that strengthened communities and contributed to minimizing conflicts between ethnic communities. The project united two indigenous communities and a *campesino* group that had long been in conflict over land rights. This ADAM fish project opened spaces for dialogue and participation for the members of the different communities, finding common goals (from one indigenous participant: "*the only form of integrating us was the need to produce trout, because our needs are the same"*) with projects that provided benefits for all parts. They get along better now and this process itself strengthened the association. Two quotes from these respondents:

"One good thing from the project is that it got us all together in a common goal, bringing Paeces, Guambianos and campesinos together under a shared objective. The project united us – before, there were communities that didn't even talk to each other, now we even joke together. This is not something we expected from the project, uniting our whole community.

"We never saw this kind of coming together between our two resguardos, but it served us because that was how we grew the business."

In Cauca, indigenous respondents reported that ADAM projects

The degree to which ethnic minorities perceived that ADAM and MIDAS projects were sensitive to their unique needs varied considerably across projects. The previous experiences of communities, their sensitivity to perceived slights, and the different competencies and approaches of individual implementer staff members have likely all contributed to this set of mixed results. Some of the negative experiences reported by respondents were linked to perceptions that a productive project devalued traditional production methods. Others felt they had not been sufficiently consulted in the process, or that their recommendations and prior knowledge was ignored.

In projects that united different communities in common goals, respondents reported surprising and positive outcomes with respect to getting along with their neighbors.

Results in promoting women's active participation in productive projects were mixed. Respondents in general did not report a particular focus on

Projects in ethnic communities require detailed and genuine prior consultation processes to identify community needs and priorities.

Diagnose local capacity during prior consultation in order to take advantage of extant knowledge.

Involve local and traditional authorities in decision-making.

Ensure that implementers respect communities' right of self-determination with concrete actions that allow for communities' participation in decision-making through the life of the project.

Diagnose differential challenges faced by men and women in alternative development projects, particularly in rural sites, on finance and credit, access to TA and services, and business skill sets. Ensure that women and men have equitable access to programming with measures such as child care during training, targeted assistance and counselors, and troubleshooting. Implementers need to make these opportunities

focused efforts in indigenous communities around those communities' own Life Plans, creating activities that were therefore more appropriate and more in line with the interests and needs identified by those communities. From Tumaco, as well: *"Our community council has a Life Plan that lays out the next ten years, so with ADAM what happened was they [ADAM] helped us technically to put our Life Plan into action. It helped us so that people would work within legal boundaries, people realized they needed to conserve the forest, and we built an internal set of rules within the community council. ADAM financed the socialization of these rules in all the communities."* In two Nariño dairy projects participants were reported to have opened opportunities for greater women's participation in the dairy associations to which they belonged. On the other hand, in both cases, there was desertion from the projects when some participants – often indigenous – found the quality standards for milking and other processes too different from their traditional practices.. In a second project in Nariño, on the other hand, a MIDAS cacao project with Afro-Colombians strengthened the relationship between several Afro-Colombian communities while supporting their traditional crop – cacao, in this case. MIDAS brought instead information, and better techniques, so that they could continue with a crop with which they were familiar and comfortable. One respondent was pleased that*"…they didn't try to take us out of our cacao culture."* In Afropatia in Cauca, respondents reported improved women's participation, though in other projects respondents did not present gender as an important aspect of the ADAM projects. Beneficiaries' and ADAM project stakeholders' own approaches and interests were said to influence the degree to which gender was included.	including both sexes in projects. Given that gender-specific constraints and inequalities do exist, especially in rural areas, in important themes related to development, the programs appeared to lack activities by sex on land tenure and credit access, technical assistance, entrepreneurship and agribusiness skills, and other themes that may have important repercussions for women in rural environments.	apparent and accessible to participating families. Work "bottom–up" to ensure relevance, community buy-in and sustainability. This should not be compromised when time or resources are short. Build in time for these processes in all cases, with additional time allotted where potential participants are returnees, victims, or belong to ethnic minorities. Insist that all implementing staff undergo sensitivity training on these issues, and monitor their work to ensure that their methods are perceived locally as inclusive. Seek local counsel on approaching communities to participate, and respect community rights to self-determination. These recommendations apply equally to abstract notions of community rights as well as to concrete decision-making about project design and implementation. While prior consultation is an oft-stated goal, in the rush of implementation it can be compromised. Leverage the successful associative

		projects in ethnic communities to counsel and train those invited to join new programs, in a peer-to-peer model that empowers one peer in sharing experiences, and the other in learning from them.
Sustainability and replication		
Without long-term, dedicated projects in the regions, local partners and beneficiaries have learned to link together support sources in order to reach longer-term goals. On average, MIDAS SME respondents had participated with 1.8 USAID projects. Qualitative examples of this linking of projects are included in this section. Respondents used their improved managerial and administrative and technical improvements to garner support from the European Community, GOC and other sources. Respondents from an agricultural project in Antioquia said that TA was essential in the medium and long term for their success, not only for the cultivation of crops – particularly those that were new to the community – but also for the management and marketing of production. In both Huila and Putumayo, the majority of projects visited were able to sustain themselves over time, after the end of ADAM and other programming support they received. As cacao trees have achieved maturity this year, in one case, cacao productivity continues to rise and new producers join with the ongoing planting initiative. Respondents said they were more likely to join and participate once they could see the production and marketing actually working in the market. The visited projects had associations with strong leadership who have continued to put the project learnings into practice, to increase	Projects initiated by ADAM and MIDAS continued to exist, in many cases thriving. Many associations, companies and individuals were highly proactive, motivated and capable in their work, progressing the projects beyond where they were left by the USAID interventions. Deep community involvement and contributions were important success factors, as was strengthened organizational capacity, and viable links to the market end of the value chain. ADAM and MIDAS had important successes in building on existing organizations, rather than starting from scratch with new projects, new associations and unfamiliar crops. While this strategy is not likely sufficient on its own, particularly post-conflict with returnees and excombatants returning to their	Leverage positive experiences with current and past projects in communities – indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and campesino alike – by having them share their experiences. The successful projects that united groups from these different communities in productive projects are a special case in point and provide a wealth of knowledge sharing for participants. This sharing encourages new participants to speak up for their community priorities from the beginning of projects, ensuring that the prior consultation becomes a two-way conversation. Include detailed, project-by-project exit strategies to guarantee the continuity in time of the activities and results. These should include networking project actors to TA,

production levels and quality standards. One of the most important sustainability lessons learned by respondents was the importance of getting stakeholders involved, from the community (both members and leaders), traditional and municipal authorities, and local alliance partners. Experiences gained with the consensus that had to be built, were useful as the programs progressed. In Cauca, various participants reported that ADAM's practice of involving participants in the construction and processes of the projects allowed participants to move past a "culture of assistentialism" toward one in which the beneficiaries are protagonists in community development. Respondents in Cauca from various organizations noted that continuity was more likely when the association leadership did not change frequently. Rotation of leadership limited continuity. This was true as well with engaging municipal leadership in the projects. In the short term, however, this strategy helped organizations resist armed actors. Organizations that created savings funds strengthened their ability to be sustainable, and more easily weathered market fluctuations, production failures, and climate variation. In Huila a group of respondents reported joining their project after seeing it become successful. Projects in Putumayo (pepper and rubber) saw similar effects, with increases in the number of producers and in hectares planted, when they see their neighbors profiting. MIDAS' apiary project in San Agustín, called Apired, created a support network to exchange knowledge and experiences in cultivating honey through the local bee varieties, in Risaralda, Quindío, Santander and Boyacá. Sustainability was tested by the lack of contingency strategies in some sites, so that project participants could deal with the challenges that inevitably arise. There were many field examples of difficulties from	communities, there is value in capitalizing on existing strengths for substantial results at a lower cost. The end-of-project TA was a substantial challenge for participants. Some were more successful than others in leveraging their ADAM or MIDAS experience to seek additional support in a chain of projects.	credit and other services necessary or potentially necessary for that project. Relations between producers in different regions allow beneficiaries to contrast their experience with those of other organizations undergoing similar processes. This generates horizontal or peer-to-peer learning among producers, and can lead to networks in which they can exchange knowledge. See more on this conclusion and related recommendations in the Capacity building section, page 23. Plan differently and with greater depth for sustainability of new projects and associations. Existing companies and associations, who are more immediately absorptive of support, can be linked to these growing enterprises for market and other TA assistance.

weather, inputs, market price volatility, natural disasters, incursions from armed actors, and other contingencies that threatened continuity and success for ADAM and MIDAS activities. Though natural disasters, as an example, are difficult to predict, having a plan in place for climate variations can mitigate the high costs and potential losses of acting after the fact. In Antioquia, Uniban was one example of an organization that took the MIDAS interventions a step further, leveraging other cooperation or national support on the basis of the positive experience with USAID's project. Respondents there cited that their improved administration and increased technical and managerial knowledge showed what they were capable of, to the European Community among others. Similarly, in Norte de Santander, local partners credited their MIDAS-supported capacity with helping them garner financial and in-kind support from other sources. In the absence of dedicated, long-term projects in the region, the local partners and beneficiaries have learned to link together support sources in order to reach their longer-term goals. There were in fact many cases of this kind of participation in multiple projects, financed by the GoC (through the DPS) and/or by international cooperation projects. On average, the MIDAS SME survey respondents said they had participated with 1.8 USAID projects. Most of the MIDAS projects that the team sought to interview in the Santanderes region remained on course, such as one in which displaced people were being returned with cacao plantation in Barrancabermeja (implemented by Comfenalco) and the majority of Catatumbo palm projects. Another example, of a project that was initiated with MIDAS, was the Pasteurizadora La Mejor in Norte de Santander which, with technical assistance to dairy producers, moved the region significantly toward self-sufficiency in dairy.		

Culture of legality

Respondents in projects in Antioquia reported that, prior to the ADAM program, area families were remote from one another because of coca cultivation. Families and associations saw illicit crops and mining as the only options for the youth of the region. Similarly, the Asociación de Productores Agropecuarios del Valle de Guamez (Asopa) took advantage of the ADAM cacao project as an alternative, in communities that were highly affected by illicit crops. Respondents reported a change in time horizons from when they cultivated illicit crops, resulting in thinking more about the future. They also report that being recognized as legal producers improves their family and community relationships, as well as those with institutions of the State. Long-term planning, such as that required for delayed harvest crops, was reported to have an effect on communities and their time horizons; this differs substantially from the short time horizons of illicit crops. In each of the regions visited, respondents discussed their longer-term plans, investment, savings, and having resources available. Similarly respondents report feeling ownership of the land and cease to be nomads, as the illicit crops tend to generate. Working in the licit economy, according to Huila respondents, carries benefits beyond the economic or business-related. They can plan and carry out a new life project, bring their families back together in one place, send their children to school, and construct collaborative relationships with their neighbors as well as with local and national institutions. One project in a particularly conflict-ridden area in Cauca brought youth together for a "school" in critical thought, community communication, territorial awareness, and other themes. In addition to showing students alternatives to recruitment into the armed groups, this project increased their ability to address community concerns as a	Shifting to licit productive activities lengthens participants' time horizons, encouraging them to think in terms of staying on their land with their families. Land tenure, credit, local associativity (see pages 2-3), intergenerational engagement and increased capacity (including formal education) are all factors that link citizens to their land and productivity, in ways with which illicit activity cannot compete. Specifically, the work of the programs has contributed greatly to increase the culture of legality by (i) providing licit means of income and security; (ii) joining together citizens' needs and expectations around the projects; (iii) empowering communities; (iv) providing a long term view that replaces the nomadic behavior of illicit crops; (v) promoting attachment to the region; (vi) involving families and not just individuals; and (vi), boosting families' self-esteem. Transparent community resource management, as in the ADAM projects, also reinforces long-term and associative thinking. These factors also act as bulwarks	Leverage an integrated vision of what projects are accomplishing – not just production, but the associativity, capacity building, land tenure, shared management of community resources, education opportunities, credit and long-term commitments that encourage the culture of legality across communities.

group. When some of the project's leaders were threatened by the armed actors, the project made strong ties to national and even international human rights organizations, maintaining constant communication in an "alert network." "*All this was in the hope of putting all this conflict behind us, to find another alternative and to look for how to get away from the guys who were in armed conflict. Because otherwise the kids here are easy prey for those groups to come and take those kids away from us.*" *"I have strong memories of the guerrilla on one side and the army on the other, the destroyed houses… After so much conflict, the people are run-down, and this project helped us reconstruct our social fabric. In Almaguer people were really afraid – afraid to go out, to speak, to participate in the meetings, because the one who spoke up woke up dead. So with the project we learned again to trust ourselves and to trust our community.*" Respondents in Cauca noted that ADAM projects' attention to transparent resource management in the projects and to community participation resulted in keeping conflict actors out of the process, because everyone could see who participated in each procurement. A condiments project in Putumayo was reported to have made an impact on the culture of legality: *"Through the pepper project, we took a step toward legality. Many of the pepper producers emerged from the process of voluntary eradication of coca, which of course has a big impact on families. When a family begins to see that a licit crop allows them to make a living, it changes the environment. The family – while growing coca – was often disintegrating. A son went one direction, the father another, everyone looking to work as raspachines with the coca leaf. With pepper, the families are organized around planting, and around their own parcels of land. Our goal, as a company, is to generate*	against the prolonged engagement of armed actors. The increased associativity of this long-term, grounded and productive thinking increases populations' abilities to resist engagement with those armed and illegal actors as well.	

sustainable economic alternatives for these families." Rodrigo Trujillo, Condimentos Putumayo S.A. Another Putumayo municipality was deeply affected by coca processing in the 90s, with armed groups of all types making incursions in the area, which also had an oil pipeline whose protection was a constant challenge. ADAM supported technological and technical advances in the existing fish farm and processing plant, and the success of the plant had repercussions on community food security: *"Now you see food in the market plaza. Sundays, it's nice to go to the plaza because you see the change in how people went back to the old way of running their farms. Before, people weren't planting food – just coca. Now in the plaza you find tomato, cucumber, cilantro, chicken, panela and fish, things that we weren't seeing before."* (Association representative, Putumayo.) In Nariño, growing cacao has developed producers' ambitions around their life plans. Their traditional agricultural practices are respected, and there is increased income that is highly valued, in part because it is licit. Respondents report positive impact in individual and community esteem, and people are committed to their shared enterprise. Cacao producers in Nariño reported that small growers responded well to the instruction to give up illicit crops, under threat of losing the project's support. Project participants say they reject the idea of illicit crops, which in turn diminishes the armed groups' interest in the area. In Antioquia, microenterprise respondents working with with Interactuar understood the importance of their continued technical assistance, which helped them resolve labor and legal needs and they reported being committed to working within the law to help achieve that goal. In a focus group with MIDAS productive project participants in the Santanderes region, respondents note that MIDAS has offered them		

licit alternatives. They have incorporated a longer-term mentality and themselves contribute to create a "culture of legality" in the Catatumbo area. *"I was a coca grower before, but that's because there were no options. But the ones who grow coca on the side of the road or near Tibú today are considered shameless."* (Manager, ASOCATI).		

Coordination with municipalities and the state

Of the 47 respondents to the infrastructure observation questions, 78% reported that the municipality or other governing body took part in the infrastructure project with ADAM. They reported that the government body provided funds, technical assistance, or simply approved the project. Among the nine respondents who said the municipality had not participated, two said the municipality had promised support but not come through with it. Municipalities varied greatly, even within a given department, in their commitment to and confinancing of ADAM projects. In the capital of Cauca, one project leader said the municipality had provided TA but stayed mostly out of the way; in a vereda with a productive project in panela, the municipality attempted to take the land on which the association had built their plant; in a third project which united three municipalities, none of those authorities ever arrived with the support they had promised. The ADAM regional coordinator for this region had worked closely with the municipalities of all three of these projects, noting that "The time we took in this selection process created tension between USAID's requirements… and the extra time it took to ensure that all was in place with the municipalities." The regional team made it a requirement that the proposed infrastructure project had to be part of the official development plan, *"in order to make it a little easier to get the cofinancing resources."* Part of the reason behind the effort, he said, was that *"we felt this was the way to guarantee sustainability…."*	Cofinancing with local, particularly municipal, counterparts was an ADAM project goal. Citizens were happy with participation from local officials (and funds) when it happened. However, when it did not, especially when it was promised but not delivered, citizens resented the failure to be involved. Municipal promises to participate, followed by failure to do so, resulted in loss of credibility for local authorities. This compounded the problem of the "absent state" for citizens and for the state itself. Municipal leaders in power during ADAM's time were frequently unavailable at the time of the evaluation. Other state or parastatal entities that worked with ADAM projects were more regularly available (i.e., still in their posts) for interviews. This affected citizens'	Determine which incentives will encourage more engaged participation from municipalities, and use them. This will be particularly important as resources and responsibilities are set in motion once peace accords are reached. Use leverage where possible to encourage greater municipal involvement. Ensure that project staff understand the importance of municipal support to provide legitimacy to cooperation projects, support governance issues like certification of producer associations, and build government credibility. Make municipal partnership a priority. Take advantage of national level programming, through the Agriculture and other Ministries. Support successful productive projects to access these programs.

Still, there were projects in which the failure to provide the promised resources *"put the brakes on the process"*, according to the regional coordinator, as well as participants in projects where the municipality/ies did not come through on their pledges. A problem in the Apropesca fish project surfaced when the ADAM project arranged with a nearby municipality to create a fish processing facility but did not secure title or have it in the name of the organization. Now that ADAM is gone, in the words of a focus group participant, "*Now they're telling us we've got 30 days to get out. Why didn't ADAM made a direct agreement between us an the municipality? They left us dealing with the legal battle, and we don't know if we should keep on investing in this project or not.*" In a contrary example, in a project in Rio Mira, the local government supported the project by helping formalize community title of the land that was used. Most of the required material for the infrastructure work was provided by the community, who worked together to extract these materials from the Rio Mira. In Cauca, a social worker who served many of the region's ADAM projects noted that municipal support – from the personero, the mayor's office, the Juntas de Accion – was uneven. But, she noted, *"at the beginning our work was hand in hand with these offices. They brought other resources, and the people started to believe a little more in the State. Usually the communities see the JAC as not doing much, just doing 'politics', but when they participated with the projects it bought the state some credibility."* Respondents from several ADAM projects reported that their municipalities promised to participate, providing TA, funds, or some other type of assistance. One project reported that the assistance came through (school cafeteria in Popayan) but the others reported that the	ability to continuously engage with municipalities, and to sustain gains made in programming. Failure on the part of municipalities to participate more fully also minimized sustainability and represents an important missed opportunity. The results do not lay blame for this on one actor or another, rather they generally show that low resource levels and competing priorities play a part, as does some lack of interest on the part of municipalities, and no compelling interest on the part of the state to actively participate.	Coordinate closely with national, regional, departmental and municipal extension services for producers, to improve sustainability. Involve local authorities from the beginning of each project, increasing ownership and allowing mayors to participate in the design, implementation and follow-up phases. A selection criterion for future projects should be the local authorities' willingness to match USAID resources (verifiable through local development plans, budgets, local royalties revenues investment plans, etc.) Include exit strategies specifying institutional roles on project follow-up, sustained TA and support. Inform participants at the producer level when governments are participating, to take advantage of the dividend in state recognition.

funds never arrived. One project (panela plant) reported that the mayor's office had actively tried to insert themselves into the ADAM project in order to take away the land that had been provided by the community. No mayors or mayors' staff members from the time of ADAM were interviewed, despite various attempts. Most were reported to be no longer in office. This was also true for the elected Juntas de Accion Comunal. Another project (the youth camps program) in Cauca attempted to engage their conflict-affected municipalities and the department in the activities. As part of the project, youth got involved with their communities through service projects and empowerment. Respondents reported positive relationships and the mayor's office and local teachers eventually willing to partner with the youth; however, they also report that an innovative "co-governing" plan in which the governor invited student participation in development planning finally fell short when the governor reneged on his commitment to the plan they had co-created. An indigenous community's dairy production project in Nariño was assisted by departmental, municipal and traditional authorities, after strenuous efforts by the leader of the association to garner their assistance in buying a chilling tank for the milk. In the Santanderes projects visited, no respondents noted MIDAS efforts to represent beneficiaries before any government bodies at any level. In Catatumbo, respondents expressed that this sort of support would have been helpful in order to secure technical assistance from the UMATA in Tibú for the various agroindustrial projects. Another example is found in Barrancabermeja, where the local partner, the Chamber of Commerce, that MIDAS could have helped the program reach out to ECOPETROL in order to come to agreement on contracting standards for local businesses to provide the industry firm with goods and services. In another example, Coemprender respondents		

indicated that they wished MIDAS had supported their efforts to access credit in institutions like the Banco Agrario or FINAGRO, which were deemed necessary for the agroindustrial projects in which they were involved. By their own initiative, the organization Proempresas continued supporting projects in the Santanderes after the MIDAS interventions ended. In another case, Pasteurizadora La Mejor, the company continued supporting the dairy farmers with technical assistance. Sustainability in in this case lay in the demonstrated benefit to the private sector of improving producer capacity and quality, and in the expansion of those producers' businesses as a result. In Suratá, Santander, where strawberry production was strengthened with technological advances, a negative result came about after the end of the MIDAS project. The project's producers were unable to resolve disputes regarding administration and project management.		

Managing implementation

Key indicators

MIDAS and ADAM both exceeded most of their performance targets. They had significant achievements from this perspective: 164,716 new hectares were planted, corresponding to 96.5 percent of the goal; natural forest hectares reached 113 percent of the target; the number of families benefited was 190 percent of the goal; and the new jobs figure was 147 percent of the goal. ADAM results averaged more than 160 percent of the initial goals. For example, 84,636 families benefited, 143 percent of the programmed 59,369. Hectares free of illicit crops reached 131 percent of target, social organizations were strengthened at 223 percent of the target, and people benefited by national programs was at 209 percent of the goal.

MIDAS staff in Antioquia described the effects of not having a contingency plan when unforeseen circumstances and needs arose, particularly during flood periods. This was important for meeting MIDAS job indicator targets, because floods did affect dramatically the achievement of the required number of work-days to meet targets.

In one set of cases in Cauca, the delimitation of the intervention zone and ADAM staff's attention to the number of families that needed to be involved exceeded the technical and financial capacities of the project undertaken. Respondents said that the impact of the project was so diffuse as to be unnoticeable.

In Antioquia and Bolivar, associations, small and medium enterprises have registered their dissatisfaction with the design and implementation of indicators of the MIDAS project, against which they were evaluated (jobs created, hectares planted and enterprises strengthened). They report that these indicators limit attention to other types of impacts, and other variables that, for them, were of great importance. In the case of the indicator on jobs created or formalized, they felt the standard concept of these jobs did not apply in rural environments given the day-

There were unintended consequences from the use of a set of comprehensive indicators – and the responsibility for meeting high targets. MIDAS and ADAM staff decision-making was distorted around reaching these targets on three output-level goals. Attention to higher-order results suffered as a result.

This had effects all the way to the local level, where beneficiaries, operators, and former implementing staff felt the pressure to meet numbers.

The indicators that were most discussed (MIDAS' jobs created, families supported, and hectares planted) did not capture everything that mattered about the project, but they were so powerfully presented, and the targets so high, that they shadowed other more nuanced data about the project's accomplishments.

The quality of those three indicators was questioned by respondents, including project staff, who were concerned that the tabulation of day labor days as if they were permanent and formal jobs distorted the real

Avoid comprehensive indicators and letting an M&E imperative push operators toward particular implementation actions – such as targeting low-hanging fruit, acting precipitously without sufficient prior diagnosis and consultation, or writing indicator definitions that reveal inconsistencies.

Be prepared to change indicators in the field. Encourage open-ended approaches to learning that are somewhere "between M & E" – that is, not simply PMP indicators on outputs, nor the biggest picture goals, but at outcome level. Train implementation staff to look beyond PMP numbers to bring back evidence of unintended consequences, longer-term developments, and subjective but valuable learning about what works in a given environment.

Construct 21st century M&E systems for complex environments – agile, adaptive, shorter-cycle, context- and conflict-sensitive, built around goals shared with stakeholders, combining log frame-type indicators with outcome mapping, targeted qualitative

worker dynamic that is used.

In Santander and Norte de Santander the indicators on jobs and hectares were met or exceeded. Nevertheless respondents found these goals inflexible and unrelated to the regional context and other strategic objectives such as local capacity generation and their work with vulnerable populations. One respondent noted, *"In the rush to comply with X number of hectares, many of the hectares of cacao were planted poorly, in terrain and conditions that were unfavorable to success."* (Manager, Asocati.)

The emphasis on meeting the goals prioritized beneficiaries with previous experience in income generation projects, with a high probability of success. Paired with that, however, are limits to access by more vulnerable groups, who require capacity building in the medium term and who have an average likelihood of success, due to the lack of a productive vocation or the need for support and training. The manager of FUNDESCAT stated that *"We had to reach out to a group of businesspeople who could help us meet the goals. Meanwhile, for vulnerable populations, we had to skip important steps or turn them down."*

In the MIDAS SME component, respondents reported feeling that the focus on hectares and jobs in the short term left on the back burner the institutional strengthening and capacity building that they might have undertaken with operator partners as well as program beneficiaries. For operators, none of those interviewed in the Santanderes had received technical assistance during the program. The operators reported that there was neither time nor resources for generating competencies among vulnerable populations or people without business skills.

Several interviewees took part in previous programming, and received some capacity building in those efforts. This was in part due to the linking up of project support over sufficient periods of time to strengthen their businesses, as mentioned above. Also, however, the privileged status of previous participants means that their access to programming was likely greater. In other words, those who had never participated were less likely to be invited to participate. Operators also

picture of program impact. Hectares planted was also questioned, because of the rush to plant that in some places was responsible for later crop failures.

In conflict- and poverty-affected environments such as those in ADAM and MIDAS require more deft, alert, and attentive M&E, with review of measures when external shocks interrupt implementation, for example. There were activity dynamics, such as that of associativity, that warranted much more high-profile attention than did the output level indicators listed above.

research, internal process and formative evaluation, and genuine feedback loops. Create space to fail and learn. Accept no less from implementers, and work to instill this kind of evaluation culture in your Mission and Agency.

One such technique is community-based M&E. This may be particularly helpful where ethnic minorities value the project activities in ways that differ from donor viewpoints – such as with collective lands. Share results with other communities to encourage the development of grounded indicators.

Measure intangible assets and outcomes (higher up the results chain) such as community participation, empowerment, self-esteem, the culture of legality, solidarity among community members, attachment to the region, community satisfaction with the projects, social cohesion, and perceptions around illicit crops and armed actors.

The alignment between M&E and knowledge management needs to promote learning to the national and local levels in an integrated manner to foster informed decision making.

likely chose those experienced target beneficiaries so as to meet their indicator targets with more certainty. With new hectares planted, there were two problems. First, because Acción Social restricted ADAM and MIDAS from work in any *veredas* with illicit crops, there is little reason to assume that these licit hectares could be construed as producers' substitution. As an output-level indicator, it also does not reveal whether the supported hectares are being harvested or are providing real means of income for producers. The second problem was the urgency with which the implementers ensured the meeting of targets: there was evidence in the field of several failed projects where these new hectares were planted ineffectively, or even creating harm. In one site, there was too little water to serve the crop, while in another the soil had been affected by a landslide and was not apt for the crop selected.		
Targeting The regional coordinator for ADAM in Cauca described the process for selecting projects in a given municipality: *"We convoked a municipal-level meeting and called organizations from the whole municipality, the mayor's office. Since our team was local, we identified some organizations to invite as well. We presented ADAM, and listened to the presentations of each group, and what kinds of activities they undertook. We took that information away, conducted our own analyses, and called a second meeting to announce the organization we were going to work with."* The coordinator stated that the ADAM management team in Bogota allowed each region to design how it would intervene and conduct project selection. The rationale he and his team used was that existing organizations with projects and direction of their own would be their primary target, to avoid starting from scratch in terms of organizational development. In the respondent's words, *"To undertake changes in behavior and attitudes, you need at least a decade. We didn't have that amount of time, and we couldn't start from*	Neither new associations nor new businesses were often invited to participate in productive projects. If a peace accord is signed, this may not be an option in the future. Returnees and reintegrating ex-combatants will not have the benefit of years of experience upon which to build. Best practices with these new associations included more time for productive project maturation but still more attention to capacity building of the association itself – how to resolve conflicts, how to make decisions, how to monitor progress. Despite intention to target veredas away from the municipal seats in ADAM, USAID added a focus on	When target populations include vulnerable groups, diagnose and address requirements for entrepreneurial education. Ensure that project indicators do not distort targeting by encouraging implementers to go only after "low-hanging fruit." Ensure that timelines and programming decisions take into account the different needs of communities, associations and individuals who are new to production, market, and the social fabric itself. These are less likely to serve as "quick wins but are necessary actors for a future peace.

zero. So we sought organizations that were already on their way. As a test, we also worked with one new group, to see the difference, and it didn't work well at all, in fact." All ADAM projects were prohibited from working in veredas with coca cultivation, per their collaboration with Accion Social. This was mentioned by many respondents. This was a hard-and-fast rule that appeared to be respected in all beneficiary selection where the evaluation visited. Among respondents, there was some dissent with this decision, in cases where potential participants were eager to work with an ADAM project but were excluded from doing so. In regions with many indigenous respondents, several respondents reported not wanting to work with ADAM initially, as they mistrusted cooperation projects and signing documents. Some were later convinced; others remained outside the project perpetually. In a project in Medellin, a project respondent worked to select beneficiaries through looking at measures of basic unmet needs. A youth project in Cauca selected projects by issuing an invitation across the four municipalities in which the project planned to work, formally through the mayor's office as well as through the schools. There was no pressure to participate – youth who joined did so of their own accord. Poor infrastructure and lack of public goods and services (schools and health centers) continue to be obstacles to successful implementation of agrobusiness projects in Catatumbo. Such problems weaken the viability and sustainability of the projects. The majority of associations in the region (Asocati, Asogpados, Asopalcat Uno, and Asopromuca, among others) have their headquarters in Tibu. They noted their inability to successfully reach municipalities such as La Gabarra and Sardinata, which were the epicenter of the recent peasant strikes. The Manager of FUNDESCAT put it this way: "The projects that have come, have come through the gateway of Catatumbo." But areas where the need is greatest were excluded from participation by the very	displaced populations, who are most commonly located in municipal seats. There are needs among both populations; however, a more focused effort (on one or the other) might have had greater effect. Post-peace accord periods may in fact require more outreach to more remote areas where infrastructure and other services are weaker.	

characteristics that describe their need. MIDAS SMEs that responded to the telephone survey had been created, on average, 19 years prior to when they were selected for participation in a MIDAS project. 35% reported that they were rural businesses, and 65% urban. Several interviewees reported having taken part in previous programming, and received some capacity building in those efforts. This was in part due to the linking up of project support over sufficient periods of time to strengthen their businesses, as mentioned above. Also, however, the privileged status of previous participants means that their access to programming was likely greater. In other words, those who had never participated were less likely to be invited to participate. Operators also likely chose those experienced target beneficiaries so as to meet their indicator targets with more certainty. Respondents tended to trust MIDAS as a transparent program but admitted not always understanding the criteria used to prioritize support. Dissemination was at times discretional, depending on individual relationships. Monica Urquijo and Gente Estrategica both joined program through their networks, not through a dissemination program.		

Annex II: Evaluation Methods and Limitations

Evaluation methods and sampling

The evaluation team used both quantitative and qualitative data as primary sources, as well as secondary documentary sources. The project began with a desk review of relevant documents, beginning with implementer program documents: annual work plans and reports, mid-term and other evaluation documents, and the available databases on program activities. A mixed-methods design was employed to capture data in the field.

Quantitative methods

A quantitative survey was deployed to capture information from a wide range of agribusiness, small- and medium-enterprises, and forestry projects. A quantitative observation checklist was employed to review the status of infrastructure works. EVAL used the MIDAS database of small and medium enterprises and agribusinesses to attempt a censal survey. The goal of this effort was to understand the sustainability of the businesses created as part of MIDAS. Respondents were asked to answer a 20- to 30-minute questionnaire by telephone. The survey team found a high level of attrition, because of the intervening two or more years since the businesses were supported. Of the 473 businesses in the database, 224 phone numbers resulted in busy signals, "out of service" messages, or never answered, despite multiple attempts. Of those that did answer the phone, 55 didn't recognize the project, or said the number did not belong to the business in the database. The remaining 85 were located, and 69 of these agreed to complete the survey. Just under two-thirds of these respondents (65%) had their businesses in urban environments, while 35 percent were rural-based.

In order to maximize survey completion, EVAL called all numbers in the database at least twice, at least one of which was prior to the end-of-year holidays, and one after the holidays. The research team phoned each organization at different times of the day and different days of the week, to maximize the capture of the sample. Nevertheless, the low level of capture – primarily due to outdated contact information – means that the results are not representative, but rather indicative.

The survey, which is found in its entirety in Annex VI with all of the evaluation instruments, consisted of primarily closed-ended questions, and thus resulted in descriptive statistics on topics around the inputs from MIDAS and beneficiaries' satisfaction with these; and outputs and outcomes over time. Respondents were asked to assess the degree to which MIDAS support affected the success of the business, from the technical assistance (TA) and training to production inputs. Open-ended questions were coded based on analysis of 100% of the responses, since the response rate was so low. Survey data was captured using the multi-user Delphi software and saved in a database using Dbase format. EVAL processed the quantitative data in descriptive statistics, following appropriate processing and coding, including steps to verify entirety and consistency using Quantum software, to produce the cross-tabulations.

A second quantitative instrument was used to observe ADAM infrastructure projects in the field, and to survey local respondents about the use and status of the projects. This instrument is also found in Annex VI. Respondents were asked about community participation in the design, construction and management or maintenance of the infrastructure works, and about the utility of these works in the present day, two or more years after construction.

Qualitative methods

Qualitative methods were also vital for the evaluation effort. Interviews and focus groups were proposed for implementing staff, USAID, and operators, association representatives and other beneficiaries in the field. ADAM and MIDAS were substantially large programs with a variety of field approaches across the country and within a given region; as a result, field teams were trained to use discretion to pursue different actors within given alliances and projects at different levels. For example, there were second-level organizations who acted as ADAM or MIDAS operators, supporting one or more than one productive project. Researchers were also trained to probe thematic areas beyond those found in the instruments, in accordance with the variety of roles and relationships represented by these different levels, at vereda, municipality, project, SME, popular-level association, second-level association and operator levels. When sufficient numbers of beneficiaries or other respondent types were available, the field teams conducted focus groups. This was, however, more rare, due to dispersion in the time since ADAM and MIDAS were completed. Where focus groups were not possible, due to dispersion of participants, in-depth interviews were substituted. The experienced field team members were instructed to cover the themes in the interview and focus group instruments completely, but also to probe for understanding the themes from various perspectives.

Interviews began in Bogotá with key informants from ARD, USAID, Accion Social and other stakeholders. Through these interviews the team was able to assemble lists of likely candidates for site visits, from both accessing databases and from respondent recollection and recommendations. Further interviews were conducted in Bogota during December and January to cover additional topics, including MIDAS policy interventions and microenterprise programming.

In total, 181 individuals were interviewed using in-depth interviews, and the team held 14 focus groups with 68 respondents. Though some identities are confidential due to respondent wishes, the list of sources consulted is included at Annex VII Sources.

Where certain cases showed particular best practices or lessons learned, especially in cases of public-private partnerships, the field teams attempted multiple interviews with subjects from various perspectives on the implementation. These were included in a set of 18 case studies produced for the evaluation, three per geographic team.

Sampling

The team selected a purposive or convenience sample by geography, with the intention to cover the activity sets prioritized by the Mission. The Program Office reviewed the sample and approved it before fieldwork began. One set of sites, in Cauca, served as early fieldwork to pilot the instruments. A summary of the sample is shown below in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary of the site visit evaluation sample

Departments	**13**	**Municipalities**	**57**
	Men	**Women**	**Total**
Interview informants	111	70	181
Focus group participants	46	22	68
Totals	**157**	**92**	**249**

The geographic coverage of the fieldwork included:

- Team 1: Cauca
- Team 2: Putumayo and Huila
- Team 3: Nariño
- Team 4: Bolivar and Antioquia
- Team 5: Santander and Norte de Santander
- Team 6: Atlántico and Cesar
- Infrastructure observation teams: Tumaco, Nariño (which was not visited by Team 3); Cordoba; Huila (in sites not visited by Team 2); and Tolima.
- National programming was reviewed with interviews in Bogotá, Cundinamarca.

The map below shows the sites visited. Full maps by region are included at Annex III.

Map 1. Field visit sites.

Source: Google Maps, Data SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO

The fieldwork required extensive use of the snowball sample technique once in the field. Nearly all contact information in implementer databases was no longer valid; capture rates ranged from 10-18% across the regions. As a result, the field teams pursued cases through project coordinators who were still in the field, through the few contacts that remained valid, or through going directly to communities that were recorded as having had a project, and asking for knowledgeable informants.

To select the sample, EVAL accessed the complete list of infrastructure projects from ADAM staff members who are still in Bogota. The list contained 220[1] works in total. The team disaggregated these by department, reviewed each department's list by thematic area and geographic dispersion, and selected four departments (Cordoba, Huila, Tolima, and the municipality of Tumaco in Nariño) for their high concentration of works and, in the case of Tumaco and Tolima, for geographic and thematic coverage. Among these four departments, 42 infrastructure works were observed, and 44 surveys conducted with local residents. Twelve works were observed in Tolima, six in Cordoba, fifteen in Huila, and nine in Tumaco.

The majority (65%) of the infrastructure survey respondents had been involved in the creation of the infrastructure works, while an additional 21 percent had observed the process as it happened, without direct participation. Eleven respondents were women, and 33 were men. In the other four cases, the works were observed but project contact information was out of date and direct questioning of passersby yielded no information on the work.

The summary of the quantitative survey samples is shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Summary of the quantitative survey sample

	Universe	Sample	Notes
SME, agribusiness and forestry projects survey with MIDAS beneficiaries	473	69	Low capture due to outdated telephone contact information
Observations of ADAM infrastructure works	220	42	Selected within geographic sites to be visited
Beneficiaries in communities with ADAM infrastructure projects	N/A	44	Outdated contact information on project participants; convenience sample where contact information failed

Fieldwork

An accelerated schedule was proposed for the evaluation fieldwork. Draft instruments were piloted in the field in the third week of November, 2013, followed by two weeks in which the pilot team and five additional teams collected data simultaneously in the fourth week of November and the first week of December. Additional fieldwork was conducted by four teams in January, 2014, to cover additional topics, particularly the observation of infrastructure works.

The first team into the field, which included the EVAL Lead Evaluation Specialist, piloted the instruments and sent revised instruments to all the teams prior to the bulk of fieldwork. The teams sought to understand how well the implementers' processes and practices supported or failed to support the desired outcomes (including sustainability).

Table 3 details the proposed and achieved methods.

Table 3. Proposed and achieved methods, and number of units

		Proposed		Total achieved
Method	Detailed approach	ADAM	MIDAS	
Document review	Review of mid-term and final evaluation reports, and program final report	2	3	5

[1] This figure differs from that (182 projects) in ARD's final report, but both figures come from the implementer.

Method	Detailed approach	Proposed		Total achieved
		ADAM	MIDAS	
	Catalogue and discussion of activities for inclusion in the sample	1	1	4[2]
	Policy review of those policies selected for inclusion	0	3	2
	Review of municipal and community plans, budgets, execution and oversight documents	4	0	0[3]
In-depth (key informant) interviews	Key implementing staff, by organization	2	2	12
	USAID staff – past CORs	2	2	2
	Alliance partners on public and private sides of the alliances	0	12	31
	National government officials	3	3	5
	Regional government officials	4	4	4
	Municipal government officials	8	0	5[4]
Focus groups	Beneficiary farmers in productive projects: job seekers, farmers, farmers' organizations, forestry groups	4	4	25[5]
	Beneficiary small business owners	0	4	89
	Beneficiary job seekers	0	4	0
	Beneficiary foresters from ethnic groups	4	4	8
	Producer associations or "ejecutores" (sub-implementers)	0	4	15
	Community and CSO groups involved in planning and municipal development, including women's, youth and ethnic organizations	6	0	6[6]
Case studies	Case studies – approx. five pages documenting the intervention and what has been sustained (including contribution to the value chain since project end). Thematic and geographic distribution. Given the focus on sustainability, these will likely be concentrated on group units of analyses, such as farmer organizations, municipalities, and CSOs.	6	10[7]	18
Infrastructure observations	Quantitative/Qualitative checklist of variables on access, use, quality and contribution to sustainability targets	10	0	42
Business	Phone interviews with the full database of businesses	0	5000[8]	69

[2] By component, rather than by program.
[3] Municipal partners who were active during MIDAS and ADAM activities were almost uniformly unavailable once the teams arrived in the field. No other respondents provided evidence of any community planning, budgeting or execution in concert with municipalities.
[4] Municipal actors were difficult to reach when they were no longer in office, which was consistently the case in the evaluation fieldwork. The team was able to locate a few (five) who were no longer in office but through snowball sampling were available.
[5] Focus groups were generally difficult to arrange, due to the dispersal of subjects in the four or more years since their involvement in the program. Most individuals were therefore reached and interviewed as individuals. This was true for all beneficiary categories.
[6] Minimal data was available on the degree to which community and associative groups worked together with municipalities from the perspective of the municipal actors. Municipal actors were difficult to reach when they were no longer in office, which was a constant in the evaluation fieldwork.
[7] The greater number of case studies under MIDAS reflects the overlap with EVAL's parallel assessment of PPPs, and allows for the greater time and effort in data collection to pursue a sufficient number of case studies of PPPs while taking advantage of the team's presence in the field.
[8] The proposed number of telephone surveys was based on erroneous information about the number of Small and Medium Enterprises that MIDAS supported. The actual universe of SMEs was 473, of which the team successfully contacted 85 whose phone numbers functioned. 69 of these completed the survey.

Method	Detailed approach	Proposed		Total achieved
		ADAM	MIDAS	
Census	created – variables on job creation, value chain, municipal support, sustainability (expect to reach ½ of target number)			
Field visits	Expert visits to sites meeting sample requisites to undertake the above methods	4-6	4-6	6
	Review of social service provision			0[9]
	Review of production and value chains			16[10]
	Review of in-practice use of plans accorded with CSOs		0	18[11]
	Review of policies/reforms and their use in practice in target municipalities	0	4-6	2

Data analysis methods

The evaluation proposed analyses appropriate for each data source; these are included at Annex IV: Getting to Answers in this report. The evaluation instruments included items (such as survey questions or thematic areas in focus group guides) that responded to different evaluation questions and activity sets. Different sources provided variant perspectives – for example, job seekers may agree or disagree with businesspeople as to the sustainability of the jobs created – such that analyses included triangulation from among these variances.

All qualitative data was processed using Atlas.ti software, used for large bodies of text and audio, among other formats. The coding was based on the evaluation questions and responses from fieldwork (emergent or in vivo coding); the code list is included at Annex IX. The codes provide the basis for analyzing the key themes from the evaluation questions from different perspectives, and for determining patterns systematically.

Evaluation findings were derived from the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data. Specific treatment of qualitative primary data included content, patterns and divergence analyses and context and contribution analysis, which helped to make sense of different cases and perspectives.

Limitations and gaps

As it was carried out more than two years after the end of the programs, with often longer gaps since given projects had ended, the evaluation is limited in its scope to those respondents for whom contact data were still available and up to date. This affected access to the range of respondent types: small- and medium-sized enterprise participants, agricultural and forestry project producers and commercial operations, community associations, implementing staff members, and municipal and other government partners. The sample, then, is skewed toward those that have maintained constant contact information. Such respondents are more likely to have remained in the same place (while missing displaced persons and communities and those with other kinds of transience), to have maintained financial solvency (while missing those for whom the phone cost was partially or fully unaffordable), to have continued in similar work

[9] Review of state social service provision was not possible, due to the lack of municipal authorities still in office since the end of ADAM programming.

[10] The case studies of productive projects involved close attention to value chains. However, in a wide range of interviews, focus groups and other site visit tasks, many more value chains were reviewed at least in part.

[11] The case studies of productive and infrastructure projects involved close attention to in-practice use of planning with civil society or productive associations. However, in a wide range of interviews, focus groups and other site visit tasks, many more plans were discussed at least in part.

(while missing those with transience in their labor conditions), to have closer connections with other projects through whom the evaluation team could find them (while missing those who were more isolated), and so on. In the case of municipal officials involved with ADAM projects, none were found to still be in office or accessible.

The issue of expired contact information affected the telephone survey completion rate, which was approximately 15 percent of MIDAS' database of agribusinesses, small and medium enterprises, and forestry enterprises.

Because of these limitations on both the qualitative and quantitative samples, no results of the evaluation can be taken to be representative of the wider population involved.

A final limitation is the geographic and thematic scope of the two programs, and the limited time for evaluation fieldwork and analysis.

Annex III: Site visit coverage maps

Source: Google Maps, through Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software

Complete map

Putumayo and Nariño



Cauca and Huila

Tolima

Antioquia, Magdalena Medio, Sur de Bolívar and Córdoba



Santander and Norte de Santander.

Caribbean region

Annex IV: Getting to Answers table

Evaluation Questions	Key factors	Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection	Data Analysis Methods
		Data Source(s)	Method		
Which approaches implemented by ADAM and MIDAS seemed to result in the greatest success in terms of promoting **more effective producer associations and competitive rural enterprises that benefit smallholder farmers**? / Which approaches seemed to result in the greatest success in terms of promoting **increased access to financial services**, particularly in the rural sector? / What success factors can be identified?	Product - Market identification, economic feasibility-comparative advantage /project design and formulation	Annual reports Evaluations Success stories Website M&E indicators (ICO) • Beneficiaries individuals • Beneficiaries associations • Local authorities • Private sector associations at the regional and national levels • ARD regional coordinators • Technical assistance team • Government staff ("Banca de oportunidades" annual reports, Bancoldex staff • Banco Agrario staff)	Desk review Focus groups Semi structured interviews Case study	N/A Convenience sample based on selection criteria	Content analysis
	Commercial and financial sustainability/profit margins/ intermediation margins reduction				
	Value chain and strategic partnerships				
	Productivity and efficiency				
	Capacity development (technical assistance, training courses, management, skills, negotiation)				
	Access to assets (financial services, irrigation systems, land ownership, seed)				
	Replication effects Life quality improvements				
	What were the ADAM/MIDAS services that were most effective at generating local level development? Most effective services from ADAM MIDAS to develop the regions?				
	Community mechanisms to protect A/M projects from Armed Groups				
Which approaches implemented by ADAM and MIDAS seemed to result in	Needs assessment-Prioritization / problem solving	Annual reports Evaluations Success stories	Desk review	N/A	Content analysis
	Sustainability				

Evaluation Questions	Key factors	Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection	Data Analysis Methods
		Data Source(s)	Method		
the greatest success in terms of expanding **economic infrastructure and connectivity**?	Technical studies / impact Local authorities and community participation	Website • Beneficiary individuals • Beneficiary SME owners • Operational committees • Local authorities • ARD regional coordinators	Business phone survey Focus groups Semi structured interviews Case study	Census Convenience sample based on selection criteria	
Which approaches implemented by ADAM and MIDAS seemed to result in the greatest success in terms of **improving community management of natural resources**?	Environment components Environment friendly practices Environment impact Respect for holy places and the territory concept from ethnic communities Conflict management (land ownership, Wood, water, pesticides, etc.)	Annual reports Evaluations Success stories Website • Beneficiary individuals (including in forestry and indigenous territories) • Producer organizations or ejecutores • Juntas de accion communal • CAR (resguardos) staff • Local authorities • ARD regional coordinators	Desk review Focus groups Semi structured interviews Case study (with indigenous/or environmental groups)	N/A Convenience sample based on selection criteria	Content analysis
What community participation approaches were used? / Which aspects of appear to have led to **sustainable foundations** for	Participation mechanisms and processes/ expected results / goals Participation obstacles Community ownership Local counterparts	Annual reports Evaluations Success stories Website M&E indicators (ICO)	Desk review	N/A	Content analysis

Evaluation Questions	Key factors	Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection	Data Analysis Methods
		Data Source(s)	Method		
joint management of future activities in these communities? / What **differentiated approaches** were used Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, and/or for men and women? / Were successful approaches **linked to specific technical areas, or were approaches successful *across* technical areas**? What success factors can be identified?	Context grounding / participation approach flexibility Formalization	• Beneficiary individuals (including ethnic minorities and gender) • Beneficiary associations • Community leaders • Local and traditional authorities • ARD regional coordinators	Focus groups Semi structured interviews Case study	Convenience sample based on selection criteria	
Which approaches implemented by ADAM seemed to result in the greatest success in terms of **strengthening municipal governments and their ability to more effectively and transparently deliver citizen-prioritized services**? / What were some keys to success and lessons learned from these activities and their work with municipal governments?	Continuity mechanisms to overcome rotation and institutional transitions Capacity transfer to the local level Technical capacities (planning, pri8oritization, Project design and implementation) Transparency and accountability Citizen participation	Annual reports Evaluations Success stories Website • Former / current Mayors and their teams • Community and CSO groups • Technical assistants to the mayor's office	Desk review Focus groups Semi structured interviews Case study	N/A Convenience sample based on selection criteria	Content analysis
Case studies of MIDAS public-private partnerships that have been sustained, with details on lessons learned and best practices / Documentation of a set of		Annual reports Evaluations Success stories Website M&E indicators (ICO)	Desk review	N/A Convenience	Content analysis

Evaluation Questions	Key factors	Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection	Data Analysis Methods
		Data Source(s)	Method		
successful and ongoing public-private partnerships (PPPs) that were initiated as a result of ADAM and MIDAS.		• Beneficiary individuals • Beneficiary SME owners and associations • Local authorities • Private sector partners, including associations at the regional and national levels • ARD regional coordinators • Technical assistance team	Focus groups Semi structured interviews Case study	sample based on selection criteria	

Annex V: Evaluation case studies

Beneficiary	Location	Sector	Program	Contact	Address	Telephone	E-mail
1. Aproaca	Antioquia	Cacao	ADAM	Berlides Gomez, vice president and Adriana Luz Olea Callejas, Administrative secretary; Sandra Milena Diaz Galvis, Alianzas Productivas	Calle 50, 50-40 Cáceres, Antioquia	(4) 836 2008	aproaca@hotmail.es
	Association that benefited new cacao production. Became providers of TA. Received Alianza Productiva. Casa Luker buying production. Increased output, quality standards						
2. Aprocasur	Sur de Bolívar	Cacao, coffee	ADAM	Miguel Vargas. Legal representative	Cra 11 No 10 -27, Santa Rosa del Sur Bolívar	569 76 55 311 804 7004	futuro150@hotmail.com
	Second-level association with 40 more under its umbrella; provides TA, institutional strengthening and microcredit to its members. Proud of the bottom-up approach it insisted upon with ADAM. Successful marketing of much of the production.						
3. Aprolim	Nariño	Dairy	ADAM	Ana Lucia Cuastumal Legal representative	Vereda Cristo Medio-Resguardo Indígena de Mallamués	318 720 2964	aprolim10@gmail.com
	Indigenous group with positive story of one woman's empowerment. She badgered municipal and departmental gov until they helped get a chilling machine for the plant. Challenges remain, including unwillingness on the part of beneficiaries to change habits to newer, more modern methods.						
4. Apropesca	Cauca	Fish	ADAM	Sandra Patricia Reboyedo	Cra 7 No. 4 - 36 tercer piso Cámara de Comercio. Centro Histórico Popayán	318 802 9328	N/A
	Strengths in association development, increase in wages, inter-community collaboration (indigenous with campesino communities) and changing mentality from subsistence farming to medium- and long-term entrepreneurship thinking. Land tenure and environmental issues.						
5. Asocati	Norte de Santander	Cacao	MIDAS	Freddy Martínez Manager	Calle 4 # 4-37, Tibú	312 521 8302	asocati2007@gmail.com
	Has become national-level actor, promoting sustainable cacao as an alternative to illicit crops, particularly in conflict areas, and expanding culture of legality. Size and influence impact industrialization and coverage. Their chief obstacle is infrastructure to expand coverage and opportunity. Knowledge exchange is a prime best practice						
6. Asocoprolyda	Nariño	Dairy	ADAM	Eugenio Ceballos	Barrio Centro – Frente al estadio municipal salida a Guachucal	311 306 6251	manueltutalcha@hotmail.com

	Association bringing campesino and indigenous dairy producers together. Strong evidence of both associativity gains and the challenges that projects with associativity face: not everyone agrees, some people drop out, but quality and efficiency gains in production support those who stayed in the group.						
7. Asogpados	Norte de Santander	Palm	MIDAS	Carlos Veleño, Manager	Calle 2 No. 3-39 Barrio Miraflores	318 424 2329	gerencia@asogpados.org
	Large promoter of palm. Relationships with commercial producers; alternative for campesinos who formerly grew illicit crops. One strength is supporting smaller associations with TA and market links. Went from being a USAID beneficiary to managing other beneficiaries. Seek win-wins, though it's not always achieved.						
8. Asopalmira	Nariño	Cacao	ADAM MIDAS	Carlos Enrique Ampudia, Community leader	Vereda San Juan Rio Mira	315 846 7131	carenamp_01@hotmail.com
	Changed mentality on entrepreneurial, market-driven production and marketing. Particularly challenging in light of natural disaster that affected the community completely. Some lessons learned on TA. Also had an ADAM project at the same time, which built classrooms.						
9. Asopez	Putumayo	Fish	ADAM	María Yaneth Bermúdez, Vice president	La Hormiga	314 395 7782	N/A
	Illicit crops conflicts were constant. An existing fish farm/processor was strengthened with technology and TA, systematizing their administrative and (fish) management. Intergenerational - youth participation, studying with SENA, doing study tours. Infrastructure and other weaknesses affect successful marketing.						
10. Aspalbe	Cesar	Palm	MIDAS	Rafael Gil, Legal representative	Calle 8 No. 5 – 87	312 691 4066	N/A
	Large palm growing commercial companies that support small palm producers associations with sustained in time technical assistance, credit back up, association strengthening. The beneficiaries claim income generation, economic stability, social cohesion and social protection from armed groups.						
11. Compania de Empaques, S.A.	Antioquia, Nariño, Cauca	Fique	MIDAS	Carlos Alberto Álvarez	Cra 42 N° 86 – 25. Autopista sur. Itagüí, Dirección Agrícola.	(4) 365 8888	Claudia.mier@ciaempaques.com.co
	Commercial firm trained producers and set up collection points; worked on increasing plantings and yield, and on improving processing, quality and transport. Removal of intermediaries from the value chain. Interestingly the demand is still not satisfied - respondents report that there is room for continued growth in fique.						
12. Condimentos Putumayo	Putumayo	Spices	ADAM MIDAS	Rodrigo Trujillo, Manager and José Diaz, Board Secretary	Centro Agroindustrial para el Desarrollo del Putumayo, Villagarzón.	311 598 4847	condimentosputumayo@yahoo.com
	Surrounded by failed projects. Very difficult to start, because the product was new. Plantation size per family is not enough to affect family economy. Recuperating deforested space. The physical plant of the factory is underused at about 5% of capacity. They're avoiding intermediaries but marketing is still a big concern.						
13. Fedar	Cauca	Youth empo wer-ment	ADAM	Raúl Coyasos	Carrera 4 No. 0 – 82 Barrio Caldas, Popayán	315 405 8348	tierravivaraulco@gmail.com

	Different type of project with youth in municipalities hard hit by conflict. Training in territory, critical thinking, community, service, communication led to greater ability to resist recruitment of armed groups. Nationally and internationally linked. Good start on collaboration with government, and brought reluctant teachers around.						
14. Frepac	Cauca	Dairy	ADAM	Faustina Rodalleja Valencia, Association leader	Cajibío	315 470 8917	N/A
	Some positive elements of a very tough case. Collaboration between afro-Colombians and indigenous communities. But second-level association hired by ADAM to oversee appears to have done a very poor job in TA and follow-up, particularly on bottom-up decision-making and on credit.						
15. Gente Estrategica	Atlántico	SMEs	MIDAS	Azucena de Benedetti and Leyla Scaff	Carrera 57 No. 72 - 143	314 593 1253 360 4830	www.genteestrategica.edu.co
	With MIDAS support created more than 3,000 new jobs in 1.5 years (2007-2008). The company's growth in number of employees and branches country-wide (from 10 to 63) are outstanding accomplishments. Their work includes special attention to Afro-Colombians in vulnerable communities, and taking time to build capacity with these populations.						
16. Greystar	California, Santander	Small-scale agriculture	MIDAS	Juan Hernando Puyana, Superintendent RSE	N/A	634 7778 ext. 222	jhpuyana@eco-oro.com.co
	Mining company GreyStar worked through its foundation and MIDAS to conduct training in small-scale agricultural production with spouses of their employees, primarily women. The project was welcome at the time but became more important after MIDAS left, when the region was given "protected" status, and all mining stopped. Working with the municipality, the women now sell their produce in a central market.						
17. Red Cantoyaco	Putumayo	Radio	ADAM	Jaime Perdomo, Legal representative	Puerto Caicedo	313 494 6987	N/A
	Radio network with community, women, indigenous, afro-Colombian, and youth programming on alternative development and a program with the Puerto Caicedo municipality. ADAM supported programming without imposing content. Training of youth and others; community participation on themes of anti-illicit crops.						
18. Textiles Mónica Urquijo	Atlantico	Arts and crafts	MIDAS	Mónica Urquijo, Director; Araceli Lechuga, weaver; and Claudia Cuello, partner	Kr 57 #68-80, Barrio El Prado, Barranquilla	368 4761	monicatex50@hotmail.com
	This project was listed as a success story from MIDAS, but the evaluation found that its fortunes had changed considerably. The goal of a profitable contributing materially to its participants' quality of life was not reached for the long term. Cultural differences appear to have been part of the failure, as the mostly Afro-Colombian producers left the project together.						

1. Aproaca: Association of farmers and cacao growers of the municipality of Cáceres

Location: Cáceres, Antioquia
Contact: Berlides Gomez: Vicepresident
Sandra Milena Diaz Galvis, Social Coordinator of Productive Alliances
Adriana Luz Olea Callejas: Administrative Secretary
Address: Calle 50. 50-40 Cáceres. Antioquia
Telephone: +(57) (4) 8362008
Email: Aproaca@hotmail.es

I. Context

The Association of Farmers and Cacao Growers of the Municipality of Cáceres (Aproaca) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to the production and marketing of agricultural products and the development of sustainable and profitable local, regional and national projects that contribute to improving the quality of life of its members and the community. Aproaca grew out of the ADAM program with cacao project beneficiaries. The Association was formed in August 2008 with 163 members. It has a certificate of incorporation and RUT category agriculture, with transporter as a secondary activity. The transport of cacao as a complementary activity developed from ADAM assistance. This arose from the increased collection center capacity, enabling purchases from new areas, necessitating increased transportation.

II. Process

A description of the main services of the association as a result of ADAM support follows:

1. Commercialization of cacao: Through buying stations located in the districts of Guarumo, Jardín, Puerto Bélgica and the municipality of Cáceres, Aproaca guarantees purchase of all cacao production from their rural farmers and families.
2. Sale of plant material: Aproaca provides the cacao plant material. It has a nursery growing genetically improved cacao sprouts for the establishment of crops, for both members and the community in general.
3. Technical Assistance: Aproaca offers qualified high-quality technical service for: advice to its members and individuals in establishing cacao plantations with improved clones, in intercropping systems and in increasing cacao growing areas.
4. Implementation of projects: Aproaca as a strategic ally or operator provides management service or project implementation.

III. Lessons Learned

- Through the support provided by ADAM, Aproaca was able to incorporate, strengthen the social fabric and create citizen oversight through empowerment and development of

the population's capacity to understand and prioritize its needs and rights. Aproaca credits the intervention of ADAM for the strengthening of the association and its value chain.

- Strengthening of community leaders led to individuals who were later able to exercise high-level positions in territorial government entities.
- A knowledge generation process was achieved, enabling the children of the strengthened leaders to maintain the productive activity and continue the training process. The intergenerational work was seen as a major strength.
- The strengthening of the association led to development of good agricultural practices, improved food safety, production efficiency, project structure, and administrative, management and technical skills.
- To date, Aproaca has achieved certifications (certification of incorporation and agricultural Rol Unico Tributario, or RUT), access to microcredit and systematized accounting and inventory.
- Establishment of a commercialization strategy through direct purchase of the production by Casa Luker. Technical assistance prioritized guaranteed market access to generate the required value chain.
- After the intervention of ADAM the process of strengthening and growth continued, evidenced by the following subsequent achievements:
    - EPSAGRO Certification (as a provider of technical support services for agriculture) by the Ministry of Agriculture.[12]
    - Beneficiary of Productive Alliances Program of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development[13]

The main results obtained from this Alliance are:

- Cacao beans, fermented, clean and dry, packed in 50 kg burlap bags, meeting the quality standards required by the commercial ally, Casa Luker, for classification of the bean and as parameters for the purchase of 100% expected production at the weighted price of $ 5,000 per kilo.
- Social and organizational strengthening of Aproaca with active participation in the governments of producer organizations, and at least one trained leader with skills in leading participatory processes.

[12] The certification of technical assistance came about through training by ADAM in management and in consolidating the association. Their staff is sufficient to advise all Aproaca members.

[13] For the Productive Alliance Program, Aproaca formulated in 2012 the project: "Sustaining 82 hectares of cacao and the construction of processing infrastructure for 41 farmers in the municipality of Cáceres". The alliance includes the participation of Aproaca, the commercial ally Casa Luker and the supporting management organization, the Fundacion Santa Isabel. Additionally, the Colombia Responde Program will provide services and leases, supplies and other investments; the Mayor's Office of Caceres will provide supplies, services and leases and social plan; the Department for Social Prosperity (formerly Social Action) will provide supplies and other investments; and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development will be involved in various activities.

- Average monthly income equal to twice the legal minimum wages for each family, over the life of the project.
- Implementation of the proposed technology package.

These results are indirect results of the support and advice provided by ADAM during 2008 to 2011. Casa Luker is the only buyer, and Aproaca cannot guarantee the purchase of all production of its members, only the cacao that meets the quality standards established by Casa Luker.

2. Aprocasur (Asociación de Productores de Cacao del Sur de Bolívar)

Location: Santa Rosa del Sur, sur de Bolívar.
Contact: Miguel Ángel Vargas Caro, Representante Legal APROCASUR
Address: Cra 11 No 10 -27. Santa Rosa del sur Bolívar
Telephone: + (5) 569 76 55 / 3118047004
Email: Miguel Ángel Vargas: futuro150@hotmail.com

I. Context

Aprocasur was launched in April, 2004. It was founded by 187 partners to participate in Fupad programming in 2002, in an effort to eradicate illicit crops in favor of cacao beans. The first phase of Fupad ended in 2006 (with a two-year overlap with the institutional life of Aprocasur).

In 2006 ADAM helped Aprocasur build on processes that had already begun, apply the lessons learned with Fupad in fundraising and joint management of resources, and provide continuity to ongoing initiatives.

The first project to be implemented by ADAM in Sur de Bolívar became known under the name of Quick Start (Arranque Rapido). It worked with 250 cacao-producing families from the municipalities of Santa Rosa del Sur, Simití and San Pablo. Over 1350 families in the south of Bolivar and the south of Cesar were ultimately served under ADAM, with 3300 hectares planted in both departments.

Its service portfolio included six primary modes of action:

1. *Planning, management and implementation*: Aprocasur was assisted by international and national cooperants, public and private companies, NGOs and government entities in the strengthening of project planning, management and implementation.
2. *Strengthening and technical assistance provided for the organizations*: Aprocasur was established as a second-level organization, based on the implementation of the ADAM program. Today, it provides comprehensive assistance and strengthening through alliances with agricultural organizations and has been registered with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development as an EPSAGRO organization since 2012.
3. *Markets and marketing management*: The association has established sales points located in municipalities in which it is present. Through commercial alliances, it sells the cacao grain in national and international markets. In the area there are intermediaries that buy and sell cacao, who, according to the legal representative, are able to pay slightly more for cacao purchased from small-scale producers.
4. *Production of plant material*: Aprocasur has specialized in the production of plant material from cacao, forest plant material and other species.
5. *Rural micro-credit funds*: The association built up its rural micro-credit fund, providing small-scale farmers microloans for production, processing, marketing and housing.

6. *Communications*: Aprocasur designed communication strategies for information processes and publicity campaigns targeted to strengthening productive processes.

II. Process

Since 2006 Aprocasur has implemented an activity called "Establishment of 375 hectares of cacao in agroforestry systems in order to benefit 250 families." It is supported by ADAM as well as the Programa de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio (Pdpmm) (Peace and Development Program in Magdalena Medio) in the municipalities of Simití and San Pablo, south of Bolívar.

First, agreement was needed among the families on which new crops should be planted. Early on they agreed that it was the producers who know the area and what they wanted. And, they wanted to sow cacao. Permitting families to pursue cacao was not only practical but empowering.

It also proved prudent to emphasize organizational strengthening, management, infrastructure and sustainability processes for local associations, so that they could implement, control, advise and develop supplementary plans in terms of alternative production in the south of Bolivar zone.

It is clear that the associations (which later became leading associations in their areas) have been able to provide support to different producer "beneficiaries" with regard to the process of sowing, sustainability and marketing of cacao and in general for other agricultural products. Aprocasur, for example, also influences the collection and marketing of coffee smallholders in view of the absence of the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros in the area. Asocafe, the present coffee association, collects the product in Aprocasur's nurseries.

Today the association has 514 cacao producing families. Almost 2,000 families have benefited from the Association; 75% of these families are associates of Aprocasur, the remainder receive benefits through a specific project. In addition, Aprocasur leads the National Cocoa Network with 15,000 families, 28,000 cacao hectares and 40 organizations in 17 departments.

III. Lessons Learned

- Institutional strengthening for small- and medium-sized grassroots organizations: The development of autonomy of the Aprocasur association has been relevant for the community of Santa Rosa del Sur inasmuch as it has become a development hub at the municipal level, through which the communities can market cacao.
- The consolidation of Aprocasur as a promoter of welfare**:** the organization has begun to think not only in terms of marketing the product it collects, but also in terms of its industrialization. According to Miguel Vargas, legal representative of Aprocasur, the ADAM program lacks one last phase of consolidation in the industrialization process and the added value of the product. In order to deal with this problem Vargas proposes consolidating and strengthening both the local price as well as the purchase and sale of cacao through industrialization. This would provide a comparative advantage in establishing standard prices and processes as well as autonomy to the associations and small non-associated producers.

- Without the industrialization that Miguel Vargas aims at, the municipalities have to depend on national cacao prices, the demand of private industrialists and marginal prices that private intermediaries establish for raw materials. As a result of this significant economic dependence on factors that are external to its production, new cacao crops have not been established locally as national prices of the product, low demand from private alliances, and the elevated costs involved do not encourage it.
- Community-led decision making has proven important to sustainability.
- Some associations are able to extend their positive influence beyond the specific crop for which they are established.

3. Aprolim - A Leader and an Association: A completed and advancing project

Location: Vereda Cristo Medio del Resguardo Indígena de Mallamués.
Municipio de Guachucal. Departamento Nariño.
Contact: Ana Lucia Cuastumal
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I. Context

Ana Lucia Cuastumal is a 32-year old indigenous woman living in the Vereda Cristo Medio of the Mallamués Indigenous Reserve, Municipality of Guachucal (Nariño-Colombia). Before the arrival of the USAID ADAM program her work involved housework, raising livestock, including guinea pigs, and the upbringing of her son. Her intentions were always to move away from the indigenous community. She wanted to study, find new spaces not offered at the reserve. Motivated by her son's illness, and the need to improve their economic condition, she considered migrating to the city of Pasto.

In 2007 the ADAM program came to Mallamués. Ana Lucia's father, who was a beneficiary of Colácteos, was a possible beneficiary of the ADAM program. But, because of his advanced age and little interest in changing habits, he withdrew from consideration. Instead, Ana Lucia's older sister attended the socialization meetings and became very involved in the topic and talked about it with her family. Ana Lucia was interested and decided to attend a workshop on business administration. She found this to be a worthwhile experience and continued participating.

One of the challenges for this community was legally constituting an association and naming a legal representative. There was little knowledge and trust in working as an association. But, to qualify for the ADAM program, the association needed a legal representative.

For the Members' Assembly, the greatest difficulty was the election of the Legal Representative. The other members of the Board of Directors had been chosen; six people had been nominated for the position of Legal Representative, but none had accepted. This hesitancy was due to the prior poor financial management in a similar association.

Despite her limited knowledge and experience, Ana Lucia thought it was important to support the Association. She decided to seek the position. For her, it was an opportunity to build a project which did not yet have a name. Surprisingly, she was elected. Her election led to the formalization of the Mallamués Indigenous Association of Milk Producers - Aprolim. The challenges to come were much greater: to produce and market milk with high quality standards.

II. Process

With this in mind, the ADAM program focused on three main fronts: a) the health and hygiene of the cows, b) good milking practices and collection of milk c) good governance and environmental attention.

First, the associated small-scale farmers learned to properly keep the cows clean and reduce the presence of bacteria in milk. Fences were built, which allowed the cows better food and water. Training was given in technical guidelines for milking to increase product quality; milking kits were supplied along with aluminum canteens, eliminating the use of the traditional plastic pails. Finally, the ADAM program encouraged growing trees to form the fences and provide shade for the cows as well as the upkeep of grasses and care for water by getting rid of the agrochemicals that had previously been used, and which could affect water sources.

Ana Lucia was strict in the implementation of the guidelines set forth by the ADAM program; she made sure that members were active, participatory, and put into practice what they learned in training. When members did not comply with the milking techniques and collection of milk, she issued verbal instructions and took actions for members to comply with the rules, particularly those involving hygiene. Of the initial 250 members, those who did not want to comply with these guidelines eventually withdrew. Nevertheless, the impact of the program was very significant: the quality of the milk increased significantly, as did the price: an increase from U.S. $0.25 to U.S. $0.42 per liter, along with greater milk production.

Aprolim became an example for the promotion of an atmosphere of technologically advanced work and labor recognition. Thanks to the participation of the indigenous community, in six months the Collection Center was completed. In 2010, Ana Lucia acquired a cooling tank with resources from Departmental Government, the Governor of the Reservation and the Mayor.

A new goal has arisen: to become a financial credit option for the members. Indeed, the association is carrying out studies to begin credit activities soon, another achievement of the program.

> *... ADAM always insisted on us being independent; they told us this in the meetings, in the training workshops. They said we should be independent financially, and that's why we are starting the lending program.*

III. Lessons Learned

- Leadership, good management, proper training, timely technical advice, and a community that gives worth to the association have enabled Aprolim to continue as a sustainable project after the departure of ADAM.

- Ana Lucia represents action through leadership with courage, honesty and rigor that have led to the achievement of the goals and objectives.

- This case shows how the transformation in a community's practices, along with the changes in productive habits with the gradual adoption of improved dairy practices, generated opportunities for income generation, job growth and an improved quality of life of the members.

4. Apropesca

Location: Municipio de Silvia Cauca (Municipality of Silvia Cauca)
Contact: Liliana Mera. Associate of Apropesca, beneficiary Project Piscícola CREPIC
Amador Agustinosa- President of the Junta and Legal Representative
Sandra Patricia Reboyedo - Coordinator CREPIC
Telephone: Sandra Patricia Reboyedo – CREPIC 3188029328
Liliana Mera- Leader of Apropesca. 3116339991
Address: Cra 7 No. 4 -36 tercer piso cámara de comercio. Centro histórico Popayán.

I. Context

Apropesca is an association with a history of more than 20 years, consisting of about 300 indigenous and peasant families engaged in fish farming and aquaculture products. It is located in the municipality of Silvia, Department of Cauca, and has 52 fish farming stations. Its main product is rainbow trout followed by the smoked trout that is processed by hand.

Its members belong to the Ambaló, Kizgó, Guambia, Quichayá, and Pitayó communities and three veredas in the rural area.

This organization was chosen as a study case because, thanks to ADAM's intervention, economic, social and productivity benefits were achieved.

II. Process

ADAM's intervention was conducted jointly with the Mayor's office and the Regional Productivity and Innovation Center of Cauca (Crepic) that had been operating for three years before the consolidation of the Cauca fish farming chain. Work began with 36 beneficiary stations. Critical at the outset was resolving years of land tenure conflict among peasants, Paeces and Guambianos. Project mediation created spaces for dialogue that encouraged cross-community participation. In the process participants discovered common goals and managed to work together, enabling coexistence and contributing to the strengthening of the association.

> *"One good thing about the project is that it brought together all people in the same place; we brought together Paeces, Guambianos and peasants under the same objective. The product joined us together. Before, there were communities that didn't talk to each other; now they even play and laugh together. That's something we did not expect from the project - uniting an entire community."*[14]

Some producers recognize that they are now more aware of environmental concerns, especially, water protection. The Autonomous Regional Corporation of Cauca was in charge of this area but growers report that they never received the promised technical support. This created gaps in the process because it led to water pollution and solid waste management issues. This is evident in the interview with Liliana Mera, from which the following quote is drawn:

[14] Focus group, Silvia, Apropesca

> *"We became polluters; and the problem was magnified because other people saw our process and began planting as well. Existing stations do not have good water management because there's no sedimentator. The project covered the spawning grounds and the quality of water getting in for fish but it didn't take into account how that water would come out, and that's how contamination started. Most pollution is produced by viscera and sludge handling. I think it would have been nice to focus on sub-products because, in the end, bones, heads, skin were accumulated. We lacked training for using them in some other way."*[15]

For handling viscera, a plant was being built with the help of ADAM but is not yet finished, so it is not in operation. It lacks cold storage and some key equipment. The land where this plant is built is also being claimed by the mayor, causing a conflict with the producers. The association has an older plant, but it has some transportation issues preventing trout getting there quickly enough for evisceration, diminishing product quality.

Through technical training regarding young fish, pond construction and harvest, producers gained knowledge that they apply to date. They also say training has helped them become more organized with their accounting.

The association is currently marketing between 20 and 25 tons per month, enough of an increase from prior production levels to shift from generating short-term revenue to more stable income.

Producers complain that marketing was weak because they did not work on a brand from the beginning. There were no prearranged buyers for the first harvest, so they had to sell at a low price to avoid losing everything. Despite all of this, they have managed to eliminate the middlemen and currently have a point of sale in Popayán and are planning to open a direct point of sale in Cali.

III. Lessons learned

- The marketing process requires more planning. It is important to identify buyers and secure sales before the harvest occurs in order to reduce the risk of losing crops or selling at low prices.
- Organizations require greater assistance in the negotiation process with large supermarket chains because, as small producers, they are subject to the conditions of the other party. The experience of trading with Éxito or Carrefour was not a good because they bought at low prices and paid only for the products with the supermarkets were eventually able to sell, which presents a big risk for producers.
- Marketing through the association turns out to be more profitable than through intermediaries; however, associations must have seed capital to buy the initial production, which is difficult for Apropesca.
- It is important to project product innovation. Apropesca continues producing fillets but has not innovated with other products. Producers argue that having an added value and being able to compete in the market with new products would be very favorable to improve the market.

[15] Liliana Mera, Apropesca Associate

- Public-private alliances must be strengthened by monitoring the agreements with entities generating long-term results, in this case, the Mayor's office. These communities do not have any document proving land use of the evisceration plant built by ADAM, so now the land is in dispute with the Municipality.

ADAM-supported fish farm plant, Silvia, Cauca

5. Asociación de productores de Cacao de Tibú (Asocati)

Location: Tibú, Norte de Santander
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I. Context

The Asociación de Productores de Cacao de Tibú (Asocati) is located in the municipality of Tibú. Its members actively promote the implementation of good practices in the cultivation of cacao in the Catatumbo region, seeking productive alternatives to coca in this region. This association has had the support of USAID's counter-narcotics programs since early 2000.

This case study was selected because it has become a nationwide driver among the networks of cacao producers. It has also engaged in experience transfer regarding cacao culture, and the challenges of poor infrastructure and trying to expand its areas of influence.

Asocati promotes a "culture of legality" by showing that it is possible to substitute profitable alternatives to illicit crops. However, the infrastructure conditions (lack of roads for transporting goods), the economic conditions of the area (the effects of being a border region where the devaluation of the Bolivar impacts production negatively on this side of the border), and the presence of armed actors associated with the coca crops (who sometimes pressure the farmers to continue with coca) have caused its expansion and coverage to be limited, especially in the areas around the municipalities of Sardinata, La Gabarra and El Tarra.

II. Process

Asocati helps to consolidate the cacao crop in the region of Catatumbo as one of the main legal production alternatives. By promoting improved agricultural techniques, and by experimenting with new strains of cacao, they are helping position the product for growth in this region. Asocati has developed strategies that increase production volumes and the quality of the product and seek to ensure access to markets that are more profitable for the producers.

The large majority of its members in the Catatumbo region were formerly growing coca, partly because of few viable legal production alternatives. It is in this environment USAID's intervention began in 2000 to offer legal production alternatives. In marked contrast, today one of the things you hear among the members is that "whoever grows coca near the road to Cucuta or to the town is a scoundrel".

Asocati managed to promote cocao networks both nationally and internationally. In Colombia, it has strived to generate, together with Aprocasur (a cacao growers' association in Sur de Bolívar), a national guild to encourage good practices and support among producers in different locations. The aim is to achieve standards in the Colombian crop such as those obtained in countries like Ecuador.

The group has stimulated exchanges of experiences to improve production in different countries. They have studied how new varieties should be introduced and managed in order to reach high production rates with export quality. Production has been aimed at generating excellent (gourmet) production to meet specific market needs.

Although all these processes cannot be linked solely to MIDAS' participation in this association, it is during the period of MIDAS support the consolidation occurred. MIDAS accomplished its targets of 593 new hectares of cacao. Furthermore, 262 families benefited and 220 equivalent jobs were created.

III. Lessons learned

- The main lesson learned in this case study has to do with the importance of creating, together with the interventions, a series of networks and knowledge flows that allow the improvement of production conditions and marketing of the products in the long term.
- It is possible to develop viable alternatives to coca production through association work and to even change community norms regarding a culture of legality.
- It is possible to expand the impact of a project by promoting lessons learned among successful projects and developing regional and national level standards and association.
- Poor transportation infrastructure remains a vexing challenge to fully successful marketing of production.

6. An Association Perseveres

Location: Municipality of Aldana. Nariño Department
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I. Context

In the town of Aldana (Nariño) the indigenous community and rural inhabitants of the region grew potatoes, wheat and barley – raw materials for the manufacture of beer produced at the Bavaria plant that existed there. After the departure of Bavaria, the farmers stopped growing barley, which decreased income. The area also had areas with poppy production, which became a source of quick and significant revenue. This illicit production was centered in the vereda of Carlosama. With Bavaria's departure, producers formed associations centered on various products, including milk, the motor of the Aldana economy.

> *"Aldana was a farming town but Bavaria´s exit caused farmers to stop producing barley. Then we came back to milk production but the conditions were not the best ".*

Milk production was low-tech and lacked basic hygiene parameters. Milk commercialization was in the hands of intermediaries who did not guarantee price stability and there was no concept of associative work.

> *"Previously we did not have a vision of working as a group; for everyone the work was independent and it was defend yourself as you can. Before, people were not trained."*

The level of confidence in local authorities was minimal because previous projects had often failed.

ADAM arrived in 2006, with open bid requests from the Mayor's Office, Council and Indigenous Reserve to socialize projects to be carried out in the region, with the main objective the substitution of illicit crops in the area. The Association of Milk Producers and Commercializers and Alternative Development – Asocoprolyda – was created in response.

This case demonstrates associative work arising from ADAM support: a group of rural and indigenous people, immersed in an environment of trust, was able to implement a project based on an associative model. However, access filters did not allow all the inhabitants to enter into the association. And, once inside the association, disagreements were a part of the process of becoming an association.

II. Process

Currently, Asocoprolyda has 155 members (a decrease from 246 previously) in the twelve veredas of Aldana. The implementation of the project required the creation of an operating committee and an oversight committee to make decisions, to monitor the compliance with the plan, to promote the participation of the members, and to obtain ownership of a lot for the construction of a collection center, construction of a refrigeration tank, and seeding of special

pasture grass. These aspects, along with difficult coordination with local government (mayor's office and government of the reserve) was challenging. In particular, the "pasture" species of grass requested by technicians was not appropriate for the class of soil in Aldana. But, failure to comply with ADAM requirements would result in non-delivery of the refrigeration tank. The members of the association felt that there was little flexibility and that the opinion of the campesino and indigenous participants was not taken into account. The communities' response was *"... well, if there's no tank we'll get our income by planting poppy".*

Additionally, local government support was given with conditions which generated more disgust: funds from members' registration were to be held by the municipality treasury and the management and leadership of the association were to be under the reserve's government. These two conditions were rejected by the board of directors. Moreover, there was little agility by the Municipal Council in the legislation necessary to raise municipal resources for the project.

Furthermore, the rural and indigenous members did not appropriate the new techniques essential to continue the project, which resulted in the departure of several members:

> *"... I had to handle up to 246 members and that is very hard, everybody needed my attention. It is difficult to change mentality and have a more technical milk production and change management of the pastures."*

There were, however, positive circumstances which were key to the success of the project. Teamwork secured the resources to purchase the lot and expand the infrastructure of the collection center. The change to more technologically advanced milking improved environmental management (recycling of agro-industrial waste and planting of trees) and led to brusellosis- and tuberculosis-free certification.

An aspect to note is that it is not easy for the community to belong to Asoprocolyda. The requirements, some "inherited" from ADAM, do not promote the growth of the association.

> *"The Association considers application requests and analyzes the balance sheet. The member's contribution is 5%, which on average is $1,500,000, although payment assistance is given in certain cases.*

III. Lessons Learned

- The associative model generated benefits leading to displacement of illicit work, in particular the growing of poppy, and increased alternative development projects.
- Before starting a project, all involved must study and analyze the real needs of the communities and the physical characteristics of the region.
- Overly prescriptive project direction from donors can limit participation and ownership and retard progress
- Unsupportive municipalities can impede progress

7. Asociación Gremial de Productores de Palma Africana de Campo Dos (Asogpados)

Location: Tibú, Norte de Santander
Contact: Carlos Veleño (manager)
John Alemán (administrative coordinator)
Silvestre Mejía (beneficiary and initial oil palm farmer)
Anderson Parada (agronomic coordinator)
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Telephone: 3184242329 (telephone of Carlos Veleño)
Email: gerencia@asogpados.org

I. Context

Norte de Santander, a department located on the border with Venezuela, is deeply influenced by currency exchange conditions of both countries. With the devaluation of the Venezuelan Bolivar with respect to the Colombian Peso (to date, the Bolivar is at 0.29 pesos), production on the Colombian side is affected by importation of Venezuelan contraband. Products from Venezuela are diverse, including fuel, meat, dairy products, essential products, electrical appliances, etc.

Norte de Santander has a significant presence of cells of former paramilitary groups (which control extortion networks and drug traffic routes at the border) as well as a strong presence of the guerrilla (Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, o FARC) in the Catatumbo region, associated with coca production.

The interior of the department, where this study is located, has challenging geography and precarious communications infrastructure. Together with the lack central government presence, the context presents daunting challenges when attempting to encourage adoption of productive alternatives to illicit crops. These difficulties influence the manner in which marketing different products can be achieved, as well as the territorial outreach that they might have.

The Asociación Gremial de Productores de Palma Africana de Campo Dos (Asogpados) is located in the municipality of Tibú. Its mission is to promote and assist in the production of African palm locally as an alternative to coca production among the families living in Campo Dos.

This association benefitted from the support provided by USAID, initially as beneficiary and later as an implementer. Due to its role in the Catatumbo region as one of the main drivers of alternative activities to illicit crops, it was chosen as a case study. It is recognized by other associations in the region as a prime example of an association able to promote development in the region.

II. Process

Asogpados' work with case with the African palm shows a different aspect than that experienced in the same region by Asocati in cacao production, although both are successful cases in finding cost-effective alternatives to illicit crops. Asogpados has demonstrated the

importance of organizational issues and administrative management that is being replicated by other associations.

This has developed over several years of learning, evolving from being beneficiaries of USAID projects to becoming an implementer. When MIDAS arrived, this association had already received USAID alternative development funding in 2001. However, after problems with the initial implementer (Cooperativa Palmas Risaralda Ltda.), Asogpados began to manage the resources. This role as an implementer would be replicated with the arrival of MIDAS in 2005, which was successful exceeding its planting targets.

The success in managing the projects was due partially to the fact that during the 4 years (2001-2005), the organization created management practices – such as the creation of a rotating fund and the creation of a supply warehouse in order to obtain resources and at the same time to offer low-cost supplies to its members – that have enabled it to become stronger and grow. Some of the actions stem from management strategies.

Asogpados has become an example in the region, contributing to consolidating the "culture of legality" among the inhabitants of the municipality and even among younger associations such as Asopalcantuno. Followers replicate some of the successful practices and are even seeking a way to solve one of the problems that productive projects face in this area of the country: the problem of communications and roads.

One of the plans envisions constructing an extraction plant to process the palm fruit. This would both reduces dependence on third parties (including the vagaries of transport to distant plants), and could provide added value to production.

III. Lessons learned

- Targeting management improvements in associations can generate empowerment for the associations.
- Associations can successfully share lessons learned with younger organizations as a way to magnify impact.
- Successful associations can foster a culture of legality among coca producers as they shift to licit crops.
- Many of the associations supported continue to innovate and maintain a vision for the future, years after project completion.

8. The Vereda of San Juan del Río Mira and the ADAM and MIDAS interaction with a collective

Location: Vereda San Juan Rio Mira. Municipio de Tumaco. Departamento Nariño.
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I. Context

The Association of Palm Growers of Alto Mira – Asopalmira – is 26 years old. Most beneficiaries live in the vereda San Juan del Rio, 2.5 hours from the municipality of Tumaco. 42 families live in the vereda; their main activity is agriculture. The residents of San Juan Río are joyful, hard-working, compassionate and grateful.

Until five years ago, the economic situation and housing, health and public services were precarious: there was no health center, no electric service, some of the housing was unstable and virtually all of it was located on the banks of Mira River. Additionally, the school was old and ill-suited for children's learning.

The community had a leader for two decades dedicated to promoting palm growing. While this was the population's main source of income, it was insufficient and was supplemented with crops for home consumption, such as corn, banana and cassava, which were also sold.

> *"... People produced for home consumption, growing and raising for home consumption. What was left over was sold ... this was what generated income."*

The community had had various difficulties with the sustainability of their crops, both for cash crops and for subsistence. The first was the fumigation spraying against illicit crops, despite the community's pleas for manual eradication to mitigate the impact on the palm. The second was a palm-rot epidemic against which little could be done.

> *"... Before there was only one line and it was palm oil… [Then] We got all the epidemics ... first, the fumigations, then came the bud rot of the palms, which they call* Phytophthora *and then came the avalanche."*

On February 16, 2009 the village of San Juan was hit by the avalanche of Rio Mira which wiped away everything belonging to the inhabitants and leveled the palm crops which were the economic support of the community.

II. Process

This was the context when the MIDAS program arrived at the vereda of San Juan with resources and technical support that promoted and strengthened the growing of cacao, with the commitment of the rural inhabitants to eliminate illicit crops. Faced with the immediate needs of the inhabitants, MIDAS joined forces with the local government with three immediate objectives: a) supply of cacao beans, b) provision of fertilizers and c) technical training for the crop.

Indeed, soon the Escuela de Campo para Agricultores (ECA, Field School for Farmers) training became the most relevant tool and source of knowledge for the community. The technical assistance enabled the inhabitants of the vereda, and especially the heads of households, men and women, to learn about the plant material (cacao beans) and aspects of pruning and grafting, advancing to the cloning of cacao trees, allowing greater production and better quality and control of pests and diseases. This knowledge led to healthier crops and a better quality product in taste and especially in floral aroma, which generated a significant increase in the income for families.

> *"…people complained that 30% of the harvest was good and 70% was bad; nowadays with that training, those that the ECA gave, this has been reversed, 70% is good and only 30% is bad".*

On the social side, MIDAS helped families learn how to make a productive life plan and thereby ensure the sustainability of the program, generating a family farming business. In this case, it is the entire community that has participated in the benefits of cacao production. At the same time, valuable lessons were learned: a) the need to implement alternative crops with a shorter timeframe (crops that serve as food crops); b) the need for greater attention and supervision after crop planting; and c) the need for soil testing for appropriate crops.

> *... we were left alone, no real diagnosis was done of what kind of crop to plant and assistance, for example if the cacao growing is for three years, that we plan and supervise for 3 years.*

In the case of the ADAM program, the final project was the construction of a new school, not only because the former was inadequate, but because after the avalanche it had ended up as temporary housing for the affected families.

The new school was the first project implemented by Asopalmira, which for this purpose had to meet the requirements of the program and had to request title from the municipality to a plot of land, certifying community ownership. From there the construction process began, with the required soil diagnosis and testing. This project was an important test in the search for the common good through the union of the community, since the community had to provide the material to build the school. To achieve this goal, the inhabitants worked long hours for three months dredging the necessary material from the Mira River.

After seven months the school was completed. Even though there was some delay in obtaining out of stock items, the school now has two large classrooms, two bathrooms for children, a kitchen with the necessary equipment and supplies, as well as a room for the teacher. It also has a water supply tank and necessary desks and seats. However, the community did not stop there. Through additional activities, they obtained resources to provide it with an LCD TV, library, and furniture for the teacher's room. Perhaps the greatest perceived benefit of the Association is the credibility of its resource management through the acquired experience.

III. Lessons Learned

- The simultaneous action of ADAM and MIDAS programs in the vereda of San Juan was crucial to overcome tragedy and strengthen the individual, economic and social

development of the community. The first achievement was the eradication of illicit crops and then the successful transition from palm oil crops to cacao crops. The second was the resulting cohesion of the community in the building of a modern school.

- The support of both programs was instrumental in the determination of the community to move ahead. Today, the school is the pride of a population that consistently gives thanks for what they received and whose inhabitants now claim: *"... The school is already famous, it seems like a university. The children from other veredas want to come and study here."*
- Crops with a short time frame should be selected to serve as food crops while waiting for longer term crops to mature;
- Attention and supervision should continue after crop planting, at least until after the first harvest
- Projects must test soils before introducing crops.
- Collective effort from producer associations on social programs can both improve quality of life and reinforce the integrity of the association.

9. Asociación de Piscicultores del Valle de Guamuez Asopez

Location: La Hormiga, Putumayo.
Participants: María Yaneth Bermúdez (Vice President ASOPEZ);
Sandra Castilla (Accountant ASOPEZ) December 5, 2013.
Telephone: (057) 314 3957782

I. Context

The municipality of Valle de Guamuez is located in the south western area of Putumayo, bordering with the province of Sucumbíos in Ecuador and with the department of Nariño in Colombia. A river flows along the valley. Most of the population is rural; the main urban centers are El Tigre, La Hormiga and San Miguel, which form a hub from Orito to the border.

During the 1990s, the municipality was greatly affected by the expansion of illegal crops, mainly for the production of coca paste. This led to violence and armed conflict, linked to irregular armed groups. Initially, it was the FARC, and later paramilitary self-defense groups and gangs involved in drug trafficking. The Trans-Andean Oil Pipeline that links the oil wells of Orito with Ecuador added to the conflict as a target. In addition, the border area with Ecuador was the scene of armed conflict by military forces and guerrillas who took refuge across the border.

The complexity of the context led the national and local governments to carry out a range of alternative development programs. USAID supported this process of consolidation of legal behaviors, based on productive initiatives.

The case of the Asociación de Piscicultores del Valle del Guamuez (Asopez, the fish farmers' association of Valle del Guamez) represents a successful partnership, where communities have taken ownership of the processes, thereby gaining social legitimacy, increasing sustainability, and creating

positive cultural changes within the community. The Asopez experience appears to be replicable.

"Now you can see food in the market place. This is a change that shows how people again began to grow crops in their farms. Before, the farmers didn't plant food crops, only coca. Now, you find tomatoes, cucumbers, cilantro, chickens, panela – brown sugar loaves - and fish – things that you didn't see before."

María Yaneth Bermúdez. ASOPEZ. La Hormiga, Putumayo.

II. Process

The Association was founded in 1998 by twelve partners in the activity. At the time they wanted to build a life project that would take them away from the conflict caused by illegal crops. The

Association has persevered and its number has increased to 85 at present. Initially, they had the support of Corpoamazonía in the construction and certification of fish ponds. They began growing tambaqui (*Colossoma macropomum*) and later diversified to varieties of young fish such as shad and red and silver tilapia.

When the ADAM program arrived (March, 2008) the fish farmers' guild was already organized in El Valle. The program began to strengthen the producers' association with technical management, financial and commercial assistance. In terms of technical assistance, the partners were provided with new varieties of young fish and received assistance to install pre-raising techniques for the young fish. Technical visits made to the fish production sites promoted improvements of 181 production units.

The technological component provided machinery to make production more efficient as well as a cold room and the cooler for the slaughter of the fish. Participants particularly valued the equipment provided to produce concentrate. This included a mill, a dryer, and a centrifuge, which allowed them to produce complementary fishmeal, complementing the fish with corn, yucca and plantain, which are products that are easily grown in the region.

Participants noted that the project complemented local fish farming knowledge with training in more technical and administrative skills. They appreciated the benefits of maintaining "sowing logs" and "feeding charts" to plan and track production per agricultural unit and as a whole. Based on this knowledge, a partnership culture was built, where members realized that*"we can't all produce at the same time."* Accordingly, they now coordinate their sowing periods.

The program trained the Association's board of directors in management, accounting and administration, strengthening long-term viability.

Participants remember fondly how the training program motivated the partners and their children to study fish farming. Some of them carried out technical studies in SENA, and made technical visits to fish production centers in Neiva and Medellin.

Marketing was challenging. Initially, Corpoamazonía marketed production within the area. They made alliances with Almacenes Éxito, but they were unable to maintain the business relationship over time because (1) the Association could not compete on product price and payment terms (60 business days); and (2) the great distance between the Valle de Guamuez and the consumption centers and the precarious conditions of the road infrastructure made transportation costly.

The result of these marketing difficulties was that each producer sought ways of selling his product locally.

Asopez is also looking towards a better future. They plan to build a fish station in the Valle de Guamuez. They already have the property where they will build ponds for the reproduction of young fish to replace those currently purchased in Villagarzón. Additionally, to improve quality and become suppliers for different municipalities of the region, they seek to build a scientific center for the study of young fish of the Amazon Region.

III. Lessons Learned

- The fish project encountered difficulties in marketing products on a national scale. They cannot easily find partners for the necessary alliances, which constricts growth to that which can serve only local markets.

- Participants emphasize that ADAM's success was due to the fact that it was assisting an ongoing process, in which the producers already had previous knowledge about fish farming. This permitted rapid adaptation by the communities which have deep knowledge of the local context. Support provided for an association that was already established provided social legitimacy and interest among the community.
- In the case of fish farming, the benefits provided by the projects go beyond the purely economic or business scope. Participants emphasize ADAM's contributions to food security, consolidation of family nuclei as production units, the interest of new generations in entering the educational system, and the possibility of creating a life project away from illicit crops.
- To succeed, productive alliances with the private sector must take into account the cash flow and credit circumstances of vulnerable producers. Requiring credit from such producers (such as by 60-day payment provisions) restricts the likelihood of success.
- Limited transportation infrastructure remains a serious constraint.
- Intergenerational participation appears to deepen ownership and promote transparency.

10. Iris Almario, producer, Becerril Palm Growers' Association - Aspalbe

Location: Becerril, Cesar
Contact: Rafael Gil - Legal Representative Aspalbe
Address: Calle 8 No. 5 – 87
Telephone: 3126914066

I. Context

According to the Observatory of Human Rights of the Presidency, between 2003 and 2006 Becerril was among the five municipalities with the highest murder rate in the Department. According to Social Action in that period over a thousand people were displaced from the municipality, one of the highest rates of expulsion in the region. In 2009 the highest number of landmine victims was recorded in Aguachica, Becerril, Curumaní, La Jagua de Ibirico, El Copey and Pailitas.[16]

In the Caribbean region, the MIDAS program promoted agribusiness projects as a response to situations of vulnerability in rural communities and families. One of the initiatives was to promote the growing of the African Palm as a means of generating revenue from the demand for food, cosmetics and fuel.

II. Process

In the early 2000's Plan Colombia promoted a social component that supported the planting of palms in different communities in Cesar Department. This support did not include accompaniment, but seed distribution among the beneficiaries. Iris Almario and her husband were beneficiaries of the program and planted the seeds on their 11 hectare farm.

One night, Mrs. Almario's husband was killed by an armed group in the doorway of their house and in front of her nine children, leaving her alone to support and raise them. She and her children had to move and leave everything behind because of threats against her. Some years passed, and the palms that had been planted on her farm were grown and producing fruit, which is why some residents told her to return and take advantage of the production.

At that time (2006), the MIDAS program had already begun operations and the oil palm company "Palmariguani", a MIDAS grantee, was supporting small-scale palm grower associations in towns like Becerril, in the Department of Cesar. The democratic security policy and other efforts helped reduce the levels of insecurity in the region and Mrs. Almario decided to return to her farm.

When she returned, she was well received by the Aspalbe. The company, Palmariguani, which provided seed capital to invest in agricultural inputs, served as a guarantor for a bank loan, purchased the entire output of her farm, collected the fruit at her farm so she did not have to pay transportation, and gave ongoing technical assistance and training. The training was key; it was

[16] "Cesar: análisis de conflictividad", July, 2010, PNUD Colombia. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/COL/00058220/Analisis%20Cesar%20Definitivo%20PDF.pdf

considered to be dynamic and fun and became a social space for entertainment and learning. The project had activities for children so that women such as Iris could attend.

For Palmariguani, investing in comprehensive support to the associations and the families is prudent because it results in more acres under production and ensures product quality. It has an interest in supporting cohesion amongst the producers to reduce desertion.

During the project, Mrs. Almario was again the victim of extortion, apparently by criminal gangs, who realized her business was prospering when they saw the farm repaired and two new employees. She had nowhere to turn but to Aspalbe. The legal representative gave full support, talking to the extortionists, who stopped making threats.

Mrs. Iris Almario is very grateful to the project. While she believes that many are owed credit and that production levels are half of what was expected, she states that the MIDAS palm project saved her life. Today her children are grown up, they received education, some already work, and she enjoys post-tax income of between 1 and 2 million pesos per month.

III. Lessons Learned

- The community association is a very effective means of generating income and reducing vulnerability to poverty and violence.
- Projects with social objectives not only generate income but also social cohesion, self-esteem, awareness of roots and identity. In working with vulnerable populations, social work is vital.
- Late yield projects, like the palm, promote long-term mentality and generate roots as life projects that provide economic support for individuals and families.
- With production projects in vulnerable communities, it is very important to ensure demand for the production and commercial relations that support it. Productive alliances must be sustainable and fair based on win-win agreements between companies and producer associations.
- Rural training should be pragmatic and dynamic. ECA Field Schools have proven an effective tool for training in agricultural skills.
- The unit of intervention should be the family, not just the individual; projects must be inclusive and consider the family unit (partners, children).
- Buyers that invest in the quality of the producers inputs and practices, as well as in social cohesion both support development and achievement of their bottom line.

11. Compañía de Empaques S.A

Location: Antioquia y Nariño
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Jhon Jairo Mira Castillo: Nuevo director Agrícola y ambiental de Compañía de Empaques S.A.
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I. Context

Between 2007 and 2009 the MIDAS program became involved in fique fiber production and marketing, strengthening twelve associations in the process. Compañía de Empaques strengthens the primary supplier in the different processes of production and marketing of fique in the Nariño, Antioquia and Cauca zones.

MIDAS provided technical assistance to individual producers and associations in the municipalities of Amalfi, Gómez Plata, El Cairo, Jericó, Montebello, Támesis and Urrao in Antioquia; and Albán, Arboleda, Buesaco, Consacá and El Tambo in Nariño, where the Compañía de Empaques has its suppliers. The Associations received support in social, business, agricultural and environmental issues and have joined forces with partners in production processes and have succeeded in accessing markets.

II. Process

MIDAS' technical assistance appears to have resulted in greater dynamics in planting, transformation, and marketing processes of the fique fiber. Public-private partnerships, the elimination of the middle man, the so-called two-way marketing, and the education of fique workers have been crucial elements.

With MIDAS' assistance, the Company worked on these components:

1. *Sowing*. Development of new crops and strengthening existing seedbeds, stimulated through the partnership with Empresas Públicas de Medellín, whose funds can only be spent for new plantings.
2. *Shredding*. Due to the lack of culture, machinery and trained workers, there remain 1,000,000 fique plants that have not been shredded (processed) in Antioquia. Public-private alliances have been important, but more efforts are needed. Further training in

transforming the fiber is needed. Support has been requested from SENA for further training in these fields. The boost provided by the MIDAS program until 2009 has enabled fique producers to meet the increasing demand. However, it is necessary to strengthen the shredding process with technical aids and more training for the workers.

3. *Marketing*. Associativity is a MIDAS legacy in this case study. Of those associations that were stimulated and strengthened, there are 10 that collect the fiber in their municipalities and transport it to the Company. Increasingly, associations are comprised of producers who eliminate the intermediary to augment profits derived from the fiber. The Compañía de Empaques today has strengthened 16 municipal associations and one called Fique Antioquia (it operates with resources from the State, the municipalities and is the operator of shredding projects and new plantings). The Federación Nacional (Fenalfique) has also been strengthened.
4. *Promoting the use*. Training has been provided in the use of ties for fique sacks as well as using the finished product. Courses have been given in the Elected Community Leaders meetings to stimulate the use of agro-textiles and bio-mantles.
5. *Education*. Different communities have been given training related to fique growers' needs, such as motor repairs, machinery, and the development of tools that the fique workers need. Compañía de Empaques trains and certifies technicians, with special emphasis on children of fique growers. These groups are sponsored by Empresas Públicas (of the Mayor's office of Medellin) and Compañía de Empaques.

This education program has required significant effort by the public companies and private institutions. The Agricultural and Environmental Director, Carlos Alberto Alvares Correa says: "*When you try, as we have, to work with an illiterate farmer on his plot, who may be used to manual production, to get him to a very local market, you have to do a process with him. A long process that includes teaching them how to manage a checkbook, keep accounts, distinguish quality. It is not easy.*"

Work has been done to strengthen the relationship with SENA and other alliances, as certified auditors of the shredding groups was required.

Today, the greatest need is for more trained people to work in processing raw material to be marketed, as demand and new markets are increasing. The consumption of fiber is increasing: in 2009, 6,500 tons of the fique products were processed; by 2013 the figure had risen to 10,000.

III. Lessons Learned

- Learning how to manage public/private alliances has been transformational. While early in 2004 (before the MIDAS program started) there were no alliances of this kind, today there are consolidated alliances with the Ministry of Agriculture Empresas Públicas, Fundación Argos, and the Governor's Office. These alliances encourage new plantings and enable the development and marketing of the fique product.
- The project could have had more support in generating technical assistance and tools for the shredding process. This is because plants are being grown but the groups are not yet agile in adapting to market demands.

- The process was successful and sustainable because the Compañía de Empaque, as a company, has remained committed to strengthening its suppliers with technical advice, management training, logistics training, opening of new markets. Identifying markets and the purchase of raw materials – eliminating intermediaries in some areas of the country – has been of great importance for the development of smallholder farmer.

12. Condimentos Putumayo S.A.

Location: Villagarzón, Department of Putumayo.
Participants: Rodrigo Trujillo (Manager), José Díaz (Board of Director's Secretary).
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"We took a step toward legality with the beginning of pepper cultivation. Many pepper producers emerged as a result of the voluntary eradication of cocaine crops, generating an impact in the families. When a family begins to see that licit cultivation allows them to generate an economy, the environment changes. When they were growing coca, the family disintegrated: the son went one way, the father, the other. All searching where to scrape the leaves; they were nomads. With pepper planting, families got organized around the crop and their plot. Our goal as a company is to generate economic alternatives, so these families can be sustainable."
Rodrigo Trujillo, Condimentos Putumayo S.A.

I. Context

Condimentos Putumayo's history can be traced back to 1998, with the implementation of alternative development programs and with subprograms, such as PLANTE or Raiz por Raiz, developed by the National Government through USAID's ADAM and MIDAS programs.

The Agricultural Development Center of Putumayo emerged in the municipality of Villagarzon, amidst many failures: an animal feed plant was abandoned due to technological failures and supply problems; Forestal Putumayo, which tried to exploit timber resources, was closed due to organizational failures; Putumayo Flowers, which tried to encourage flower production, failed due to high freight costs and phytosanitary problems. From the companies developed at that time, Condimentos Putumayo is the only one standing at present.

The roots of the program go back to 1999, with a Ministry of Agriculture program associated with an Ecuadorian agronomist, who had expertise in the local culture. He provided lectures to a group of rubber tappers, who became interested. Thirty leaders travelled to Ecuador to study pepper crops in Sucumbios. They submitted a project proposal to the Ministry of Agriculture involving 1000 hectares of rubber plantation accompanied with pepper and plantain. At that time there were no resources, so the project could not be developed.

The Project finally began in 2001, with an agreement with Chemonics, which was responsible for implementing cooperation resources for the first phase of Plan Colombia. They signed the agreement as Asociacion de Caucheros del Putumayo, Asocap. The program provided two hectares of rubber to each family, together with 400 pepper plants. The program was started in Mocoa, Puerto Guzmán, Villagarzón and Puerto Caicedo, Puerto Asís, Orito, San Miguel and Valle del Guamuez.

Substituting pepper for coca resulted in clashes with neighbors who continued cultivating coca leaves. At first cultivation of pepper was seen as strange; but after initial successes, additional families sought to join the program.

> *"Pepper cultivation in Putumayo Department was a new issue. The beneficiaries didn't know how to grow it. But, as time went by, knowledge of how to do it better has accumulated. The company shares this knowledge with new producers".*

At first, 1200 plants were planted per family. Many crops failed because of lack of knowledge, leading many to abandon pepper growing. Today, producers have between 500 and 800 plants, which do not offer a real impact on the household economy. It is estimated that a family should produce 250 kilograms per month, which can be achieved with 1500 plants. This is the medium-term goal established by the company.

Shifting to pepper cultivation has positive ecological impacts. Coca required at least one hectare to be viable, which implied the destruction of one forest hectare per year. Pepper cultivation permits stripped planting, supporting land recovery. Some plots already have second-generation forests, helping recover local watersheds. Similarly, the use of agrochemicals on pepper or rubber is minimal, unlike coca, which requires large amounts of pesticides.

II. Process.

The ADAM and MIDAS projects contributed knowledge about the product and its characteristics. They supported the farmers with their processing machines, as well as with a toaster and tower mill. These are all in good condition, but are being used at five percent of their capacity, due to the low production increase as the new crops take a lot of time to produce pepper.

Farmers see themselves as partners of the company. They are now confident that the company will purchase their production, whereas initially they doubted the company's willingness to purchase their crops.

Farmers currently receive market research and business strengthening support from the Canadian Embassy and from Gran Tierra, an oil company that exploits Orito reservoir. Farmers hope to expand production to 20 tons per month, in order to be able to export.

They have chosen to market their product through institutional marketing and catering. They hope to offer a quality product with a better margin, avoiding intermediaries. They have an alliance with the Wok restaurants of Bogota for a four-year period and also sell to restaurants in Pereira and Cartagena. They hope to increase their list of cities to 80. The company emphasizes organic production as an added value. Its vision includes the cultivation of curcuma and ginger, of which they already have initial crops.

III. Lessons Learned.

- In the case of new products in the region, there should be better support, training and technical assistance, in order for them to be sustainable over time especially, with middle or late performance.
- Working directly with companies or with associations in the region improves the productive, community and family systems.
- Working with existing groups enhances the likelihood of success.

13. Fedar - Promoción de la Autoría Social de los Jóvenes en los Municipios de Almaguer, la Sierra y Rosas

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I. Context

Escuela Normal Superior in Almaguer initiated the promotion of social involvement of young people in the municipalities of Almaguer, la Sierra, Rosas and la Vega. This process was stimulated by the NGO, Fedar, as the basis for strengthening leadership among the young people through financing provided by ADAM.

Almaguer had much armed conflict; by 2009 it had suffered 12 guerilla attacks and the destruction of the Escuela Normal Superior (Teacher's College) and the Church as a place of congregation in the town. The social fabric was torn by the armed conflict, sparking fear, school dropouts and the displacement of families.

It is relevant as a case study because, through ADAM's intervention in a difficult context, it was possible to strengthen a sense of belonging to the land among the young people of the municipality of Almaguer, which helped mend the social fabric that had been shattered by the armed conflict.

II. Process

Youth involvement was encouraged in 2009 and 2010 by forming groups of boys and girls from the municipalities aged 13-21 years. ADAM funded the first year's activities, during which five thematic hubs were taught: territory, values, community leadership, social involvement of young people, and community communication.

The intent was to recover young peoples' sense of identity with their territory and with the meaning of being a rural worker. They analyzed conflicts in the municipalities and provided the youngsters with tools to analyze their own problems and those of their territory. An awareness component for teachers was included to facilitate the work.

One of the difficulties was that the process was not uniformly strong among the thematic hubs. One way to overcome this was through youth organizations' exchanges across departments. For example, exchanges were arranged with youth from Montes de María, who were skilled in audio-visual communication; whereas Almaguer was strong in social participation.

The Colombian Network of Social Involvement arose from these exchanges, which includes 14 departments currently belonging to the Latin American Network of Youth Social Involvement.

It presented an alternative lifestyle for young people with few options, who are exposed to the presence of illegal armed groups and subject to recruitment.

"*The hope to put the conflict aside, to search for other alternatives and for the possibility of keeping young people away from the armed conflict, because they are easy prey for the armed groups to begin to recruit them*." [17]

"*With the Project we were involved in a process of education, and this in some way was to shield youths from recruitment. Another thing that made a difference is that young people did not get involved with illicit crops. When a person develops a questioning attitude, he or she is capable to decide what they want out of life."*[18]

Reconstructing the social fabric is evident in the following interview:

"*I remember well the image of the guerrilla on one side and the army on the other; all the houses destroyed. After so much conflict, people become deteriorated. The Project helped us, above all, to rebuild the social fabric. In Almaguer people were quite afraid, afraid to go out, to talk, to participate in committees, because whoever expressed opposition, ended up dead. So, with this Project, we were taught to believe in ourselves and to trust the community.*"[19]

The process also considered the care of the territory and its natural resources. Youth organized around water. Opportunities for debate were created about megaprojects and youth processes. Because these topics were sensitive in terms of the armed conflict, they created problems of insecurity among some of the leaders of the process, who received threats from the armed groups. In order to manage these risks, they linked with human rights organizations and created an alert network with people in Bogotá from the Colombian Network of Social Involvement, with whom they were constantly in contact.

According to Fedar, one of the strengths of working in the midst of the armed conflict is that the process obtained the endorsement of the community, teachers and mayors. Partnerships were made with the mayors' offices, and it was the youth who took over fundraising. For example, in Almaguer, the young people began a waste collection Project and managed it with the community. In the case of La Vega, the young people participated in the preparation of the municipal development plans with an educational proposal.

The methodology was well accepted in the Department. In fact, the methodology was transferred to the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros where they worked together in nine municipalities with young, teenage coffee growers.

III. Lessons Learned

- In the midst of the armed conflict, reconstruction of the social fabric implies the restoration of life projects of people and towns, the encouragement of social and personal development, the generation of scenarios that encourage active participation of different

[17] Fluvia Salazar. Teacher on the process of Youth Social Involvement in the municipality of Almaguer. Interview, December 1, 2013.
[18] Ricardo Cobo, Director, FEDAR. Interview, November 30, 2013.
[19] Tatiana Parra Guzmán, member of the first Young people's Involvement Group and current community leader. Interview, December 1, 2013.

generations emphasizing socio-cultural identity, a sense of belonging, and community organization and capacity for self-management.

- Influencing public policies and development plans requires commitment by the mayors' offices and territorial authorities. This often requires a sensitization process with these entities as skepticism over capabilities of youth impede opportunities for participation.

14. Asociación Productores de Aguacate Haas - Frepac

Location: Cajibio Departamento del Cauca
Contact: Faustina Rodalleja Valencia
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I. Context

The Hass Avocado Project was implemented with 400 producers in the municipalities of Toribío, Cajibío and Popayán, with the Hass avocado as a new product. The case study focuses on the municipality of Cajibío, Cauca, where rural workers and indigenous people live together. This case was studied because the methodology implemented by ADAM with the avocado producers was different from the one used in the rest of the department. Since it was a new product, and there was no former organization of producers in the zone, a new organization was created by the Project. The Nasa natives live in the reservations where the project was located. Initially 22 indigenous producers of this ethnic group were assisted as well as rural workers of the Cajibío sector.

II. Process

Initially, the Project was discussed among the communities in town meetings, with indigenous governors, and some rural leaders. Since it was a new product in the area without an organization of producers, one of the difficulties was to achieve cohesion in the (new) organization.

> *"We tried out a new product –Haas avocados – which had not been grown here before. We knew that because of this and because it was a new organization, they would need more assistance, and we collaborated with the Corporación Colombiana Internacional. But we did not realize how much (help was needed). It was more than we could provide, especially when a whole harvest failed and they had worked for 6-7 months and then lost everything. There are groups that have been able to keep up, but this association was disintegrated. There were conflicts about resources and leadership. And we did not provide sufficiently clear technical orientation. The truth is that technical ownership takes less time than the work to structure a group.*"[20]

Producers who were interviewed acknowledge the benefits of the program, mainly in terms of new knowledge acquired through training in sowing, fertilization, harvesting, waste management and technical follow-up of good farming practices.

However, there were complications because technical support was not implemented in a consistent manner. Because it was a new product, the producers did not have sufficient tools to manage the crops up to the end of the production cycles. In addition, the characteristic conditions of the area, such as climate and soil conditions, were not considered. It is an area where there is a lot of hail, and this affected the crops. The soil on some farms was not adequate for this type of crop. The producers also complained that chemicals for pest control for this crop were not affordable.

[20] Juan Pablo Urrutia. Regional coordinator, ADAM. Interview, 25 November, 2013.

The Frepac cooperative was created to take care of sales. However, price stability has not been achieved due to volatile market prices and because there was no seed capital for the initial purchase. In addition, they had not identified committed buyers before harvest, resulting in large losses. The experience with chain supermarkets, such as Éxito and Carrefour, weakened the association as the conditions were not favorable to producers.

> *"The supermarket (chains) pay one month later, so that shattered the association because they all had the bad experience of not receiving payment for their crops, so they preferred the intermediaries".*[21]

All these factors resulted in insufficient benefits from the production for the producers. This reduced their ability to repay loans acquired at the beginning of the project. With these debts, and without significant income from avocado production, some producers were forced to go back to work for wages and some women as domestic workers in order to pay off the loans.

Furthermore, producers who participated in a focus group say there was lack of clarity with regard to the operating entity and the participation of the Mayor's Office. In their mind, the Corporación Colombiana Internacional (CCI) agreed to cover 50% of the loans, but not all benefited and some of them are paying the entire amount. There is the perception among the producers that the Project did not end and that the CCI is in debt with the communities.

> *"We had problems with the operator* [CCI]. *Many difficulties… Mistrust with the CCI… You end up having hopes, but for us as producers the results are not what we had wanted for our children. … For me CCI has not finished the Project. They owe us about 9 million that they have not delivered to us. They said that they were going to do it. I signed the check and then, nothing."*[22]

III. Lessons Learned

- The implementation of new crops requires more continuous monitoring to enable the producers to have the technical assistance needed to face possible difficulties of growing new crops.
- Implementing this type of project in communities where there is no previous organization requires greater assistance and more intervention time to structure the group. A budding organization that is not consolidated may not have the necessary tools to solve internal conflicts on its own (for example, conflicts regarding resources and leadership) or the external obstacles in terms of marketing and production that can come up at the beginning of the process.
- It is necessary to diminish marketing risks by previously identifying possible buyers, and whenever possible, ensure sales before the harvest.
- Second-level organizations hired to manage projects must be rigorously monitored, including incorporating the perspectives of the associations with whom they work.

[21] Faustina Rodalleja. Leader of the Haas Avocado Productive Project. Interview, Nov 26, 2013.
[22] Ibid.

Ricardo Mera, beneficiary of the Haas avocado project, Cajibio, Cauca

15. Gente Estratégica (GE)

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I. Context

The company, Gente Estratégica focuses on outsourcing services and human resources management. In 2006, it learned about a request for proposal from the MIDAS program regarding support for small businesses. Since it met the criteria of job creation, technical assistance, and attention provided to vulnerable populations, it registered, submitted a project, and was selected.

This case is of interest to USAID because it is a successful example of job creation, business growth, and effective support provided to vulnerable communities. MIDAS' role was crucial because its timely support enabled the company to move from being a small company to becoming a large one. In addition to technical assistance, MIDAS facilitated the acquisition of software that enabled administrative expansion and also developed the main value-added element of the company, a work training center.

Key actors were Gente Estratégica (GE), MIDAS, and the private sector. During the implementation of MIDAS there was no specific role for the state or for local authorities.

II. Process

The goal of the activity was to create 1,903 jobs. Overall, 3,077 jobs were created over a period of 1.5 years (2007-2008). Over 2,700 jobs were created in social strata 1 and 2, demonstrating the social focus of the activity. Prior to MIDAS, the company was present in 10 cities; today it operates in 63. Moreover, today the company is implementer for a range of cooperation agencies and international foundations. The company has employed 625 Afro-Colombians and indigenous persons with companies such as call-centers. Dropout rates are below 5%.

III. Lessons Learned

- The manager had broad experience and business vision. He correctly identified the bottlenecks to company growth and to increasing coverage of vulnerable populations. These included: the lack of a tool (software) to manage a company with thousands of employees in multiple cities and the lack of a training center which would provide valued personnel training customized to the needs of the client companies.
- GE has legitimacy and a network of contacts and agreements with the business sector that enabled it to identify the markets for the personnel it trained. GE has agreements with large marketing and production companies, such as Éxito and Carrefour. The ability to find employment opportunities with agility was important given that vulnerable communities have difficulty waiting for a job match, due to poverty and other social challenges. The lesson learned is that programs, products and services need

to be relevant to the needs of the sector and that efforts must focus on meeting existing sector demand.

- The activity met international quality standards. Even when work is carried out by persons with low educational levels, training must meet international requirements. It must be a hardnosed business approach, and not the softer approach typical of charities. Companies must use a win-win approach that is sustainable over time. It cannot be a welfare initiative.
- The activity approached training comprehensively, not limiting itself to productive issues. At GE this is called "Strengthening of the Self". This approach recognizes that when trying to create jobs in poor communities, one is starting out with people whose self-esteem, aptitude and social skills are significantly below the optimum. Because of this, training and coaching in this area is ongoing and lasts an average of 18 months.
- GE provided psychosocial support, involving the whole family. This is very important because often pupils drop out due to family pressure, i.e., when couples or parents do not understand the advantages of training for the beneficiaries.
- Training was both theoretical and practical, with lab installations designed to carry out business practices (GE has an industrial bakery, a call center, a market, etc.). Furthermore, the last phase of training emphasized labor placement and real practices.
- The quality of installations, benefits such as transportation aids and snacks, and, above all, humane treatment were motivating factors for beneficiaries who have persevered and succeeded in the process.
- The benefits expressed by the beneficiaries are:
    - Ability to have access to higher training
    - Use of the installations, material, equipment and libraries, all of excellent quality
    - Quality of the teachers
    - Knowledge of subsidies provided by the government
    - Flexible schedules to enable attendance
    - Work opportunities
    - Self-esteem
    - Constant follow-up of each case by the directors
    - Family meetings
    - Improvement in family relations
    - Employment and income

16. Greystar

Location: California, Department of Santander
Contact: Juan Hernando Puyana (RSE Superintendent)
Olivia Pulido (Beneficiary)
Sandra Blanco (Beneficiary)
Cecilia Guerrero Villamizar (Beneficiary)
Ana Dolores Lizcano (Beneficiary)
Telephone: 6347778 ext 222
Email: jhpuyana@eco-oro.com.co

I. Context

The Santurbán region has historically been connected to gold exploitation. During the field visit residents expressed concern related to the impact on the economy from the government establishing a protected area to conserve the páramo ecosystem. That decree outlawed most mining activities, thereby reducing local incomes. Some local companies have begun laying off workers. Anecdotally, local people estimate that at present the companies have approximately one-tenth of the number of plant workers they used to have. In fact, the subject company, Greystone, suffered as a result of the decree, eventually being sold and adopting its current name, EcoOro.

Interviewees reported that illegal armed groups (mainly guerrilla) have fallen back and the area is under control by the authorities. Nevertheless, they also expressed their concern about the mining companies closing down, possibly enabling illegal groups to take over the zone again.

MIDAS co-financed an effort with Greystar to create an association of family farms, in which mainly the miners' wives would participate. As long as Greystone was in good shape economically and was providing support to the association, it functioned effectively. But as Greystone's support retreated, the association deteriorated. Nevertheless, the MIDAS efforts left behind capacity among participants that that has enabled them to regroup, to produce crops, even resulting in surpluses for commercialization.

Thus, the reason for choosing the case is because during the MIDAS period, it might have been regarded as a failure, partly due to external economic factors affecting Greystone. However, in hindsight, today it can be seen as an intervention that left a set of capabilities behind that ultimately allowed the people involved to find productive alternatives to mining.

II. Process

In 2007, MIDAS and GreyStar co-financed an effort to create a vegetable production association in the municipality of California and its surroundings. The idea was to (a) provide labor and production alternatives other than mining, by supporting the promotion of small-scale farming; and (b) have alternative employment for mining households, particularly workers' wives.

California is traditionally a mining town, either by panning or through multinational companies, with little other productive activity. Therefore, the family farm initiative was viewed as a welcome innovation, even before the mining sector disappeared locally.

Despite the "failure" of the specific family farm imitative, it is possible to observe the positive effects of the MIDAS intervention today in the form of a range of productive projects as the economic crisis has led people to plant food crops. This transition was facilitated by the new farming knowledge introduced through MIDAS.

All of this is complemented by initiatives coming from the mayor's office that seek to provide alternatives to the municipality. Among the main actions that have paid off is the consolidation of an internal market, where farmers sell what they manage to grow in their fields at better prices.

III. Lessons Learned

- Strengthening and establishing general capacity in the intervention areas can benefit in unanticipated ways, sometimes cushioning external shocks.
- Effective training can lend resilience to weather negative external shocks.
- Families – even those with little conventional agricultural experience – will adopt new farming approaches when necessary.
- Municipal support for alternative livelihoods can be catalytic.

17. Strengthening Communication Process through Community Radio Network

Location: Puerto Caicedo
Contact: Jaime Perdomo, Legal Representative
Telephone: 3134946987

I. Context

The Cantoyaco Putumayo Community Radio Station Network was founded ten years ago with the support of the Catholic **C**hurch. It has been under the direction of its Legal Representative, Jaime Perdomo, for the last four years. He is currently Director of the Ocaina Estéreo Radio Station in Puerto Caicedo.

The main headquarters of Cantoyaco is located in the Ocaina Estéreo Radio Station, having been donated thirteen years ago by Fondo Amazónico. It has received support from other organizations, such as the German Catholic Organization, which helped update equipment and provided a mobile unit to broadcast from distant villages in the region. Cantoyaco also received support from the ADAM program.



Cantoyaco as received support from the Ministry of Culture for the last two years, and they manage a cooperation project with the government of Japan that involves the installation of an audio production center.

The Cantoyaco Putumayo Radio Station Network includes eight community broadcasting stations as follows:

1. Manantial Estéreo in Sibundoy
2. Ondas del Putumayo in Mocoa
3. Villa Cívica in Puerto Garzón
4. Amazonia Estéreo in Puerto Guzmán
5. Ocaina Estéreo in Puerto Caicedo
6. Colombianísima Estéreo in Puerto Asís
7. Orito Estéreo in Orito
8. Proyección Estéreo del Valle in Guames

"*Sometimes we also have the participation of indigenous broadcasting stations such as Radio Waira in Mocoa and Inga Kamentsa, in Puerto Leguizamo, but we are very far away.*"

Programming of the Putumayo Community Radio Station Network is aimed at dealing with the needs and problems of the communities of the department; it covers topics on the environment, farming, governance, education, human rights and conflict, among other issues.

	*"Ocaina Estereo is a central meeting place for the Caicedense community, which aims to empower human capabilities and disseminate folk wisdom in order to create alternatives in terms of opinions and participation and promote peaceful conviviality, food security and cultural expressions through the dissemination of programs that contribute to the development of our municipality"*

Some of the most popular programs broadcast are:

Ocain Andariega: It is broadcast to the veredas through its mobile unit, working with community leaders to find out what is going in the municipalities and to support to the region and promote budget transparency.

Asmun Asociación Municipal de Mujeres: Topics include health and gender issues, rights, violence or abuse in the family, mining, etc.

Espacio Afro: Dedicated to the Afro-Colombian community that lives in the region; it dwells on specific topics of the community, their rights and duties.

Programa institucional de la alcaldía municipal: The Mayor's Office of Puerto Caicedo has a weekly, 1.5 hour program covering issues regarding its work in the municipality.

II. Process

ADAM was known because of its work in the department, but had been perceived as focused on large, productive or infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the Community Radio Station Network sensed an opportunity to participate.

> *"We told ADAM that we were autonomous and had to have complete independence; that if they were going to provide resources, they could not condition what we were going to do or say. They respected us. We liked that very much."*

ADAM provided timely support, because the Network was reactivating its Board of Directors and beginning a re-structuring process. With its program called "Strengthening Communications Processes of Community Radio Stations," and a donation of 76 million pesos, radio forums, chronicles, training, cultural events and a radio soap opera were launched. Examples of programming follow:

> *Chronicles:* The 52 chronicles centered on the problem of crop legality, and included topics such as fumigations, environmental damage and eradication (of illicit crops).
>
> *Pégate al Micrófono – Educational Program*: 120 young communicators were trained in broadcasting, so that in the future they would be able to lead the community radio stations of Putumayo.
>
> > *"In the indigenous communities, a certification was issued by their president or the reservation delegating them to participate in order to establish a commitment to contribute to radio activities."*

Country Music Festival in the Municipality of San Miguel: The festival promotes cultural values through string music of the region. All of the municipalities participated and groups were chosen by the department. The grand finale was held in the municipality of San Miguel.

Radio Soap Opera "Rio de Pasiones": The topic was related to the problems of illicit crops, their sale and the presence of armed groups. The soap opera had 24 chapters and was supported by ADAM with gifts for raffles among the audience.

> *"We enjoyed it very much, so much so that we repeated it three times… It was very important because somehow it made people aware that dealing with illegality brings a lot of problems."*

III. Lessons Learned

- Strengthening of the Network: Active participation of the communities empowers residents to evaluate the established policies and demonstrate that social realities are intertwined:

  "The trainees of 'Pégate al Micrófono', if they contribute to the radio, they also contribute to the community; they are reporters that can show us what is going on in their communities."

  "Training 120 persons creates an impact; they are still working in the radio."

- Formalization of the Network. The acknowledgment of Ocain as the best community radio station of the country mobilized ADAM's resources to develop a Process and Procedures Manual with as well as a Staff Manual for radio employees.

- The music festival inspired the creation of groups that have revitalized customs and traditions.

  "The string music festival was very good because that (kind of music) had already disappeared. Every week we broadcast a program with six groups that were created."

- The impact of the soap opera was to bring family realities around the problems of illicit crops from the private to the public realm, helping people identify with the reality. Community participation was key, as they now identify with these problems.

  "ADAM must make agreements with the communities because the projects that it brought were designed elsewhere and imposed on the people. They should create a proposal based on the communities saying: what we need is this and that. And, this should be agreed. This way, things will work out. Otherwise they won't."

18. Textiles Monica Urquijo

Location: Barranquilla
Contact: Mónica Urquijo, Director.
Araceli Lechuga, Weaver.
Claudia Cuello, Partner.
Address: Kr. 57 # 68 – 80, Barrio El Prado, Barranquilla
Telephone: 368 4761
Email: monicatex50@hotmail.com

I. Context

Textiles Mónica Urquijo is a business of handicrafts, mainly textiles, started over ten years ago in Barranquilla, Colombia. Its founder, Monica Urquijo, has sought to combine creative work and innovation with social commitment, for which she has won several international awards. Most of the workers are woman heads of households, some of them victims of forced displacement and violence.

During the ten years she has been working on this issue, Monica Urquijo has had all kinds of difficulties in consolidating her business. Over this period, she has identified weaknesses on both the commercial and administrative levels and in the field of human resources. Her ventures have floundered several times and yet she has always restarted her creative and social work.

In 2007, Monica sought support from the USAID MIDAS program, through Fenalco - Atlantico. The project was expected to strengthen the company and solve specific problems that had been previously identified, including internationalization, market consolidation and labor relations. The process had mixed results, with great apparent success in the early years that was not sustainable later on.

II. Process

To consolidate Textiles Monica Urquijo as a competitive and, at the same time, inclusive company, the project focused on two fronts. First, Monica as head of the organization, attended workshops on marketing, inventory management, human resource management, and legal processes. Second, the artisans attended workshops on entrepreneurship and cultural change.

The aim was to strengthen the company while the artisans improved their quality of life. Although it is likely that these objectives were met independently, the relationship between Mónica and craftswomen remained a challenge.

> *"After MIDAS we continued for a while ... and then they got bored. I'm losing them! ... I would like to have a magic wand to identify something that generates change"*
>
> (Monica Urquijo, November 2013)

The results recorded once the project was completed were very positive. Sales of the company increased, income and quality of life of women who were linked to the project improved, associated projects were initiated and in general there was much optimism.

Shortly after, the decline that continues to this day began. The vast majority of women who were hired by the company during the MIDAS project have gradually left. The disappointment and wear and tear that Monica felt with respect to the human resources of her region are evident. The expansion into international markets has not been achieved.

The artisans who are still in the company recognize that there has been a substantial improvement in the quality of life of their families, that their incomes have increased, that their expectations in life have changed and that there has been continual learning. Likewise, the businesswoman considers the experience with MIDAS to have strengthened her and allowed her to focus on her goals.

In summary, although the experience with the project was very positive for all involved, the fundamental objective, the integration between strengthening the company and improving the quality of life for the artisans, has not been achieved. There is a cultural gap that could not be overcome and that prevented the relationships within the business from flourishing.

III. Lessons Learned

- Understanding the cultural dynamics of the people involved in the projects will increase the possibility that the relationships between beneficiaries and business owners are maintained over time. In the case of this activity, it would be necessary for the beneficiaries to identify with experiences, situations and common objectives beyond that of obtaining individual economic benefit.
- Employment policies of the participating companies need to be formalized to ensure the sustainabile employment. Keeping the artisans in extra-legal work situations, without elements that foster a sense of belonging to the project, weakens the links between them and the company.
- It is advisable to conduct a mid-term evaluation with the beneficiaries in which they share their experiences and lessons learned and to create support networks among beneficiaries from different parts of the country. In the absence of feedback from similar experiences, the businesswoman feels great disappointment with the setbacks.

Annex VI: Data Collection Instruments

ENTREVISTA A PROFUNDIDAD CON BENEFICIARIOS PROYECTOS AGRÍCOLAS – INDIVIDUOS y ASOCIACIONES

(nombre y apellido), pertenezco al **CNC**, un centro de investigación social. Nos encontramos desarrollando **un estudio que tiene como fin explorar las opiniones sobre los programas ADAM y MIDAS que se han desarrollado en la región**. Su identidad así como las respuestas suministradas serán de **carácter confidencial**. **El beneficio de su participación es dar información sobre la cooperación internacional en las regiones.** Agradecemos su participación y su tiempo. Lo importante aquí es su espontaneidad, **no hay respuestas correctas o incorrectas; todas las opiniones son válidas.** Le reitero que nuestro compromiso es guardar la confidencialidad de su opinión.

CONTEXTO INICIAL

- Nombre
- Cargo/Rol en la organización
- Tiempo de antigüedad en la organización
- A qué sector pertenece esta organización

- Últimos 3 años: qué programas se hayan desarrollado en este municipio - ciudad?
- Recuerda de ADAM o MIDAS?
- Donde, cuánto tiempo, qué hicieron con ADAM o MIDAS

ASPECTOS CLAVE A INVESTIGAR

- De dónde surgió la idea del proyecto? Porqué se escogió ese producto? Quién formuló el proyecto?
- Por qué participaron en el proyecto?
- El programa **fue participativo**? Cómo/Por qué?
- Recibió información suficiente antes de iniciar?

Beneficios comerciales (ingresos)

- Qué **efectos tenía el proyecto** en usted y/o su familia, si es que los hubo *(acceso a crédito, unión con la comunidad, seguridad alimentaria, ingresos, autoestima, participación, sistemas de riego, etc.)*
- Impactos en su **situación económica o calidad de vida**? Cómo/Porqué?
- Impactos acerca de los intermediadores?
- Quién **le compra el producto**?
- Hay **alianzas** con empresas/gremios?

Fortalecimiento municipal

Ustedes han recibido **apoyo de la alcaldía**? Cómo?

Medio ambiente

Hubo cambios (positivos o negativos) en el **ecosistema**?

Capacitación

- El proyecto lo capacitó a usted/a la comunidad o asociación? En qué temas? Le ha servido?
- **La capacitación fue suficiente o faltó más**? En qué temas?

Sostenibilidad - Replicación

- **Qué se ha mantenido y qué no se pudo mantener** una vez terminó el apoyo del programa?
- El proyecto aún necesita asistencia técnica? O ustedes ya lo manejan solos?

Conflicto y zonas vulnerables

- Este tipo de proyectos ayudan **a reducir la siembra de coca**? Por qué?
- Estos proyectos ayudan a que los grupos armados o narcotraficantes se alejen?
- Qué **lecciones aprendidas** hay para trabajar en comunidades vulnerables/**en medio del conflicto**?

Enfoque diferencial de género y de etnia

- Este proyecto ha incluido a **las mujeres**? Cómo? Cómo participaron ellas?
- El proyecto ha sido **respetuoso de las tradiciones** ancestrales-étnicas-cosmovisión?
- ¿Cómo articulan los saberes tradicionales con las nuevas prácticas aprendidas?

CONSIDERACIONES FINALES

- Desde su punto de vista, cuáles lecciones deben aprender las entidades que estuvieron detrás de los programas ADAM y MIDAS?

a. Qué **resultados no esperados** tuvo el programa? Hubo beneficios adicionales?

b. **Si regresáramos al inicio del programa: qué repetiría de nuevo? Qué no repetiría?**

ENTREVISTA A PROFUNDIDAD CON SECTOR PRIVADO, ASOCIACIONES

(nombre y apellido), pertenezco al **CNC**, un centro de investigación social. Nos encontramos desarrollando **un estudio que tiene como fin explorar las opiniones sobre los programas ADAM y MIDAS que se han desarrollado en la región**. Su identidad así como las respuestas suministradas serán de **carácter confidencial**. **El beneficio de su participación es dar información sobre la cooperación internacional en las regiones.** Agradecemos su participación y su tiempo. Lo importante aquí es su espontaneidad, **no hay respuestas correctas o incorrectas; todas las opiniones son válidas.** Le reitero que nuestro compromiso es guardar la confidencialidad de su opinión.

CONTEXTO INICIAL

- Nombre
- Cargo/Rol en la organización
- Tiempo de antigüedad en la organización
- A qué sector pertenece esta organización

- Últimos 3 años: qué programas se hayan desarrollado en este municipio - ciudad?
- Recuerda de ADAM o MIDAS?
- Donde, cuánto tiempo, qué hicieron con ADAM o MIDAS

ASPECTOS CLAVE A INVESTIGAR

Programa

- Qué **tipo de aporte** recibió su empresa u asociación?
- Qué impacto, si hubo alguno, hizo el programa para su empresa u asociación?
- Qué impacto, si hubo alguno, dejó el programa para el sector, o para su región?
- Cómo le pareció el **desarrollo o desempeño** del programa?

Sostenibilidad - Replicación

- **Qué se ha mantenido y qué no se pudo mantener** una vez terminó el apoyo del programa?
- Hubo algun aspecto del programa que su empresa/asociación haya apropiado? Por qué?

Alianzas público-privadas

- Se creó alguna **alianza** de que su empresa o asociación tomó parte? (Caso afirmativo) Describela por favor.
- Cree Ud. que esta alianza **le dio un beneficio a su municipio o región**? (Caso afirmativo) Por qué y cómo?
- Cuales lecciones habrá del programa para el **fomento de alianzas exitosas**?

Capacitación y asesoría técnica

- Recibió su empresa/asociación **aporte en forma de asesoría o capacitación técnica**?
- (Caso afirmativo) Describe el aporte técnico y califica, por favor, **su utilidad y calidad** para su empresa u asociación.
- Falta capacitación o asesoría técnica en otros temas? Cuales?

Participación comunitaria

- El proyecto **invitó la participación comunitaria**? (Caso afirmativo) Cómo y con qué fin?
- Qué recomendaciones tendría Ud. para que se desarrolle mejor en cuanto a la participación comunitaria? Por qué?

Conflicto y zonas vulnerables

- Este programa incluyó comunidades vulnerables?
- En su opinión, ha tenido el programa efectos qué van **más allá de la economiía familiar**, por ejemplo a economías de mayor escala? Por qué?
- Qué **lecciones aprendidas** hay para trabajar en comunidades vulnerables/**en medio del conflicto**?

Enfoque diferencial de género y de etnia

Este proyecto ha incluido a **las**

mujeres? Cómo? Cómo participaron ellas?

CONSIDERACIONES FINALES

- Desde su punto de vista, cuáles lecciones deben aprender las entidades que estuvieron detrás de los programas ADAM y MIDAS?

c. Qué **resultados no esperados** tuvo el programa? Hubo beneficios adicionales?

d. **Si regresáramos al inicio del programa: qué repetiría de nuevo? Qué no repetiría?**

Cabezote		
Evaluación MIDAS/ADAM	Centro Nacional de Consultoría S.A. Calle 34 N° 5-27 Bogotá Teléfono: 339 4888	Empresas beneficiarias del programa MIDAS
Centro de Costos:	Fecha:14/11/2013	Prueba Piloto: Sí No
Elaborado por: Carlos Castro	Revisado por:	Revisado en Campo por:

1. ¿Recuerda usted que entre el año 2006 y 2010 su negocio/empresa fue beneficiaria del programa MIDAS financiado por USAID?

1. Si ------→ **1.1**. Año en que fue beneficiaria: _____
2. No ----→ Termine

2. El tipo de beneficio que recibió fue:

Capacitación	1
Asistencia Técnica	2
Entrega de insumos para la producción	3
Capacitación	4
Dotación de elementos o equipos	5

- **Saludo al primer contacto.** Muy Buenos días/ tardes/ noches, mi nombre en _(nombre y apellido) . Le saludo en nombre del Centro Nacional de Consultoría, una empresa privada dedicada a la investigación social. Actualmente estamos realizando un estudio para _(nombre de la entidad/ empresa) . Por favor, ¿podría hablar con el Sr. (Sra.) Gerente y/o representante legal de la empresa

- ***Saludo al Informante.*** *Muy buenos días/ tardes/ noches (Dr.) / (Dra.) (nombre del informante de la base). Mi nombre es (nombre y apellido). Estoy llamando del Centro Nacional de Consultoría, una empresa dedicada a la investigación. Actualmente estamos realizando un estudio para _(nombre de la entidad/ empresa) , que tiene el propósito de (remplace por el objetivo del estudio). Por esa razón, me estoy comunicando con usted para pedirle que por favor me dedique unos _15_____ minutos para responderme unas preguntas. El beneficio de su participación es hacer valer sus opiniones y las de su compañía en la presente investigación. Su participación es voluntaria y su identidad, la de su compañía y las respuestas suministradas serán de carácter confidencial. Los datos se utilizarán para fines estadísticos y de mejoramiento. Le agradezco de antemano su valiosa colaboración. Para cualquier inquietud puede comunicarse con el Centro Nacional de Consultoría, teléfono 3394888.*

Iniciación Hora /__/__/ minutos **/__/__/**

Otros Cuales_____	

3. Conoce Ud. si además de los recursos invertidos por el programa MIDAS/USAID para financiar la ***(E:Mencione el beneficio señalado en p2)*** recibida por su negocio/empresa, alguna otra entidad, pública o privada invirtió recursos para que su negocio/empresa recibiera éste beneficio?
Si
No ---- **Pase a 5**

4. Cual fue el nombre(s) de la(s) entidad(es) que también invirtieron recursos para que su negocio/empresa recibiera el beneficio entregado por el programa MIDAS de USAID?
Nombre entidad:_____

4.1. Del 100% del valor total del proyecto financiado por MIDAS/USAID, ¿Qué porcentaje calcula Ud. financió ***(E:Mencione la entidad señalada en p4):*** _____**%**

5. Nombre del negocio/empresa ***(E: Para el caso de los negocios agrícolas, nombre del productor):***
_____
__

6. Nombre de la persona que responde:
_____**6.1.**
Cargo:_____

7. Por favor describa la actividad a la que se dedica el negocio/unidad productiva:
_____
_____
_____

8. Lugar donde está ubicada el negocio/empresa:
Municipio:_____ Departamento:_____

8.1. Año de creación del negocio/empresa:
__/__/__/__

9. Zona donde se ubica su negocio/empresa:
1. Urbana
2. Rural

10. Con respecto al año ***(E: Mencione el año reportado en p. 1.1)*** la situación **ACTUAL** de su negocio/unidad productiva en cuanto a los siguientes aspectos ha:(Aumentado/permanecido igual/Disminuido):

	1. Aumentado	**2. Permanecido Igual**	**3. Disminuid**
a. La producción/ventas anuales	1	2	3
b. El número de empleados formales (con contrato de trabajo escrito)	1	2	3
c. Los mercados donde comercializa/vende sus productos. (El número de clientes a los que le vende?)	1	2	3
d. El número de proveedores a los que le compra los insumos	1	2	3
e. Las posibilidades de acceder a créditos para la producción/comercialización	1	2	3
f. La capacidad para gestionar proyectos y recursos que beneficien al negocio/unidad productiva	1	2	3

11. Con respecto al año ***(E: Mencione el año reportado en p. 1.1)*** la situación **ACTUAL** de su negocio/unidad productiva en cuanto a los siguientes aspectos ha:(Mejorado/permanecido igual/empeorado):

	1. Mejorado	**2. Permanecido Igual**	**3. Empeorad**
a. Conocimiento técnico para el manejo de la producción	1	2	3

y/o ventas			
b. Conocimiento para el manejo administrativo/financiero del negocio/unidad empresa (aspectos contables, operativos)	1	2	3
c. La planta física, instalaciones y equipos para la producción y ventas de su negocio/empresa	1	2	3
d. El uso de la tecnología para la operación del negocio/empresa (software, computadores, etc)	1	2	3
e. La capacidad para asociarse con otros negocios/ empresas para compra de insumos, acceder a nuevos mercados, tener mayor representación como gremio, etc	1	2	3
f. El manejo ambiental de la negocio/empresa en cuanto a manejo de desechos (reciclaje), manejo de aguas residuales, etc	1	2	3

12. En general, comparando la situación ACTUAL de este negocio/empresa, con las condiciones que tenía en el año ***(E: Mencione el año reportado en p. 1.1)*** Usted considera que ésta situación:

1. Mejoró
2. Permaneció Igual
3. Empeoró

13. A qué atribuye principalmente que la situación de su negocio/empresa haya: ***E: Mencione respuesta de la p.12***

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

14. Si en este momento se vendiera este negocio/empresa, cree Ud. que el valor de la venta es:

1. Mucho más de lo que se hubiera vendido hace 5 años
2. Algo más de lo que la hubiera vendido hace 5 años
3. Igual a lo que se hubiera vendido hace 5 años
4. Algo menos de lo que se hubiera vendido hace 5 años
5. Mucho menos de lo que se hubiera vendido hace 5 años

15. Cuál es el principal beneficio para su negocio/empresa que considera le trajo su participación en el programa MIDAS?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

16. Cuál es el número de empleados que **ACTUALMENTE** tiene su negocio/unidad productiva:

_____

17. Cuanto fueron las ventas totales de su negocio/unidad productiva el año inmediatamente anterior?

$_____

a. No lo sé/no responde

18. ¿Cuántas veces su negocio/unidad productiva ha participado en proyectos financiados por Agencia de Cooperación Norteamericana/USAID?

____ Veces

AGRADECIMIENTOS Y SOLICITUD DE COLABORACIÓN POSTERIOR

Le agradecemos mucho sus opiniones. Quisiera preguntarle si estaría dispuesto en el futuro a volver a colaborar con nosotros.

Sí	1	No	2

CONTROLES FINALES

Fecha de la encuesta Día /___/___/ Mes /___/___/ Año /_____/				Hora inicio /___/___/: /___/___/ Fin /___/___/: /___/___/			
Encuestador Cédula				Supervisor Cédula			
SUPERVISIÓN		HALLAZGO	RESPONSABLE	ACCIÓN	RESPONSABLE	APROB	RECHAZ
Monitorización (75%)	1					1	2
Re-contacto Presencial	2					1	2
Re-contacto Telefónico	3					1	2
Revisión en Campo	4					1	2
Revisión en Crítica	5					1	2
Notas							
HALLAZGO: 1 Inconsistencia- 2 Datos Ficticios- 3 Pregunta faltante ACCIÓN: 5 Anular- 6 Verificar- 7 Recuperar- 8 Devolver a Campo APROBADO/RECHAZADO						Verificad	Codificad
Verificación de Crítica	6	HALLAZGO		ACCIÓN			
HALLAZGO: 1 Omisión código - 2 Código errado - 3 Omisión de crítica				ACCIÓN: 1 Asignar código - 2 Corregir - 3 Revisión pases/Revisión campos - 7 Otro			

MINI-CHECKLIST AND SURVEY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS

Municipio:	Fecha iniciación obra:
Tipo de obra:	Fecha de entrega obra:

Investigador(a):

	Preguntas	Respuestas
ENTREVISTA A ACTORES LOCALES INVOLUCRADOS EN LA OBRA	1. Nombre	
	2. Ocupación	
	3. Rol frente a la obra (participo o no, de qué forma?)	
	4. La comunidad participó en el diseño de la obra? Cómo?	
	5. Esta obra era muy necesaria para la comunidad? (Mucho, poco, nada)	
	6. La construcción de la obra fue rápida o demorada? Por qué?	
	7. La comunidad participó en la construcción? Cómo?	
	8. La comunidad participó en la gestión de la obra? Cómo?	
	9. La alcaldía u otra institución apoyó la obra? Cómo? Lo sigue haciendo hoy en día?	

	10. La obra ha tenido efecto en la calidad de vida de la comunidad? Cómo?				
	11. Hubo algún inconveniente, un problema o un conflicto con grupos armados u otros actores opuestos a la obra?				
	12. Cómo se sostiene o se financia el mantenimiento de la obra?				
OBSERVACIÓN EN TERRENO Para investigador(a) CNC	**Anotaciones**	Si	No	No aplica	Porque?
	La infraestructura se ve en buen estado?				
	Existen evidencias de deterioro físico?				
	La pintura está en buen estado?				
	La comunidad da mantenimiento?				
	La infraestructura esta siendo utilizada para su objetivo?				
	Hay alguna organización comunitaria alrededor de la infraestructura?				
	La comunidad consultada se muestra satisfecha aun?				
	COMENTARIOS OBSERVACIONES				

Guia para estudios de caso

"Como un método en una evaluación, un estudio de caso es un medio de aprendizaje sobre una instancia compleja, basada en un entendimiento comprensivo de esa instancia, obtenida por descripción y análisis extensivas de esa instancia, tomada como una cosa entera y dentro de su contexto"

(USAID 2013, "Technical Note: Evaluative Case Studies", Washington DC, November, p. 1)

Se usa a través de entrevistas a profundidad o grupos focales (i) cuando las preguntas más destacadas son la "por qué" y el "cómo", (ii) para ilustrar "buenos ejemplos" o casos exitosos

Titulo del caso elegido:	Dirección:
Localización del caso:	Teléfono:
Persona de contacto:	Correo electronico:

I. Ubicación contextual del estudio de caso

Aquí se debe proporcionar información sobre el caso objeto de estudio, sobre la situación que se vive y la cobertura territorial. El caso debe ser de un hecho de interés para USAID y su cooperación en Colombia o para el país, y se debe de elaborar en forma muy concreta.

Dentro de esta descripción debe comentar el papel que han jugado la comunidad, el gobierno local, USAID, y/o el Estado y sus instituciones. Y otra información sobre el contexto, que a usted les parezca relevante: ¿Por qué se eligió esta experiencia?

II. El proceso

Este apartado debe ser el "corazón del caso". En forma muy concreta se debe mencionar el contenido esencial de cómo se dio o está dando el proceso como tal, y elementos para el análisis critico, que tengan sustento en literatura, documentos publicados, información de instituciones, o grupos que dirigieron el proceso.

Es relevante consignar información sobre las fechas de inicio y final del proceso del caso; el marco del asunto de que se trata; ¿porqué se da la experiencia?; ¿Que dio inició al proceso? ¿Qué decisiones claves se dieron o están dando en el proceso? ¿Y como se están tomando en cuenta esas decisiones? (SOLO HACER UNA MENCIÓN, NO ENTRAR EN DETALLES).

III. Lecciones Aprendidas

En este apartado se mencionan algunas lecciones aprendidas de las más importantes y que estén vinculadas directamente con el tema escogido y el proceso de investigación.

Annex VII: Sources of Information

This annex contains all sources consulted, including documentary (bibliography), site visits (infrastructure works) and human subjects (interviews and focus groups.) Where anonymity was requested, names were omitted. Files with sources' sex and ethnicity are included on the data disk in the final evaluation submission.

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In addition to the above titles, the team reviewed unpublished documents that were provided to the evaluation team, including:

- ADAM and MIDAS PMPs (2008)
- Work Plans (all years)
- ADAM and MIDAS contracts and modifications
- Briefers
- Online activity one-pagers ("*fichas*") and communications documents from the MIDAS website repository
- Supplemental ADAM program reports and M&E documentation (provided by Tetratech ARD on CD)
- MIDAS PyMEs model disc
- An extensive set of MIDAS internal component documents on policy efforts in several sectors.

INTERVIEWS

	Name	Role	Component	Organization name	Project	Department	Municipality/city
1	Carlos Alberto Alvares	Beneficiary	SME	Compañía de Empaques	MIDAS	Antioquia	Medellín
2	Jhon Jairo Mira Castillo	Beneficiary	SME	Compañía de Empaques	MIDAS	Antioquia	Medellín
3	Francisco Serna	Beneficiary	SME	Compañía de Empaques	MIDAS	Antioquia	Medellín
4	Claudia Mier	Beneficiary	SME	Compañía de Empaques	MIDAS	Antioquia	Medellín
5	Fernando Baena	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación Uniban	ADAM	Antioquia	Medellín
6	Luis Felipe Cano Vieira	Operator	Agribusiness	Interactuar	MIDAS	Antioquia	Medellín
7	Gina D'Amato Herrera	Implementer	M&E	ARD	MIDAS	Antioquia	Medellín
8	Mauricio Enriquez	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	ASOCAMA	MIDAS	Antioquia	Medellín
9	Rodolfo Rodríguez	Implementer	Agribusiness	ARD	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
10	Yuli Gonzalez Jaramillo	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Palmeras de la Costa	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
11	Furio Risaldiero	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Compañía Envasadora del Atlántico	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
12	Pedro Mahecha	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Tecnoaji	MIDAS	Bolívar	Cartagena
13	Dennis Fajardo	Implementer	SME	ARD	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
14	Pero Sierra	Implementer	SME	ARD	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
15	Heidy Rivera	Implementer	SME	ARD	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
16	Azucena Guaque	Beneficiary	SME	Gente Estratégica	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
17	Araceli Lechuga	Beneficiary	SME	Textiles Mónica Urquijo	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
18	Claudia Cuello	Beneficiary	SME	Textiles Mónica Urquijo	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
19	Monica Urquijo	Beneficiary	SME	Textiles Mónica Urquijo	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
20	Giovanni Montaño	Beneficiary	SME	Caribean Supply	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
21	Francisco Tarud	Beneficiary	SME	Termocoil	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
22	Estefanía Payares	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Proyecto de Vivienda Urbana Enrraiza	ADAM	Bolívar	San Pablo
23	Miguel Vargas	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación Aprocasur	ADAM	Bolívar	Santa Rosa del Sur
24	Francisco Suarez	Beneficiary	SME	Campito	MIDAS	Bolívar	Cartagena
25	Johnny Pacheco	Operator	SME	Cámara de Comercio	MIDAS	Bolívar	Cartagena
26	Amin Diaz	Beneficiary	SME	Cocoliso	MIDAS	Bolívar	Cartagena
27	Nubia Sanchez	Beneficiary	SME	Proyecto Alianza Cartagena	MIDAS	Bolívar	Cartagena

	Name	Role	Component	Organization name	Project	Department	Municipality/city
28	Patricia Lopez	Operator	Productive projects	Asociación Asocafé	ADAM	Bolívar	Santa Rosa del Sur
29	Isidro Buirán	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Aprocasurb	ADAM	Bolívar	San Pablo
30	Luis Hernando Quitían	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Villa Esperanza	ADAM	Bolívar	San Pablo
31	Cecilia Alarcón	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Villa Esperanza	ADAM	Bolívar	Santa Rosa del Sur
32	Petrona Abad	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Coragrosurb	ADAM	Bolívar	San Pablo
33	Carlos F. Espinal	Component lead	Agribusiness	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
34	Didier Meneses	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Palmariguaní	MIDAS	Cesar	Bosoconia
35	Oiden Zarate	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Palmariguaní	MIDAS	Cesar	Valledupar
36	Rafael Gil	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Aspalbe	MIDAS	Cesar	Valledupar
37	Gabriela Tarifa	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Confederación Indígena Tayrona	MIDAS	Cesar	Valledupar
38	María Consuelo Álvarez	Operator	Agribusiness	Corporación Autónoma	MIDAS	Huila	Neiva
39	Angela Arevalo	USAID	M&E	USAID	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
40	Ramiro Valderrama Carvajal	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Asociación Timaná	MIDAS	Huila	Timaná
41	Jorge Luis Muñoz España	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación Pitalito	ADAM	Huila	Pitalito
42	Carlos Iván Zuluaga	Component lead	Infrastructure	ARD	ADAM	C/Marca	Bogotá
43	Augusto Ruiz	Operator	Productive projects	Empresa privada Neiva	ADAM	Huila	Neiva
44	Mariluz Martínez Vera	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Cooperativa Tello	ADAM	Huila	Tello
45	Jairo Fonseca	Implementer	M&E	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
46	Jorge WIliam Cárdenas	Public servant	Productive projects	Gobernación del Huila	ADAM	Huila	Neiva
47	Jesús Torres	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación Bruselas	ADAM	Huila	Bruselas
48	Jaime Andres Niño	Component lead	Policy	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
49	Natalia Arias	Component lead	SME	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
50	Diego Bautista	Implementer	Policy	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
51	Eugenio Ceballos	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación de Productores y Comercialización de Leche y Desarrollo Alternativo Asocoprolyda	ADAM	Nariño	Aldana
52	Ana Lucia Cuastumal	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación Municipio Guachucal - Aprolim	ADAM	Nariño	Guachucal
	Name	**Role**	**Component**	**Organization name**	**Project**	**Department**	**Municipality/city**

53	Carlos Enrique Ampudia	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Asociacion de Palmicultores del Alto Mira Asopalmira	MIDAS	Nariño	Tumaco - Vereda San Juan Rio Mira
54	Blanca Ampudia	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Asociacion de Palmicultores del Alto Mira Asopalmira	MIDAS	Nariño	Tumaco - Vereda San Juan Rio Mira
55	Iván Caviedes	Operator	Productive projects	Colacteos	ADAM	Nariño	Pasto
56	Eudoro Bravo	Operator	Productive projects	Sociedad de Agricultores y Ganaderos de Nariño	ADAM	Nariño	Pasto
57	Liliana Noriega	Operator	Agribusiness	Fundescat	MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta
58	Marleny Rodriguez	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	STAM Limitada	MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Tibú
59	Parmenio Tinoco	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Asopalcat Uno	MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Tibú
60	Jhon Sandoval	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Liceo Alexander Humboldt	ADAM	Cauca	Timba
61	Silvestre Mejía	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Asogpados	MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Tibú
62	Mercedes Tobar	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Empresa Privada Puerto Asís	ADAM	Putumayo	Puerto Asís
63	Ricardo Cobo	Operator	Infrastructure	Fedar	ADAM	Cauca	Cajibío
64	José Díaz	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación Villa Garzón	ADAM	Putumayo	Villagarzón
65	Guillermo Hormaza	Operator	Infrastructure	Comfacauca, Caja de Compensacion Familiar del Cauca	ADAM	Cauca	Popayán
66	María Janeth Bermudez	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación La Hormiga	ADAM	Putumayo	La Hormiga
67	Elsy Ibarra	Operator	Agribusiness	Cámara Comercio de Puerto Asís	MIDAS	Putumayo	Puerto Asís
68	Gustavo Moreno Gutiérrez	Operator	Productive projects	Caja de Compensación de Puerto Asís	ADAM	Putumayo	Puerto Asís

	Name	Role	Component	Organization name	Project	Department	Municipality/city
69	Claudia Castillo	Operator	Productive projects	Comité de Ganaderos	ADAM	Putumayo	Puerto Asís
70	Rodrigo Ordóñez	Public servant	Infrastructure	Mayor (ret), San Sebastian	ADAM	Cauca	San Sebastian
71	Gilberto Yafué	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas Caldono - Nasa	ADAM	Cauca	Toribío
72	Rodrigo Trujillo	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Condimentos Villagarzón	ADAM	Putumayo	Villagarzón
73	Andrés Árias	Operator	Productive projects	Consultoría Mocoa	ADAM	Putumayo	Mocoa
74	Mabel Navarro	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación Coragrosur	ADAM	Bolívar	San Pablo
75	Carlos Albeiro Martínez Arango	Public servant	Productive projects	Alcaldía Municipal	ADAM	Bolívar	Santa Rosa del Sur
76	Eliodoro Tapias	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Coragrosurb	ADAM	Bolívar	Santa Rosa del Sur
77	Jaime Ospina	Component lead	Agroforestry	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
78	Liliana Muñoz Menecez	Operator	Agroforestry	Asociación San Agustín	MIDAS	Huila	San Agustín
79	Luis Ernesto Silva	Beneficiary	Agroforestry	Asociación San Agustín	MIDAS	Huila	San Agustín
80	Fluvia Salazar	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Teacher with Fedar student project	ADAM	Cauca	Almaguer
81	Tatiana Parra Guzman	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	High school student with Fedar project	ADAM	Cauca	Almaguer
82	Rosalba Vetio	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Citizen in town with water and sewer project	ADAM	Cauca	Pueblo Nuevo
83	Raul Collazos	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Teacher with Fedar student project	ADAM	Cauca	Popayán
84	Anderson Orobio	Beneficiary	Agroforestry	Consejo Comunitario Bajo Mira	MIDAS	Nariño	San Juan del Bajo Mira
85	Marcelina Hurtado Salla	Beneficiary	Agroforestry	Consejo Comunitario Río Chaguí	ADAM MIDAS	Nariño	San Juan del Bajo Mira
86	Luis Alexander Mejía	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Corporación Autónoma de Caquetá	ADAM	Putumayo	Mocoa
87	Luis Alberto López	Operator	Productive projects	Organización Zonal Indígena Mocoa	ADAM	Putumayo	Mocoa
88	Julio Cesar López	Operator	Productive projects	Organización Zonal Indígena Mocoa	ADAM	Putumayo	Mocoa
89	Manuel Montiel	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Colegio El Palmar	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
90	Anibal Martinez	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Colegio El Palmar	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
91	Ever Ignacio Ruiz	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Colegio Nueva Esperanza	ADAM	Córdoba	Puerto Libertador
92	Abel Sierra	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Colegio Nueva Esperanza	ADAM	Córdoba	Puerto Libertador
	Name	**Role**	**Component**	**Organization name**	**Project**	**Department**	**Municipality/city**

93	Humberto Sierra	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Colegio Belén	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
94	Onis Teran	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Hogar Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
95	Narciso Guerra Rivera	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Hogar Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
96	Luis Camano	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Puente Montelíbano (quebrada El Cristo)	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
97	Edilma Rosas	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Saneamiento Básico Córdoba	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
98	Maria Jimenez	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Saneamiento Básico Córdoba	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
99	Daniel de Jesus Aguilar Navarro	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Saneamiento Básico Córdoba	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
100	Anibal Martinez	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Saneamiento Básico Córdoba	ADAM	Córdoba	Montelíbano
101	Olivia Pulido	Beneficiary	Agroforestry	NA	MIDAS	Santander	California
102	Cecilia Guerrero	Beneficiary	Agroforestry	NA	MIDAS	Santander	California
103	Sergio Jaramillo	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	MIDAS	Antioquia	Medellín
104	Cristina Barrera	USAID	Multiple	USAID	ADAM	C/Marca	Bogotá
105	David Cano	USAID	Multiple	USAID	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
106	Bryan Rudert	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
107	Charles Oberbeck	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	ADAM	C/Marca	Bogotá
108	Francisco Bautista	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
109	Ximena Niño	Public servant	Multiple	Accion Social/GOC	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
110	Luis Carlos Lis Sanchez	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Carretera Vereda Corozal	ADAM	Huila	Isnos
111	Freddy Martinez	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	IE Eva Orozco	ADAM	Huila	Gigante
112	May Dorian Rosas	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	IE Silvania	ADAM	Huila	Gigante
113	Miguel Rojas	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Descole	ADAM	Huila	Pitalito
114	Gladys Diaz	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Colegio Huila	ADAM	Huila	Pitalito
115	Anonymous - resident	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	IE Montessori	ADAM	Huila	Pitalito
116	Tarsicio Duran	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Comedor Colegio Huila	ADAM	Huila	Pitalito
117	Anonymous - blackberry producer	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Comercializadora Isnos	ADAM	Huila	Isnos
118	Miguel Rojas	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Parque Pitalito	ADAM	Huila	Pitalito
119	Maria del Socorro Ipuz	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	IE Eduardo Santos	ADAM	Huila	Neiva
120	Elizabeth Rojas de Castaneda	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	IE Eduardo Santos	ADAM	Huila	Neiva
	Name	**Role**	**Component**	**Organization name**	**Project**	**Department**	**Municipality/city**

121	Luis Enrique Villamil	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Alcantarillado, bateas y puentes	ADAM	Huila	La Plata
122	Ana Cened Trujillo	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Baterias sanitarias La Lindosa	ADAM	Huila	La Plata
123	Anonymous - resident	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	IE San Sebastian	ADAM	Huila	La Plata
124	Diego Molano	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
125	Yesid Sandoval	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	ADAM	C/Marca	Bogotá
126	Maria Eugenia Tamara Torres	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	ADAM	C/Marca	Bogotá
127	Juan Pablo Urrutia	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	ADAM	Cauca	Popayán
128	Diana Maria Osorio	Contractor	Multiple	ARD	ADAM	Cauca	Popayán
129	Claudia Patricia	Contractor	Multiple	ARD	ADAM	Cauca	Popayán
130	Rigoberto Perez	Contractor	Multiple	ARD	ADAM MIDAS	Cauca	Popayán
131	Azucena Calderón	Contractor	Multiple	ARD	ADAM	Cauca	Popayán
132	Andres Bernal	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Acueducto Nariño	ADAM	Nariño	Tumaco
133	Isaac Quinones	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Carretera Chilvi to Robles	ADAM	Nariño	Tumaco
134	Ligia Doris Valencia	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Casa Acción Comunal Tangareal	ADAM	Nariño	Tumaco
135	Yamile Araujo	Contractor	Infrastructure	ARD	ADAM	Nariño	Tumaco
136	Francisco del Castillo	Implementer	Multiple	ARD	ADAM MIDAS	Nariño	Pasto
137	Jorge Arévalo	Public servant	NA	Banco Agrario	MIDAS	C/Marca	Bogotá
138	Antonio Alegria	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Government house and football field	ADAM	Nariño	Tumaco
139	Anderson Orobio	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Sports complex and school	ADAM	Nariño	San Juan del Bajo Mira
140	Isaac Quinones	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Water plant	ADAM	Nariño	Tumaco
141	Agustin Olmedo	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Sports complex and park Rescate las Varas	ADAM	Nariño	Tumaco
142	Maria Margarita Araujo	Beneficiary	Microcredit	Banco Agrario credit	MIDAS	Nariño	Tumaco
143	Jose Arcadio Valencia Pedraza	Beneficiary	Microcredit	Banco Agrario credit	MIDAS	Nariño	Tumaco
144	Antonia Cortejo	Beneficiary	Microcredit	Banco Agrario credit	MIDAS	Nariño	Tumaco
145	Dora Tenorio Martinez	Beneficiary	Microcredit	Banco Agrario credit	MIDAS	Nariño	Tumaco
146	Silvio Estupiñán	Operator	Microcredit	Banco Agrario	MIDAS	Nariño	Tumaco
147	Victor Gallo	Public servant	NA	Municipality	ADAM MIDAS	Nariño	Tumaco

	Name	Role	Component	Organization name	Project	Department	Municipality/city
148	Jaider Tovar	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Amunorca, Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities	ADAM	Cauca	Popayán
149	Adelmo Carabalín	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Association of three municipalities	ADAM	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao
150	Mónica Fonseca	Operator	SME	Proempresas	MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta
151	Carlos Rodríguez	Public servant	SME	Municipality	MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta
152	Clemencia Carabalín	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Association of three municipalities	ADAM	Cauca	Timba
153	Apolonia Aragán Mina	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Association of three municipalities	ADAM	Cauca	Timba
154	Nicanor	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Comité Municipal de Paneleros	ADAM	Cauca	Cajibío
155	Soraida Cuellar	Operator	Productive projects	CoObra	ADAM	Cauca	Timba
156	Gabriel Cuaran	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Comité Municipal de Paneleros	ADAM	Cauca	Tambo
157	Salvadro Barragán	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Junta de Acción Comunal	MIDAS	Putumayo	Puerto Asís
158	Hernán Ibarra	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Fesap cacao association	ADAM	Cauca	Patía
159	Faustina Rodalleja Valencia	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Frepac	ADAM	Cauca	Toribío
160	Sandra Patricia Rebolledo	Operator	Productive projects	Crepic	ADAM	Cauca	Silvia
161	Carlos Cotacio	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Coffee project executed by Fedecafe	ADAM	Cauca	Inzá
162	Jaime Perdomo	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Asociación Puerto Caicedo	ADAM	Putumayo	Puerto Caicedo
163	Carlos Rodrigo Solarte	Operator	Productive projects	Fedecafe (regional)	ADAM MIDAS	Cauca	Popayán
164	Liliana Mera	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Apropesca	ADAM	Cauca	Silvia
165	Marco Elías Mosquera	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asprocafe	ADAM MIDAS	Cauca	Silvia
166	Humberto Olejua	Operator	SME	Comfenalco	MIDAS	Santander	Bucaramanga
167	Carmen Cecilia Quintero	Operator	SME	Comfenalco	MIDAS	Santander	Bucaramanga
168	Jorge Gómez	Beneficiary	SME	Pasteurizadora La Mejor	MIDAS	Santander	Barrancabermeja
169	Mónica Castro Parra	Operator	SME	Camara de Comercio de Barrancabermeja	MIDAS	Santander	Barrancabermeja
170	Nohemy Aparicio	Operator	SME	Coemprender	MIDAS	Santander	Barrancabermeja
171	Paola Ruiz	Operator	SME	Coemprender	MIDAS	Santander	Barrancabermeja
172	Nilson Ahumada	Operator	SME	RSE Multiservicios	MIDAS	Santander	Barrancabermeja
173	Laura Ahumada	Operator	SME	RSE Multiservicios	MIDAS	Santander	Barrancabermeja

	Name	Role	Component	Organization name	Project	Department	Municipality/city
174	Jorge Cortissoz	Implementer	SME	ARD	MIDAS	Santander	Bucaramanga
175	Claudia Patricia Navarro	Beneficiary	SME	Linco-Floridablanca	MIDAS	Santander	Floridablanca
176	Andrés Gómez	Beneficiary	SME	Linco-Floridablanca	MIDAS	Santander	Floridablanca
177	Aumer Manuel Gachetá	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Coffee project executed by CoObra	ADAM	Cauca	Silvia
178	Juan Carlos Realpe	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Asociación de pequeños agricultores campesinos	ADAM	Cauca	Popayán
179	Miguel Ángel Vargas	Operator	Productive projects	Aprocasur	ADAM	Santander	Barrancabermeja
180	Ludwin Guerrero	Contractor	SME	Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Tecnica Agropecuaria	MIDAS	Santander	Suratá
181	Rogelio Rayo	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Alcantarillado Vereda Pueblo Nuevo	ADAM	Tolima	Ortega
182	Jose Alirio Ramos	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Colegio Carlos Lleras	ADAM	Tolima	Ibagué
183	Emiro Quesada Reyes	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Aulas IE La Reforma	ADAM	Tolima	Rovira
184	Ludis Solano	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Alcantarillado Vereda Buenos Aires	ADAM	Tolima	Ibagué
185	Luz Mariela Pachon Toro	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Acueducto Acuamodelia	ADAM	Tolima	Ibagué
186	Alirio Torres	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Centro de Atencion a familias desplazadas	ADAM	Tolima	Rioblanco
187	Juan Keney Prada	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Colegio Vereda San Nicolas	ADAM	Tolima	Ortega
188	Simon Hernandez	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Aulas IE Nueva Esperanza	ADAM	Tolima	Ibagué
189	Enrique Polo	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Polideportivo	ADAM	Tolima	San Antonio
190	Fabian Elias Botero	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Aulas de colegio	ADAM	Tolima	Ibagué
191	Walter Yanguma Garcia	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Aulas de colegio Vereda El Quebradon	ADAM	Tolima	Rioblanco
192	Jose Agustin Perdomo	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Bridge Veredas San Miguel and La Conquista	ADAM	Tolima	Rioblanco

FOCUS GROUPS

Legend
#W = Number of women
#M = Number of men

#W	#M	Role	Component	Organization name	Program	Department	City/town
4	1	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Aproaca	MIDAS	Antioquia	Caceres
4	3	Beneficiary	SME	Gente Estratégica	MIDAS	Atlántico	Barranquilla
3	0	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	High school students with Fedar project	ADAM	Cauca	Altamira
0	4	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Avocado growers, Frepac	ADAM	Cauca	Cajibío
4	2	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Junta de accion comunal	ADAM	Cauca	Villa Gorgona
1	4	Beneficiary	Productive projects	Fish farmers Apropesca	ADAM	Cauca	Silvia
3	7	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Palmeras de la Costa	MIDAS	Cesar	El Copey
2	5	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Palmariguaní	MIDAS	Cesar	Becerril
0	6	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Asociación Ganaderos Sur del Huila	MIDAS	Huila	Timaná
2	6	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Asoprocolyda	ADAM	Narino	Aldana
4	4	Beneficiary	Infrastructure	Asopalmira	ADAM	Narino	San Juan de Rio Mira
0	3	Operator	Agribusiness	Asocati and Asogpados	MIDAS	Norte de Santander	Tibú
1	4	Beneficiary	Agribusiness	Asociación Productores Agropecuarios Valle de Guamuez	ADAM	Putumayo	La Hormiga
0	3	Beneficiary	Microenterprise	Coemprender y Fundesmag	MIDAS	Santander	Barrancabermeja

INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS VISITED

	Department	Municipality/city	Type of Infrastructure work(s)
1	Tolima	Ibagué	Classroom construction
2	Tolima	Rioblanco	Bridge
3	Tolima	Rovira	Classroom construction
4	Tolima	Ibagué	Classrooms for displaced community
5	Tolima	Ibagué	Sanitary sewerage
6	Tolima	Ortega	Sanitary sewerage
7	Tolima	Ortega	School construction
8	Tolima	Rioblanco	Classroom construction
9	Tolima	San Antonio	Sports center
10	Tolima	Rioblanco	Classrooms for displaced community
11	Tolima	Ibagué	Aqueduct
12	Tolima	Ibagué	Classroom construction
13	Huila	Gigante	School improvements
14	Huila	La Plata	Sanitary sewerage and a bridge
15	Huila	Isnos	Highway maintenance
16	Huila	Isnos	Classroom and restroom construction
17	Huila	La Plata	School construction
18	Huila	Pitalito	Recreation area
19	Huila	Pitalito	Run-off system for rainwater and wastewater
20	Huila	Pitalito	School construction
21	Huila	Pitalito	School cafeteria construction
22	Huila	Rivera	School cafeteria construction
23	Huila	Gigante	Headquarters remodeling
24	Huila	Gigante	School construction
25	Huila	La Plata	Restroom construction
26	Huila	Gigante	Construction of three highway ramps
27	Huila	Neiva	School construction
28	Huila	Isnos	Blackberry collection and marketing center
29	Nariño	Tumaco	Water treatment plant and a bridge
30	Nariño	Tumaco	Sports center and children's park
31	Nariño	Tumaco	Sports center and school construction
32	Nariño	Tumaco	Government building and recreational area construction
33	Nariño	Tumaco	Sports center, aqueduct, a bridge and two schools
34	Nariño	Tumaco	Aqueduct, school construction, sanitary sewerage and a bridge
	Department	**Municipality/city**	**Type of Infrastructure work(s)**
35	Nariño	Tumaco	Headquarters for Junta de Accion Comunal

36	Nariño	Tumaco	Highway from Chivli to Robles
37	Córdoba	Montelíbano	Sanitation project for displaced families
38	Córdoba	Montelíbano	Housing construction
39	Córdoba	Montelíbano	School improvements
40	Córdoba	Montelíbano	School improvements
41	Córdoba	Puerto Libertador	School improvements
42	Córdoba	Montelíbano	Bridge over Quebrada El Cristo

Annex VIII: Disclosure of any Conflicts of Interest

Conflicts of Interest disclosure statements are included for all team members on the disk submitted as part of the final evaluation package.

Annex IX: Analytical codes used in qualitative analysis

The following codes, or analytical categories, were applied to all the interviews, recordings and infrastructure survey data during data analysis. The codes correspond to the key themes identified by the evaluation team, from among the activity sets under study. The number of citations reflects the number of times the themes were discussed in interviews and focus groups.

Codes for interviews and focus groups – notes and recordings (222 records)	
Code	**Number of citations**
Strategic alliances	160
Quality of life	50
Armed conflict	104
Illicit crops	109
Capacity development	333
Community empowerment	201
Negative experiences	649
Positive experiences	1093
Income generation	52
Indicators	73
Environment	80
Ethnic minorities	56
Productivity	217
Selection of beneficiaries	158
Financial services	66
Sustainability	277
Codes for the infrastructure observations and questionnaires (48 records)	
Support from municipal or other government institution	39
Community quality of life	36
How the work is maintained	34
Community participation in design	35
Armed group opposition to the works	36
Community participation in construction	35
Utility of the work for the community	38
Community participation in management	38
Time in execution	36

The following two graphics show the relationships between these codes in the dataset.

Graphic 1. Code relationships, interviews and focus groups



Graphic 2. Code relationships, infrastructure observations and questionnaires



The final list of codes is that of the master groups by which all interviews, focus groups, and other documents are classified, called Families. The list shows the list of families, along with the number of primary documents (e.g., interviews, etc.) are classified in each, the number of codes assigned to that family of documents, and the total number of citations.

Family	**Primary documents**	**Codes assigned**	**Total citations**
Social sector	7	14	47
Fish sector	8	15	56
Condiments sector	3	15	46
Palmitos sector	2	12	26
Palm sector	6	15	76
Dairy sector	15	14	117
Fruit sector	1	11	12
Rubber sector	7	15	74
Coffee sector	9	16	110
Cacao sector	7	16	82
Apiary sector	2	11	21
Avocado sector	3	15	27
Mixed sectors (multi-crop)	12	16	147
Regional authorities	5	15	98
MIDAS activities	65	16	747
Microcredit	4	6	17
SMEs	16	16	218
Agribusiness	16	16	194
Forestry	7	15	86
ADAM activities	86	16	776
Productive projects	6	16	107
Infrastructure	44	24	411
Second-level organizations	10	15	119
Indigenous groups	12	16	99
Displaced people	10	20	75
Afro-Colombian people	8	24	196

Annex X: Selected bibliography of M&E in complex environments

Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, *Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven, Iterative Adaptation (PDIA),* Center for International Development, Harvard University, 2012.

Barder, Owen, *Complexity, Adaptation and Results,* Global Development: Views from the Center (Center for Global Development blog series), September 2012

Cox, Marcus and Nigel Thornton, *Managing results in conflict-affected and fragile state: a stock-take of lessons, experience and practice,* http://www.agulhas.co.uk/Publications_Fragile_States.html

DFID UK Stabilisation Unit, *Integrated Planning and M&E in Stabilisation Contexts,* Coffey International Development, Ltd., February 2012

DFID UK, *Measuring and managing for results in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations,* Interim Guidance Note, undated, at http://www.agulhas.co.uk/cms_files/14/InterimGuidanceNote-Managing_results_in_conflict-affected_and_fragile_states_a_stock-takeoflessonsexperienceandpractice.pdf

Hughes, Karl and Claire Hutchings, *Rigour without randomization*, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation working paper #13, New Delhi, 2011

Porter, James, *UK Collaborative on Development Sciences Report: Complexity Science and International Development,* University of Warwick, undated

Pritchett, Lant and Justin Sandefur, *Context Matters for Size: Why External Validity Claims and Development Practice Don't Mix,* Center for Global Development working paper 336, August 2013.

Pritchett, Lant, Salimah Samji, and Jeffrey Hammer, *It's all about MeE: Using Structured Experiential Learning ("e") to Crawl the Design Space*, Center for Global Development working paper 322, April, 2013

Rist, Ray C., Marie-Helene Boily, Frederick R. Martin, editors, *Development Evaluation in Times of Turbulence: Dealing with crises that endanger our future,* The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2013

USAID Discussion Note, *Complexity-Aware Monitoring,* Monitoring and Evaluation Series, December 2013.

Van Ongevalle, Jan and Huib Huyse, Cristien Temmink, Eugenia Boutylkova, Anneke Maarse, *Dealing with complexity through 'Actor-focused' Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation,* PSO Thematic Learning Programme on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation of Complex Processes of Social Change, Netherlands, November, 2012

Woolcock, Michael, *Using case studies to explore the external validity of 'complex' development interventions*, Evaluation 19(3) pp 229–248.

The World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Complex Systems, *Perspectives on a Hyperconnected World: New Tools for New Perspectives,* January, 2013

Annex XI: Evaluation Statement of Work

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
USAID/COLOMBIA

Statement of Work
Post-completion evaluation of aspects of the ADAM and MIDAS programs, 2004-2010

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Program backgrounds

ADAM Program Identification Data	
Program title	Areas for Municipal Level Alternative Development Program (ADAM)
Award number	514-C-00-06-00-300-00
Award dates	October 2005 to October 2011 (including extension)
Funding	US $189,000,000
Implementer	ARD, Inc.

MIDAS Program Identification Data	
Program title	More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS)
Award number	514-C-00-06-00301-00
Award dates	October 2006 to October 2011 (including extension)
Funding	US $180,000,000
Implementer	ARD, Inc.

The Government of the United States of America through its Agency for International Development (USAID) created two major programs in Colombia to improve conditions for rural citizens in productive projects, community participation, public policy development and strengthening municipal governments, among other themes. Many Colombian organizations worked in partnership with the programs to extend the influence of programming, ensure relevance, and work toward sustainability.

The programs were complex and multi-faceted, attempting to affect social and economic behaviors at very local, municipal, and national levels. In addition, the programs operated in challenging environments where illicit productive activities, population displacement, violence and environmental change were potential, if not always active, threats. Through the range of partnerships and alliances, among other means, the programs worked to establish sustainable economic and social development through the varied interventions.

II. EVALUATION RATIONALE

1. Evaluation purpose

USAID/Colombia requests an independent external evaluation of the sustainability of targeted themes within the ADAM and MIDAS efforts two years post-completion. The evaluation is designed to inform future Mission strategy and project design. The ADAM and MIDAS evaluation will help the Mission to better understand what has worked, what has not worked, and what has been sustained, through documentation of lessons learned and "sustainability stories" from among the activities.

2. Audiences and intended uses

The key intended audiences of the final evaluation report will be:

- USAID/Colombia Mission Front Office, Technical Offices, and Program Office
- Implementing partners, at both prime and sub levels

Two guiding principles have been set for uses of the evaluation, as follows:

(1) Identify best practices and lessons learned that can be taken from ADAM and MIDAS to inform USAID/Colombia's CDCS implementation, including new PAD development and new activity design.

(2) Document and describe cases (e.g., success stories[23]) where methodologies, processes, capacities, public-private partnerships and infrastructure set in motion by the projects have been successful and sustainable.

The evaluation is proposed as a way to capture and disseminate lessons learned on key themes (described in detail below) in different sectors, as well as cross-cutting themes. Importantly, the main use of the evaluation findings will be to incorporate these lessons learned and best practices into program design in alignment with the new Mission CDCS, expected to be finalized in early 2014. In this way, the evaluation will be used to support evidence-based activity design and development.

3. Research questions

The themes selected for the evaluation have been identified through a series of participatory meetings within the Mission through a process that began with the document entitled "SOW Themes" provided at Annex A [to the SOW, copied below.] The Mission called upon a support contract (EVAL: Evaluation and Analysis for Learning) to conduct a review of key ADAM and MIDAS reports, PMPs, work plans and other documents.

In this review, EVAL catalogued major activity categories from the two programs and rated these on two scales. The first scale was the likelihood of discovering project components or activities that had been sustained. The second was the relevance of the activity category to the draft Mission CDCS. These scores were coded and the most relevant, most likely sustained activity categories were presented to USAID for their review and comment. The revised document provided the basis for a detailed internal USAID discussion on the proposed contents of this statement of work.

Rather than respond to specific evaluation questions, the evaluation will pursue a set of activities within the two guiding principles presented above. The product of the discussions, document review, and analysis has led to the Activity Sets in Table 1. Methods to be used are presented by Activity Set, and will be described in detail in the Methods section that follows.

Table 1. Activities to be evaluated, and methods proposed

	Activity set	Proposed methods
1	Agricultural activities (ADAM Outcome 2)	Focus groups; review of value chains
2	Community participation (ADAM Outcome 3)	Focus groups; field documentation; service provision reviews; infrastructure observations
3	Municipal strengthening (ADAM Outcome 6)[24]	Focus groups; review of plans and evidence of their use in practice
4	Productive activities (MIDAS Outcome 1)	Focus groups; review of value chains
5	Alliances (MIDAS Outcome 3)	Interviews with alliance participants

[23] In addition to a number of case studies that will be completed as part of this evaluation, USAID seeks the documentation of at least two "sector-wide success stories," if the team encounters experiences that would qualify as such. These success stories would not be limited to individuals, or even community groups or businesses; rather they should document cases where USAID's investments have had a significant influence on a broad productive sector in Colombia (e.g., USAID's influence on the cacao sector, dairy sector, or others through the ADAM and MIDAS projects).

[24] To the extent practical, findings from this research area will feed into the likely upcoming EVAL Assessment of "Intermittent central-departmental-municipal operations."

Annex A includes a more elaborated description of the activities and the methods. As part of its internal deliberations, USAID also provided a list of areas of inquiry that EVAL might consider as they relate to these activities and themes. In general terms, the list of areas of inquiry corresponds to the guiding principles for the intended use of the evaluation findings, as noted in Section II.2 of this SOW: on the one hand, best practices and lessons learned, and on the other, case studies that will include sufficient detail as an evidence base for future program design. Table 2 details what the Mission hopes to learn from the evaluation by aligning those sub-questions with the Areas of Inquiry.

Table 2. Crosswalk of activities and areas of inquiry

Activity set	Areas of inquiry
Agricultural activities (ADAM Outcome 2) Productive activities (MIDAS Outcome 1)	Which approaches implemented by ADAM and MIDAS seemed to result in the greatest success in terms of… 1. Promoting more effective producer associations and competitive rural enterprises that benefit smallholder farmers? 2. Promoting increased access to financial services, particularly in the rural sector? 3. Expanding economic infrastructure and connectivity? 4. Improving community management of natural resources? *To inform design of CDCS DO3: Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*
Community participation (ADAM Outcome 3)	1. What community participation approaches were used by ADAM and MIDAS? 2. Which aspects of these approaches appear to have led to sustainable foundations for joint management of future activities in these communities? 3. What differentiated community participation approaches were implemented for Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, and/or for men and women? 4. Were successful approaches for community participation linked to specific technical areas, or were approaches successful *across* technical areas? 5. What success factors can be identified? *To inform design of IRs 3.1, 3.2, & 3.3; IRs 4.1, 4.2 & 4.3; and perhaps IRs 1.2, 2.2 and 2.3*
Municipal strengthening (ADAM Outcome 6)	1. Which approaches implemented by ADAM seemed to result in the greatest success in terms of strengthening municipal governments and their ability to more effectively and transparently deliver citizen-prioritized services? 2. What were some of the keys to success and lessons learned from these activities and their work with municipal governments? *To inform design of CDCS DO1: Effective presence of democratic institutions and processes in targeted areas*
Alliances (MIDAS Outcome 3)	1. Case studies of MIDAS public-private partnerships that have been sustained, with details on lessons learned and best practices.[25] 2. Documentation of a set of successful and ongoing public-private partnerships (PPPs) that were initiated as a result of ADAM and MIDAS.[26] *To inform design of CDCS DO3: Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth*

In addition, USAID notes that the Policy component of MIDAS, while not expressly included in the evaluation themes and subquestions in this section, may be investigated peripherally, as its activities at times impacted the success of the other MIDAS interventions.

USAID's list is provided in its entirety in Annex B. Given the extensive nature of the questions, these are construed by EVAL to be "sub-questions" that will guide the exploration of Areas of Inquiry, rather than questions that will require specific responses in the evaluation report. EVAL will consider these questions, as applicable, to respond

[25] These case studies will comprise up to six of the 16 that are programmed for the evaluation.
[26] The set of PPPs that will be documented for the ADAM/MIDAS evaluation will come from among those with which the evaluation team interacts in fieldwork. Products of this analysis will feed into the simultaneous EVAL PPP assessment.

comprehensively and inclusively to the two guiding principles for the intended use of the evaluation findings, as presented in Section II.2 above.

III. EVALUATION DESIGN

1. Design

EVAL will conduct a post-completion evaluation of aspects of the ADAM and MIDAS programs. A mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach will be used to examine a set of key activities from multiple angles. The main data sources will be program stakeholders – direct beneficiaries (project or activity participants – men, women and, as applicable, youth of both sexes), implementing partners, USAID staff, and government actors, particularly at the municipal level.

2. Data collection methods

Table 3 summarizes the expected methods in advance of the detailed Team Planning Meetings. Specific numbers may be rearranged based on the sample selection discussed below. Any resultant net changes to the budget would be discussed with USAID before proceeding.

Table 3. Proposed methods and number of units

Method	Detailed approach	ADAM	MIDAS
Document review	Review of mid-term and final evaluation reports, and program final report	2	3
	Catalogue and discussion of activities for inclusion in the sample	1	1
	Policy review of those policies selected for inclusion	0	3
	Review of municipal and community plans, budgets, execution and oversight documents	4	0
In-depth (key informant) interviews	Key implementing staff, by organization	2	2
	USAID staff – past CORs	2	2
	Alliance partners on public and private sides of the alliances	0	12
	National government officials	3	3
	Regional government officials	4	4
	Municipal government officials	8	0
Focus groups	Beneficiary farmers in productive projects: job seekers, farmers, farmers' organizations, forestry groups	4	4
	Beneficiary small business owners	0	4
	Beneficiary job seekers	0	4
	Beneficiary foresters from ethnic groups	4	4
	Producer associations or "ejecutores" (sub-implementers)	0	4
	Community and CSO groups involved in planning and municipal development, including women's, youth and ethnic organizations	6	0
Case studies	Case studies – approx. five pages documenting the intervention and what has been sustained (including contribution to the value chain since project end). Thematic and geographic distribution. Given the focus on sustainability, these will likely be concentrated on group units of analyses, such as farmer organizations, municipalities, and CSOs.	6	10[27]
Infrastructure observations	Quantitative/Qualitative checklist of variables on access, use, quality and contribution to sustainability targets	10	0
Business	Phone interviews with the full database of businesses created –	0	5000

[27] The greater number of case studies under MIDAS reflects the overlap with EVAL's parallel assessment of PPPs, and allows for the greater time and effort in data collection to pursue a sufficient number of case studies of PPPs while taking advantage of the team's presence in the field.

Method	Detailed approach	ADAM	MIDAS
Census	variables on job creation, value chain, municipal support, sustainability (expect to reach ½ of target number)		
Field visits	Expert visits to sites meeting sample requisites (below) to undertake the above methods	4-6	4-6
	Review of social service provision		
	Review of production and value chains		
	Review of in-practice use of plans accorded with CSOs		0
	Review of policies/reforms and their use in practice in target municipalities	0	4-6

Annex C includes detail on each of the methods to be used, and how they will be used in analysis.

3. Sample selection

Sampling for the evaluation will be done at the level of geographic sites, in order to select municipalities or other areas with concentrations of ADAM or MIDAS activities. This convenience sample is efficient in terms of time and cost. It is preferable to other sample selection types because the focus of the evaluation is a review of approaches and models, and their sustainability, rather than a costly and challenging impact evaluation of the total areas of each of the two very large programs. As such, this evaluation is not designed or sampled with the intention of determining statistical causality.

The sample of sites to be visited in the field will be determined prior to fieldwork, using inputs from EVAL interviews with locally-available USAID and implementing partner staff that were key to the efforts of ADAM and MIDAS. In addition to detailed discussions of design, implementation and management, these respondents will be asked for their geo-referenced recommendations on activities that are likely to have been sustained, that warrant analysis, or that they perceive to provide useful lessons for upcoming USAID strategy. Activities with gender focus will be also part of sample deliberations, to ensure that across the visits, participation included women, men, and youth of both sexes.

The evaluation team will assemble these recommendations, and others drawn from their document review and their own experiences and knowledge of ADAM and MIDAS, to create a list of possible sites to be visited. Between eight and twelve sites are proposed for the evaluation, across the geographies in which the programs operated, as displayed in Table 4. The sites selected must include those with concentrations of the activities under study, in order to maximize the data availability. To be included in the list for selection, a site must meet the requisites in Table 4.

Table 4. Sample requisites

ADAM	MIDAS
• Agricultural productivity projects with available individuals and/or associative groups. • A range of project sectors and types • Municipal strengthening in finance, administration, communications, and/or resource management • Community training in municipal government planning and infrastructure, across methods/partners employed	• Productive activities with agricultural, forestry and other businesses, commercialization and marketing, and access to credit. • A range of project sectors and types • Alliances, including production and value chain development projects, forestry plantations, and work with small farmer groups • Community mobilization activities, as applicable, across methods/partners employed

Gender: Sites chosen for the sample must have had programming directed at women or women and men, and where applicable, databases for those projects must have at least 30% women's participation to be included in the evaluation.

Logistics: To maximize data collection and minimize transportation costs, the sample selection will include the criteria of accessibility, co-location or nearby location, and security

Sample size: Four to six sites will be chosen, depending on program densities in the sites

In addition to the fieldwork in departments sampled outside Bogotá, the evaluation team will interview four individuals who worked on policies. MIDAS focused on a number of policy clusters, including financial and fiscal reform, microfinance, labor market reform, land markets, agriculture, forestry and environmental policy, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, alternative development, victims, and the articulation of national, regional and municipal governments. This SOW and budget presume that **three of these sectors** are selected for the study, from the same interview and team process that works to select the sites to be visited.

IV. EVALUATION PRODUCTS

A. Deliverables

The Start Date – providing EVAL with sufficient time to recruit the team, arrange contracts, and prepare for the start – will be agreed upon once a final SOW is approved by USAID. Team member profiles and/or CVs will be provided to USAID prior to the Start Date.

Table 5. Evaluation deliverables

DELIVERABLE	DESCRIPTION	DATE
Work plan	Detailed work plan that indicates evaluation activities. The work plan will be submitted to the EVAL COR at USAID/Colombia for approval.	7 days after TPM
Evaluation design	A written evaluation design and operational work plan will be prepared and submitted to USAID for review prior to fieldwork.	14 days after TPM (subject to availability for interviews with USAID and implementers)
Data collection and analysis tools	All draft instruments and the analysis plan will be prepared and submitted to USAID for review prior to fieldwork.	28 days after TPM
Field data collection	Weekly electronic reports of the data collection progress made covering key scheduled activities, completion status, constraints identified with approaches to address constraints.	Throughout field work
First draft report	Rough draft of the report submitted to the USAID COR, who will provide preliminary comments – one unified document from whatever sources are required within USAID – to facilitate preparation of the debriefing.	60 work days after TPM; this may be extended around the holidays
Debriefing with USAID	EVAL will present the evaluation findings to USAID through a presentation and discussion of findings, conclusions and recommendations. The team will consider USAID comments and revise the draft report, as appropriate.	Ten work days after submission of draft
Final report	Final report including issues identified by USAID during the debriefing. As part of the final submission, quantitative data will be delivered in SPSS and Excel formats, and qualitative data will be shared in secure hard copies (encoded disks) to maintain respondents' confidentiality.	Seven work days after receipt of final comments from USAID

B. Reporting Guidelines

The format for the Evaluation Report is as follows:

- Executive Summary—most salient findings and recommendations, concisely stated (2 pages)
- Introduction—purpose, audience, and synopsis of task (1 page)
- Background—brief overview of the programs, and purpose of the evaluation (2 pages)
- Design—data collection methods, including limitations and gaps (2 pages)

- Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations— (17–20 pages)
- Issues—list of key technical and/or administrative concerns, if any (1–2 pages)
- References---including bibliography and other references as appropriate (as needed; not included in page count)
- Annexes—methods, schedules, interview lists and tables will be succinct, pertinent and readable. Final case study reports will be included in annexes. The evaluation SOW and instruments will be in the annexes, per the 2011 Evaluation Policy. The final version of the evaluation report will be submitted to USAID/Colombia in both hard copy and electronic formats.
- Quantitative and qualitative data files will be included in electronic annexes, to the extent this can be done without revealing confidential identifying information. (As needed)

The report will not exceed 40 pages, excluding table of contents, acronyms list, executive summary, references and annexes. This format is consistent with the 2011 USAID Evaluation Policy.

V. EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

A. Team composition

The evaluation will be carried out by a high-level team of social science researchers, with sector-specific experience in the key evaluation themes. They will work together in Bogotá at the start of the project to ensure inter-rater reliability and shared criteria, to interview USAID and implementing partners, to develop the list of sites and case studies, and to elaborate the evaluation design and instruments.

A Team Leader will direct the evaluation fieldwork, with support from Bogotá- and locally-based field researchers. Field teams will include local interviewers that share language and culture with the respondents, including women.[28] Logistics will be covered by the supervisory stratum of the field team and back-stopped from Bogotá. While fieldwork is underway in four to six sites for each of the two programs, a Bogotá-based team will conduct the business surveys by telephone, using project contact databases. A native-English speaking editor will support the technical writing. The following table shows the detail for the team member roles expected:

POSITION	QUALIFICATION
Team Leader	• Advanced degree in relevant field and minimum of 5 years of related experience, or M.A. and 10 years of experience • Significant professional experience in detailed mixed-methods evaluation research and analysis
Three Field Coordinators	• Five years of related experience • Range of disciplines to cover value chain, microfinance, community mobilization and municipal strengthening • Significant field experience in Colombia, particularly in qualitative (focus group, interview, case study) data collection
Field guides	As necessary, to gain entry to indigenous, Afro-Colombian or other harder-to-reach populations, local field guides to support neutral entry into communities
Quantitative phone surveyors	Training and experience in quantitative data collection, including telephone surveying
Quantitative analyst	Experience in preparation, processing, analysis of quantitative data analysis using quantitative software with small-n surveys
Qualitative research lead	Extensive experience in designing, coding and analysis of interviews, focus groups, case studies and other qualitative data from the field
Qualitative	Experienced data entry team members to conduct data editing, entry and cleaning on

[28] Every effort will be made to hire local women and men as interviewers ("field data collectors") to facilitate entry to communities as well as the establish rapport with respondents.

coders – data entry team	survey data from the field
American technical editor	Extensive experience in writing technical reports in American English for donor audiences

B. Common evaluation targets with the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) evaluation

The evaluation will assume the fieldwork, analysis and related costs of four case studies related to public-private partnerships (PPPs) undertaken through MIDAS. This work will be incorporated into the PPP assessment also underway through EVAL. Since the ADAM-MIDAS team is expected to be in the field at approximately the same time, this design would avoid duplication of effort and provide field inputs that otherwise would be too costly for the PPP assessment to assume.

The PPP assessment team will be invited to the ADAM-MIDAS team planning meeting session that corresponds to case studies, so that they can provide input on the case study design and case selection that the ADAM-MIDAS team will carry out in the field. Following fieldwork, the teams will coordinate on the delivery of the case study data, findings and analysis. Each team will include the PPP case studies in their reporting, with the bulk of the case study content in annexes but with key findings, conclusions and recommendations in the report text, as appropriate for answering the research questions of each study.

C. Logistics

EVAL will hold a set of Team Planning Meetings at the outset, to guide the multi-faceted tasks of the first phase of the evaluation, to build team consistency, and to plan the evaluation. The first steps will include document review and initial interviews with USAID and implementing partner key personnel. The evaluation team will work with USAID to arrange these and any other initial meetings in Bogotá, as well as the hand-over of implementer databases to facilitate site selection and construction of the business survey universe.

EVAL will direct the evaluation's logistics in Bogotá and the field sites. The EVAL Team will be responsible for arranging all the transportation for fieldwork, and will monitor security issues and threats closely before and during field work.

The business survey instrument will be piloted with a small selection of businesses in similar national areas. Results from that pilot will inform the final instrument design.

The field teams will each be led by an experienced field researcher. Communications will be maintained daily with each of the teams in the field, to ensure that challenges or difficulties are quickly resolved.

D. Analysis

Management of analyses will be based on the detailed analysis plan set forth in the final evaluation design, and led by the evaluation Team Leader.

[Provide contact information on the back cover. This can be USAID headquarter information, or specific to the USAID mission or operating unit that commissioned the report.]

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